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V- 


A   SYSTEM 


OF 


MORAL    SCIENCE 


BY 


LAURENS  P.   HICKOK,   D.D.,  LL.D. 


REVISED 
WITH  THE  CO-OPERATION   OF 

JULIUS   H.  SEELYE,  D.D.,  LL.D., 

PRESIDENT   OF   AMHERST   COLLEGE. 


BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED   BY   GINN   &   COMPANY. 

1886. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1880,  by 
LAURENS  P.  HICROK, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Press  of  Berwick  &>  Smith,  iiS  Purchase  Street. 


3T  A- 

lOO\ 


PREFACE. 


SCIENCE  subjects'  all  the  facts  it  uses  to  a  controlling 
law,  and  by  tliis  law  binds  all  its  facts  into  an  orderly 
system.  No  elements,  however  abundant,  can  become  a  phi- 
losophy without  their  determining  principle. 

Moral  Science  must  conform  to  this  condition,  and,  more- 
over, must  find  its  principle  within  the  spiritual  part  of  man's 
being.  Nature,  through  all  her  successions,  can  reach  no 
absolute  rule,  and  can  bind  relatively  only,  according  to  her 
connections  as  found  in  experience.  Her  highest  appeal  is 
to  self-interest,  and  can  never  awaken  the  feeling  of  spiritual 
worthiness.  With  such  consequences,  it  is  prudent  to  take 
such  a  direction ;  for  the  great  revolving  wheel  will  crush 
those  who  cross  its  course.  But  the  spiritual  is  the  supernat- 
ural; and  nature  must  be  for  this,  not  this  for  nature.  The 
moral  law  is  above  nature,  not  taken  from  nature.  The  vir- 
tuous man  must  say,  "  I  am  thus,  and  I  live  thus,  because  this 
only  is  worthy  of  my  spiritual  being ; "  not  at  all,  "  I  stand 
here  and  do  this,  because  otherwise  the  ongoings  of  nature 
would  torment  me." 

The  following  work  has  been  prosecuted  under  the  full  con- 
viction of  such  a  twofold  demand.     Only  expediency,  and  not 

iii 


IV  PREFACE. 

morality  can  be,  if  the  ultimate  rule  of  life  be  taken  from 
natural  consequences,  and  not  from  spiritual  imperatives ;  and 
with  such  spiritual  rule  there  cannot  even  then  be  science, 
and  in  this  a  system  of  morals,  unless  all  the  elements  used 
are  boimd  up  in  it.  But  while  the  steady  design  has  been  to 
attain  and  keep  prominent  the  spiritual  principle,  and  also  ro 
combine  all  the  parts  in  this  principle,  there  has  been  no 
anxiety  to  exlaaust  all  the  facts  which  belong  to  the  field  of 
morals,  nor  is  there  the  pretension  that  even  all  the  important 
facts  have  been  here  gathered  and  classified.  A  wide  occasion 
stiU  remains  for  extending  the  application  and  circumscription 
of  the  principle,  though  it  is  with  great  confidence  assumed, 
that  the  principle  here  applied  will  be  found  adequate  to  de- 
termine every  virtue,  and  to  detect  every  vice,  and  to  give  to 
them  their  proper  arrangement  in  a  system  of  morals.  The 
science  is  incomplete,  not  in  its  principles,  but  only  in  not 
collecting  every  fact. 

Very  little  regard  has  been  paid  to  questions  of  casuistry. 
The  principle  being  given,  and  plain  instances  of  its  applica- 
tion, all  has  been  effected  that  is  profitable.  To  take  com- 
plicated cases,  and  resolve  doubts  whether  such  ambiguous 
facts  come  within  the  principle,  would  give  little  instruction  of 
general  use.  Ninety-nine  such  cases  of  doubt  might  be  cor- 
rectly solved,  and  yet  the  hundredth  would  have  its  own 
peculiarities  not  at  all  touched  in  any  former  solution.  The 
good  sense  of  every  man  must  do  this  work  for  him  as  best 
it  may,  by  his  own  application  of  the  principle  to  the  case, 
and  not  by  any  rules  which  can  be  taught  him,  and  which  he 
may  lay  up  in  memory  for  use  on  common  occasions.    With- 


PREFACE.  V 

out  the  wit  to  apply,  the  rules  would  be  wholly  useless ;  and 
with  that,  the  man  will  do  very  well  without  any  scholastic 
rules.  He  will  ordinarily  solve  the  original  doubt  easier  than 
he  can  settle  just  what  other  cases  are  like  the  present. 

This  System  of  Moral  Science  is  designed  as  a  Text-Book 
for  College  study.  The  aim  has  been  to  make  it  as  concise  as 
clearness  would  admit ;  and  this  has  been  connected  with  the  full 
persuasion  that  no  labor  of  the  teacher  can  give  to  the  student 
a  dispensation  from  close  thought  and  hard  study,  if  he  would 
attain  to  any  adequate  apprehension  of  the  groundwork  of 
moral  science,  and  comprehend  the  completeness  of  the  sys- 
tem. The  kindness  of  Dr.  Tayler  Lewis  is  gratefully  acknowl- 
edged for  important  suggestions  made  in  the  process  of  its 
preparation.  It  is  published  in  the  belief  that  something  like 
it  is  greatly  needed. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  REVISED  EDITION. 


SUCH  was  the  Preface  to  the  first  Edition  of  the  Moral  Sci- 
ence, in  its  original  form,  and  it  is  put  here  in  its  present 
connection  as  appropriately  as  it  was  then.  A  quarter  of  a 
century  has  since  passed,  within  which  the  System  of  Mora] 
Science  has  been  widely  taught  and  studied,  and  its  use  con- 
tinues still  undiminished.  There  occurs,  however,  good  occa- 
sion for  a  revision  of  the  work,  making  some  additions  to  it, 
transpositions  of  some  parts,  and  giving  to  others  a  clearer 
mode  of  expression.  The  ultimate  Rule  of  right  has  been 
deemed  obscure  to  some,  and  thought  to  involve  a  self-contra- 
diction by  others,  but  it  is  now  so  presented  as  scarcely  to 
admit  of  partial  or  mistaken  apprehension.  There  has  been  a 
more  complete  consideration  of  the  general  questions  of  the 
state  and  of  state  authority,  with  more  particular  reference  to 
punishment,  property,  taxation,  representation,  religion,  and 
education ;  and  the  claims  of  morahty  in  such  matters  have 
been  more  explicitly  stated  and  applied.  Old  and  New  Tes- 
tament views  of  domestic  slavery  have  been  put  in  connection 
with  what  reason  teaches,  and  as  the  institution  is  now  abol- 
ished in  our  Government,  the  whole  may  the  more  effectually 
minister  to  Universal  Emancipation.  With  these  considerable 
alterations,  the  still  unchanged  principle  runs  through  and 
unites  the  whole  work  as  before,  and  thus  with  a  different 
Book  there  yet  is  not  a  different  System  of  Moral  Science. 

Amherst,  Mass.,  1879. 

vi 


CONTENTS. 


— ♦— 

PAGE. 

INTRODUCTION.    The  Special  Province  of  Moral  Science  .   .  13 
CHAP.  I.       Different   Theories    of    the  Ultimate   Rule   in 

Morals 23 

CHAP.  II.     The  Ultimate  Rule  of  Right 30 

CHAP.  III.    The  Essential  Attributes  of  the  ultimate  Right  32 

CHAP.  IV.    General  Method 38 


FIRST  PART. 

PURE    MORALITY. 

I.  The  Essence  of  all  Virtue 41 

II.  There  are  many  Particular  Virtues 43 

I.    DUTIES   TO   MANKIND. 

CHAP.  I.     I.  Personal  Duties.    Self-control 45 

General  Maxim.    Bear  and  Forbear.  ., 

Particular  Maxims. 

1.  Do  thyself  no  hartn 46 

1.  Maiming 46 

2.  Self-torture .    .    .    .  47 

3.  Suicide 4^ 

4.  Self-defence 4^ 

2.  Keep  your  body  under 49 

1.  Intemperance 5° 

2.  Licentiousness 5' 

3.  Ambition 52 

4.  Covetousness 5^ 

vii 


VUl  CONTENTS 

PAGE. 

3.  Rule  your  oiun  spirit 53 

I.  Senility 54 

2-  Vanity 55 

3.  Jealousy 56 

4.  False  Honor 57 

5.  Gambling 58 

CHAP.  II.      I.  Personal  Duties.     Self-culture 58 

General  Maxim.     Secure  a  complete  self-development. 
Particular  Maxims. 

1.  Grow  in  Stature 59 

1.  Diet 60 

2.  Dress • 61 

3.  Exercise 62 

4.  Cleanliness 63 

2.  Gro-u  in  Practical  Knowledge 63 

1.  Stupidity 65 

2.  Heedlessness 66 

3.  Rashness 67 

4.  Credulity 67 

5.  Skepticism 68 

6.  Destiny 68 

3.  Grow  in  Rational  Wisdotn 69 

1.  Taste 70 

2.  Science 70 

3.  Morality 71 

CHAP.  HI.     II.  Relative  Duties.    Kindness 72 

General  Maxim.   Do  good  to  all  men  as  ye  have  opportunity. 
Particular  Maxims. 

1.  Owe  no  man  any  thing 73 

1.  Honesty 74 

2.  Reciprocity 75 

3.  Monopoly 75 

2.  Give  to  the  Poor 76 

1.  Charity 77 

2.  Obduracy 78 

3.  Sentimentality 7^ 


CONTENTS.  IX 

PAGE. 

3.  Be  ye  thankful 79 

1.  Gratitude  • 80 

2.  Insolence 80 

3.  Peevishness 81 

CHAP.  IV.     II.  Rel.\tive  Duties.     Respect 82 

General  Maxim.     Honor  all  men. 
Particular  Maxims. 

1.  Be  ye  courteous 83 

1.  Arrogance 84 

2.  Scorn 84 

3.  Ridicule 85 

4.  Vulgarity 86 

2.  Deal  justly  with  all  men 87 

1.  Assaulting 88 

2.  Defrauding 88 

3-  Lying 89 

3.  Sustain  thy  7ieighbor''s  good  name 90 

1.  Slander „    .  91 

2.  Libel 92 

3.  Censoriousness 93 

4.  Be  obedient  to  Government 94 

1.  Subjection 9^ 

2.  Tribute 96 

3.  Service 96 

II.     DUTIES   TO    OTHER   THAN    MANKIND. 

CHAP.  V.     I.  Duties  to  Nature 97 

General  Maxim.     Use  but  not  abuse  nature. 
Particular  Maxims. 

1.  AW  wantonly  to  mar  nature 98 

2.  Convert  nature  to  thy  use 99 

3.  Beautify  and  perfect  nature 99 

4.  Explore  nature  scientifically lOO 

5.  Use  nature  as  a  discipline  in  virtue lOO 


X  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

CHAP.  VI.     II.  Duties  to  God loi 

General  Maxim.    "  Worship  God." 
Particular  virtues. 

1.  JReverence I02 

2.  Godly  Fear 103 

3.  Humility 104 


SECOND  PART. 

POSITIVE    AUTHORITY. 

I.  Occasion  for  Positive  Authority 107 

II.  Peculiarity  of  Authority .    109 


FIRST    DIVISION. 

CIVIL    GOVERNMENT. 

CHAP.  I.  The  State in 

CHAP.  II.        The  State  requires  a  government 115 

CHAP.  III.       The  rectitude  of  State  authority i2i 

I.  The  point  in  which  sovereignty  should  be 

PLACED 121 

CHAP.  IV.        II.  The  lines  within  which  sovereignty  should 

ACT 125 

CHAP.  V.         Rewards  and  punishments 130 

1.  The  meaning  and  ground  of  punishment    ....  130 

2.  The  righteousness  of  punishment 132 

3.  The  degree  of  punishment 133 

CHAP.  VI.       The  position   of  the  citizen  in  reference  to 

the  Government 137 

1.  In  some  respects  beyond  civil  interference    ...  137 

2.  No  right  to  evade  civil  law 140 

3.  No  right  to  sympathy  against  law 141 

4.  The  citizen  can  stand  on  mere  legality 141 

5.  The  citizen  may  righteously  expatriate  himself  .    .  143 

6.  Merit  or  demerit  is  as  the  sanction  of  law  ....  144 


CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGE. 

CHAP.  VII.     The  position  of  the  Government  in  reference 

TO   THE   citizen I46 

The  Government  can  be  satisfied  with  nothing  but  obedience  to 

its  laws 147 

Sec.  I.           Judicial  Oaths 148 

Sec.  II.          Property 155 

Sec.  III.       Taxes  and  Imposts 160 

Sec.  IV.        Representation 163 

Sec.  V.          Religion 163 

Sec.  VI.        Education 166 

Sec.  VII.      Internal  Improvement 170 

Sec.  VIII.     Commerce 171 

Sec.  IX.        Postal  Arrangements 173 

Sec.  X.          Prohibitory  Laws 173 

Sec.  XI.        Sumptuary,  Sanitary,  and  Poor  Laws .    .  175 

Sec.  XII.      Weights,  Measures,  Currency,  Interest  .  177 

Sec.  XIII.     Revolution i8i 

CHAP.  VIII.    The  position  of  a  State  in  reference  to  others  184 

1.  The  Sovereignty  of  each  State  is  independent     ...  184 

2.  International  regulations  rest  on  Pure  Morality   .    .  185 

Sec.  I.          Comity  of  Nations 187 

Sec.  II.        Treaties 188 

Sec.  III.      Alliances 190 

Sec.  IV.       Confederations 190 

Sec.  V.        Republics  _ 192 

Sec.  VI.       War 195 

Sec.  VII.     A  Congress  of  Nations 197 


SECOND    DIVISION, 

DIVINE      GOVERNMENT. 

CHAP.  I.  God's  Being  and  Communion  with  Man  ....    200 

CHAP.  II.        End  of  Divine  Legislation 203 

CHAP.  III.       The  Process  of  the  Divine  Administration  in 

Justice. •   207 

CHAP.  IV.       The  Process  of  the  Divine  Administration  in 

Grace 21S 


xu 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

CHAP.  V.         Process  in  Grace  for  sustaining  authority  .   .    223 

CHAP.  VI.       Process  in  Grace  for  stronger  Influences  ro 

Loyalty 229 

CHAP,  VIL      General  Result  from  a  Gracious  Administra- 
tion   237 


THIRD    DIVISION. 

PARENTAL     GOVERNMENT. 

CHAP.  I.       The  Family 241 

CHAP.  II.      Marriage 245 

Sec.  I.       The  Authority  for  the  Marriage  Institution  .  248 

Sec.  II.      Breach  of  Marriage  Promise 249 

Sec.  III.    Polygamy 250 

Sec.  IV.    Incest 251 

Sec.  V.      Divorce 253 

CHAP.  III.    Duties  of  Parents 256 

CHAP.  IV.     Duties  of  Children 264 

CHAP.  V.      Duties  of  Brothers  and  Sisters 267 

CHAP.  VI.     Duties  of  Servants 272 

Sec.  I.      Vohmtary  Servitude 272 

Sec.  II.    Involuntary  Servitude 274 

1 .  The  Nature  of  Domestic  Slavery 276 

2.  Righteous  Domestic  Slavery 277 

3.  Unrighteous  Domestic  Slavery 28 1 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  SPECIFIC   GROUND  OF  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

MOR-\L  SCIENCE  must  be  preceded  by  a  familiarity 
with  Mental  Science.  Without  an  accurate  and  some- 
what profound  knowledge  of  the  human  mind,  there  will  be 
no  clear  discernment  of  the  ground  on  which  a  system  of 
morals  can  rest,  and  thus  no  attainment  of  any  stability  for 
the  attempted  science.  Let  us,  therefore,  as  a  direct  and  in- 
telligent introduction  to  the  field  we  are  now  to  explore,  gain 
a  clear  apprehension  of  some  of  the  foundation  facts  in  mental 
philosophy. 

ISIan  is  compounded  of  the  animal  and  the  rational  being. 
These  are  so  intimately  blended,  that  they  together  make  one 
existing  man,  yet  the  animal  can  always  be  distinguished  from 
the  rational  being,  and  each  can  be  apprehended  in  its  own 
peculiar  operation  without  any  confusion. 

The  animal  part  of  human  nature  finds  the  end  of  its 
activity  in  the  gratification  of  its  constitutional  appetites,  as 
is  evident  from  the  fact  that  it  rests  in  the  attainment  of  such 
gratification  until  some  new  craving  of  nature  returns.  'I'he 
appetites  may  be  originally  of  greater  or  less  variety,  and 
may  be  more  or  less  refined  by  cultivation ;  but,  in  every 
case  the  end  of  animal  appetite  is  the  same.  Happiness  is 
its  highest  law,  and  whether  the  life  be  mortal  or  immortal, 
it  is  the  life  of  the  brute  only. 

The  rational  part  of  man's  being  owns  quite  a  different  law 

13 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

and  finds  quite  a  different  end.  Its  impulses  are  no  prompt- 
ings of  an  appetite,  but  the  urgency  of  a  requirement.  The 
animal  is  impelled  by  a  craving,  the  rational  is  inspired  by  a 
claim.  The  difference  between  these  two  is  very  broad.  A 
craving  is  always  going  out  towards  something  it  can  get ;  a 
claim  is  ever  rising  towards  something  it  can  give,  or  can  be. 
A  craving  seeks  a  self-gratification ;  a  claim  requires  a  self- 
surrender,  perhaps  a  self-sacrifice.  The  self  which  the  crav- 
ing seeks  is  not  found,  but  is  lost  in  the  very  process  of  its 
seeking ;  while  the  self  which  the  claim  surrenders  is  not  lost, 
but  is  found  in  its  very  surrender.  The  animal  has  thus  no 
true  self,  and  is  incapable  of  self-possession  or  self-direc- 
tion ;  while  to  the  rational  belong  the  prerogatives  and  respon- 
sibilities of  a  free  person,  knov/ing  itself  and  determining 
itself  In  this  knowing  of  itself  is  the  knowledge  also  of 
what  is  due  to  itself,  and  thus  of  its  own  law,  —  a  law  not  laid 
upon  it  from  without  like  that  of  the  animal,  but  written 
within,  and  thus  a  self-law,  whose  authority  is  both  revealed 
and  justified  in  the  light  of  what  the  personal  self  sees  to  be 
due  to  reason  alone.  This  personal,  rational  self,  knowing 
itself,  and  thus  possessing  or  having  itself,  is  under  the  per- 
petual imperative  to  behave;  and  while  the  craving  of  the  ani- 
mal is  intermittent,  the  rational  needs  no  rest,  and  its  claim 
knows  no  cessation. 

Such  is  humanity ;  not  all  animal,  and  thus  wholly  the 
brute ;  not  all  spiritual,  and  thus  altogether  an  angel ;  but 
both  in  one,  —  spirituality  incarnate.  We  can  never  say  of 
mankind,  they  are  sense  or  spirit ;  but  must  ever  affirm, 
that  man  is  sense  and  spirit.  "The  law  in  the  members," 
and  "the  law  of  the  mind,"  are  perpetually  interworking 
through  all  humanity. 

And  now  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  ground  of  morality 
must  lie  altogether  within  the  sphere  of  man's  rational  and 
spiritual  being.     To   the   animal  nothing  can   ever  be   due. 


THE    GROUND    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE.  1 5 

No  conception  of  owing  any  thing,  or  of  that  which  ought  to 
be,  can  begin,  or  end,  except  with  what  is  rational.  The 
animal  has  no  law  save  happiness ;  but  this  law  laid  upon  the 
animal  from  without,  carries  with  it  no  explanation,  and  reveals 
no  ground  for  itself.  All  that  we  can  possibly  learn  from  its 
highest  generalizations  is  ever  how  to  satisfy  a  craving,  and 
never  how  to  fulfil  a  claim.  Why  the  animal  should  be  happy 
requires  a  farther  answer  than  that  thus  it  was  made  to  be ; 
for  to  tliis  answer  the  question,  why  it  was  thus  made,  at  once 
repeats  itself ;  and  to  this  all  the  happiness  conceivable,  or  all 
the  adaptations  thereunto  could  give  no  reply.  A  spiritual 
excellency  must  be  apprehended,  that  may  command  for  its 
own  sake,  and  find  something  due  to  itself  in  the  conscious 
right  of  its  own  intrinsic  dignity,  or  we  can  find  no  possible 
ground  for  morality. 

But  even  the  rational  spirit  of  man  is  not  all  ethical.  A 
deeper  analysis  of  the  human  mind  must  be  effected,  or  we 
shall  not  attain  to  the  province  of  pure  morality,  nor  be  able 
to  give  a  completed  science.  The  spirit  attains  other  neces- 
sary and  universal  principles  than  such  as  control  in  morals, 
and  we  must  be  able  fully  to  distinguish  each  in  its  own 
grounds,  or  it  will  not  be  possible  for  us,  as  ethical  philos- 
ophers, to  determine  our  proper  position. 

I.  Man,  as  rational,  has  the  capacity  to  apprehend  the 
necessary  and  universal  principles  which  determine  Beauty, 
and  can  thus  apply  the  rules  of  Taste  in  the  fine  arts  ;  and 
hereby  he  introduces  himself  into  the  province  of  yEsthetics. 

The  word  form  may  be  used  in  reference  to  any  thing  which 
can  be  limited  and  brought  within  definite  circumscription. 
When  only  the  limit  is  regarded,  without  respect  to  that  which 
is  limited,  it  is  known  as  pure  form.  We  may  thus  have  pure 
form  as  mere  shape  in  space,  or,  in  the  degrees  of  intensity, 
pure  form  also  as  mere  tone  in  sound.  The  blending  of 
forms  in  space  by  colors   gives   figure,  and   the   blending   of 


l6  INTRODUCTION. 

forms  in  sound  gives  tune.  We  may  thus  modify  colors 
in  outline  to  represent  any  figure,  and  modulate  tones  to 
represent  any  tune ;  and  when  only  the  form,  without  any 
regard  to  that  which  fills  it,  is  apprehended,  we  shall  have 
pure  figure  or  pure  tune. 

Now,  certain  forms  of  figure  or  of  tone  fitly  express  cer- 
tain sentiments.  We  cannot  tell  why  this  is  so.  Indeed,  the 
attempt  to  tell  it  would  be  a  palpable  absurdity,  for  we  could 
only  tell  it  in  words,  and  the  words  •themselves  are  forms. 
But  we  accept  the  truth  that  every  sentiment  has  its  expres- 
sive form  in  some  shape  or  sound  appropriate  to  itself;  and 
the  pure  form,  when  presented,  is  at  once  apprehended  as  the 
expressive  representation  of  the  living  sentiment.  And  herein 
is  determined  the  entire  sphere  of  the  Beautiful.  Not  at  all 
the  matter  contained  in  the  form,  but  the  pure  form  itself, 
which  only  the  mind's  eye  and  not  any  organ  of  the  sense  can 
apprehend,  is  the  Beautiful.  Nor  is  all  pure  form,  but  only 
such  as  gives  expression  to  some  rational  sentiment,  to  be 
apprehended  as  beauty.  The  pure  form,  which  represents 
some  emotion  of  a  living  being,  is  an  aesthetic  object ;  and  no 
form,  that  does  not  express  sentiment,  can  be  of  any  signifi- 
cancy  in  the  fine  arts.  With  this  full  comprehension,  the  only 
adequate  and  complete  definition  of  beauty  is  rational  senti- 
ment expressed  in  form.  When  the  sentiment  thus  expressed 
is  carried  up  to  an  emotion  of  the  supernatural  and  the  divine, 
the  Beauty  also  rises  and  loses  itself  in  the  Sublime. 

Here  is  the  province  of  art.  The  sculptor  gives  some 
living  expression  in  the  shaped  outline  of  the  statue ;  the 
painter  blends  his  colors  into  more  complicated  forms  upon 
the  canvas ;  the  bard  throws  his  entrancing  sounds  of  song 
upon  the  ear;  and  we  apprehend  the  Beautiful  in  them  all, 
solely  because  we  have  here  the  living  forms  in  which  beauty 
is.  Nature,  also,  in  her  thousand  shapes  and  sounds,  is  per- 
petually expressing  some  touching  sentiment,  and  thus  throw- 


THE    GROUND    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE.  \f 

ing  beauty  all  about  our  paths.  Not  because  nature  is  an 
imitation  of  some  higher  copy,  nor  from  any  surprise  and  de- 
light that  art  should  be  found  to  imitate  nature  so  well,  but, 
both  in  nature  and  art,  solely  because  the  mind's  eye  catches 
the  pure  form  which  is  expressive  of  some  rational  sentiment, 
do  we  awake  to  the  consciousness  of  the  Beautiful  or  the 
Sublime. 

The  rational  spirit  can  itself  create  its  own  pure  forms,  which 
shall  express  the  rational  emotion  more  full  and  perfect  than 
can  be  embodied  in  any  media  of  nature  or  of  art ;  and  thus 
the  cultivated  genius  has  his  own  absolute  ideal  Beauty,  as 
the  highest  and  purest  conception  of  the  rational  sentiment  in 
any  particular  case ;  and  this  he  makes  his  ultimate  criterion  to 
judge  of  any  representation  in  nature  or  art,  and  becomes  the 
critic,  measuring  and  estimating  every  actual  form  of  beauty 
that  he  finds,  and  pronouncing  it  fine  or  faulty,  as  it  agrees  or 
fails  to  agree  with  this  absolute  ideal. 

The  eye  and  ear  are  the  only  organs  which  give  the  percep- 
tions that  take  on  these  pure  living  forms,  and  hence  the  sight 
and  the  hearing  are  the  only  senses  that  can  be  recognized  in 
the  fine  arts.  But  even  these  organs  are  of  use,  only  as  they 
may  give  the  phenomenal  matter  which  takes  on  these  pure 
forms,  and  so  far  only  has  sense  at  all  any  part  in  beauty. 
The  pure  form  itself  is  only  for  the  mind's  eye,  and  with  which 
the  bodily  organ  has  nothing  to  do ;  and  it  is  wholly  by  the 
rational  part  of  man  also,  that  the  pure  ideal  is  discerned  in 
which  lies  the  absolute  Beauty,  and  by  whose  application  he 
criticises  all  forms  of  beauty  which  art  or  nature  may  anywhere 
present  to  either  eye  or  ear.  The  absolute  Beauty  is  only  in 
the  reason,  and  all  outer  beauty  is  judged  and  determined  by 
this.  It  is  so  far  of  sense,  that  its  pure  forms  can  only  find 
their  expression  in  some  objects  of  sense ;  but  the  Beauty 
itself  is  nothing  that  the  sense  gives  ;  for  if  the  pure  form  any 
way  express  the  living  sentiment,  the  taste  is  quite  indifferent 


l8  INTRODUCTION. 

what  material  object  it  may  be  that  represents  it.  That  material 
will  be  the  most  desirable  which  will  obtrude  itself  the  least 
upon  the  mental  vision,  and  leave  the  pure  form  in  the  most 
unhindered  manner  to  express  the  living  sentiment. 

We  have  in  this  the  field  of  Esthetics,  which  no  merely 
animal  eye  or  ear  can  enter,  inasmuch  as  it  is  reason  in  her 
freedom  which  creates  the  ideal  Beauty,  and  cares  nothing  for 
the  material  part,  except  merely  that  it  may  communicate  and 
preserve  the  pure  living  form  which  is  put  upon  it.  This  fac- 
ulty is  of  the  rational  part  of  man,  and  has  an  intrinsic  excel- 
lency which  controls  the  animal  appetite  for  its  own  end,  and 
will  not  permit  that  its  beauty  should  be  bartered  for  bread  or 
any  sensual  gratification.  But  though  controlling  the  sense  for 
its  own  higher  end,  yet  can  it  not  rise  to  the  dignity  of  an 
ethical  imperative.  It  controls  by  taste  and  not  by  duty ;  its 
retributions  are  disgust  and  loathing,  not  remorse  and  despair. 
Its  ugliness  is  not  that  of  vice,  and  its  deformities  are  not  the 
debasement  of  guilt.  It  fills  an  important  province  in  the 
domain  of  the  reason,  but  is  wholly  separated  from  morality. 

2.  Man,  as  rational,  has  the  capacity  to  apprehend  Truth, 
and  to  apply  necessary  and  universal  principles  in  science, 
and  thus  to  introduce  himself  into  the  field  of  pure  Philosophy. 

All  possible  diagrams  may  be  constructed  in  pure  space. 
In  these  diagrams,  skillfully  arranged,  a  succession  of  intuitive 
steps  may  be  taken  which  shall  lead  out  from  axioms  to  the 
most  remote  demonstrations.  So,  also,  in  the  mind's  passing 
from  point  to  point  along  a  mathematical  line,  it  may  attain 
the  apprehension  of  succession  in  pure  time.  As  this  intel- 
lectual agency  is  contemplated  as  standing  in  the  successive 
points,  and  thus  giving  so  many  insta?its,  or,  as  moving  from 
one  point  in  the  Ime  to  the  next,  and  thus  giving  so  many 
moments,  all  possible  pure  periods,  and  in  these,  all  possible 
pure  numbers  may  be  attained.  Such  pure  numbers  may  be 
skilfully  arranged,  in  such  a  variety  of  ways,  as  to  indicate  the 
results  of  all  arithmetical  processes. 


THE   GROUND    OF    MORAL   SCIENCE.  1 9 

In  this  manner  a  pure  geometry  and  a  pure  arithmetic  are 
possible ;  and  the  whole  field  of  mathematical  truth  lies  open. 
This  does  not  rest  upon  the  experience  in  sense,  but  the  intel- 
lect works  out  its  own  figures  and  numbers,  and  the  mind's  eye 
sees  the  consecutive  steps  and  apprehends  the  ultimate  con- 
clusion. Because  man  can  thus  use  pure  space  and  pure  time, 
he  can  see  in  his  pure  constructions  necessary  and  universal 
truth,  and  thereby  affirm  not  only  what  is,  but  what  any  ex- 
perience must  be.  The  sense  has,  here,  no  more  relevancy 
than  in  the  fine  arts.  The  pure  mathematical  figures  may  be 
filled  by  some  matter,  just  as  the  pure  living  forms  of  beauty 
may  be ;  yet  the  reason  regards  the  matter  filling  the  pure 
forms  as  of  no  importance,  and  uses  it  only  to  retain  or  com- 
municate the  intuitions,  while  the  entire  science  lies  only  in  the 
pure  figures  of  the  mind's  own  construction. 

And  so,  also,  the  phenomena  given  in  sense  must  be  connec- 
ted in  determinate  places  in  space,  and  determinate  periods 
in  time,  or  they  cannot  come  into  any  order  of  experience. 
They  are  else  a  mere  rhapsody  of  appearing  and  disappearing 
visions.  And  such  determined  order  of  connection  cannot 
be  effected  by  the  senses.  The  reason  must  give  the  notion 
of  permanent  substance  in  which  the  phenomenal  qualities 
/where,  or  they  could  not  be  determined  to  their  places  in 
the  connections  of  universal  space :  and  must  also  give  the 
notion  of  perduring  cause  to  which  the  phenomenal  events 
adhere,  or  they  could  not  be  determined  to  their  periods  in 
the  connections  of  one  successive  time :  and  must,  further, 
give  the  notion  of  action  and  re-action  through  which  all 
passing  events  r^here,  or  they  could  not  be  determined  as 
contemporaneous  in  one  and  the  same  time.  The  reason  de- 
termines, not  so  experience  is,  but  so,  if  there  be  any  experi- 
ence in  space  and  time,  it  mtist  be.  With  these  pure  notions 
of  substance,  cause,  and  counter-causation,  as  connecting  all 
possible    phenomena   of  the   sense,  the   whole   field    of  pure 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

physics  lies  open  to  us  in  which  the  sense  has  no  more  im- 
portance than  in  aesthetics  and  mathematics.  The  quahties 
and  events  constituting  a  nature  of  things  may  be  given  in  such 
connection ;  but  whether  actually  given  or  not,  the  philosophy 
is  valid. 

Not  then  at  all  in  the  animal,  but  only  in  the  rational  part 
of  our  being,  is  the  field  for  mathematical  and  philosophical 
truth.  And  this  province  is  also  entirely  distinct  from  the 
field  of  beauty,  though  both  these  belong  to  the  region  of  the 
rational,  —  the  field  of  the  beautiful  being  limited  to  rational 
sentiment,  and  the  field  of  the  true  being  confined  to  rational 
principle.  In  this  realm  of  truth,  from  the  pure  love  of  science, 
man  may  freely  subject  the  animal  appetites  and  refuse  to  pros- 
titute philosophy  to  any  craving  of  pleasure.  He  may  also 
withdraw  all  attention  from  art,  and  fully  devote  himself  to 
science.  But  while,  thus,  science  is  clearly  discriminated  from 
the  province  of  taste,  it  still  does  not  come  within  the  field  of 
morality.  The  excellency  of  science,  far  transcending  animal 
happiness,  is  still  other  than  the  excellence  of  virtue. 

3.  The  Beautiful  and  the  True  would  be  impossible,  if  the 
reason  which  they  express  were  not  other  and  more  than  sen- 
timent or  principle.  Reason  knows  itself,  and  in  knowing  itself 
it  also  determines  itself,  and  is  thus  a  person.  In  this  true  self- 
knowledge,  in  this  true  personality,  is  the  only  adequate  disclos- 
ure of  reason. 

Man  as  rational  thus  knows  himself.  He  knows  himself  as 
rational,  as  spiritual,  and  thus  as  possessing  an  intrinsic  excel- 
lence and  dignity  which  is  above  all  price.  There  is  something 
reverent  and  awful  in  his  own  being,  in  whose  light  he  finds 
himself  at  the  same  time  a  sovereign  proclaiming  a  law,  and  a 
subject  acknowledging  the  obligation  of  obedience  thereunto. 
The  law  is  written  upon  his  inner  being,  and  requires  him  to 
do  what  is  due  to  reason,  and  for  no  other  reason  than  that  it 
is  reason  which  requires  it.     The  Shekina  in  his  own  bosom 


THE  GROUND  OF  MORAL  SCIENCE.         21 

compels  respect  for  its  majesty  and  authority,  and  he  feels 
bound,  alone  by  himself,  to  sacrifice  appetite,  and  subdue 
sense,  and  subject  the  body  to  the  worthiness  of  the  spirit. 
He  is  often  made  conscious  how  terrible  is  the  retribution 
which  comes  from  within  him,  in  the  sense  of  his  own  degra- 
dation and  conviction  of  personal  debasement,  when  he  has 
bowed  his  soul  as  a  bond-slave  to  some  appetite  of  the  flesh. 
This  discernment  is  wholly  spiritual  anti  not  sensual.  The  ani- 
mal nature  cannot  in  the  least  participate  therein.  The  author- 
ity itself  is  wholly  in  and  of  the  spirit,  and  it  uses  the  sensible 
world  only  as  worthy  to  be  subdued  and  subjected  to  its  own 
ends.  It  does  not  want  nature  that  it  may  represent  its  own 
pure  forms  within  it,  like  beauty ;  nor,  that  it  may  study  its 
own  necessary  connections  in  it,  as  philosophy ;  but  that  by 
its  use  of  it,  it  may  make  the  spirit  itself  more  worthy.  It  is 
competent  to  stand  in  itself,  an  everlasting  law  of  life,  when 
flesh  and  sense  shall  cease,  and  this  mortal  shall  put  on  im- 
mortality. 

Here,  then,  is  a  ground  upon  which  we  can  rest  our  science, 
and  here  exclusively  is  the  field  of  Morals.  This  field  we  are 
now  to  explore.  Knowing  our  precise  position,  we  can  precisely 
determine  our  Moral  Philosophy,  and  therein  possess  a  science 
from  necessary  principles,  and  not  a  guess  from  general  conse- 
quences. 


SYSTEM   OF   MORAL   SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

DIFFERENT  THEORIES  OF  THE  ULTIMATE  RULE  IN  MORALS. 

"  T  T  THERE  there  is  no  law  there  is  no  transgression ; " 
V  V  and  for  the  same  reason,  where  there  is  no  law  there 
is  no  obedience.  Law,  thus,  is  essential  to  all  moral  action, 
inasmuch  as  without  it  there  can  be  no  ethical  obligation ;  no 
merit  nor  demerit,  no  punishment  nor  reward.  The  faculties 
of  moral  agency  constitute  mere  capacity  for  praise  or  blame, 
but  except  some  rule  be  applied,  no  occasion  is  given  for  calling 
forth  this  capacity  into  the  attainment  of  any  moral  character. 
The  first  inquiry  for  Moral  Science  is,  therefore,  after  an  ulti- 
mate Rule  of  life,  under  whose  imperative,  moral  character  may 
be  formed  and  estimated,  and  from  the  authority  of  which, 
justification  or  condemnation  may  be  pronounced. 

Such  a  rule  must  be  apprehended  by  the  subject,  and  thus 
promulgated  to  the  conscience,  and  must  be  so  universal  that 
it  may  come  home  in  its  convictions  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
race,  otherwise  there  can  be  no  valid  ground  for  a  comprehen- 
sive science  of  Morals.  Where,  then,  is  the  source  of  a  univer- 
sal OUGHT,  which  shall  press  upon  the  entire  conscience  of 
humanity? 

Widely  different  and  very  conflicting  theories  have  been  here 
advanced  ;  and  as  this  is  so  fundamental  for  the  science  of 
morality,  the  system  has  of  course  received  its  whole  character 

23 


24  .  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

from  its  foundation-principles.  It  is  in  fact  a  history  of  Moral 
Science,  to  give  a  history  of  the  ultimate  rules  which  have  been 
adopted  as  the  ground-work  of  the  many  systems  which  have 
been  elaborated.  This  wide  diversity  in  reference  to  the  very 
ground  of  Moral  Science  might  seem  very  discouraging  to  any 
expectation  of  a  final  general  agreement,  and  even  to  be  taken 
to  indicate  that  all  morality  is  itself  very  uncertain,  since  those 
who  study  it  most  contradict  each  other  in  their  philosophy. 
But  there  is  much  relief  in  the  fact,  that  the  diversity  has  been 
mainly  in  reference  to  what  has  been  made  a  matter  of  specu- 
lation, and  not  in  reference  so  much  to  the  matter  of  fact  as  to 
what  is  right ;  and  more  especially  is  discouragement  removed, 
when  it  is  known  that  former  discussion  has  not  been  useless. 
Many  of  these  conflicting  theories  have  had  their  day,  and  are 
now  numbered  among  the  things  that  were,  with  neither  teacher 
nor  disciples.  A  few  only  now  divide  the  great  mass  of  ethical 
writers,  and  the  prospect  is  the  more  hopeful  that  the  truth  shall 
ere  long  shine  forth  too  clearly  to  permit  of  any  radical  dis- 
crepancy. 

It  will  help  us  in  fixing  our  convictions  of  what  is  the  ulti- 
mate Rule  in  morals,  if  we  pass  in  cursory  review  some  of  the 
more  prominent  theories  which  have  been  advanced  by  either 
ancient  or  more  modern  philosophical  moralists.  We  will  give 
these  in  the  most  concise  statement  practicable,  without  any 
attempt  at  confirmation  or  refutatfon,  and  leave  them  by  merely 
specifying  their  distinctive  authors.  The  simplest  statement  of 
the  theory  is  all  we  need  for  the  present  design ,:  and  for  the 
more  convenient  presentation,  we  may  classify  them  as  theories 
which  put  the  ultimate  Rule  in  something  external  to  the  mind, 
and  those  that  find  the  ultimate  Rule  in  something  within  the 
mind  itself.  We  shall  thus  have  two  classes,  which  may  be 
termed, 

I.   Objective  theories  of  the  Ultimate  Moral  Rule. 

II.  Subjective  theories  of  the  Ultimate  Moral  Rule. 


DIFFERENT    THEORIES    OF    THE    ULTIMATE    RULE.      25 

Under  the  class  of  Objective  theories  we  may  put : 

1.  The  Authority  of  the  State.  Man  must  liv^e  in  civil  so- 
ciety, and  this  cannot  be  sustained  without  political  regula- 
tions. The  state,  through  its  constituted  authorities,  legislates, 
and  to  this  the  citizen  is  bound  in  unquestioning  obedience. 
The  conservation  of  the  public  welfare  would  be  impossible,  if 
any  subject  were  permitted  to  question  and  resist  the  civil 
authority.  The  man  is  not  to  go  back  of  the  law  and  judge  of 
it  by  some  imaginary-  standard ;  the  civil  authority  is  ultimate, 
and  the  citizen  has  nothing  to  do  but  obey.  The  whole  duty, 
where  the  state  has  legislated,  is  to  read  the  law  and  act  ac- 
cordingly.     HOBBES. 

2.  The  revealed  Will  of  God.  What  God  wills  is  ultimate, 
simply  because  he  wills  it.  ^^'hen  this  is  revealed  to  man  in 
any  way,  there  is  no  higher  rule  by  which  it  can  be  judged ; 
but  that  God  has  so  willed,  is  in  that,  and  on  that  account, 
final.  If  the  position  be  taken  that  there  must  be  some  prin- 
ciple for  the  direction  of  the  Divine  Will,  it  is  answered  that 
God  can  have  no  superior  sovereign  to  his  will,  but  this  may 
make  and  unmake  principles,  and  create  moral  truth  as  well  as 
natural  existences.  All  moral  truth  originates  in  the  Divine 
wU ;  and  it  is  thus,  solely  because  God  wills  thus.     Des  Cartes 

and  DvMOND. 

3.  Something  inherent  in  the  Nature  of  Things.  This  admits 
of  several  modifications,  in  accordance  with  what  it  is  in  the 
nature  of  things,  that  is  put  as  the  ground  of  the  ultimate  Rule. 
{a.)  One  will  say,  _that  there  is  a  fitness  in  things  themselves, 
which  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  obligation.  There  is  a  "  fitness  " 
in  returning  gratitude  for  a  favor,  —  in  the  payment  of  an  hon- 
est debt,  —  in  love  and  honor  towards  a  parent,  and  homage 
towards  God.  This  "fitness"  in  one  to  be  accompanied  by  the 
other,  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  obligation,  where  there  is  the 
one  to  do  also  the  other.  Dr.  s.  Clarke,  {b.^  In  all  things  there 
is  a  truth,  and  this  seen  confers  obligation  to  be  regarded  and 


26  •  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

treated  as  it  is.  It  is  "  true  "  that  man  is  not  a  post,  and  this  is 
a  vahd  reason  why  he  should  not  be  treated  as  a  post.  It  is 
"  true  "  that  he  is  a  rational  being,  therefore  deal  with  him  as 
such.  The  Rule  is  founded  in  "the  truth"  of  things ;  all  dis- 
obedience is  somewhere  acting  out  a  lie.  wollaston.  (^.)  There 
are  certain  relations  bet\veen  things,  in  which  is  found  the  ulti- 
mate Rule.  The  "  relation  "  of  parent  and  child  —  of  bene- 
factor and  beneficiary  —  of  the  state  and  the  citizen  —  of  the 
Creator  and  creature,  is  itself  the  ultimate  Rule  for  the  duties 
enforced.  We  need  only  to  know  the  relations,  and  the  duty  is 
seen  in  them  and  made  up  from  them.  Dr.  Wayland.  (^.)  There 
is  a  beauty  in  the  union  and  consent  of  one  mind  or  heart  with 
the  great  whole  of  being,  and  which  may  be  termed  good  will 
to  being  in  general,  and  in  this  moral  beauty  is  the  essence  of 
true  virtue.  The  consent  and  agreement  of  heart  with  being 
in  general  is  conditional  for  the  beauty,  and  the  love  to  being 
in  general  is  not  for  the  beauty  in  the  being,  but  the  love  is  to 
the  being  and  the  beauty  is  inherent  in  such  love  ;  and  thus  the 
beauty  of  benevolence  or  of  love  to  being  in  general,  is  the 
essence  of  aU  true  virtue.  Pres.  Edwards.  These  may  all  mean 
much  the  same  thing ;  but  whatever  be  understood,  they  all 
agree  that  the  ground  of  tUe  rule  is  seen  in  the  nature  of  things. 
4.  The  highest  Happiness.  This  assumes  that  happiness  is 
the  only  good,  and  that  whatever  tends  to  this  is  right,  and  the 
design  to  secure  this  is  virtuous.  The  ultimate  Rule  of  all 
action  must  be  found  in  this  tendency  to  promote  happiness. 
The  general  theory  of  highest  happiness  has  its  modifications 
constituting  distinct  systems,  {a^  A  purely  selfish  system  in 
which  pleasure  is  put  as  the  chief  good,  and  personal  enjoyment 
the  only  virtue.  Inasmuch  as  the  future  is  altogether  uncertain, 
the  highest  wisdom  is  found  in  making  the  most  of  the  present, 
and  thus  it  takes  the  form  of  the  old  perverted  Epicurean 
maxim,  "live  while  you  live."  (^.)  The  modifying  of  all  our 
appetites  and  desires  so  as  to  keep  "  the  golden  mean,"  neithei 


DIFFERENT    THEORIES    OF    THE    ULTIMATE    RULE,     2/ 

too  lax  nor  too  intense  in  any  inclination.  Moderation  is  the 
great  virtue.  The  highest  happiness,  and  thus  the  highest 
virtue,  is  by  keeping  in  the  midst  between  two  extremes. 
Aristotle,  ((f.)  It  may  take  apparently  a  more  religious  aspect, 
and  assume  future  eternal  happiness  as  the  highest  good,  and 
thus  denying  present  gratification  for  the  endless  happiness  of 
hea\-en.  Paley.  (^.)  Taking  the  general  conception  of  utility, 
and  referring  this  to  the  public,  and  making  the  ultimate 
Rule  to  be  "the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number." 
Bentham.  (^■.)  Putting  all  under  the  name  of  Benevolence  as 
the  highest  good,  inasmuch  as  it  blesses  both  giver  and  re- 
ceiver. Man  is  so  made  that  he  finds  his  highest  happiness 
in  promoting  the  highest  happiness  of  others,  and  thus  benefi- 
cence is  the  highest  rule  of  life.      Pkes.  Dwight  and  Dr.  Taylor. 

All  the  above  find  the  highest  rule  of  life  in  some  source 
external  to  the  mind,  and  have  regard  to  some  object  which 
it  is  deemed  makes  the  strongest  claim  upon  man,  and  which 
is  thus  the  measure  of  all  right  as  itself  the  ultimate. 

Under  the  class  of  Subjective  theories,  we  have  : 

1.  A  natural  susceptibility  to  Pride,  gratified  by  Flattery. 
Man  has  many  impulses,  but  among  the  strongest  is  that  of 
pride,  which  induces  to  self-denial  in  other  things  that  it  may 
find  more  than  its  equivalent  in  the  praise  that  is  returned,  and 
the  whole  of  virtue  is  found  in  the  vanity  that  is  satisfied  by 
flattery.  The  many  are  thus  cunningly  enslaved  by  the  design- 
ing few,  who,  to  reward  their  patient  service  and  devotion,  have 
invented  such  terms  as  loyalty,  patriotism,  heroism,  virtue, 
religion,  etc.,  and  apply  them  in  flattering  distinctions  to  such 
as  are  the  most  subservient  and  obsequious.  Praise  is  given 
in  barter  for  freedom,  and  all  moral  virtue  is  but  "  tlie  offspring 
of  flattery  begotten  upon  pride."    Mandeville. 

2.  An  inner  recipj-ocal  Sympathy.  All  we  know  of  other 
men,  is  by  referring  what  we  may  deem  their  experience  to 
some  simikr  experience  of  our  own,  and  finding  a  sympathy 


28  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

between  us.  Just  so  in  morals.  We  change  places  in  thought 
with  the  actor,  and  if  we  deem  that  we  should  approve  of  the 
act  as  a  spectator,  we  affirm  it  to  be  right ;  and  if  we  should 
not  so  sympathize  with  it,  we  affirm  it  to  be  wrong.  In  refer- 
ence to  another's  act,  we  must  imagine  ourselves  to  be  the 
actors  and  him  the  spectator,  and  accordingly  as  it  would  meet 
or  oppose  his  sympathy,  we  affirm  the  act  to  be  right  or  wrong. 
Thus  the  apprehension  of  the  rule  is  never  direct,  but  through 
this  reflex  sympathy ;  and  there  must  be  an  imagined  reci- 
procity between  the  actor  and  the  observer  of  the  action,  or 
neither  of  them  could  affirm  any  right  or  wrong  in  the  action. 
The  capacity  to  such  inner  reciprocal  sympathy  is  the  sole, 
ground  and  possibility  of  morality.     Adam  Smith. 

3.  An  inner  Sense,  which  gives  Moral  Distinctions.  This 
has  its  various  modifications.  {a.)  Amid  the  other  senses 
with  which  man  is  endowed  and  which  give  material  qualities, 
he  has  a  distinct  and  specific  sense  which  apprehends  moral 
distinctions.  This  perceives  a  right  and  wrong  as  the  organic 
senses  perceive  colors,  sounds,  etc.  This  moral  sense  is  each 
man's  source  of  all  obligation,  and  to  him  his  measure  of  all 
virtue.  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson.  (^.)  Virtue  and  vicc  in  the 
abstract  are  nothing,  and  like  all  other  qualities  have  their 
existence  only  in  the  percipient.  There  is  thus  a  universal 
sentiment,  by  reason  of  the  original  conformation  of  all  minds 
by  one  Divine  Creator,  which  approves  certain  intentions  and 
affections,  and  disapproves  certain  others.  This  universal  sen- 
timent, from  an  original  conformation  of  the  human  mind,  is 
the  ultimate  source  of  all  moral  truth,  and  in  this  is  the  ultimate 
Rule  of  life.  It  is  a  mark  of  the  Divine  Wisdom  and  Benev- 
olence that  the  human  race  has  been  made  with  such  con- 
formity of  moral  sentiments,  that  substantially  the  same  things 
are  approved  and  disapproved  through  all  generations.  Dr.  Brown. 
•  {c.)  An  inward  revelation  as  a  warning  voice,  which,  though 
sounding  in  us  is  not  of  us,  makes  itself  to  be  felt  as  an  awe 


DIFFERENT    THEORIES    OF    THE    ULTIMATE    RULE.      29 

and  fear  of  Deity ;  and  which  thus  becomes  a  conscience  in 
all  human  bosoms,  and  lies  at  the  source  of  all  morality.  An 
external  revelation  may  also  be  given  as  another  form  of  the 
same  admonition ;  but  this  inward  awe  of  the  Deity,  awakened 
by  this  warning  voice,  and  before  which  we  find  the  whole 
carnal  mind  shrinking  and  retiring,  is  that  which  first  originates 
imperatives  in  the  consciousness,  and  involves  all  that  is  moral 
or  religious  in  the  human  race.  The  divinely-awakened  rever- 
ence and  awe  of  the  Supreme  Being,  first  wakes  the  moral  life, 
and  this  finds  its  rule  in  any  form  of  God's  commandments. 

F.  SCHLEGEL. 

4.  An  immediate  Intuition.  This  view  supposes  the  human 
mind  in  its  rational  endowment  to  have  an  intuition  higher 
than  the  immediate  perceptions  of  sense,  and  which  higher 
intuition  immediately  apprehends  universal  and  necessary  prin- 
ciples in  their  own  light,  and  among  others  such  also  as  belong 
to  morality.  The  organs  of  sense  have  no  connection  with  this 
higher  intuition,  either  directly  or  remotely,  since  no  reflection 
upon  what  is  perceived  by  sense  —  combining,  abstracting,  or 
comparing  —  can  give  these  necessary  principles.  The  Reason 
is  the  organ  for  their  apprehension,  and  this  immediately  be- 
holds them.  The  Ought  is  thus  immediately  seen  by  the 
reason,  and  needs  and  admits  of  no  other  explanation  than 
that  it  is  so  seen  in  its  own  light.  The  reason  sees  the  right, 
and  that  is  ultimate  and  conclusive.  The  phraseology  and 
application  may  differ  somewhat  in  different  writers,  but  all  of 
this  theory  hold  substantially  to  this,  that  the  ultimate  right 
is  a  dry  and  pure  rational  intuition,  seen  and  not  felt,  —  an 
intellectual  object,  and  not  a  sentiment  or  a  feeling,  —  and  that 
this  intuitive  beholding  of  the  right  is  its  highest  affirmation. 
It  is  not  right,  because  of  this  or  that ;  it  is  immediately  seen 
to  be  right,  and  that  is  the  end  of  it.  The  right  is  ultimate 
in  its  own  intuition,  and  there  cannot  be  a  further  explanation 
when  the  last  is  reached.     Cudwokth,  Kant,  and  Coleridgh. 


30  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

The  review  of  these  varied  theories,  and  what  has  been 
already  attained  in  the  determining  of  the  particular  field  of 
Moral  Science,  will  now  enable  us  the  more  readily  and  intel- 
ligently to  apprehend  the  ultimate  Rule  of  Right,  when  the  true 
ground  in  which  it  must  lie  shall  be  set  fully  before  the  mind. 
Without  a  detailed  examination  of  these  theories,  this  will  at 
once  correct  what  is  erroneous,  and  fill  out  what  may  be  in- 
complete in  any  of  them. 


CHAPTER   II. 

.   THE  ULTIMATE   RULE   OF   RIGHT. 

As  our  first  inquiry  in  Moral  Science  is  for  an  ultimate  rule 
of  right,  let  us  start  the  inquiry  with  a  clear  view  of  what  we 
mean  by  an  ultimate  rule.  Nothing  is  ultimate  where  there  is 
any  thing  beyond.  An  ultimate,  therefore,  is  not  simply  the 
last  point  our  thoughts  can  reach  because  they  are  too  feeble 
to  go  farther ;  rather  is  it  the  truly  last,  on  which  our  thoughts 
rest  when  they  reach  it,  because  they  see  that  there  is  noth- 
ing farther.  No  fact,  therefore,  can  ever  be  ultimate  ;  for  a 
fact  is  something  made,  and  of  course  beyond  it  is  its  maker. 
An  ultimate  is  unmade.  It  could  never  either  begin  or  cease 
to  be.  It  knows  no  past  nor  future,  but  only  ever  is.  The 
limitations  of  space  are  also  as  little  beyond  it  as  are  those 
of  time.     It  is  everywhere  as  well  as  everywhen. 

An  ultimate,  therefore,  has  its  ground  only  in  itself,  and  the 
light  which  reveals  it  is  altogether  its  own.  It  is  both  self- 
supporting  and  self-evident.  It  rests  upon  itself,  and  the 
thoughts  that  reach  it  rest  because  itself  rests. 

But  nothing  is  thus  ultimate — nothing  is  at  the  same  time  first 
and  last,  and  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  for  ever — but 


THE    ULTIMATE    RULE    OF    RIGHT.  3 1 

reason.  Reason  alone  supports  and  declares  and  is  the  all- 
sufficient  voucher  for  itself.  We  are  always  seeking  for  reason  ; 
and  while  we  never  rest  till  the  self-sufficient  reason  is  found, 
vvlien  this  is  found  we  never  seek  for  any  thing  beyond.  It 
would  be  impossible  and  absurd  for  us  to  ask  why  any  three 
points  must  be  in  the  same  plane,  or  why  it  is  impossible  for 
z  thing  to  be  and  at  the  same  time  not  be,  or  to  ask  a  reason 
why  a  man  should  do  right,  since  each  of  these  statements  is 
a  statement  of  reason  itself,  and  is  therefore  self-sufficient  and 
final.  To  seek  for  any  thing  beyond  reason  would  be  to  seek 
a  reason  for  reason,  which  would  be  the  absurdity  of  seeking 
for  precisely  what  we  already  have.  Reason  must  be  the  inspi- 
ration and  the  end  of  all  our  seeking.  That  this  is  so  appears 
as  soon  as  we  note  that  the  question  why,  which  really  voices 
all  our  inquir}'  respecting  any  thing,  simply  means,  what  is  the 
reason  for  the  thing. 

An  ultimate  rule,  therefore,  must  be  a  reasonable  rule.  In 
other  words,  it  must  conform  to  reason,  must  be  worthy  of 
reason,  and  must  reveal  its  reasonableness  in  its  very  statement. 
But  this  is  not  true  of  any  of  the  rules  which  have  been  adduced 
in  the  previous  chapter.  None  of  these  rules  can  be  justified 
by  its  bare  statement.  Why  the  authority  of  the  state,  the  re- 
vealed will  of  God,  the  nature  of  things,  the  highest  happiness, 
or  any  of  the  subjective  rules  that  were  named  should  require 
our  obedience,  could  only  be  shown  by  showing  the  reason  on 
which  it  is  supposed  to  rest.  Unless  the  rule  is  reasonable  it 
has  no  authority,  and  if  it  is  reasonable  its  authority  is  beyond 
dispute.  The  same  is  true  of  every  rule  that  could  be  named. 
We  inquire  for  its  reasonableness  as  the  ultimate  foundation  for 
its  authority,  and  when  this  is  found,  and  only  when  this  is 
found,  we  rest.  * 

The  rule,  therefore,  by  which  all  other  rules  must  be  deter- 
mined is  the  only  ultimate  rule.  Let  us  start,  then,  with  that 
wherein  all  these  other  rules  must  end.     We  can  ask  for  noth- 


32  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

ing  more,  we  can  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less ;  the  reasonable 
rule  is  the  right  rule,  and  it  is  right  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  it  is  reasonable. 

We  use  the  term  right  as  a  substantive  and  as  an  adjective. 
Its  exact  equivalent  as  a  substantive  is  reason,  and  as  an  adjec- 
tive is'  reasonable.  The  ultimate  rule  of  right  is  the  ultimate 
rule  of  reason,  and  as  a  rule  must  be  a  rule  of  action,  and  a  rule 
of  right  a  rule  determinative  of  right  action,  or  the  action  that 
ought  to  be,  the  simple  and  sufficient  statement  of  the  ultimate 
rule  of  right  is  that  a  reasonable  being  ought  to  act  reasonably. 
This  is  a  rule  self-evident  and  self-sufificient,  needing  no  other 
ground  to  support  itself  or  reveal  itself  than  itself.  This  is 
the  true  ultimate ;  and  as  all  other  rules  must  come  to  it  for 
their  test,  we  take  it  at  the  outset,  and  direct  all  our  inquiries 
by  its  determinations. 


CHAPTER    III. 

ESSENTIAL  ATTRIBUTES    OF  THE   ULTIMATE   RIGHT. 

We  may  now  unhesitatingly  make  the  following  summary 
statements. 

Man  is  a  reasonable  being,  and  the  highest  claim  that  can 
possibly  be  made  upon  him  is  that  he  act  in  a  way  worthy 
of  his  rational  endowment.  As  a  reasonable  being  he  knows 
himself,  for  reason  is  the  true  and  sole  self-knower ;  and  in 
this  self-knowledge  he  knows  that  the  claim  of  reason  upon 
his  personal  conduct  transcends  all  other  claims.  It  is  the 
consciousness  of  this  claim,  it  is  the  recognized  presence  of 
an  authority  which  he  can  neither  dethrone  nor  delude,  and 
which  is  inalienable  from  himself,  which  gives  to  every  man  a 
sense  of  awe  when  forced  to  stand  alone  with  his  own  spirit. 


ATTRIBUTES    OF    THE    ULTIMATE    RIGHT.  33 

It  is  as  if  another  and  a  divine  self  scanned  and  judged  every 
thought  and  purpose  of  the  active  self,  and  announced*  the 
irreversible  sentence  of  self-justification  or  self-condemnation. 
Man  is  thus  a  law  unto  himself,  and  has  his  judge  and  execu- 
tive inseparable  from  himself.  We  may  call  this  law  and 
authority,  the  claim  of  reason,  or  constraint  of  conscience,  or 
inner  voice  of  God ;  the  true  meaning  is  all  the  same,  that 
every  man  is  consciously  bound  to  do  that  and  that  only  which 
the  rational  spirit  that  has  been  given  him  sees,  in  its  own 
rationality,  to  be  due  to  reason.  Herein  is  the  ultimate  rule 
of  right,  which  both  includes  and  measures  all  human  rights 
and  obligations.  It  is  beyond  all  deductions  from  experience, 
and  is  itself  determinative  of  what  experience  itself  should  be. 
It  is  amenable  to  no  outer  interference,  and  admits  into  itself 
no  other  consideration,  than  that  it  behooves  spirit  to  act 
worthy  of  its  spirituality,  which  is  but  the  inner  claim  of  reason 
itself  to  act  reasonably.  The  ultimate  authority  binds  univer- 
sally and  absolutely,  for  no  other  reason  than  that  it  is  reason. 

With  this  precise  intuition  of  the  ultimate  Right,  it  is  of 
further  importance  that  we  apprehend  as  distinctly  some  of  the 
attributes  which  it  possesses. 

I .  It  is  simple.  By  this  is  meant  that  it  is  wholly  uncom- 
pounded,  and  thus  incapable  of  any  analysis. 

This  is  manifest  from  the  genesis  of  the  conception  itself. 
We  do  not  attain  it  from  any  generalization,  nor  by  any  pro- 
cess of  degrees  which  by  an  accumulation  at  last  constitutes 
right.  We  may  pass  in  our  analysis  of  mind  from  the  appetite 
of  the  animal  to  the  imperatives  of  the  rational  within  us,  and 
in  the  rational  may  also  pass  through  the  sphere  of  taste  and  of 
philosophy  up  to  that  of  morals  ;  but  we  do  not  carry  along 
with  us  any  conceptions  which,  in  their  last  complexity,  be- 
come the  conception  of  the  right.  We  leave  each  law,  of 
happiness  and  of  beauty  and  of  j^hysical  truth,  in  its  own 
sphere,  and  only  as  we  come  into  the  sphere  where  reason 


34  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

knows  itself,  and  is  conscience,  do  we  find  the  law  of  right ; 
and  here  it  stands  in  its  own  simplicity  as  seen  by  the  eye  of 
reason  itself. 

This  is  further  seen  in  the  impracticability  of  all  analysis 
of  it.  No  intellectual  process  can  decompose  it  and  show  its 
parts.  It  may  be  said,  as  it  has  been,  that  for  any  action  to 
be  right,  there  must  be,  i.  Understanding,  2.  Free-will, 
3.  Tendency  to  universal  happiness,  4.  Tendency  to  the  indi- 
vidual happiness ;  but,  though  this  should  be  admitted  to  be 
a  true  analysis  of  right  action,  it  is  manifestly  a  mistake  to 
suppose  it  an  analysis  of  right  itself.  The  very  first  ingredient 
—  an  understanding  —  is  of  no  possible  use,  but  as  it  is  con- 
ditional for  already  perceiving  the  right.  Besides,  how  know 
that  it  would  be  not  right  to  hold  to  responsibility  without 
such  assumed  elements?  The  very  attempt  at  analysis  con- 
victs itself  of  carrying  along  with  it  the  still  simple  conception. 

2.  The  ultimate  right  is  imitiutable.  Ultimate  truths  are  not 
the  product  of  power,  but  must  themselves  condition  all  exer- 
tions of  power.  Power  does  not  make  the  principles  by  which 
all  power  must  be  judged.  No  possible  power  can  make  it 
right  that  God,  or  angel,  or  man,  should  act  unworthy  of  their 
spiritual  excellency.  Mutability  of  the  ultimate  right  is  thus  an 
impossibility. 

And  still  more,  to  conceive  of  any  change  involves  the  alter- 
native, either  that  it  changes  to  somewhat  that  it  is  not  and 
should  not  be,  and  thus  changes  from  a  right  to  that  which  is 
not  right ;  or,  that  it  changes  to  somewhat  that  it  is  not  and  yet 
should  be,  and  thus  that  there  was  another  right  determining 
how  the  ultimate  right  should  be  changed.  Mutability  of  the 
ultimate  right  is  thus  an  absurdity. 

3.  The  ultimate  right  is  universal.  As  in  relation  to  all 
ultimate  truth,  no  one  can  appropriate  it  and  say  of  it,  this  is 
my  truth  ;  but  that  same  truth  will  also  be  truth  for  every  mind 
that  looks  into  the  same  gi-ound,  so,  eminently  of  the  ukimate 


ATTRIBUTES    OF    THE    ULTIMATE    RIGHT.  35 

moral  right,  it  is  the  same  to  all.  In  reference  to  all  facts  of 
sense,  every  man's  experience  is  his  own  measure.  His  own 
sensation  is  his  ultimate  rule.  The  taste  of  wine,  the  size  of  the 
moon,  the  sound  of  a  trumpet ;  these  are  what  they  are  to  me, 
and  by  his  own  peculiarity  of  organs  all  these  may  be  very 
different  to  another  man.  But  not  thus  with  rational  intuitions. 
Axioms  in  mathematics,  principles  in  philosophy,  rights  in 
morals,  are  the  same  to  all  minds,  when  seen  in  the  same 
grounds.  It  has  sometimes  been  objected,  to  the  reproach  of 
ethical  science,  that  quite  contradictory  actions  have  been 
deemed  right  in  different  ages.  The  Spartan  may  have  ap- 
proved of  theft,  while  other  people  approve  of  honesty.  But 
the  Spartan  approved  of  theft  only  when  it  was  done  so  adroitly 
as  to  escape  detection,  and  in  this  only  as  perfecting  the  man 
in  the  deceits  and  stratagem  of  war,  which  was  looked  upon  as 
the  highest  glory  of  man.  The  same  perverted  view,  looking 
into  the  same  ground,  would  give  to  all  the  Spartan  justification 
of  theft.  But  never  will  there  be  approbation  where  the  act  is 
viewed  in  its  own  light,  as  the  taking  by  one  man  that  which 
is  not  his,  from  another  who  owns  it.  Such  an  act  is  unworthy 
of  reason,  and  is  thus  an  indignity  to  the  man  robbed,  and  a 
debasement  in  the  thief;  in  which  light  it  can  receive  from  all 
only  reprobation.  And  so  with  all  moral  obligations  whatever, 
when  followed  up  to  the  ultimate  principle  of  debasing  the 
rational  spirit,  no  man  can  violate  the  obligation  without  re- 
morse. 

That  the  ultimate  rule  is  universal,  appears  further  in  this, 
that  the  character  even  of  the  Supreme  Being  may  be  deter- 
mined by  it.  Were  right  determined  by  the  will  of  God,  then 
that  will  itself  would  be  undetermined  in  its  moral  character. 
But  God  himself  permits  and  makes  the  appeal  to  the  ultimate 
principle,  determinative  of  his  own  action.  "Shall  not  the 
Judge  of  all  the  earth  do  right?"  "Are  not  my  ways  equal?" 
God  perfectly  knows  his  own  excellency  as  Absolute  Spirit,  and 


36  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

that  which  it  behooves  him  to  do,  and  lias  thus  the  same  RuW 
of  right  that  is  everywhere  apphcable.  We  have  thus  in  a 
universal  rule  an  occasion  for  a  universal  system  of  morals. 

A  few  particulars  may  be  here  noticed ;  some,  as  direct 
inferences  from  what  has  been  already  gained. 

1.  Rights  can  never  dash  with  each  otJici-.  Reason  is  ever 
at  one  with  itself,  whether  viewed  in  the  personality  of  the 
Absolute  Spirit,  or  in  that  of  the  finite  spirit.  That  which  is 
due  to  the  rational  spirit  is  ever  the  measure  of  obligation,  and 
thus  all  ethical  claims  must  necessarily  adjust  themselves  in 
complete  harmony,  through  the  ever  concurring  and  according 
rights  of  rational  personalities.  The  finite  as  truly  debases  itself 
in  all  conflict  with  the  absolute,  as  would  the  absolute  in  all 
subjection  to  the  finite.  Reason  can  never  deny  itself  and  put 
forth  unreasonable  claims  ;  and  hence  no  rights,  of  any  number 
or  degree  of  rational  beings,  can  come  into  any  collision  with 
each  other.     The  one  rule  makes  all  rights  harmonize. 

2.  The  animal  can  possibly  possess  no  rights.  So  far  as  we 
have  any  knowledge  of  animals,  they  are  only  individual  exam- 
ples of  a  species.  They  give  no  evidence  of  self-determination, 
of  freedom,  of  personality,  and  thus  they  show  nothing  which  is 
peculiarly  their  o\\ti.  In  them  the  species  appears,  through 
them  the  species  is  continued,  and  when  they  have  sufficiently 
subserved  these  ends  of  the  species,  they  are  cast  aside  and  left 
to  perish.  Individuals  in  the  animal  world  appear  simply  as 
passive  objects  upon  which  the  species  exerts  its  power,  and 
who  fulfil  its  design  without  any  purpose  or  agency  of  their 
o\vn.  They  have,  therefore,  no  rights,  and  can  have  no  obli- 
gations.    Appetites  belong  to  them,  but  not  imperatives. 

3.  It  is  desirable  here  to  note  sojne  of  the  distinctions  in 
mental  facts  which  are  used  in  moral  science. 

This  self-knowledge  of  the  spirit,  or  the  consciousness  of  its 
own  spiritual  excellency,  awakening  in  man's  rational  nature 
an  imperative  towards  that  which  is  due  to  his  own  intrinsic 


ATTRIBUTES    OF    THE    ULTIMATE    RIGHT.  3/ 

dignity,  and  which  moves  in  complacency  for  obedience  and 
in  remorse  for  disobedience,  is  conscience.  The  capacity,  from 
this  imperative  of  conscience  to  resist  the  impulses  of  appetite, 
and  thus  to  possess  an  inherent  spring  to  an  alternative  when 
the  animal  good  allures,  is  moral  agency.  This  causality  of 
reason  to  act  even  against  the  cravings  of  appetite,  and  thus 
from  the  law  of  what  is  worthy  of  itself  as  ultimate  end,  is  will 
{Jiberum  arbitrium) ,  and  which  wholly  differs  from  animal  will 
{briituvi  arbitriutn),  that  can  only  go  out  in  executive  acts  after 
strongest  appetite  or  highest  happiness.  When  the  will  keeps 
in  subjection  every  colliding  appetite,  and  is  thus  regnant  over 
the  whole  animal  nature,  it  is  free-will;  when  it  yields  to  the 
animal  impulse,  so  as  to  make  the  gratification  of  appetite,  or 
highest  happiness,  its  ultimate  end,  and  thus  puts  the  whole 
executive  agency  under  the  domination  of  sense,  it  is  an  en- 
slaved will.  When  this  capacity  of  will  goes  out  towards  either 
alternative  of  happiness  or  of  worthiness  as  ultimate  end,  it  is 
choice.  When  this  choice  of  ultimate  end  is  in  reference  to  the 
highest  generalization  of  all  human  action,  and  thus  the  whole 
voluntary  capacity  is  disposed  either  towards  the  end  of  the 
sense  or  the  end  of  the  spirit,  i.e.,  happiness  or  worthiness. 
Mammon  or  God,  it  is  the  moral  disposition,  giving  permanent 
moral  character.  This  dilTers  wholly  from  constitutional  bias, 
sometimes  called  natural  disposition,  and  which  results  from 
physical  temperament  only ;  having  no  moral  character  in  itself, 
except  only  in  its  constraint  and  subjection.  When  this  agency, 
fixing  upon  its  object  as  end,  is  contemplated  solely  as  a  subjec- 
tive state,  and  not  as  going  forth  into  overt  action,  it  is  prefer- 
ence;  and  when  this  has  respect  to  objects  beyond  our  reach,  it 
is  wish.  In  all  these  cases,  the  mental  fact  is  peculiar  in  its 
own  being,  and  the  word  should  be  carefully  used  as  expressing 
its  own  precise  meaning.  The  system  is  intelligently  appre- 
hended, only  when  its  elementary  thoughts  are  distinct,  and  the 
terms  in  which  they  are  expressed  are  made  precise. 


38  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

GENERAL    METHOD. 

The  way  is  now  prepared  for  a  Definition  and  general  Method 
of  Moral  Science.  Morals  {inoralis)  and  Ethics  (c^ikos)  both 
alike  refer  to  that  which  pertains  to  the  manners  and  conduct 
of  persons.  A  moral  act  is  a  personal  act,  the  act  of  a  person 
or  a  free  will.  An  act  without  freedom,  an  act  necessitated,  is 
no  moral  act,  and  an  agent  without  a  free  will  is  no  moral  agent. 
The  sphere  of  morality  and  the  sphere  of  freedom  are  not  only 
co-extensive,  they  are  identical.  If  a  man  is  capable  of  virtue, 
if  it  is  possible  for  him  to  do  a  deed  of  heroism  or  of  right, 
he  is  free,  or,  conversely,  if  he  is  free  he  is  capable  of  virtue. 

Moral  Science  is  the  science  of  moral  action.  Precisely  de- 
fined, it  is  the  systematic  application  of  the  moral  rule  to  all 
conceptions  of  moral  conduct. 

The  moral  rule,  or  ultimate  rule  of  right,  we  have  already 
seen  to  be  that  a  reasonable  being  ought  to  act  reasonably,  or, 
as  it  might  otherwise  be  stated,  that  all  twluntary  action  should 
be  held  subordinate  to  the  dig/iity  of  the  rational  spirit.  The 
state  of  the  will  as  permanent  disposition,  and  the  specific  acts 
of  the  will  as  it  goes  out  into  executive  operation,  are  all  to  be 
determined  by  this  ultimate  rule  of  life.  Thus  all  bodily  agency 
which  is  voluntary,  the  organs  of  sense  and  of  speech  and  the 
members  of  the  body,  together  with  all  the  mental  faculties 
which  the  will  may  control,  lie  within  the  province  of  ethics, 
and  may  be  brought  under  the  determinations  of  the  Rule  of 
right.  Inasmuch  as  this  ultimate  rule  is  necessary  and  univer- 
sal, and  no  result  of  any  generalization  of  experience,  so  the 
system  which  it  binds  up  within  itself  will  be  of  no  partial 
application,  but  will  determine  how  all  moral  experience  should 


GENERAL    METHOD.  39 

be,  whether  it  any  where  be  actually  so  found  or  not.  We  thus 
do  not  found  our  morals  upon  experience,  but  bring  our  system 
to  determine  experience. 

The  appHcation  of  this  ultimate  rule  must  be  our  work, 
throughout,  in  the  building  up  of  our  moral  system ;  but  this 
admits  of  tivo  aspects,  which  give  two  very  distinct  Parts  to 
moral  science. 

Where  the  ultimate  rule  is  itself  directly  applied  to  the  sub- 
ject, and  is  expected  to  control  for  its  own  sake,  and  in  its  own 
light  solely,  so  that  the  man  obeys,  and  holds  all  things  in  sub- 
serviency to  the  end  of  the  spirit,  from  a  direct  insight  into 
what  reason  requires,  we  have  then  the  important  Part  of  Pure 
Morality.  Nothing  in  this  part  acts  as  motive,  but  the  sole 
consideration  of  the  claims  of  spiritual  excellency;  and  the 
obedience  of  the  man  is  purely  from  a  regard  to  what  is  due 
to  rational  dignity.  This  is  the  first  to  be  studied ;  and  will  be 
found  to  be  a  comprehensive  and  clear  province,  where  from 
the  intuitions  of  the  reason  alone,  a  wide  portion  of  human 
duty  and  responsibility  may  be  imperatively  determined. 

When  the  ultimate  rule  is  applied  to  determine  why  and  how 
far  another  may  control  me,  and  thus  brings  a  foreign  constraint 
upon  my  action  through  the  expressed  will  of  a  sovereign,  we 
shall  have  the  no  less  important  Part  of  Positive  Authority. 
This  will  next  demand  a  full  investigation,  and  present  some  of 
the  most  interesting  and  important  methods  of  applying  the 
ultimate  rule  to  moral  action.  The  two  will  exhaust  the  whole 
field  of  Moral  Science. 

Pure  Morality,  controlling  the  entire  man  for  virtue's  sake, 
and  in  its  own  light,  admits  of  no  varied  form  in  the  application 
of  the  ultimate  rule,  and  hence  this  First  Part  of  our  work  will 
not  present  any  occasion  for  a  division  of  its  leading  motive. 
The  doing,  of  the  right,  for  the  right's  sake,  is  everywhere  the 
only  causality  to  action  which  is  recognized  in  it.  But  Positive 
Authority  applies  its  constraints  in  varied  forms,  and  must  be 


40  SYSTEM    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE. 

considered  under  corresponding  divisions.  The  obedience  may 
be  sought  through  the  influence  of  pains  and  penalties,  and 
thus  the  subject  be  viewed  as  wholly  servile ;  and  such  will 
give  the  division  of  mere  Legality.  While  again,  the  motive  to 
obedience  may  be  solely  affection  and  reverence  for  the  sover- 
eign, and  thus  wholly  cordial ;  and  this  will  give  the  further 
division  of  complete  Loyalty. 

Mere  Legality  will  introduce  us  to  the  consideration  of  Polit- 
ical Government,  and  the  moral  principles  that  must  determine 
its  action  ;  and  complete  Loyalty  will  introduce  to  the  consider- 
ation of  the  Divine  Government,  and  the  ethical  considerations 
which  must  be  found  in  its  administration.  These  two.  Legality 
and  Loyalty,  with  their  motives  of  hope  and  fear  for  the  one, 
and  of  simple  faith  and  love  for  the  other,  admit  of  a  most 
peculiar  and  interesting  combination  in  their  action,  upon  cer- 
tain subjects,  to  induce  obedience ;  and  which  will  introduce 
a  third  division  to  our  study,  under  the  form  of  Family  Govern- 
ment. In  these  Divisions  will  be  exhausted  the  whole  part  of 
Positive  Authority,  and  thus  the  entire  field  of  Moral  Science. 

We  have,  then,  our  General  Method  fully  before  us,  viz  : 

I.    Pure  Morality. 
IL    Positive  Authority. 

1.  Legality,  in  Civil  Government. 

2.  Loyalty,  in  the  Divine  Government. 

3.  Both  Legality  and  Loyalty,  in  the  Parental  Government. 


FIRST   PART. 


PURE    MORALITY. 


THE  ESSENCE   OF  ALL  VIRTUE. 

VIRTUE  is  heroism  or  personal  worthiness,  as  the  etymol- 
ogy of  the  word  discloses.  In  its  attainment  and  pres- 
ervation all  imperatives  are  satisfied.  The  ultimate  right, 
inclusive  of  all  rights,  is  the  right  of  a  rational  being  to  act 
worthy  of  its  rationality,  and  submission  to  the  constraint  of 
this  right  is  the  great  duty  which  involves  all  other  duties. 
When  the  good  will  fixing  itself  upon  this,  and,  in  a  perma- 
nent disposition,  holds  all  other  volitions  in  subserviency  to 
this,  there  is  the  comprehensive  character  of  the  purely  virtuous 
man. 

But  this  essential  virtue  may  be  said  to  have  its  conditions 
in  several  particulars. 

I .  There  must  be  pure-mindedness.  There  can  be  no  double- 
end,  and  no  double-dealing  to  gain  the  end  of  virtue.  That  I 
may  be  worthy,  I  must  know  what  worthiness  requires  and  must 
be  moved  to  the  end  of  worthiness  alone.  If  any  thing  else 
mingle  and  blend  in  the  motive,  it  must  so  far  debase  and 
degrade  and  make  me  to  be  unworthy.  This  pure  simplicity  of 
heart  and  guilelessness  of  spirit  is  the  most  lovely  trait  in  every 
virtuous  character.  The  clear,  calm,  full  eye,  and  the  whole 
countenance  serene  and  sweet  in  frank  sincerity,  is  but  the 
diffused  light  of  a  pure  mind  through  the  windows  of  its  tem- 
porary tabernacle ;  and  this  is  still  but  a  faint  reflection  of  the 

41 


42  PURE    MORALITY. 

glowing  splendor  of  the  spirit  itself,  shining  out  that  it  may- 
know  and  approve  its  own  glory.  As  no  countenance  can  be 
fair  except  as  brightened  by  candor,  so  no  soul  can  be  lovely 
and  worthy,  no  character  can  be  virtuous,  which  has  not  a 
pure-hearted  simplicity  and  sincerity. 

2.  There  nmst  be  decision.  The  most  pure-hearted  sincerity 
will  want  the  dignity  and  manliness  of  virtue,  without  the  firm 
resolve  and  the  strong  will  to  carry  the  honest  intention  into 
execution.  The  loveliness  of  virtue  is  in  its  purity ;  but  the 
strength  and  dignity  of  virtue  is  in  its  manly  valor.  The  coun- 
tenance of  virtue  is  not  only  light  with  its  calm  eye  and  open 
brow,  but  its  lip  is  firm  and  its  look  steady.  Every  rising  ap- 
petite that  would  debase  the  spirit,  in  its  passionate  gratification, 
is  held  back  with  a  determined  grasp ;  and  a  tight  and  steady 
curb  is  put  upon  the  entire  animal  nature.  The  triumphs  of 
human  virtue  never  terminate  here  in  a  complete  conquest. 
The  conflicting  appetites  of  the  animal,  though  restrained,  still 
exist ;  and  the  loose  rein,  thrown  upon  the  neck  for  a  single 
hour,  may  be  the  signal  for  their  waking  in  untamed  wildness, 
and  plunging  into  the  most  ruinous  excesses.  There  must  be  the 
element  of  a  strong  will,  or  all  virtue  is  essentially  defective. 

3.  There  must  be  independence.  That  is  not  virtue  which 
waits  on  another's  help,  or  follows  only  another's  example. 
Alone  and  single-handed,  deserted  and  derided  by  the  multi- 
tude, the  virtuous  man  has  still  an  eye  just  as  clear,  a  brow 
just  as  calm,  a  look  just  as  steady,  and  a  step  just  as  firm  in 
the  way  of  duty,  as  when  the  path  is  trodden  by  thousands  at 
his  side.  What  others  may  think,  or  say,  or  do,  is  nothing  to 
him.  The  worthiness  of  his  own  spirit  is  to  be  sustained ;  and 
the  clear  conviction  of  what  that  demands,  and  the  complacency 
which  that  imparts,  hold  him  steadfast  no  matter  where  the 
multitude  are  going.  He  speaks  his  own  word,  holds  up  his 
own  hand,  stands  on  his  own  feet,  and  disdains  that  another 
should  lead  or  drive  him,  without  his  own  firm  conviction  of 
the  rightness  of  the  course. 


THE  ESSENCE  OF  ALL  VIRTUE.  43 


II. 

THERE  ARE  MANY  PARTICULAR  VIRTUES. 

All  virtue  is,  in  general,  one  ;  and  is  pure-minded,  decided, 
and  independent.  But  this  is  also  consistent  with  there  being 
many  particular  virtues,  in  the  pursuit  of  many  subordinate 
ends.  The  one  great  end,  and  in  this  the  one  comprehensive 
virtue,  is  the  attainment  by  every  man  of  the  highest  spiritual 
worthiness.  This  is  the  complete  virtue,  and  gives  perfection 
to  the  moral  character.  But  this  is  not  secured  in  any  one 
single  act,  and  only  through  a  perpetual  course  of  action ;  and 
this  course  of  action  not  directed  in  the  pursuit  of  any  partic- 
ular object,  but,  as  occasion  may  catl,  in  the  attainment  of 
many  objects.  The  one  great  end  will  demand  the  attainment 
of  the  proper  object  at  the  proper  time. 

So  neither  is  man  the  subject  of  one  particular  right  or  im- 
perative ;  but  he  has  many  rights  and  many  duties,  and  therein 
he  has  occasion  to  exercise  himself  in  many  virtuous  deeds. 
Thus,  to  attain  the  highest  virtue,  man  wall  be  required  to 
exhibit,  each  in  its  proper  time,  the  virtues  of  veracity,  honesty, 
charity,  temperance,  frugality,  etc. ;  nor  could  the  comprehen- 
sive virtue  be  attained,  except  in  the  attainment  at  the  proper 
times  of  the  particular  virtues.  Pure  morality  will  in  this  way 
include  as  many  particular  virtues,  as  the  one  grand  end  of 
morality'  may  at  various  times  call  forth. 

In  looking  to  the  varied  objects  to  which  the  action  of  man 
may  have  reference,  we  may  classify  according  to  some  natural 
peculiarities,  and  thus  arrange  our  order  for  considering  the 
particular  virtues. 

A  comprehensive  Method  may  here  be  given,  which  will  at 


44  PURE    MORALITY. 

one  view  disclose  the  order  of  investigation  that  will  be  pursued 
in  the  Part  of  Pure  Morality  : 

I.  DUTIES  TO  MANKIND. 

1.  Personal  Duties. 

a.  Self-control. 

b.  Self- culture. 

2.  Relative  Duties. 

a.  Kindness. 

b.  Respect. 

II.  DUTIES  TO  OTHER  THAN  MANKIND. 

1.  Duties  to  nature. 

2.  Duties  to  God. 


I.    DUTIES  TO  MANKIND. 


CHAPTER   I. 
I.   Personal  Duties,     Self-control. 

BY  personal  Duties  are  meant  such  as  belong  to  one's  self, 
and  are  rev^ealed  in  each  man  as  due  to  his  own  being. 
Inasmuch  as  I  am  a  rational  person,  and  my  ultimate  law  of 
action  is  that  which  requires  me  to  act  worthy  of  this  high 
endowment,  there  are  many  duties  to  myself  beside  the  duties 
to  others  which  the  same  law  of  reason  will  disclose.  The 
ultimate  Rule  of  the  highest  worthiness  of  reason  will  demand 
from  myself  the  highest  attainable  perfection  in  all  things  ;  and 
will  apply  negatively,  —  that  I  avoid  all  injury  by  self-control ; 
and  also  positively,  —  that  I  secure  all  practicable  improvement 
by  self-culture.  The  first,  under  the  virtue  of  self-control,  will 
occupy  the  present  chapter. 

A  moral  Laiv  is  a  rule  imposed  upon  a  man  ;  a  moral  Maxim 
is  a  rule  adopted  by  a  man.  Pure  morality  may  make  a  certain 
maxim  to  be  law,  in  the  sense  that  it  imposes  upon  the  man 
the  duty  to  adopt  the  maxim ;  but  it  is  known  as  maxim,  not 
from  its  being  imposed  by  morality,  but  only  from  its  being 
voluntarily  adopted  by  the  person.  Inasmuch  as  we  are  now 
to  consider  the  duties  which  man  owes  to  himself,  we  are  vir- 
tually determining  the  maxims  which  every  man  should  propose 
to  himself  in  the  regulation  of  his  own  conduct,  and  the  most 
conclusive  and  consistent  way  of  grouping  the  particular  duties 
together,  will  be  found  by  this  application  of  the  several  distinct 

45 


46  PURE    MORALITY. 

maxims  which  morality  would  make  it  incumbent  on  every  man 
to  adopt.  Under  the  maxim  will  be  appropriately  classified  the 
duties,  and  we  shall  use  the  maxim  indiscriminately  for  both 
commanded  duties  and  forbidden  offences,  and  thus  take  occa- 
sion to  introduce  the  virtues  or  the  opposite  vices,  as  con- 
venience may  dictate. 

The  grand  maxim  for  this  virtue  of  self-control,  is,  "  Bear 
AND  Forbear."  It  will  comprehensively  embrace  all  the  vir- 
tues included  in  self-control,  although  there  will  be  an  advan- 
tage in  breaking  up  the  general  maxim  into  several  less  general, 
but  which  will  each  still  include  many  duties. 

I.  ^^  Do  thyself  no  harm!'''  By  this  maxim,  morality  would 
guard  all  bodily  members  and  all  mental  faculties.  The  physi- 
cal constitution  is,  throughout,  adapted  to  the  grand  end  of 
the  spirit,  and  it  is,  therefore,  a  reasonable  requirement  upon 
each  man  to  preserve,  as  far  as  lies  within  his  power,  his  entire 
constitutional  nature  inviolate.  All  over-taxing  and  straining  any 
member  or  faculty ;  all  enervating  habits  and  careless  neglect, 
which  leaves  the  body  or  mind  to  suffer ;  all  injurious  methods 
of  dress  or  diet,  or  general  regimen,  which  bring  any  violence 
to  nature ;  or,  in  fine,  any  acting  or  withholding  to  act,  which 
weakens,  deranges,  or  paralyses  any  portion  of  the  human 
system,  are  forbidden  in  this  maxim,  and  are  to  be  excluded 
as  vices  reproachful  to  man's  spiritual  dignity.  All  excessive 
indulgence,  and  all  engrossing  attention  to  business  or  study, 
whereby  the  physical  powers  become  debilitated  or  disordered, 
are  in  like  manner  here  prohibited.  But  besides  these  general 
applications  of  the  maxim,  we  may  introduce  several  specific 
topics  of  excluded  vices  or  included  virtues  which  we  will  now 
more  fully  particularize. 

I.  Maiming.  By  this  is  to  be  understood  any  bodily  injury 
or  dismemberment  wliich  lames  or  disfigures  the  person. 
The  polling  of  the  hair,  clipping  of  the  beard,  or  paring  of  the 
nails,  may  be  demanded  by  comeliness  or  cleanliness,  and  the 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  47 

neglect  subject  to  great  inconveniences ;  and  decay  may  make 
it  salutary  to  remove  a  tooth,  and  disease  to  amputate  a  limb  ; 
and  in  all  such  cases  the  maiming  may  be  a  virtue,  as  really 
dignifying  and  not  debasing  the  man.  But  whatever  mars  the 
human  constitution,  or  would  be  a  disgrace  to  the  person  in  the 
circumstances,  is  forbidden.  A  man  might  lose  his  hair  or  a 
tooth,  in  the  above  view,  with  no  disparagement  to  his  moral 
character;  but  one  who  should  shave  off  the  hair  or  pull  the 
teeth  for  a  reward,  would  necessarily  incur  an  indignity  which 
morality  would  condemn. 

Among  more  barbarous  people,  the  practice  of  disfiguring 
and  scarring  the  body,  or  terribly  distorting  and  maiming  it,  is 
by  no  means  uncommon ;  and  any  lingering  habits  of  such 
violence,  for  forcing  a  more  fashionable  shape,  or  attaching 
artificial  ornaments,  are  offences  both  against  a  pure  civilization 
and  a  pure  morality.  Emasculation,  for  purposes  of  improving 
the  voice,  adapting  one's  self  to  serving  in  a  seraglio,  or  from  a 
mistaken  view  of  repressing  occasions  of  temptation,  is  a  most 
vicious  degradation  of  manhood,  and  abhorrent  to  all  moral 
sentiment. 

2.  Self-torture.  All  penances,  mortifications,  fastings,  and 
rigid  austerities,  by  which  health  is  undermined  and  the  con- 
stitution weakened,  are  condemned  by  a»  pure  morality  as  a 
'vicious  indignity  to  the  person  and  an  unwarranted  invasion  of 
the  constitutional  integrity.  Superstition  often  exacts  that  which 
morality  forbids ;  but  a  true  piety  never  demands  immoralities. 
It  always  exalts,  and  in  nothing  debases  humanity.  Constitu- 
tional nature  may  never  righteously  be  violated  for  purposes  of 
spiritual  discipline.  The  Saviour's  announcement  of  the  law 
of  the  Sabbath,  is  the  divine  example  for  all  Christian  ordinances, 
that  it  is  made  for  man,  not  man  for  it.  It  is  never  to  be  pushed 
in  its  strictness  to  man's  physical  injury.  Mercy,  as  a  regard  to 
constitutional  welfare,  is  higher  than  sacrifice.  The  fasts  and 
self-denials,  that  true  Christianity  enjoins,  will  rather  invigorate 
than  enfeeble  the  human  system. 


48  PURE    MORALITY. 

3.  Suicide.  The  highest  immorality  against  this  maxim  is 
suicide.  In  this  the  violence  to  constitutional  being  reaches 
to  its  utter  destruction.  Man's  duty  is  to  cherish  and  preserve 
life,  not  to  destroy  it.  The  instinct  of  nature  is  strong  towards 
the  preservation  of  life,  and  to  guard  against  and  ward  off  what- 
ever may  threaten  it,  so  that  the  act  of  the  suicide  is  most  shock- 
ingly unnatural.  It'  is  sometimes  asked,  has  not  the  man  the 
right  to  withdraw  himself  from  the  contests  or  the  tedium  of 
life,  when  hfe  itself  becomes  a  burden  ?  The  answer  is  a  most 
decided  negative,  when  the  ultimate  end  of  life  is  truly  appre- 
hended. This  end  is  not  happiness,  and  thus  permission  for 
voluntary  release  when  misery  becomes  unavoidable,  but  spirit- 
ual worthiness,  and  which  may  be  gained  and  preserved  in  any 
position,  and  in  none  more  fully  than  amid  disappointments, 
afflictions,  and  bereavements.  The  claim  is,  to  stand  up  in 
manly  dignity  and  preserve  the  entire  person,  body  and  soul, 
in  full  integrity,  keeping  the  spirit  brave  and  pure  while  the 
flesh  suffers,  and  not  cowardly  to  fly  the  post  providentially 
assigned  because  disasters  multiply. 

4.  Self-defence.  If  I  am  to  restrain  my  own  hand  from 
self-injury,  it  is  my  duty  to  ward  off  injuries  to  myself  from 
other  sources.  The  man  would  be  immoral,  who  should  unre- 
sistingly allow  foreseen  dangers  to  come  upon  him.  This  is 
quite  clear,  when  the  danger  threatened  is  from  nature,  or  from 
a  wild  beast.  No  violence  done  to  nature,  or  to  an  animal, 
invades  any  rights  which  can  lie  in  nature  or  an  animal;  and 
when  this  violence  is  in  self-defence,  my  duty  to  myself  de- 
mands it.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  self-defence  where  no  rights 
are  invaded. 

But  when  attacked  by  a  person,  may  I  defend  myself  by 
assaulting  and  disabling  him?  The  dictate  of  pure  morality 
seems  plain  in  the  affirmative.  If  I  only  disable  in  self-defence, 
I  may  ever  afterward  regret  that  necessity  as  a  misfortune  ;  but 
if  it  has  gone  to  the  extent  of  taking  life  where  this  was  neces- 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  49 

sary  to  shield  my  own,  I  shall  not  feel  debased  by  it ;  nor  does 
the  common  judgment  of  men  condemn  me.  The  courts  ex- 
cuse a  homicide  required  by  self-defence.  This  is  not  because 
I,  if  assailed,  have  any  right  to  punish  the  assailant.  To  repel 
a  wrong  and  to  requite  a  wrong  are  two  very  different  matters, 
and  my  only  right  when  attacked  is  the  right  to  repel  the  attack 
only  so  far 'as  this  may  be  requisite  for  my  own  defence.  When 
this  is  done,  the  assailant  has  no  right  to  complain,  nor  I  any 
reason  to  feel  self-degradation.  It  would  have  been  unworthy 
of  me  to  have  passively  assented  to  the  injury,  and  allowed  my 
own  rights  to  have  been  wantonly  and  wickedly  destroyed.  The 
general  maxim,  "  Bear  and  forbear,"  does  not  exclude  the  right 
of  self-defence. 

But  is  not  Christianity  against  it?  "Forgive  your  enemies." 
"  Resist  not  evil."  "  If  one  take  your  cloak,  give  him  also  your 
coat ;"  "if  he  smite  on  one  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  other  also." 
The  full  prohibition  here  is  of  revenge.  Vengeance  is  the 
Lord's,  Qot  for  any  man.  Where  the  injury  is  ini^icted,  let  God 
avenge,  not  yourself.  Rather  let  the  injury  be  repeated,  than  to 
retaliate.  Forgive  him  ;  do  him  good  ;  "heap  coals  of  fire  on 
his  head."  This  will  melt  and  subdue,  rather  than  vengeance. 
The  whole  spirit  of  Christianity  looks  at  injuries  in  this  aspect, 
and  pure  morality  would  do  the  same.  Even  in  strict  self- 
defence,  the  least  blending  of  retaliatory  vengeance  would  be 
unworthy  of  me,  and  thus  an  immorality.  But  self-defence 
may  be,  and  should  be,  without  revenge.  The  disabling  of  the 
assailant  must  be  done  solely  to  save  myself,  not  to  take  ven- 
geance on  him ;  and  with  that  spirit,  even  to  the  extent  of 
taking  life  to  save  my  own,  Christianity  as  well  as  morality  will 
justify  it. 

2.  "Keep  your  body  under.^''  To  permit  the  gratification  of 
any  appetite  to  become  an  end  of  life,  is  to  allow  the  flesh 
to  tvTannize  over  the  spirit  and  bring  it  into  a  most  unworthy 
bondage.    No  want,  however  craving,  may  rule  over  an  impera- 


50  PURE    MORALITY. 

tive  in  man's  spiritual  being.  The  indulgence  of  such  want 
would  be  a  vice,  not  merely  as  inducing  injury  to  the  consti- 
tution and  thus  violating  the  former  maxim,  "  do  thyself  no 
harm,"  but  here,  as  a  direct  affront  to  the  spirit,  and  immoral 
because  unmanly.  It  would  be  the  man  prostituting  the  pre- 
rogatives of  his  humanity,  and  living  like  the  animal.  No 
tyranny  is  more  degrading  than  when  carnal  appetite  gets  its 
domination  over  the  reason,  and  the  man  sells  himself  in  bond- 
age to  the  flesh.  There  is  no  act  so  base  that  such  a  man  may 
not  do,  and  no  vice  so  vile  that  such  a  man  may  not  practice. 
This  maxim  excludes  : 

I.  Intemperance.  This  more  directly  applies  to  an  exces- 
sive indulgence  in  eating  and  drinking,  though  the  term  prop- 
erly includes  all  immoderate  gratification.  Stimulating  and 
pampering  the  appetite  for  food  and  drink,  and  then  permitting 
this  to  control  as  an  end  in  life,  to  the  exclusion  of  spiritual  and 
moral  claims,  is  a  most  shameful  degradation.  We  do  not  need 
to  look  at  it  in  the  light  of  the  evils  it  entails  upon  the  man,  and 
his  family,  and  the  community ;  sufficient  for  its  deep  con- 
demnation as  an  immorality,  when  we  see  the  baseness  and  the 
vileness  of  a  spirit  which  consents  to  forego  and  sacrifice  its 
own  high  prerogatives,  and  discard  its  claims  to  rightful  sov- 
ereignty, that  the  body  may  be  surfeited  with  riotous  living. 

In  the  case  of  strong  drink  another  appetite  is  awakened, 
more  raging  and  insatiate  than  the  strongest  thirst.  The  diffu- 
sion of  the  alcohol  through  the  system  awakens  a  wild  but 
pleasurable  excitement,  and  ultimately  an  uncontrollable  desire 
to  perpetually  repeat  the  intoxication.  The  languor  and  col- 
lapse of  the  system  after  the  debauch  is  an  insufferable  pain  to 
the  drunkard,  and  nothing  allays  it  but  increased  measures  of 
the  same  stimulant,  so  that  he  is  driven  to  the  cup  by  an  intol- 
erable torment,  as  well  as  allured  by  anticipated  gratification, 
and  before  these  raging  passions  the  spirit  has  sunk,  hopeless 
of  all  recovery  of  its  rightful  dominion.     A  more  pitiable,  and 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  $1 

at  the  same  time  a  more  contemptible  condition  among  men, 
cannot  be  found,  than  that  of  the  confirmed  drunkard.  The 
use  of  the  stimulant,  in  the  most  moderate  degree,  is  a  door 
opened  upon  this  frightful  abyss,  and  thus  all  use  is  dangerous ; 
and  the  most  stringent  reasons  must  be  found  for  its  being  tasted, 
or  it  becomes  an  immorality.  To  tempt  the  dangerous  way,  by 
occasional  convivial  indulgence,  is  already  a  spiritq^il  indignity 
that  no  pure-minded  man  would  bear. 

2.  Licentiousness.  This  includes  all  illicit  indulgence  of  the 
sexual  passion,  though  every  unlawful  gratification  is  properly 
licentious.  The  perpetuation  of  the  race  depends  upon  this 
constitutional  inclination,  and  hence '  the  necessity  and  the  be- 
nevolence of  its  deep  and  universal  implantation  in  human  na- 
ture. The  consequences  depending  could  not  be  safely  left  to 
weak  impulses  ;  but  this  very  necessity,  in  the  nature  of  the 
case,  induces  the  greater  danger  of  spiritual  degradation  and 
debasement  from  it.  Hence  God,  in  nature,  has  surrounded  it 
by  the  many  checks  and  safeguards  of  the  native  modesty  and 
precious  estimate  of  virtue  in  the  pure,  the  public  disgrace  and 
self-reproach  which  attaches  to  the  impure,  the  most  inveterate 
and  loathsome  diseases  which  follow  in  its  train,  and  the  debas- 
ing of  every  refined  sensibility  which  follows  on  the  loss  of 
sexual  virtue.  By  the  positive  institution  of  marriage,  God  has 
also  tempered  and  regulated  the  sexual  propensity,  and  tran- 
quilized  its  impulses,  so  that,  even  in  the  necessity  for  its 
strength,  it  may  be  held  by  every  one  in  legitimate  subjection  to 
the  dignity  of  the  spirit.  Only  in  regulated  marriage  is  sexual 
intercourse  consistent  with  virtue,  while  all  forms  of  fornication, 
seduction,  prostitution,  and  adultery,  are  vices  that  terribly  de- 
grade and  debase  the  immortal  spirit.  We  look  not  now  to  the 
physical  evils  attendant  upon  licentiousness,  and  which  greatly 
aggravate  its  immorality;  but  the  conscious  vilencss  of  the 
spirit  of  the  debauchee  is  his  own  perpetual  monitor  of  the 
viciousness  of  his  practice.  The  presence  of  virtue  and  purity 
is  a  perpetual  reproach  to  him. 


52  PURE    MORALITY. 

3.  Ambition.  This,  when  understood  in  a  bad  sense  as  a 
vice,  includes  an  inordinate  desire  for  power  and  control  over 
the  actions  of  other  men.  To  seek  power  and  attain  it  for  the 
ends  of  spiritual  worthiness,  if  it  be  called  ambition,  is  a  virtue. 
It  becomes  a  vice  when  the  power  is  desired  as  a  lust  of  agran- 
dizement,  or  as  a  means  of  ministering  to  any  other  constitu- 
tional appetite.  It  is  the  putting  of  the  false  dignity  and  honor 
of  popular  distinction  in  the  place  of  that  which  truly  dignifies 
and  ennobles  the  spirit.  It  is  thus  the  same  vice  as  before ; 
putting  under  the  spirit  and  not  the  body. 

The  consequences  of  inordinate  ambition  have  been  always 
dreadful  in  the  world  :  oppression,  cruelty,  war,  and  bloodshed. 
But  the  great  vice  in  the  eye  of  pure  morality,  is  the  exceeding 
degradation  of  the  ambitious  man.  In  the  midst  of  all  his 
proud  triumphs,  and  the  ser\'ile  homage  and  flattery  he  is  re- 
ceiving, his  own  spirit  is  conscious  that  it  could  not  come  into 
the  presence  of  a  truly  glorious  and  dignified  soul,  without  a 
sense  of  self-contempt  and  conscious  unworthiness.  None  of 
his  honors  will  bear  uncovering  in  the  presence  of  his  own 
spirit.  When  he  mus.t  retire  alone  and  commune  with  his  own 
conscience,  he  knows  that  he  is  not  only  naked  and  empty, 
out  debased  and  unworthy.  He  has  not  pursued  such  ends  as 
give  spiritual  dignity,  but  he  has  discarded  these  ends  for  sensu- 
ous cravings,  and  gained  only  vanity  and  self-abhorrence  before 
his  own  judging  and  awarding  spirit. 

4.  CovETOusNESS.  A  man  may  covet  any  possession,  but 
the  term  applies  to  an  avaricious  disposition,  seeking  inordinate- 
ly to  amass  wealth.  It  need  not  be  dishonest  in  attaining,  but 
it  is  putting  wealth,  however  attained,  as  the  end  of  the  active 
life  and  not  the  worthiness  of  the  spiritual  character.  Wealth 
may  consist  in  any  possessions  of  property,  but  more  especially 
in  money  as  the  representative  of  all  property.  In  the  avari- 
cious desire  for  money,  the  baseness  of  covetousness  more  spe- 
cially manifests  itself.     It  comes  to  transfer  its  idolatry,  from 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  53 

the  objects  which  might  minister  to  sensual  appetite  to  that 
which  is  only  their  representative  ;  and  ultimately  to  that,  not 
as  the  representative  of  any  thing  it  means  to  take  in  exchange 
for  it,  but  for  the  gold  itself,  and  sordidly  hugs  the  treasure,  not 
in  any  anticipation  of  coming  enjoyment,  but  solely  in  the  ava- 
ricious lust  of  possessing  money. 

How  debasing  is  this  vice  may  always  be  seen  in  its  effects. 
It  swallows  up  and  absorbs  all  other  emotions.  The  miser  lives 
and  feels  only  in  his  gold.  Want  and  misery  in  any  form  may 
present  themselves,  but  his  heart  is  callous  to  all  distress.  He 
denies  himself  all  the  comforts  of  life,  and  barely  subsists  in  the 
use  of  the  plainest  necessaries  that  he  may  daily  add  a  little 
more  to  his  large  accumulations.  He  not  only  loses  all  noble- 
ness of  spu-it,  but  more  than  almost  any  other  vicious  man  loses 
the  apprehension  of  what  real  spiritual  dignity  is.  The  volup- 
tuar}',  whether  the  drunkard  or  the  debauchee,  often  feels  a 
keen  disgust  of  his  pleasures,  and  to  the  ambitious  man  there 
come  times  when  the  unsatisfying  nature  of  all  that  he  has 
gained  gives  him  bitter  mourning,  but  the  miser  never  seems 
to  feel  his  real  wTCtchedness.  The  inner  light  has  so  nearly 
gone  out,  that  he  seems  to  have  lost  all  consciousness  of  his 
degradation  in  the  loss  of  all  apprehension  of  what  is  due  to 
his  spirit.  His  reverence  is  gone ;  his  sense  of  self-respect 
is  gone ;  his  moral  shame  is  gone,  and  his  whole  sentient 
being  has  become  almost  as  torpid  as  the  gold  he  worships. 
This  is  the  ultimate  goal  of  avarice,  and  discloses  how  detest- 
able a  vice  it  is. 

3.  Rule  your  own  spirit.  The  spiritual  in  humanity  is  de- 
graded whenever  it  submits  to  have  ends  imposed  upon  it,  and 
yields  itself  blindly  to  the  dictates  of  another.  Self-possession 
and  self-direction  are  essential  to  virtue  ;  and  the  obligation, 
to  take  upon  himself  the  control  of  his  own  conduct,  is  inalien- 
able from  man.  No  one  can  rightfully  give  up  this  responsibility 
to  another,  and  no  one  can  rightfully  assume  it  for  another. 


54  PURE    MORALITY. 

The  true  dignity  of  man's  spiritual  being  can  be  sustained  in 
no  other  manner  than  by  his  proposing  to  himself  the  ends 
of  reason,  and  resisting  to  the  last  extremity  all  interference 
with  tliis  inalienable  prerogative.  There  can  be  no  question 
allowed  as  to  whether  he  may  not  live  longer,  or  avoid  more 
care,  by  allowing  his  spirit  to  be  ruled  by  some  other  agency 
than  himself;  the  assent  to  such  dictation  is  a  renunciation 
of  the  prerogatives  of  personaUty  and  consenting  to  become 
a  thing,  and  thereby  an  attempt  to  abdicate  the  authority  of 
his  own  rationality,  than  which  nothing  can  be  more  debasing. 
It  is  man  renouncing  his  manhood,  and  voluntarily  taking  the 
place  of  the  animal,  to  be  used  by  others. 

The  submission  to  the  claims  of  a  righteous  debt,  complying 
with  the  conditions  of  a  contract,  or  yielding  to  the  demands 
of  righteous  authority,  is  no  renunciation  of  the  control  over 
my  own  spirit ;  for  in  each  case  I  see  the  rule  which  binds 
my  conscience,  and  which  it  would  be  unworthy  of  myself  to 
disregard.  But  to  sacrifice  the  authority  and  integrity  of  my 
spirit,  by  allowing  circumstances,  or  other  persons  to  impose 
their  own  ends  upon  me,  would  be  feloniously  to  destroy  my 
moral  self,  and  make  it  better  for  me  not  to  have  been  born. 
Better  not  to  have  had  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of  a 
person,  than  in  having  them  basely  to  surrender  and  aUenate 
tliem. 

This  maxim  stands  opposed  to  : 

I.  Servility.  This  includes  not  only  the  assent  to  be  a 
slave  and  obey  a  master  who  regards  only  his  own  ends,  but 
all  mean  submission  and  cringing  or  fawning  sycophancy.  To 
put  myself  so  under  the  control  of  a  military  leader,  that  I  can- 
not comply  with  the  claims  of  morality  and  religion ;  or,  to  sur- 
render my  soul  to  the  keeping  of  any  minister  of  religion,  that 
he  may  direct  my  faith  and  determine  all  my  devotional  service, 
which  I  only  blindly  adopt  from  him  ;  or,  to  yield  myself  to  a 
master,  who  consults  his  own  pleasure  and  uses  me  only  for  his 


PERSONAL    DUTIES,  55 

purposes ;  all  these  would  be  openly  renouncing  my  manhood 
and  giving  away  my  personality,  and  would  be  most  severely 
condemned  by  morality. 

But  much  more  comprehensively,  this  maxim  excludes  very 
many  unworthy  exhibitions  of  a  slavish  spirit  among  multitudes 
who  would  claim  the  dignity  of  freemen.  Many  shrink  from 
known  duty  before  the  opposition  of  power,  or  a  perverse  public 
sentiment;  others  yield  to  custom,  and  follow  the  fashion  in 
matters  of  a  moral  bearing,  and  thus  renounce  their  own  judg- 
ment for  the  caprices  of  the  multitude ;  and  others  identify 
themselves  with  some  party,  and  give  up  opinion  and  practice, 
measures  and  influence,  as  the  party  may  direct.  Private  judg- 
ment is  renounced,  and  personal  responsibility  discarded,  and 
men  thus  become  the  mere  drift-wood  on  the  current  which 
others  are  controlling. 

Servility,  also,  often  takes  the  form  of  hypocrisy,  which  con- 
ceals real  convictions,  or  makes  pretence  of  such  as  it  has  not, 
and  dare  not  stand  out  in  open  acknowledgment  of  its  honest 
sentiment ;  it  shows  itself  in  cowering  before  arrogance,  in 
flattery  to  get  favor,  in  ostentatious  humility  to  procure  praise, 
and  gratuitous  self-disparagement  to  induce  undeserved  com- 
mendation ;  and  in  all  cases  manifests  a  want  of  manliness  and 
dignity  highly  derogatory  to  a  rational  spirit.  The  man  does 
not  rule  himself,  but  he  allows  other  things  to  rule  him.  He  is 
a  mere  trimmer  and  time-server,  or  a  mere  tool  in  the  hands  of 
others,  with  no  self-decision  and  manly  independence. 

2.  Vanity.  This,  as  the  name  imports,  is  mere  self-inflation  ; 
making  large  assumptions  and  speaking  "great  swelling  words," 
when  the  real  character  is  empty  of  all  solid  attainments.  It 
abundantly  manifests  a  want  of  self-possession,  and  consents  to 
exchange  that  self-complacency  which  a  spirit  that  rules  itself 
worthily  acquires,  for  that  self-conceit  which  self-ignorance 
induces. 

This   also   appears   in   divers    forms.      Persons    may   over- 


56  PURE   MORALITY. 

value  particular  qualifications  or  possessions,  and  show  a  false 
pride  in  their  beauty  or  strength,  their  talents  or  station,  their 
dress  or  equipage,  while  disregarding  all  obligation  to  attain 
such  real  excellences  as  would  adorn  and  ennoble.  There  is 
often  exhibited  with  such  a  thirst  for  popular  applause,  which 
is  most  reproachful  to  all  true  worth,  by  thrusting  themselves 
forward  on  all  occasions  ;  obtruding  upon  pubhc  notice  in  most 
conspicuous  positions,  and  making  lofty  pretensions  ;  turning 
conversation  upon  themes  which  will  give  prominence  to  their 
deeds,  or  occasion  to  gratify  a  perpetual  egotism  ;  and  a  boast- 
ing demeanor,  which  vaunts  of  their  success  and  parades  their 
possessions,  despising  the  unfortunate  and  throwing  contempt 
upon  all  their  competitors.  It  is  in  one  respect  more  unfortu- 
nate than  most  vices.  The  vain  man  cannot  refrain  from  his 
perpetual  ostentation,  and  yet  he  can  nowhere  show  himself 
without  exposing  his  emptiness.  It  necessitates  the  contempt 
due  to  all  destitution  of  worth  and  dignity. 

3.  Jealousy.  This  term  is  used  here  to  cover  a  wide  region 
of  vicious  manifestations  among  mankind  of  a  spirit  selfishly 
greedy  for  its  own  indulgence,  and  malevolently  averse  to  all 
enjoyment  by  others.  It  may  have  other  names  of  envy,  ha- 
tred, malice,  revenge,  etc.,  according  to  the  different  circum- 
stances of  its  exhibition  and  degrees  of  intensity. 

We  not  seldom  find  those  who  habitually  dwell  upon  their 
own  wants  and  woes,  and  magnify  their  own  misfortunes  and 
afilictions,  and  set  over  against  their  poverty  and  hardships  the 
abundance  and  enjoyment  of  others,  and  thus  keep  themselves 
in  a  perpetually  peevish  discontent  and  petulant  complaining. 
Their  fretfulness  drives  away  all  comfort,  their  murmuring  ex- 
cludes all  gratitude ;  and  they  cannot  enjoy  what  they  have, 
because  some  one  has  received  so  much  more  ;  nor  sympathize 
with  any  other's  distress,  because  their  son'ows  have  been  so 
much  greater.  Such  a  temper  ripens  on  to  a  more  gloomy  and 
sullen  discontent.     It  broods  over  real  ills  or  imagined  injuries, 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  "         57 

and  thus  nurses  a  spirit  of  misanthropy  and  malevolence,  which 
either  rankles  in  secret  hatred,  or  comes  out  in  fits  of  anger 
and  revenge.  The  evils  to  himself  and  others  abundantly  show 
the  vice  of  a  jealous  temper,  and  the  inveteracy  of  such  a  habit, 
once  formed,  testifies  that  "  greater  is  he  that  ruleth  his  own 
spirit  than  he  who  taketh  a  city." 

4.  False-honor.  When  a  man  looks  steadily  at  his  own 
spiritual  being,  and  completely  knows  himself,  he  will  have  a 
true  estimation  of  what  is  real  dignity  and  worth.  In  the  appre- 
hension of  what  is  the  intrinsic  excellency  of  humanity,  he  ^^■iIl 
see  at  once  what  is  due  to  himself,  and  what  is  due  from  him- 
self to  others.  True  honor  will  be  found  in  that  course  which 
secures  the  highest  spiritual  worthiness.  But  when  a  man  turns 
off  the  eye  from  his  rational  spirit,  and  looks  out  upon  popular 
opinion  and  public  estimation,  and  deems  that  to  be  honor 
which  gives  him  reputation  among  the  multitude,  he  has  come 
to  an  estimate  of  personal  dignity  most  false  and  really  degrad- 
ing. His  honor  is  not  worthiness,  but  popular  repute ;  his 
standard  is  not  that  which  requires  inward  excellency,  but  that 
which  follows  human  opinion ;  and  instead  of  ruling  his  own 
spirit,  the  conventional  maxims  and  factitious  customs  of  the 
society  where  he  may  happen  to  dwell  will  rule  him. 

This  is  a  great  immorality,  and  leads  to  many  enormities. 
The  man  soon  becomes  most  morbidly  sensitive  to  the  applica- 
tion of  the  outer  standard,  since  he  has  no  clear  apprehension 
of  the  standard  within ;  and  he  is  jealous  and  resentful,  arms 
himself  to  protect  his  false  dignity,  and  challenges  his  friend 
and  meets  him  in  deadly  combat,  to  keep  himself  in  counte- 
nance with  the  society  about  him.  He  kills  his  friend,  or  lets  his 
friend  kill  him,  for  public  reputation ;  but  he  has  no  courage  to 
face  public  opinion  for  inward  worthiness'  sake.  The  whole 
immorality  of  the  quick,  fiery,  resentful,  duelling  spirit,  so  rife  in 
some  portions  of  society,  is  best  seen  in  this  very  point.  The 
honor  which  defers  to  a  popular  and  perhaps  perverse  estima- 


58  PURE    MORALITY. 

tion,  instead  of  standing  by  the  standard  of  what  the  worthiness 
of  the  spirit  requires,  is  the  spirit's  greatest  indignity. 

5.  Gambling.  This  is  the  risking  of  one's  possessions  upon 
chance.  It  is  the  abandonment  of  wisdom,  and  the  acceptance 
of  an  issue,  which  the  gambler  not  only  cannot  foresee,  but 
respecting  which  he  has  no  conviction  that  it  will  be  rationally 
determined.  He  sets  aside  his  reason,  he  goes  upon  a  guess 
which  has  no  foundation,  or  even  proceeds  without  a  guess,  and 
thus  besides  blindly  risking  a  possession,  which  he  has  no  right 
io  own  except  with  the  obligation  to  use  it  wisely,  he  blindfolds 
himself  where  his  first  and  clearest  duty  is  to  see.  It  is  un- 
worthy of  reason  thus  to  do,  for  it  is  the  surrender  of  the  self- 
possession  and  the  self-control  of  which  reason  can  only  be 
unreasonably  deprived. 


CHAPTER   11. 
I.  Personal  Duties.     Self -culture. 

It  is  not  a  sufficient  fulfillment  of  our  personal  duties  that 
we  control  ourselves  from  all  that  will  induce  harm;  we  are 
morally  bound  to  advance  to  as  high  a  degree  of  perfection  as 
is  attainable,  and  improve  ourselves  in  all  things  as  we  have 
opportunity.  This  perpetual  and  complete  self-culture  of  every 
bodily  and  mental  faculty  is  due  in  the  right  of  our  o^^^l  spirit- 
ual being,  and  it  is  unworthy  of  any  man  to  neglect  any  por- 
tion of  his  person  which  admits  of  improvement.  The  general 
maxim  is,  —  Secure  a  complete  self-development.  The  moral 
force  of  the  maxim  appears  in  the  following  considerations. 

Every  germ  expands  to  maturity  through  the  energizing  of  an 
inner  vital  force,  and  no  unfolding  from  the  outside  should  be 
called  a  development.    Each  living  germ  has  its  own  rudimental 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  59 

forms  vvithiii  it,  and  the  li\'ing  energy  works,  as  occasion  is 
given,  through  these  forms,  and  thereby  induces  a  growth 
according  to  the  law  within  the  subject  itself.  The  conditions 
being  given,  the  whole  growth  takes  an  orderly  and  symmet- 
rical progress  to  its  consummation.  Nothing  new  can  be 
inserted  in  the  germ;  the  vital  force,  the  determining  form, 
and  the  rudimental  elements  are  already  given,  and  the  culture 
can  be  only  outside  appliances  to  occasion  the  development  of 
what  is  now  within. 

Plants  and  animals  are  subjected  to  such  conditions  as  nature 
throws  around  them,  and  must  thus  grow  to  maturity  under  a 
necessity  of  both  external  and  internal  determinations.  But 
to  man  is  given  a  capacity  to  superintend  himself  the  entire 
development  of  body  and  mind.  He  can  add  nothing  to  the 
rudiments  already  there,  and  can  change  none  of  the  inner 
forms  through  which  the  working  of  the  vital  force  shapes  the 
growing  product ;  yet  can  he  supply  fitting  conditions,  and 
exclude  such  as  are  unfit,  and  perpetuate  these  through  all  the 
process,  and  thereby  bring  out  completely  and  in  due  propor- 
tion all  that  has  been  given.  And  here  applies  the  whole  stress 
of  the  imperative  in  the  above  maxim.  So  select  and  apply  the 
outward  conditions,  that  all  which  is  given  in  the  man  may  be 
perfectly  developed.  A  wilful  or  a  careless  neglect  secures  a 
deficiency  or  a  deformity,  and  this  perpetuates  itself  in  all  sub- 
sequent being,  and  beside  the  reproach  of  the  perpetuated 
physical  deformity,  there  is  an  eternal  debasement  from  the 
moral  delinquency. 

This  general  maxim,  which  binds  every  man  to  the  duty  of- 
self-culture,  may  best  be  apprehended  in  its  ethical  claims,  by 
considering  it  as  it  divides  itself  into  several  other  maxims  less 
general  and  yet  including  each  many  specific  duties  under 
them.  We  shall  here,  as  before,  include  promiscuously  virtues 
to  be  practiced  and  vices  to  be  avoided. 

I.    "  Grc^w  in   stature.'"     This   maxim   includes   the  entire 


6o  PURE    MORALITY. 

physical  development  of  the  man,  and  demands  that  he  be  not 
allowed  to  grow  up  like  the  wild  ass'  colt,  but  under  well-regu- 
lated training  and  discipline  that  shall  secure,  as  far  as  practi- 
cable, a  sound  mind  in  a  sound  body.  All  the  appliances 
which  exjDerience  and  sound  judgment  have  found  to  be  salu- 
tary should  be  induced,  and  all  that  is  deleterious  averted. 
This  is  especially  important  in  childhood  and  youth,  where  the 
whole  constitution  is  the  most  susceptible,  and  the  impressions 
made  in  it  the  most  enduring.  From  a  vicious  neglect  in  this 
respect,  many  children  die  in  infancy,  and  many  others  drag 
on  a  sickly,  deranged,  and  deformed  body  through  life,  the 
whole  misery  of  which  is  chargeable  to  the  culpable  neglect 
of  their  physical  education.  Much  mental  imbecility,  inde- 
cision, and  irresolution,  and  even  cases  of  mental  derangement 
and  idiocy,  find  their  cause  in  the  treatment  received  in  the 
cradle.  The  whole  type  of  the  physical  character  shows  ever 
after  the  effect  of  the  earliest  applications  to  it. 

The  parent,  it  is  true,  must  first  and  earliest  stand  respon- 
sible ;  but  with  the  first  dawnings  of  discretion  and  accounta- 
bility, the  child  should  be  made  to  feel  the  importance,  and 
to  act  under  it,  of  a  careful  regard  to  a  healthy  and  orderly 
physical  development.  Very  early,  responsibilities  begin  to 
rest  upon  the  person  himself,  and  any  injury  done  to  the  health 
or  the  constitution,  by  the  child's  presumption  or  carelessness, 
is  a  vice  as  truly  lying  at  his  door  as  the  consequences  are 
certain  to  enter  into  his  experience.  There  is  here  embraced 
a  careful  regard  to  : 

I.  Diet.  The  earliest  nourishment  which  nature  provides 
from  the  mother,  may  be  so  vitiated  as  to  give  a  perverted  ap- 
petite, a  diseased  constitution,  or  an  early  death.  The  whole 
future  experience  of  an  immortal  being  very  much  depends  up- 
on its  salutary  sustenance  and  nourishment  for  the  first  months 
of  its  existence.  The  carelessness  or  viciousness  of  the  parents 
may  thus  go  down  to  the  third  and  fourth  generation  of  theii 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  6l 

children.  The  mother  may  poison  her  own  blood  by  her  prac- 
tices, or  the  child  be  fed  on  the  milk  of  animals  which  has 
been  poisoned  by  their  food,  and  no  excuses  of  convenience  or 
interest  can  any  more  expiate  the  guilt  than  they  can  remedy 
the  mischief  of  the  conduct.  A  misplaced  tenderness  and  fond- 
ness is  also  ruining  many  constitutions  in  their  infancy  and  child- 
hood, by  an  indulgence  in  crude  fruits,  confectionery,  pastries, 
and  other  so-called  delicacies,  and  though  pleasing  to  the  child 
in  the  indulgence,  is  to  be  terribly  bitter  in  the  subsequent  ex- 
perience. And  through  adult  life,  beside  the  indignity  of  pam- 
pering appetite,  and  living  only  to  eat  and  drink,  there  are  the 
certain  consequences  upon  the  constitution  of  what  we  eat  and 
drink  j  and  all  unwholesome  diet,  all  surfeiting  and  drunken- 
ness, reaches  and  dishonors  the  spirit  by  deranging  the  taberna- 
cle in  which  it  dwells  and  the  only  organism  through  which  it 
can  act.  The  imprudences  and  excesses  in  diet  and  drink 
probably  disfigure  and  derange  more  bodies  and  destroy  more 
lives,  among  the  successive  generations  of  mankind,  than  the 
combined  ravages  of  war  and  pestilence. 

2.  Dress.  Nature  clothes  the  animal  for  the  climate  where 
it  dwells  ;  but  the  unprotected  body  of  man  must  be  clothed  by 
his  own  care.  His  dress  therefore  belongs  to  his  culture.  He 
needs  dress  both  for  the  protection  of  his  body,  and  also  for  the 
ends  of  comeliness  and  adornment.  Reason  expresses  itself  in 
beauty,  and  the  rational  spirit  in  its  self-development  appropri- 
ately clothes  the  body  with  a  dress  expressive  of  the  moral  per- 
sonality which  dwells  within  it.  Dress  thus  becomes  beautiful, 
and  the  body  is  made  more  beautiful  thereby.  An  unclothed 
body  would  be  as  abhorrent  to  the  taste  of  a  well-developed 
person  as  to  his  sense  of  modesty  or  comfort.  But  modesty 
and  comfort  can  never  be  sacrificed  to  fondness  for  fashion  or 
love  of  display  without  an  immorality.  While  modesty  will 
always  be  compatible  with  the  dress  which  is  also  comfortable, 
fashion  may  often  violate  both ;  and  when  it  does  either,  no 


62  PURE    MORALITY. 

purely  moral  person  will  follow  it.  Dress  is  often  so  worn  as  to 
cramp  and  deform  the  person,  or  made  of  so  slight  and  frail  a 
texture  as  to  fail  of  proper  protection,  and  in  each  case  the 
duty  of  the  maxim  is  violated.  Elegance  and  taste  are  shocked 
where  modesty  and  comfort  are  sacrificed,  and  no  fashion  can 
really  make  that  dress  becoming  which  belies  the  very  ends  for 
which  dress  is  worn  at  all.  Protection  to  the  person,  good 
taste,  and  pure  morality  will  always  readily  combine  in  the 
same  garment. 

3.  Exercise.  To  the  young,  life  is  a  perpetual  motion. 
The  necessary  sleep  is  no  sooner  over  than  the  increasing 
activity  again  begins.  Every  constitutional  faculty  is  aug- 
mented and  perfected  in  its  own  exercise.  There  is  no  healthy 
and  vigorous  growth,  in  the  animal  constitution,  without  activity 
and  exertion.  This  becomes  less  impulsive  and  sportive  as 
age  advances  ;  but  so  long  as  the  spirit  dwells  in  the  body,  it 
will  demand  for  its  own  sake  that  the  body  be  used,  and  so 
long  as  there  is  life  in  the  body,  will  the  well-being  of  the  body 
demand  action.  An  idle  man  or  a  slothful  man  will  not  long 
remain  a  vigorous  man.  The  child  needs  the  air  and  the 
sunshine,  as  well  as  the  plant ;  and  the  strongest  constitutions, 
the  most  hardy  men,  are  those  who  have  grown  up  in  active 
employment  in  the  open  winds  of  heaven. 

A  sedentary  employment,  a  student's  occupation,  should  be 
regularly  interrupted  by  periods  of  vigorous  out-door  exercise. 
The  culture  of  the  mind  is  falsely  sought  by  perpetual  applica- 
tion, and  leaving  the  body  through  which  it  must  act  to  enfeeble 
itself  in  inaction.  It  will  be  no  honor  to  the  spirit,  to  plead 
a  perpetual  devotion  to  its  culture,  if  there  is  a  neglect  of  the 
bodily  organs,  through  whose  healthy  functions  alone  the  cul- 
tivated spirit  can  come  out  in  communion  with  man  and  nature. 
A  credulous  or  conceited  application  of  some  peculiar  gymnastic 
exercises,  as  well  as  dietetic  observances,  may  be  cherished  and 
practiced,  and  harm  be  done  to  the  body  by  its  unadaptedness^ 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  63 

as  well  as  dishonor  to  the  spirit  by  its  foolishness  ;  but  past  a 
doubt,  many  diseases  and  deaths  had  been  precluded,  and 
many  otherwise  mortal  disorders  may  now  be  removed  by 
judicious  and  regulated  bodily  exercise.  It  is  better  than 
medicine ;  it  is  really  very  much  the  efificient  in  many  far- 
famed  methods  of  dealing  with  chronic  diseases,  combined 
with  a  regard  to  regular  sleep  and  diet. 

4.  Cleanliness.  Filthiness  of  person,  dress,  and  dwelling, 
is  a  vice  in  itself,  and  a  reproach  and  indignity  to  the  spiritual 
being  of  man  ;  but  it  also  interferes  with  the  health  and  per- 
fection of  the  body.  A  refined  sense  might  be  repelled  from  a 
dirty  dress  or  dwelling,  before  its  foulness  had  attained  to  such 
a  degree  as  to  injure  health'  or  endanger  life  ;  but  many  a  lin- 
gering disease  is  induced  or  aggravated,  and  many  a  death 
hastened,  by  the  foulness  of  the  apartment  in  which  the  person 
takes  his  food  and  sleep.  The  body,  as  well  as  the  mind  of 
the  child,  will  mature  more  perfectly,  the  more  cleanly  are  its 
habits ;  and  the  life  of  no  adult  person  can  be  passed  in  sloven- 
liness and  filthiness  without  debasement  to  the  spirit  and  de- 
triment to  the  bodily  health  and  soundness.  Cleanliness  of 
person  and  dress,  and  neatness  in  and  about  the  dwelling  which 
is  the  home  of  a  family,  reward  themselves  in  the  refinement 
and  elevation  they  induce,  and  the  buoyancy  and  vigor  of 
health  they  impart ;  and  no  parent  is  fulfilling  his  moral  duties 
to  himself  or  to  his  family  who  permits  himself  or  them  to  be 
habitually  uncleanly. 

2.    Grow  in  practical  knowledge.     We  restrict  this  maxim  to 
U  the  cultivation  of  the  faculty  of  judging  according  to  the  sense. 
What  this  limited  province  is,  may  be  apprehended  from  the 
following  considerations  : 

Animals  learn  from  experience.  They  have  found  conse- 
quences in  certain  connections,  and  have  thus  come  to  expect 
their  recurrence.  They  may  thus  become  prudent  in  conduct 
towards  themselves,  and  kind  in  their  actions  towards  others. 


64  PURE    MORALITY. 

But  the  animal  cannot  carry  up  its  data  to  any  higher  point 
than  sensible  experience.  There  is  no  capacity  for  apprehend- 
ing necessary  and  universal  truth ;  no  power  to  intuitively  see 
axioms  and  a  priori  principles  ;  and  thus  no  capability  to  carry 
its  processes  beyond  the  data  given  in  sense.  Its  deductions,  if 
we  may  call  them  such,  are  all  sensible  and  never  strike  their 
root  in  reason,  and  while  we  ascribe  to  the  animal  knowledge, 
we  never  assign  it  wisdom.  If  we  apply  the  word  wisdom  to 
any  animal  sagacity,  it  is  always  in  the  inferior  sense  of  cunning, 
and  not  that  the  animal  can  ever  become  the  sage.  If  it  ever 
uses  an  understanding,  it  gives  no  evidence  of  ever  making  use 
of  reason. 

Man,  also,  as  participant  in  the  animal  faculties,  has  an  un- 
derstanding which  judges  from  the  data  given  in  sense  ;  and  as 
his  animal  faculties,  though  the  same  in  kind  yet  in  many  re- 
spects superior  in  degree  to  the  brute,  can  be  made  the  more 
comprehensive,  so  he  can  attain  to  greater  knowledge.  He  can 
observe  more  extensively,  and  deduce  general  consequences 
more  accurately,  and  thus  attain  to  broader  and  more  safe  pru- 
dential rules  of  action.  And  here  come  in  the  duties  enforced 
by  the  maxim,  "  to  grow  in  knowledge."  Man's  spiritual  worthi- 
ness demands  that  he  make  the  most  he  may  of  his  understand- 
ing. The  events  transpiring  around  him  are  not  mere  floating 
appearances,  occurring  and  passing  away  with  no  important 
bearings  upon  human  interests,  but  that  which  has  been  is  an 
index  how  it  may  again  be ;  and  thus  nature  is  perpetually 
teaching  every  man  through  his  experience.  An  instructive 
book  is  directly  before  him,  and  it  is  worthy  of  him  that  he 
study  therein  daily,  and  gain  practical  knowledge.  He  is 
bound  to  thus  learn  the  way  to  do  good  to  himself  and  others, 
and  how  also  from  both  himself  and  them  to  ward  off  evils. 

It  is  by  thus  cultivating  the  faculty  of  judgment,  that  we 
become  prudent  and  skilful.  This  perpetual  flow  of  events 
passes  on  by  us,  throwing  upon  ourselves  and  others  the  com- 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  65 

mingled  good  and  evil  which  the  current  bears  along,  and  as 
we  habituate  ourselves  to  judge  of  what  is  coming  from  what 
has  passed,  we  know  how  prudently  to  direct  our  own  conduct, 
and  how  to  propose  that  which  is  useful  for  others.  This  power 
of  practical  consideration  and  ready  tact  to  seize  upon  the 
proper  means  in  the  right  time,  gives  an  executive  skill  which 
we  sometimes  term  wisdom  ;  but  to  mark  our  distinction  of  it 
from  the  attainment  of  the  cultivated  reason,  we  call  it  wo7'ldly 
wisdom ;  a  skill  in  safely  and  effectively  using  natural  occur- 
rences. No  man  becomes  thus  worldly  wise  who  does  not 
habituate  himself  closely  to  observe  men  and  things,  and  keep 
his  eyes  constantly  open  upon  what  is  passing  around  him.  A 
clear,  far-reaching  foresight,  is  the  result  of  careful  discipline 
and  patient  practice.  To  one  it  may  come  more  readily  and 
more  perfectly  than  to  another,  but  a  sound  and  safe  judgment 
is  in  all  cases  the  product  of  careful  and  cultivated  industry. 
An  endowment  of  native  wit  is  essential  to  any  cultivation, 
but  however  richly  endowed,  the  talent  will  lie  hidden  and  un- 
improved, if  not  put  out  to  use.  The  maxim  carefully  practiced 
will  exclude  : 

I .  Stupidity.  This  as  here  used  is  not  so  much  a  defect  of 
nature  as  of  moral  energy  ;  for  what  is  a  natural  defect,  morahty 
does  not  recognize.  By  sensuality,  laziness,  or  a  torpid  indiffer- 
ence to  consequences,  occasioned  by  a  phlegmatic  temperament, 
a  man  may  so  neglect  all  exercise  of  the  judgment  as  to  be- 
come stupid  and  doltish.  If  the  mind  will  not  awake  to  ob- 
servation, and  habituate  itself  to  draw  conclusions  from  facts 
when  observed,  the  capacity  of  judging  will  become  weak,  and 
the  man  properly  incur  the  name  of  a  blockhead.  Many  a  per- 
son, with  native  faculty  for  much  influence  and  usefulness,  al- 
lows himself  to  become  a  dunce  in  stupidity  from  his  own  sloth 
and  vicious  indolence.  Experience  makes  him  no  more  worldly- 
wise,  for  in  his  torpid  forgetfulness  he  never  draws  any  practical 
conclusions  from  what  has  been.     He  habitually  indulges  his 


66  PURE    MORALITY. 

wants  without  knowing  any  thing  how  to  direct  or  correct  his  in- 
dulgence. Opportunities  of  good  pass  by,  which  he  never  sees, 
and  evils  come  thick  upon  him,  which  he  had  not  anticipated. 
The  brute  is  often  less  stupid  than  such  a  man,  and  would  both 
avoid  evils  which  come  upon  him,  and  gain  benefits  which  he 
never  attains.  This  is  stupidity  in  an  extreme  degree,  but  all 
approaches  to  it  are  so  far  vicious  as  self-culture  could  avoid 
them. 

2.  Heedlessness.  This  is  rather  occasional  forgetfulness 
than  perpetual  foolishness.  The  heedless  man  allows  his  atten- 
tion to  be  engrossed  with  the  matter  in  hand,  and  so  fixes  his 
mind  upon  a  limited  number  of  facts,  that  the  wider  stream  of 
events  bring  their  consequences  to  him  quite  accidentally.  While 
he  was  looking  at  some  things,  and  perhaps  narrowly  enough 
estimating  their  connections,  there  were  other  things  outside  his 
narrow  vision  which  came  unexpectedly,  and  of  course  to  him 
quite  unpreparedly.  To  all,  it  may  be  true,  that  nature  brings 
consequences  quite  unforeseen,  but  when  these  are  obvious  to 
an  attentive  mind,  and  only  strike  us  suddenly  because  we  were 
busied  with  something  more  limited,  we  properly  incur  thf' 
charge  of  heedlessness,  however  attentive  we  may  have  been  to 
something  else. 

This  short-sightedness  may  be  allowed  to  grow  into  a  habit 
of  general  carelessness,  and  which  will  induce  all  the  evils  of 
stupidity ;  but  such  absorption  in  any  one  thing  as  to  neglect 
the  consequences  that  must  flow  from  many  other  things,  and 
especially  to  put  in  operation  a  train  of  events  ourselves,  that 
bring  evil  upon  us  on  one  side  because  we  only  observed  the 
connections  on  the  other  side,  wiU  manifest  a  want  of  self-cul- 
ture that  moraUty  must  decidedly  condemn.  Beside  the  smart 
of  the  unexpected  evil,  there  is  the  conviction  of  indignity  and 
ill-desert  in  our  heedless  subjecting  of  ourselves  to  its  infliction. 
A  better  culture  of  the  judgment  would  have  anticipated  and 
averted  the  evil,  and  it  was  a  vice  in  us  to  have  tolerated  the 
heedlessness. 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  6/ 

3.  Rasid^ss.  This  differs  from  heedlessness,  in  that  it  is  a 
hardy  daring  of  the  consequences,  seen  or  unseen.  The  man 
is  so  intent  on  a  particular  end,  that  though  he  may  have  abun- 
dant occasion  to  anticipate  evil  consequences,  he  determines  to 
risk  them,  and  recklessly  persists  in  his  course  till  the  blow  falls. 
It  is  usually  passion  blinding  the  judgment,  and  the  appetite 
rushing  on  to  gratification  in  the  discarding  of  all  prudence. 

This  is  a  deeper  vice  than  heedlessness  or  stupidity,  for  it 
manifests  a  more  desperate  depravity,  that  will  gratify  passion 
at  whatever  expense.  It  directly  assaults  the  judgment,  and 
stifles  it.  It  will  not  be  controlled,  and  hence  it  w'ill  not  be 
warned. 

Nature  may  do  its  worst  in  its  connected  consequences,  but 
its  own  way  the  appetite  will  have.  Its  impulse  is  all  that  con- 
trols, and  the  rule  of  expediency  is  contemptuously  disregarded. 
Here  is  both  the  neglect  of  self-control  and  the  want  of  self- 
culture,  in  having  allowed  the  domination  of  the  appetite  to 
become  so  strong,  and  the  dictates  of  the  judgment  to  be  so 
inoperative.  No  one  may  thus  make  a  mockery  of  all  pru- 
dence, and  go  on  in  defiance  of  all  consequences  A\dthout  great 
moral  guilt.  He  refuses  to  know  what  he  might  and  ought  to 
apprehend,  and  what  he  does  know  he  recklessly  disregards, 
and  greatly  degrades  his  humanity.  A  phlegmatic  man,  in  his 
carelessness,  ^vill  probably  be  stupid,  and  a  sanguine  tempera- 
ment, in  his  carelessness,  will  probably  be  rash. 

4.  Credulity.  The  man  of  weak  judgment  is  very  liable  to 
be  a  credulous  man.  If  his  temperament  is  ardent,  he  will  be 
hopeful ;  and  as  he  has  no  safe  deductions  from  facts,  he  will 
weakly  take  his  anticipations  from  his  wishes,  and  be  vainly 
expecting  good  when  evil  is  near.  He  is  conscious  of  his  in- 
capacity to  deduce  clear  conclusions,  and  he  fondly  takes  what 
others  say,  as  more  probably  true  than  any  opinions  he  may 
form.  Oftentimes  such  a  man  indulges  in  idle  speculations 
and  dreamy  fancies,  and  empty  castle-building  in  the  air ;  and 


68  PURE    MORALITY. 

this  credulous  conceit  finds  no  check  fi-om  sober  thought  and 
sound  judgment,  but  his  weak  fancy  runs  riot  without  control. 
The  opposite  to  this  is  : 

5.  Scepticism.  There  is  a  scepticism  which  is  preliminary  to 
all  true  science,  a  cautious  state  of  mind  because  the  man 
knows  how  readily  human  judgment  is  biased,  and  how  easy 
it  is  to  come  to  conclusions  from  insufficient  grounds.  He 
will  not  take  on  trust,  but  induces  doubts  for  the  sake  of  more 
complete  investigation  and  ultimately  more  thorough  demon- 
stration. But  a  weak  understanding  distrusts  its  own  ability  to 
judge,  and  with  a  desponding  or  melancholic  temperament,  is 
predisposed  to  distrust  the  judgments  of  others,  and  is  thus 
sceptical  in  all  things.  He  doubts  for  no  good  reasons,  but 
solely  because  doubt  has  been  made  more  habitual  to  him  than 
belief,  and  he  has  not  sufficient  force  of  understanding  to  cure 
himself  of  it. 

Both  of  the  above,  the  credulous  and  the  sceptic,  have  a  like 
want  of  confidence  in  their  own  judgments,  and  are  ahke  weak- 
minded,  and  their  difference  arises  only  from  varied  tempera- 
ment, or  the  action  of  opposite  outward  influences.  They  both 
neglect  the  cultivation  of  their  understandings,  and  bring  gi-eat 
dishonor  upon  their  spiritual  being,  and  are  alike  vicious  in  the 
judgment  of  a  pure  morality. 

6.  Destiny.  Quite  akin  to  the  last  two,  is  that  weak  judg- 
ment, which,  having  no  confidence  in  its  own  opinions  and 
conclusions,  flies  to  fixed  fate  and  destiny,  as  determining  all 
things  for  the  man  blindly.  It  may  be  sombre,  and  all  things 
destined  to  be  adverse  ;  or  it  may  be  bright,  and  all  things  des- 
tined to  be  prosperous  ;  but  in  either  case,  the  issue  is  expected, 
not  because  any  clear  connection  of  cause  and  effect  is  seen, 
but  in  the  absence  of  all  apprehended  connection,  a  depend- 
ence is  placed  upon  some  mysterious  destiny  to  work  out  all 
results.  There  is  no  mounting  to  an  absolute  spirit,  who  uses  all 
causaUty  as  his  creature,  and  in  his  wisdom  appoints  the  move- 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  69 

ments  of  nature's  causes  as  the  indices  of  his  own  intelligent 
designs,  and  which  would  require  clear  and  vigorous  thinking ; 
but  the  whole  is  an  escape  from  all  thouglit,  and  fondly  or  fear- 
fully leaving  all  things  in  their  own  ignorance,  to  some  fatuity 
that  determines  its  issues  for  them. 

This  is  the  vice  of  neglecting  self-culture  and  leaving  the 
understanding  in  its  weakness,  as  in  the  former  cases,  and 
equally  an  indignity  to  that  authority  within,  which  enjoins  such 
a  use  of  the  faculty  of  judgment  as  to  grow  in  knowledge  by  it. 

3.  Grow  in  rational  wisdom.  By  this  maxim,  it  is  intended 
to  express  the  obligation  which  morality  lays  upon  every  man 
to  cultivate  the  exercise  of  his  reason,  and  directly  to  discipline 
the  spirit  in  all  the  functions  of  its  activity.  The  result  is  a 
much  higher  and  purer  cognition  than  any  cultivation  of  the 
judgment  can  alone  attain.  It  is  wisdom,  emphatically ;  that 
knowing  which  is  not  a  rule  of  prudence  to  some  further  good, 
but  a  direct  knowing  which  is  a  good  as  end  in  itself.  It  is  the 
consummation  of  self-culture. 

The  animal,  whether  in  brute  or  man,  has  attained  to  its 
ultimate  point  of  cultivation,  and  reached  the  consummation 
of  its  nature,  when  it  is  brought  to  apprehend  and  observe  the 
rules  of  prudence  and  kindness  as  generalizations  from  experi- 
ence. The  faculty  judging  according  to  sense  is  the  highest 
endowment,  and  when  that  is  fully  developed  the  animal  part 
of  our  being  is  maturely  grown. 

But  man  is  also  rational  spirit,  and  in  this  is  a  far  higher 
endowment.  This  gives  capacity  to  apprehend  necessary  and 
universal  truth ;  not  general  deductions  from  data  given  in 
experience,  but  absolute  principles  which  must  determine  for 
us  our  experience  itself  It  is  only  in  the  possession  of  such 
a  faculty  that  man  is  capable  of  self-knowledge,  self-direction, 
self-instruction,  and  self- approbation  or  remorse.  The  animal 
can  no  where  attain  to  it ;  the  human  possesses  it  in  the  endow- 
ment of  a  rational  spirit.     After  what  has  before  been  shown. 


70  PURE    MORALITY. 

we  need  only  cursorily  look  at  the  duty  of  self-culture  in  the 
province  of  the  rational  spirit  in  its  three  grand  functions  of 
operation : 

1.  Taste.  Man  can  create  his  own  pure  forms  which  ex- 
press for  him  living  sentiment,  and  can  thus  in  his  mind's  eye 
apprehend  every  beauty.  These  created  forms  are  to  him  per- 
fect ideals,  and  he  can  recognize  no  outer  beauty  so  perfect  as 
the  patterns  he  has  within  himself.  By  these  he  judges  of  all 
beauty  in  nature  or  art,  and  as  he  can  intelligently  apply  his  own 
ideal  archetypes,  he  can  intelligently  criticise  any  copy  in  na- 
ture or  art.  But  this  capacity  to  originate  pure  forms  of  beauty 
may  be  greatly  cultivated.  By  the  study  of  beauty  in  nature, 
and  as  expressed  in  the  products  of  other  artists,  his  own  mental 
eye  becomes  clearer,  and  more  perfect  ideals  project  themselves 
before  it  as  the  creations  of  his  own  genius.  He  thus  mounts 
to  a  higher  point  of  criticism  ;  and  as  an  artist,  rises  to  a  higher 
style  of  execution  in  his  copies  from  his  inner  more  perfect 
patterns. 

Thus  is  a  man  competent  to  cultivate  his  tastes,  and  to  bring 
himself  and  all  that  he  may  control  more  completely  under  its 
dictates.  He  becomes  the  more  refined,  and  makes  all  about 
him  to  be  more  beautiful.  Society  thus  adorns  itself  in  the 
elevation  of  its  OAvn  members,  the  refinement  of  their  pursuits, 
and  the  elegance  of  their  products.  Such  cultivation  is  a  virtue. 
It  perfects  what  is  in  man,  and  makes  him  intrinsically  more 
excellent.  Not  because  he  is  happier,  but  because  he  is  higher 
in  excellence,  and  more  worthy  the  commendation  and  accept- 
ance of  reason.  xA.s  an  object  of  simple  contemplation  in  the 
end  of  the  reason,  he  is  thus  a  more  dignified  and  excellent 
being. 

2.  Science.  Man  can  attain  to  universal  axioms,  and  carry 
out  his  pure  intuitions  to  necessary  conclusions  in  geometry ; 
and  can  rise  to  universal  principles  and  carry  out  the  necessary 
connections  in  a  nature  of  things,  and  attain  to  demonstrated 


PERSONAL    DUTIES.  yi 

truths  in  philosophy ;  and  can  thus  cultivate  a  pure  science  in 
mathematics  and  physics.  He  may  thus  commune,  not  with 
nature  only,  but  with  the  Creator  of  nature,  in  those  principles 
which  were  in  the  Divine  Mind  and  which  determined  the 
Eternal  Wisdom  when,  ere  creation  was.  He  proposed  that  it 
should  be. 

Such  attainment  of  truth,  and  the  subjection  of  appetite  to 
the  study  of  it,  elevates  man,  and  he  rises  from  animal  happi- 
ness, not  alone  to  the  refinement  of  taste,  but  here  also  to  the 
dignity  of  science.  He  is  so  much  the  more  a  man  as  he  has 
cultivated  and  brought  out  his  manly  prerogatives.  His  pursuit 
of  science  for  the  end  of  philosophy  itself,  is  a  virtue.  The 
cultivation  of  his  scientific  reason  has  rendered  him  the  more 
excellent,  and  thus  the  more  worthy  of  his  own  spiritual  regard. 

3.  Morality.  Man  may  know  himself,  and  thus  apprehend 
what  is  due  to  himself,  and  thereby  attain  to  an  ultimate  rule  of 
life  for  his  own  direction.  He  may  also  carry  out  this  ultimate 
rule  in  its  application  to  all  men,  and  determine  what  is  due 
from  each  to  each,  and  from  one  to  all,  and  thus  attain  a  uni- 
versal science  of  morals.  He  may  bring  his  own  heart  and  life 
under  this  ultimate  rule,  and  strive  to  pursuade  all  men  to  fol- 
low the  purely  right  and  good.  To  de  such  as  the  claim  of  his 
spiritual  excellency  demands  is  his  highest  moral  worth,  and 
therein  is  he  worthy  of  his  own  acceptation  and  that  of  all  other 
moral  beings,  and  in  that  position  is  his  highest  dignity.  Mor- 
ality is  fulfilled,  and  virtue  consummated,  and  reason  satisfied, 
when  man  has  cultivated  his  spirit  to  its  highest  worthiness. 
Here  is  the  end  of  all  self-culture. 

The  process  of  this  growth  in  rational  wisdom  is  the  same  in 
all  the  three  ways  in  which  reason  is  revealed.  Only  reason  can 
speak  to  reason,  and  only  a  contemplation  of  the  beautiful,  the 
true,  and  the  good  can  quicken  us  to  a  keener  apprehension  of 
the  same.  The  ugly,  the  false,  and  the  wrong  can  lend  us  no 
light,  nor  lead  us  to  any  wisdom.     They  have  no  light,  not  even 


72  PURE    MORALITY. 

a  light  which  can  disclose  themselves,  and,  incapable  of  self- 
revelation,  they  are  only  revealed  by  the  shining  of  the  beautiful, 
the  true,  and  the  good.  It  is  only  by  the  contemplation  of 
beauty,  truth,  and  goodness  that  the  true  culture  in  Taste,  and 
Science,  and  Morality  can  be  achieved. 


CHAPTER    m. 

2.  Relative  Duties.     Kindness. 

We  here  contemplate  man  as  in  society,  and  seek  for  the 
duties  which  one  owes  to  another.  He  is  one  of  the  race  with 
other  men,  and  the  rule  of  life  which  each  should  adopt  must 
have  reference  to  his  relations  with  all.  That  which  is  reason- 
able for  one  man  cannot  run  counter  to  the  universal  reason  for 
all  men,  and  thus  no  one  may  propose  as  end  to  himself  that 
which  would  not  permit  all  other  men  to  propose  the  same. 
All  countervailing,  in  any  one,  the  universal  rule  of  reason 
would  be  setting  up  some  other  end  for  himself  than  the  ex- 
cellency of  the  universal  reason,  and  thus  dishonoring  himself 
in  acting  unreasonably.  So  deep  in  universal  reason  lies  the 
divine  maxim,  "  whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to 
you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them." 

Under  this  head  of  relative  duties  we  have,  therefore,  to  find 
and  embody  such  maxims  as  each  man  should  wish  all  others 
to  adopt  towards  himself,  and  under  these  will  be  found  what 
every  man  should  adopt  towards  all.  This  will  give  a  universal 
system  of  social  moral  duties.  It  will  not  be  essential  to  par- 
ticularize all  that  might  be  introduced  ;  the  maxims  will  include 
all  duties,  and  several  will  be  specified  as  examples  of  any 
others. 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  73 

If  we  contemplate  man  in  his  constitutional  appetites  as  the 
creature  of  wants,  and  thus  finding  an  end  in  happhiess,  he 
will  find  occasion  to  render  the  same  kind  offices  to  others, 
that  he  might,  in  like  circumstances,  wish  should  be  rendered 
to  him ;  and  in  this  there  will  be  the  universal  duty  of  Kind- 
ness. If  we  contemplate  him  in  his  intrinsic  spiritual  excellency 
as  the  creature  of  rights,  and  thus  with  an  end  in  worthiness, 
he  will  find  the  obligation  to  regard  others  with  the  same  respect 
and  reverence  as  his  own  spiritual  excellency  claims  from  them, 
and  in  this  there  will  be  the  universal  duty  of  Respect.  These 
two  will  embrace  all  social  duties. 

We  take  in  this  chapter  the  comprehensive  law  of  kindness, 
and  give  as  its  general  maxim,  "do  good  to  all  men  as  ye 
HAVE  OPPORTUNITY."  This  wiU  divide  itself  into  other  maxims 
less  general,  under  which  may  be  noticed  several  specific 
duties  ;  including,  as  before,  promiscuously,  virtues  commanded, 
or  vices  prohibited. 

I.  "  Owe  no  man  any  thing."  No  man  can  stand  entirely 
independent  of  others.  He  must  live  in  society,  and  be  per- 
petually receiving  something  from  the  community  in  which  he 
dwells,  either  as  individuals  or  collectively.  It  would  be  un- 
worthy of  any  man  to  discard  all  good  offices  from  others,  and 
in  a  false  pride  of  self-sufficiency  determine  to  acknowledge  no 
obligations  to  his  fellow-men  which  demand  from  him  good 
offices  in  return.  Society  is  thus  bound  together  by  mutual 
wants  and  interests,  and  no  one  may  say  to  another,  "  I  have 
no  need  of  thee  "  ;  and  the  force  of  the  maxim  requires  a  re- 
payment to  individuals  and  to  the  community  of  that  which  is 
an  equivalent,  or  at  least  that  which  evinces  an  acknowledgment 
of  indebtedness.  It  may  be  wholly  impracticable  to  enforce 
such  returns  of  good  deeds  by  any  outward  authority,  or  coer- 
cive measures ;  but  the  claims  of  morality  are  imperative  that 
we  do  that  good  to  others  which  repays,  or  requites  by  an  ac- 
knowledgment, the  good  that  has  been  done  to  us.     This  is  not 


74  PURE    MORALITY. 

here  put  upon  the  ground  of  equity  alone,  which  would  con- 
strain from  the  sense  of  respect  for  the  rights  of  others,  but 
rather  on  the  ground  of  kindness,  as  one  way  in  which  we  are 
bound  to  do  good  to  our  fellow-men.  We  are  to  pay  them 
what  is  due,  not  only  as  a  matter  of  justice,  but  as  one  of  the 
ways  of  shoAving  kindness.  They  need  such  returns  ;  it  does 
them  good  to  receive,  and  morahty  thus  requires  it  as  within, 
the  scope  of  human  beneficence.  The  debt  is  paid  with  the 
warm  spirit  of  a  sympathizing  interest  in  their  need. 

I.  Honesty.  It  is  not  only  unjust,  but  also  unkind  not  to 
be  honest.  Many  a  child  of  want  has  been  left  in  suffering 
when  the  honest  debt  paid  would  have  relieved  firom  distress ; 
and  many  a  wealthy  and  powerful  man  has  been  put  to  great 
inconvenience,  because  the  service  expected  and  paid  for  was 
not  rendered.  In  the  most  emphatic  sense  may  it  be  said,  that 
morality  demands  the  kindness  which  has  already  been  made 
obligatory  by  previous  kindness  received. 

We  may  thus  be  in  debt  for  money,  for  labor,  for  kind  deeds 
or  kind  words  ;  a  sympathizing  look  or  a  cordial  smile  may  have 
most  touchingly  obliged  us  ;  and  the  law  of  kindness  demands 
that  we  repay  the  good  deed  by  other  good  deeds  in  return.  A 
debt  is  thus  incurred,  by  the  reception  of  such  favor,  that  can- 
not be  cancelled  by  any  thing  else  save  the  same  kindness  in 
some  manifested  form  of  reply.  Justice  might  be  satisfied  in 
imparting  some  equivalent,  but  to  the  benevolent  spirit  which 
had  conferred  the  obligation,  nothing  could  be  an  equivalent 
that  did  not  come  warm  with  the  exhibition  of  mutual  good  will. 
Though  a  benefactor  ask  no  return  and  urge  no  claim,  it  is  not 
honest  in  the  beneficiary,  if  the  opportunity  is  not  sought  to  do 
some  good  which  sTiall  unequivocally  express  his  sense  of  obli- 
gation for  the  kindness.  Wlierever  there  is  a  debt,  there  is  an 
obligation  from  the  received  good  that  must  be  cancelled  by 
goodness,  and  the  maxim  will  leave  no  moral  man  at  rest  until 
it  is  paid. 


RELATIVE   DUTIES.  75 

2.  Reciprocity.  Not  only  will  kindness  be  honest,  and 
render  back  the  good  deed  by  equal  goodness,  but  it  will  show 
itself  open  to  be  obliged,  that  its  own  benevolence  may  thereby 
be  the  more  stimulated  and  cultivated.  We  owe  it  to  humanity 
to  stand  ready  and  inviting  to  good  deeds,  as  if  we  cherished 
the  opportunity  to  be  under  obligations  to  reciprocate  the  kind- 
ness. It  would  be  ■  a  cold  world,  that  calculated  its  debt  and 
credit  solely  in  the  light  of  exact  equivalent  and  a  just  balance  ; 
and  still  a  shy  and  selfish  world,  that  only  owned  its  indebted- 
ness after  the  good  deed  had  been  rendered  ;  but  true  kindness 
stands  at  once  out  on  the  open  ground  of  reciprocity,  ready  to 
take  and  to  give,  yea  rather  ready  to  take  in  order  that  it  may 
give  its  own  full-hearted  joy  expression  in  the  quick  reciproca- 
tion of  beneficence.  It  aheady  partakes  of  a  vice  to  be  chary 
and  coy  of  proffered  kindness,  as  if  the  heart  were  reluctant  to 
feel  obligation,  and  would  rather  not  have  benefits  than  to  be 
holden  to  make  kind  returns.  The  law  of  kindness  binds  us  to 
be  open  to  a  reciprocity  of  good  offices,  and  admit  ourselves  to 
be  debtors  to  humanity  in  encouraging  good  deeds,  both  by  a 
frankness  in  receiving  and  a  readiness  in  repaying. 

3.  Monopoly.  Under  this  are  included  all  attempts  to  take 
advantage  of  others'  necessities  for  personal  interest.  It  may 
be  an  arranged  and  laboriously-executed  plan  to  bring  others 
under  the  necessity,  or  the  prompt  and  greedy  seizing  upon  the 
opportunity  which  providentially  occurs.  In  either  case  there 
is  the  same  unkindness,  though  in  the  first  there  is  the  aggrava- 
tion of  overt  selfishness  to  secure  the  unkind  opportunity. 

Islorality  condemns  all  such  monopoly.  It  is  not  in  the  spirit 
of  kindness,  and  however  the  man  may  plead  considerations  of 
equity,  it  is  not  strict  honesty.  Man's  relation  to  man  in  society 
is  such,  that  there  is  due  to  the  whole  a  higher  consideration 
than  to  the  partial,  and  especially  than  to  the  individual ;  and 
he  wrongs  the  community,  when  he  robs  them  in  any  way  to 
advance  an  opposing  interest  in  himself.     He  may  take  advan- 


^6  PURE    MORALITY. 

tage  of  his  skill  and  foresight,  and  honestly  obtain  a  fair  re- 
muneration for  it,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  being  unkind  to 
humanity. 

2.  "Give  to  the  poor. ^''  This  includes  more  than  honesty, 
which  always  acknowledges  some  previous  indebtedness  and  the 
obligation  from  kindness'  to  pay  the  debt,  and  demands  charity, 
which  feels  the  imperative  to  give  where  there  is  no  indebted- 
ness. It  originates  indebtedness.  It  comes  up  solely  from  a 
known  want  in  another,  and  a  consciousness  of  ability  in  our- 
selves to  relieve. 

The  poor  are  not  merely  those  who  have  little  or  nothing  of 
this  world's  wealth,  but  all  or  any  who  are  in  want.  The  rich  in 
money  may  in  many  cases  be  far  poorer,  have  more  distressing 
wants,  than  those  who  beg  their  bread  from  door  to  door.  If 
there  is  any  human  want  we  know,  and  knowing  can  relieve, 
there  the  maxim  applies,  and  every  one  so  able  is  morally  bound 
to  adopt  it  as  his  own  guide.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  it  be  a 
mere  sentiment,  or  an  inward  preference  which  leads  to  no  exe- 
cution. A  man  may  sincerely  say  to  the  poor,  "be  ye  warmed, 
and  be  ye  filled,"  and  truly  wish  it  might  be  so,  and  yet  not 
himself  actually  give  any  thing  to  accomplish  it.  If  they  were 
relieved  at  the  expense  of  others'  self-denial  he  would  rejoice, 
but  his  charity  is  a  sentiment  not  strong  enough  to  overcome 
the  purpose  of  selfishness  within  him.  There  must  be  not  only 
the  7uish  but  the  executive  will,  or  there  will  be  no  giving  to  the 
poor. 

It  will,  moreover,  regard  mankind  as  such,  and  not  merely 
some  few  men  for  whom  we  cherish  a  partial  favoritism.  With 
no  distinction  of  rank,  fortune,  place,  or  age  ;  the  mere  fact 
that  there  is  a  man  in  want,  whom  we  may  relieve,  must  be  suf- 
ficient to  fix  the  obligation.  All  may  in  some  way  be  reached 
by  the  good  offices  of  others,  and  the  lower  in  society  have 
often  the  opportunity  of  imparting  the  most  welcome  favors  to 
the  higher,  and  in  such  a  case  it  is  a  more  noble  charity.     Such 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  7/ 

instances  are  the  more  affecting  as  they  are  less  expected ;  and 
the  good  will  which  seeks  to  bless  itself  in  doing  good  to  others, 
need  not  in  any  class  of  the  community  be  a  day  without  its 
favored  opportunity  for  full  and  effective  exercise.  And  not 
only  the  suffering  which  providences  thrust  before  us,  but  that 
unobtrusive  misery,  which  cannot  or  would  not  express  its  wants, 
is  to  be  sought  out  and  alleviated.  Nor  is  this  imperative  ex- 
hausted in  making  the  sacrifice  necessary  to  find  and  relieve  the 
destitute.  Charity  may  itself  be  prodigal  No  man  is  allowed 
to  be  charitable  indiscreetly,  and  thus  not  permitted  to  give  in- 
discriminately. Much  almsgiving  fosters  want  and  augments 
the  misery  it  would  relieve.  Charity  may  encourage  vice,  idle- 
ness, improvidence,  habitual  beggary,  and  horrible  cruelty  in  its 
prepared  cases  for  moving  public  sympathy,  and  however  kind 
such  an  incautious  donor  may  be,  his  duty  has  been  unworthily 
performed.  All  injudicious  charity,  which  overlooks  its  effect 
upon  its  objects  and  the  public,  and  gives  from  an  excited  sen- 
sibility or  to  relieve  itself  from  further  importunity,  is  a  weak- 
ness and  a  vice,  and  the  careless  manner  may  degrade  the  giver 
more  than  the  giving  elevates  him..  All  are  to  seek  out  the 
needy,  to  give  for  their  relief,  to  guard  against  injudicious  and 
unsuitable  benefactions,  and  thus  show  a  kindness  worthy  of 
their  spiritual  and  rational  excellency.  To  supply  others  at  the 
expense  of  what  is  due  to  himself,  wdll  never  be  a  virtue  in 
any  man. 

I.  Charity.  This  involves  tho  love  of  benevolence,  a  dis- 
position that  is  pleased  and  rejoiced  in  seeing  others  made  hap- 
py by  its  hand.  It  thus  delights  in  doing  good.  It  may  not 
approve  of  the  moral  character  and  conduct  of  those  it  relieves, 
and  may  thus  feel  a  deep  moral  aversion  and  repugnance  to  its 
beneficiaries  ;  but  it  looks  at  them  as  sensitive  beings,  with  wants 
and  sympathies  kindred  to  its  own,  and  relieves  from  suffering 
and  administers  to  happiness  from  the  promptings  of  philan- 
thropy.    It  is  not  satisfied  with  the  acting  out  of  its  constitu- 


78  PURE    MORALITY. 

tional  kindness ;  it  cultivates  and  cherishes  the  spirit  of 
benevolence,  and  would  make  its  heart  more  compassionate  and 
its  hand  more  open  to  human  wretchedness.  It  deems  nothing 
foreign  to  itself  that  is  human,  and  thus  makes  every  man  a 
brother  and  every  sufferer  an  object  of  its  sympathy,  and  relieves 
so  far  as  it  may.  It  adorns  and  dignifies  the  man  who  appro- 
priately practices  it,  and  by  common  consent  the  world  puts  it 
among  the  most  exalted  virtues.  Because  God  does  good,  and 
makes  his  sun  to  shine  on  the  evil  and  unthankful,  so  the  man 
who  does  good  in  works  of  charity  is  named  the  Godlike. 

2.  Obduracy.  This  includes  the  stifling  of  natural  sympathy, 
and  the  hardening  of  the  constitutional  feelings  against  human 
want  and  misery.  It  must  always  spring  from  a  perverse  devo- 
tion to  some  object  of  gratification  which  interferes  with  the 
working  of  kindness.  Charity  gives  away  for  others ;  but  an 
inordinate  passion,  that  craves  its  expensive  objects  of  gratifica- 
tion, may  demand  the  gifts  for  the  poor  to  be  expended  upon 
its  own  indulgence  ;  and  in  such  an  attitude  the  man  will  steel 
himself  against  distress  that  courts  relief.  It  may  be  an  ava- 
ricious inclination  to  amass  and  hoard  wealth,  and  such  a  miserly 
and  sordid  spirit  will  fast  banish  all  feelings  of  pity,  and  choose 
that  the  heart  may  grow  hard  lest  the  hand  should  open  to 
impart  that  which  is  so  deeply  coveted. 

So  the  man  who  looks  upon  charity  itself  as  administered  to 
others,  with  a  selfishness  and  envy  that  grudges  the  gift  as  so 
much  bestowed  upon  others  and  diverted  from  himself,  and 
would  chide  and  hinder  the  kindness  which  does  not  flow 
towards  his  possession,  will  rapidly  harden  his  heart,  and  care 
only  to  depreciate  another's  sorrows  and  magnify  his  own  need. 

3.  Sentimentality.  This  is  the  excess  of  animal  sensibility 
uncontrolled  by  judgment,  and  unenlightened  by  reason.  The 
natural  susceptibility  which  is  pained  and  weeps  at  others'  woes 
is  left  to  its  own  impulses,  or  perhaps  quickened  in  sensibility 
by  habitual  indulgence,  and  yet  has  no  regulated  action  from  its 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  79 

direction  to  any  intelligible  and  worthy  ends.  The  mere  luxury 
of  a  soft  sensibility  is  all  that  is  sought,  and  the  tragedy  of  fiction 
and  of  real  Ufe  are  alike  welcome  as  they  alike  kindle  the  same 
emotions.  An  object  of  distress  at  once  touches  the  feeling, 
but  the  judgment  is  not  at  all  consulted  whether  or  how  to 
reheve,  nor  the  conscience  enlightened  to  any  source  of  moral 
obligation  and  claims  of  duty.  The  tears  are  as  instinctive  as 
the  noisy  manifestations  of  animal  sympathy  in  the  distress  of 
a  fellow  brute,  and  the  movement  for  relief,  if  any  is  made,  is 
equally  destitute  of  all  virtue.  The  whole  feeling  is  a  weakness, 
and  the  morbid  sensibility  viciously  excludes  all  control  of  the 
spiritual  over  the  animal  nature.  If  we  sometimes  say  of  senti- 
mentality, in  contrast  with  unfeeling  obduracy,  that  it  is  an 
amiable  weak  lies  s,\\Q  never  suppose  that  the  weakness  is  thereby 
exalted  to  a  virtue.  Morality  condemns  this  soft  sentimentality 
which  is  shocked  at  all  suffering,  and  would  interfere  as  readily 
to  save  from  the  salutary  retributions  of  righteous  law,  as  from 
the  misfortunes  of  providential  experience. 

3.  "Be  thankful. ^^  When  any  act  of  kindness  has  been  done, 
the  reciprocal  duty  is  thankfulness.  The  same  spirit  of  kind- 
ness, which  would  giv'e  in  charity,  would  in  changed  circum- 
stances be  thankful.  Kindness  is  exhibited  in  thanksgiving. 
To  one  who  has  received,  there  may  often  be  nothing  but 
thanks  left  for  him  to  give ;  and  in  such  a  condition  his  cordial 
gratitude  may  evince  as  real  and  as  much  kindness  as  the 
other's  benefaction.  Gratitude,  grace,  and  charity  have  the 
same  root,  and  express  originally  the  same  idea.  No  one 
would  doubt  the  genuine  charity  of  a  heart  truly  thankful. 
Put  such  a  man  where  he  can  show  kindness  by  giving,  and 
his  charities  will  be  as  cheerful  as  has  been  his  thankfulness. 
It  is  tlius  the  same  grace  at  heart,  and  only  showing  itself  in  a 
different  form  from  the  necessities  of  the  condition.  It  is, 
therefore,  as  truly  the  duty  of  the  beneficiary  to  be  thankful, 
as  of  the  man,  who  is  able,  to  be  charitable.  It  is  the  same 
virtue  of  a  cordial  kindness  in  both. 


80  PURE    MORALITY. 

1.  GR.4TITUDE.  By  this  is  meant  the  possession  of  a  dispo- 
sition that  will  express  thankfulness  on  all  occasions,  of  benefits 
intended.  The  maxim  binds  the  spirit,  and  not  merely  the 
word  and  outward  deed.  Ingratitude  of  spirit  is  as  unkind  and 
as  debasing  to  humanity  as  uncharitableness.  The  habit  of 
unkindness  is  more  rapidly  gained  through  ingratitude  than 
through  uncharitableness.  Favors  bestowed  indicate  a  position 
of  superior  wealth  and  power,  and  the  receiver  is  more  liable  to 
indulge  a  false  pride,  and  cultivate  a  spirit  of  mortified  vanity, 
and  thus  check  the  fljw  of  reciprocal  kindness  in  his  gratitude  ; 
and  this  tendency  in  human  nature  should  be  sedulously  watched 
and  guarded.  An  ungrateful  spirit,  in  whatever  way  induced,  is 
a  base  spirit ;  it  violates  the  law  of  kindness,  and  unfits  itself  in 
any  change  of  circumstances  to  be  a  charitable  spirit.  It  shows 
the  person  to  be  not  only  in  a  condition  of  want,  which  might 
be  of  no  moral  moment,  but  to  have  fallen  into  much  deeper 
degradation  by  not  keeping  the  control  of  the  spirit,  and  main- 
taining its  worthiness  in  all  circumstances. 

2.  Insolence.  This  manifests  itself,  not  merely  in  the  rich 
and  powerful  by  a  haughty  dictation  and  overbearing  contempt, 
but  not  seldom  also  in  the  poor  by  a  rude  and  impudent  and  re- 
proachful bearing  towards  those  in  a  superior  station.  It  is  really 
the  same  vice  in  both  cases,  and  finds  its  root  in  a  heart  of  un- 
kindness. Ingratitude  in  receiving  favors  very  readily  runs  to 
insolence  in  demanding  more,  and  querulous  complaining  that 
the  gifts  are  not  better ;  and  such  impertinence  soon  renders 
itself  intolerable.  The  public  contempt  excludes  all  pubhc 
compassion  for  such  impudence,  however  needy. 

Habitual  begging  is  sure  to  generate  this  spirit.  It  begins  in 
selfishness,  and  as  it  can  have  no  true  gratitude  when  favors  are 
given,  it  will  be  quite  sure  to  manifest  displeasure  when  the  favor 
sought  is  denied.  There  will  be  equal  insolence  in  the  impor- 
tunity, and  in  the  insult  that  follows  refusal.  Not  only  can  no 
habitual  mendicancy  cultivate  a  pious  spirit,  it  is  quite  incom- 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  8 1 

patible  ^vith  a  v-irtuous  spirit.  It  directly  promotes  insolence, 
and  induces  many  other  vices  with  it. 

3.  Peevishness.  Here  is  the  same  unkind  feeling  manifest- 
ing itself  in  another  way,  and  perhaps  in  a  somewhat  lower 
degree.  Whatever  be  done,  the  person  is  hard  to  please  ;  there 
is  always  something  not  as  it  should  be,  and  a  disposition  to 
magnify  it,  complain  of  it,  and  fret  about  it.  The  temper  is 
soured ;  the  spirit,  murmuring  and  repining,  teases  and  chafes 
itself  by  imagined  slights  or  the  magnified  neglect  of  others ; 
and  the  miserable  person  soon  quenches  all  sympathy  for  the 
misery,  which  he  so  pen^ersely  determines  to  make  and  to  keep. 
Such  perpetual  peevishness  is  perpetually  annoying  and  in- 
creasingly revolting.  Every  one  sees  in  it  the  want  of  a  kind 
and  benevolent  spirit,  charitable  in  giving  and  grateful  in  receiv- 
ing, and  can  give  no  approbation  to  the  moral  character  thus 
represented.  When  kindness  meets  kindness  with  favors,  the 
charity  awakens  gratitude,  and  the  grateful  heart  is  always  meek, 
and  always  cheerful.  To  the  sorrowing  and  destitute,  the  con- 
trol of  a  kind  and  thankful  heart  keeps  the  spirit  serene  and 
tranquil.     Even  suffering  will  have  its  patience. 

The  spirit  of  kindness  will  induce  to  the  adoption  and  fulfil- 
ment of  the  above  maxims,  and  these  will  include  the  above 
and  other  duties,  and  avoid  the  vices  which  might  be  drawn  out 
in  greater  detail.  Sufficient  has  been  done  to  illustrate  the  prin- 
ciple in  this  part  of  morality,  and  there  yet  remains  to  present 
the  duties  to  mankind  which  are  demanded  by  respect. 


82  PURE    MORALITY. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

2.  Relative  Duties.     Respect. 

We  here  view  man  not  as  a  creature  of  appetite  and  want 
merely,  but  more  especially  as  possessed  of  a  rational  dignity 
and  spiritual  excellency  that  in  his  own  intrinsic  being  entitles 
him  to  regard  above  the  brutes  that  perish.  The  animal  craves 
help  ;  the  spiritual  claims  respect. 

All  imperatives  originate  in  the  spiritual  part  of  man's  being ; 
and  man's  animal  wants  are  to  be  relieved  by  man,  not  because 
the  animal  nature  has  rights  and  can  make  ethical  demands, 
but  because  his  spirit  has  an  intrinsic  excellency  which  is  de- 
based if  a  man  can,  but  will  not  help  the  needy.  This  claim 
to  respect  must  modify  the  manner  of  helping,  as  well  as  deter- 
mine the  duty  to  help.  Those  to  whom  we  are  to  manifest  our 
kindness  are  human,  and  thus  our  charity  must  not  be  as  when 
thrown  to  brutes ;  and  those  from  whom  we  receive  kindness 
are  human,  and  their  charities  are  to  be  taken  not  as  if  snatched 
from  dogs.  The  charity  must  be  accompanied  and  the  favor 
reciprocated  with  respect  on  both  sides.  The  commerce  in 
giving  and  receiving  is  between  rational  beings,  and  the  kind- 
ness of  the  charity  no  more  ennobles  the  one,  than  the  kindness 
of  the  gratitude  must  ennoble  the  other.  A  defect  on  either  side 
is  not  merely  a  want  of  kindness,  but  a  debasing  of  the  spiritual 
personality,  and  to  give  with  contempt  or  to  receive  with  im- 
pudence would  be  alike  disrespectful  to  humanity  and  a  re- 
proach to  both  parties.  All  violation,  in  any  way,  of  the  spirit- 
ual claim  to  respect  in  man,  is  necessarily  connected  with  the 
loss  of  his  own  self-respect  in  the  offer  of  the  indignity.  Mu- 
tual respect  amid  all  the  communications  of  man  with  man,  is 
a  universal  imperative. 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  83 

The  general  maxim  is,  "  Honor  all  men."  Out  of  this  com- 
prehensive maxim  there  spring  others  less  general,  and  which 
have  each  many  duties,  as  commanded  virtues  or  forbidden 
vices,  included  within  them. 

I.   Be  ye  courteous.     The  import  of  this  maxim  is,  that  each 
man  should  deport  himself  in  a  manly  way  in  all  his  intercourse 
with  other  men.     All  men  have  an  intrinsic  spiritual  excellency 
which  obliges  each  to  demand  of  all  others  the  tribute  of  a  manly 
respect.     This  is  not  to  be  estimated  by  merely  conventional 
rules  and  customs  which  change  with  the  place  and  the  age,  but 
by  that  perpetual  respect  which  the  permanent  possession  of 
rational  dignity  in  the  human  race  demands  from  all,  and  in  aU 
ages.     It  is  not  punctilious  regard    to  rules  of  etiquette  ;  not 
obsequiousness,,  nor  flattery,  nor  dissimulation  that  smiles  out- 
wardly when  there  is  inward  contempt ;  but  a  cordial  recognition 
of  the  rights  and  prerogatives  of  a  man,  and  a  full  accordance  of 
them  all  in  our  whole  bearing  and  demeanor  towards  men.     If 
such  be  withholden  by  others  from  us,  and  we  be  treated  by 
them  quite  discourteously,  there  is  a  courteousness  of  demeanor 
still  due  to  them  inasmuch  as  they  are  men  ;  and  our  resentment 
is  to  be  tempered  with  a  dignity  and  delicacy,  which  manifests 
our  own  self-possession  in  observing  what  is  due  to  humanity, 
both  in  them  and  ourselves.     It  will  exclude  all  rudeness,  rash- 
ness, and  insolence,  in  any  condition  or  towards  any  man.     A 
vicious  man,  a  criminally  convicted  man,  a  capitally  condemned 
man,  in  each  case  is  still  a  man,  and  must  be  treated  with  the 
consideration  due  to  the  possession  of  a  rational  spirit ;  yea,  an 
abusive  and  insulting  man  may  in  no  way  make  me  to  forget 
what  is  due  to  him  as  a  man,  and  that  under  the  smart  of 
the   insult,    I   should   allow   myself  to   treat  him  as  a  raging 
animal. 

I  .may  show  other  and  different  tokens  of  respect  to  the 
morally  wise  and  virtuous,  to  the  respectful  and  courteous,  than 
to  the  base  and  the  insolent ;  but  in  no  case  may  I  treat  any 


84  PURE    MORALITY. 

man  at  all  unmanly,  I  debase  myself  in  such  disrespect,  and 
am  also  guilty  of  offering  an  affront  to  humanity.  To  insult 
another  who  has  insulted  me,  or  to  refuse  him  the  courteous 
recognition  due  to  him  as  a  man,  is  not  only  an  affront  offered 
to  him,  but  is  a  contempt  placed  upon  myself,  since  I  thus 
acknowledge  that  my  manliness  is  capable  of  being  outraged  by 
one  in  whom  I  recognize  no  manliness.  Such  a  treatment  of 
another  does  not  spring  from  the  self-respect  of  a  truly  digni- 
fied character,  but  is  an  off-shoot  of  that  self-conceit  whose  real 
nature  is  a  self-contempt.  In  so  far  as  I  recognize  myself  as  a 
man,  I  shaU  recognize  and  respect  that  which  is  spiritual  in 
all  men. 

1.  Arrogance.  This  is  the  ostentatious  assumption  of  supe- 
rior importance.  Simply  as  a  man,  one  has  no  prerogative 
above  another.  If  moral  qualities  make  one  more  excellent 
than  another,  this  can  never  permit  the  virtuous  to  display  their 
virtue  ostentatiously  ;  and  if  any  adventitious  circumstances  place 
one  man  in  a  higher  position  than  another,  that  will  never  jus- 
tify arrogance  and  assumed  self-consequence.  It  is  more  and 
better  to  be  a  man  than  to  be  a  king ;  and  it  is  immoral,  because 
it  is  a  disrespect  to  humanity,  when  one  puts  forth  the  arrogant 
claim  that  his  superior  station  makes  him  a  superior  man.  The 
truly  noble  and  elevated  man  manifests  such  kindness  and  re- 
spect for  all  other  men  in  his  dignity,  that  he  inspires  esteem 
and  love,  and  the  highest  honors  are  accorded  to  him  by  his  fel- 
low-men without  any  painful  sense  of  their  inferiorit)'.  His 
greatness  inspires  reverence,  and  his  courteous  bearing  so  tem- 
pers it  towards  all,  that  it  becomes  cordial  respect  and  good- 
will; while  an  arrogant  man,  no  matter  how  high  his  station, 
will  awaken  only  the  feelings  of  contempt  and  reproach.  This 
arrogance  is  a  vice,  in  that  it  denies  the  respect  due  to  others, 
and  really  brings  upon  the  man  who  assumes  it  a  self-reproach. 

2.  Scorn.  This  adds  to  the  self-inflation  of  arrogance,  a 
manifested  contempt  and  proud  despising  of  others.     In  arro- 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  85 

gance,  this  contempt  is  rather  implied,  while  the  manifestation 
is  mainly  confined  to  an  ostentatious  display  of  the  person's  own 
fancied  importance  ;  but  in  scorn  the  manifestation  of  the  con- 
tempt for  another  is  made  prominent,  and  the  undue  conse- 
quence attached  to  himself  is  rather  implied  in  the  indignity 
and  reproach  with  which  the  man  treats  another.  Scornfulness 
is  thus  a  more  direct  and  gross  breach  of  courtesy,  and  the  more 
odious  vice.  It  is  an  indignity  to  humanity  to  arrogate  some 
prerogative  over  it ;  but  it  is  a  greater  indignity  to  offer  a  direct 
affront  to  it,  and  manifest  an  open  contempt  for  it.  Coleridge 
has  remarked  that  Shakespeare  never  makes  a  great  character  a 
scomer. 

Scorn  is  sometimes  used  in  a  good  sense,  as  when  we  say, 
"the  man  scorns  to  do  a  mean  action,"  "he  rejected  the  in- 
famous proposal  with  scorn,"  etc. ;  in  which  is  represented  the 
indignant  rebuke  of  virtue,  and  the  abhorrence  it  feels  towards 
vice  ;  but  more  generally  it  is  used  in  a  bad  sense,  and  as  above, 
for  the  contemptuous  disparagement  of  some  other  man,  and 
which  is  always  condemned  by  pure  morality. 

3.  Ridicule.  This  may  include  both  arrogance  and  scorn- 
fuhiess,  and  adds  thereto  the  maliciousness  that  would  make  the 
subject  an  object  of  reproach  to  others.  But  while  it  goes  be- 
yond in  overt  acts  to  make  contemptible  to  others,  it  is  applied 
to  awaken  contempt  of  not  so  strong  a  degree  as  scorning,  but 
rather  that  the  victim  ntay  be  the  object  of  derision.  And  this 
it  does,  not  by  fair  presentation  of  plain  facts  or  serious  defects 
that  might  truly  be  reproachful,  but  by  ludicrous  selections  or 
combinations  designed  to  make  the  person  a  laughing-stock  to 
others.  This  may  sometimes  be  in  wantonness  and  not  deliber- 
ate maliciousness,  but  in  any  such  exhibition  there  is  a  want  of 
courtesy  which  the  obligations  of  mutual  respect  among  man- 
kind demand. 

It  is  sometimes  inquired  if  vice  is  not  often  ridiculous,  and 
thus  a  jjroper  subject  of  derision ;  to  which  it  may  properly  be 


86  PURE    MORALITY. 

replied,  that  nothing  which  sets  vice  in  its  true  light  as  both 
foolish  and  wicked  is  wrong.  The  Scriptures  represent  good 
men  and  even  God  as  treating  wickedness  with  irony.  —  i  Kings, 
xviii.  27.  —  Prov.  i.  26.  But  in  this  is  no  discourtesy,  for  the  manner 
and  the  end  are  directed  as  a  severe  and  terrible  rebuke  of 
iniquity.  For  such  higher  end,  when  occasion  calls'  ridicule 
may  be  legitimate.  But  this  seldom  occurs  among  men,  and 
the  moral  effect  of  serious  expostulation  and  solemn  rebuke  is 
ordinarily  better  than  ridicule  or  satire.  Its  immorality  is  easily 
determined  in  the  attempt  to  traduce  or  defame,  to  subject 
to  reproach  or  derision,  when  contemplated  solely  as  man 
among  men.  No  one  has  the  prerogative  to  so  exalt  himself 
above  the  common  humanity  that  he  may  despise  others,  nor 
to  take  any  one  from  amid  the  ranks  of  mankind  and  make 
him  ridiculous  to  others.  It  is  a  discourtesy  which  common 
respect  for  man  forbids,  and  morahty  condemns. 

4.  Vulgarity.  This  is  used  here  in  reference  to  grossness 
of  language,  or  coarseness  and  rudeness  of  manner,  in  our 
intercourse  with  men.  The  plainest  man  in  the  lowest  walks  of 
life,  and  who  can  only  use  the  homeliest  phrases  and  manners, 
will  do  this  with  a  respectful  deference  and  delicacy  of  spirit, 
which  evinces  the  essence  of  true  courtesy  in  his  regard  toward 
the  man  he  addresses  ;  and  when  such  a  man  feels  respect,  the 
inward  sentiment  will  at  once  raise  his  plainness  above  all  vul- 
garity. The  man  of  vulgar  bearing  always  evinces  the  absence 
of  proper  respect  for  the  persons  with  whom  he  is  communing, 
and  thus  the  vulgar  man  is  always  voluntarily  the  discourteous 
man.  Let  him  raise  his  conception  of  the  persons  he  addresses, 
to  the  proper  dignity  and  excellency  of  their  spiritual  being, 
and  whatever  may  have  been  his  comparative  culture  or  re- 
finement, the  inner  respect  for  humanity  will  at  once  remove  all 
vulgarity  and  put  in  its  place  true  courtesy.  President  Lincoln 
was  not  bred  in  courts,  but  his  sense  of  human  worth  and  his 
respect  for  man  made  him  so  well  bred  that  at  the  great  Gettys- 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  8/ 

burgh  celebration  where  the  representatives  of  foreign  govern- 
ments and  of  our  own  were  so  largely  gathered,  it  was  said  that 
he  showed  himself  as  a  gentleman,  the  peer  of  any  one  there. 

All  profanity  is  of  course  vulgarity,  and  obscenity  is  vulgarity 
of  a  gross  degree,  which  can  be  habitual  in  any  one  only  in  the 
loss  of  all  self-respect  and  all  respect  for  the  men  with  whom 
he  associates.  It  indicates  a  baseness  of  spirit  fit  for  any  de- 
grading companionship  in  iniquity,  and  can  hardly  have  been 
attained  except  by  a  familiarity  with  low  vices. 

2.  Deal  justly  with  all  men.  Man,  in  the  excellency  of  his 
spiritual  being,  has  rights,  and  may  demand  that  all  these  shall 
be  acknowledged  and  regarded  by  others ;  and  as  all  other 
men  have  rights,  so  they  may  in  the  same  manner  demand  that 
these  shall  be  respected  by  him.  In  this  is  the  foundation  of 
natural  justice ;  the  mutual  rights  of  a  common  spirituality  of 
being,  giving  equality  of  claims  and  reciprocity  of  duties. 
Every  man  may  thus  demand  from  all  others  that  which  is  just 
and  equal.  To  rob  one  of  his  right  or  defraud  him  of  his  due 
is  an  indignity  to  his  spiritual  being,  and  this  want  of  due  re- 
spect to  his  fellow-man  debases  his  own  spirit  and  makes  the 
robber  unrighteous.  The  vice  is  seen,  not  directly  in  the  loss 
of  the  happiness  which  has  been  occasioned  by  the  injustice, 
for  if  this  had  been  occasioned  by  the  animal  activity  alone, 
its  loss  of  happiness  would  have  involved  no  unrighteousness, 
but  it  shows  itself  only  in  the  indignity  which  has  been  done  to 
humanity.  The  defrauded  man  has  been  treated  as  if  he  had 
no  rights  ;  as  if  he  were  thing  and  not  person  ;  and  in  this  want 
of  respect  morality  finds  the  vice  and  applies  the  condemnation, 
and  the  whole  is  brought  home  to  the  conscience  of  the  unjust 
man,  in  that  his  knowledge  of  his  own  spirituality  convicts  him 
of  conscious  debasement  in  the  indignity  he  has  done  to  his 
neighbor.  In  the  invasion  of  his  neighbor's  manhood  he  has 
debased  his  own. 

Whatever,  thus,  becomes  a  right  in  any  person,  whether  nat- 


88  PURE    MORALITY. 

ural  or  acquired  in  the  ongoing  of  society  where  he  dwells,  is 
his  to  keep  and  control,  and  with  which  another  may  not  inter- 
fere. Any  invasion  of  another's  right  is  this  injustice,  that  it  is 
a  violent  discarding  of  his  prerogatives  of  personality,  and  con- 
temptuously holding  him  as  a  thing  with  no  rights.  Such 
an  act  would  sting  your  own  soul  with  remorse,  for  you  know 
that  in  that  indignity  to  him,  you  have  wounded  your  own 
spirit  and  made  yourself  unworthy.  No  injustice  can  so  en- 
rich in  happiness,  that  it  does  not  more  surely  impoverish  in 
unworthiness.  No  amount  of  gratification  can  compensate  for 
the  perpetual  stigma  in  baseness.  Happiness  may  have  been 
enhanced,  but  at  the  terrible  price  of  perpetual  self-contempt. 

1.  Assaulting.  This  includes  all  invasion  of  rights  by  a  di- 
rect attack  upon  the  person  or  possessions  of  another.  The 
same  ethical  principle  is  violated  in  them  all,  and  the  guilt  lies 
in  the  indignity  done  to  the  personality,  and  its  degree  is  to  be 
measured  by  that,  and  not  the  amount  in  which  it  may  have  inter- 
fered with  animal  enjoyment.  It  embraces  all  crimes  of  vio- 
lence, and  which  would  be  too  numerous  to  consider  here  in 
detail;  whether  assaults  upon  property,  as  trespass,  burglary, 
theft ;  or  assaults  upon  chastity,  as  seduction  and  rape ;  or  as- 
saults upon  person,  as  battery  or  murder.  The  enormity  of  the 
vice  is  measured  by  the  dignity  of  the  right  invaded,  and  is  thus 
as  the  violation  of  the  grand  maxim,  "  Honor  all  men."  The 
injustice  is  a  want  of  respect ;  an  indignity  to  humanity ;  and 
the  nearer  to  the  excellency  of  the  spirit  stands  the  riglit  which 
has  been  invaded,  so  is  the  personaHty  the  more  dishonored  and 
the  vice  of  greater  enormity. 

2.  Defrauding.  I  here  include  all  invasion  of  rights  which 
is  made  covertly  or  deceptively.  AH  cheating,  double-dealing, 
false-weights  and  measures,  obtaining  goods  by  false  pretences, 
violation  of  contracts,  pledges,  trusts,  commissions,  insurance, 
etc.,  and  thus  frauds  committed  in  any  way  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  any  thing  which  belongs  to  another.     These  all,  again, 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  89 

come  under  the  one  principle  of  disrespect  to  the  rights  in 
humanity,  and  an  attempt  to  obtain  possession  in  utter  disregard 
of  such  rights.  It  is  not. so  heinous  as  a  direct  assault,  though 
it  may  attain  fraudulently  a  greater  pecuniary  value,  for  it  does 
not  so  directly  offer  its  indignity  to  the  personality;  but  its 
immorality  is  truly  in  this,  that  it  assumes  to  take  from  a  man 
as  it  would  elude  or  cheat  an  animal.  It  discards  the  humanity ; 
it  ignores  rights ;  it  uses  man  as  a  thing  in  nature,  which  may 
be  used  in  a  delusive  or  perv^erse  accommodation  to  your  own 
purposes  without  indignity.  And  in  proportion  to  such  disre- 
spect and  contempt  of  the  prerogatives  in  humanity  is  the  vice 
of  the  fraudulent  transaction. 

3.  Lying.  A  lie  is  a  statement  of  one  person  to  another, 
which  contradicts  the  conviction  of  the  person  making  it.  It 
may  be  made  by  direct  declaration,  by  equivocation,  by  delusive 
gesture  and  signs,  or,  even  by  utter  silence,  in  circumstances 
where  truth  demands  assertion  or  denial ;  but,  however  effected, 
it  makes  use  of  the  power  which  a  person  has  of  communicating 
thought  in  a  way  subversive  of  the  very  end  for  which  that 
power  was  given.  It  is  thus  a  conscious  and  voluntary  de- 
thronement of  that  rational  personality  by  which  alone  one  is 
capable  of  an  interchange  of  thoughts  with  another ;  it  is  an 
abandonment  of  one's  own  dignity,  and  a  direct  affront  to  hu- 
manity itself.  The  liar  is  willing  to  declare  himself  to  be  no 
man,  and  that  others  are  not  men. 

The  essential  vice  of  lying,  the  ultimate  turpitude  of  the 
iniquity,  is  in  this  indignity  to  the  rational  spirit,  whose  impera- 
tive it  is  that  there  be  "  truth  in  the  inward  part."  Respect  for 
the  rational  being  of  others,  and  the  integrity  of  your  own  spirit 
in  personal  worthiness,  demand  perpetual  veracity. 

Questions  of  casuistry,  in  reference  to  the  vice  of  lying,  origi- 
nate in  wholly  wrong  conceptions  of  the  ground  of  obligation  to 
veracity.  If  the  duty  of  truth  is  to  be  seen  only  in  its  general 
consequences,  and  this  is  obligatory  only  as  greater  happiness 


90  PURE    MORALITY. 

results  from  it,  there  may  be  many  conditions  supposed  in  which 
it  would  at  least  be  difficult  to  conclude  that  the  greater  good 
would  not  result  from  the  falsehood.  Looking  only  at  gratified 
appetite,  and  not  at  spiritual  worthiness,  as  the  good  to  be  at- 
tained, it  will  not  be  difficult  to  multiply  many  most  perplexing 
cases,  in  which  human  judgment  would  be  pretty  sure  to  lie  on 
the  side  of  the  falsehood,  unless  it  were  to  be  conceived  that 
direct  Divine  interpositions  would  occur  to  change  the  antici- 
pated general  consequences.  Yea,  even  in  some  false  views 
of  religion,  it  may  be  decided  that  falsehood  is  more  than 
excused,  and  is  even  obligatory  to  a  religious  end. 

But  the  grand  principle  for  determining  all  such  questions 
of  casuistry  is  not  by  any  calculation  of  general  consequences, 
and  judgment  of  greater  happiness  and  unhappiness.  Some- 
where it  is  to  be  decided  which  course  oicgJit  to  be  made  the 
most  happy  or  unhappy.  The  Being  who  establishes  the  order 
of  nature,  that  gives  out  its  measure  of  happiness  in  its  general 
results,  must  still  have  his  higher  principle  determining  where 
the  highest  happiness  ought  to  be.  And  this  cannot  be  in  some 
necessity  of  his  own  nature,  which  decides  that  so  it  must  be  or 
he  shall  be  unhappy,  for  this  would  make  it  to  rest  only  on  what 
that  Being  wants  it  should  be,  and  not  at  all  on  what  he  sees 
it  ought  to  be.  To  have  any  basis  in  morality,  the  ultimate  test 
must  be  one  of  worthiness  and  indignity.  If  a  lie  is  ever  to  be 
justified,  it  must  be  because  there  and  then  it  is  no  indignity 
to  the  deceived,  and  no  degradation  to  the  deceiver.  All 
spiritual  being  demands  respect  for  its  own  intrinsic  excellency ; 
and  unless  you  can  find  the  human  being  to  whom,  in  his  con- 
dition, it  is  no  mark  of  contempt  and  indignity  to  deceive  him, 
morality  will  condemn  the  lie,  and  oblige  the  man  to  blush  in 
secret  at  the  consciousness  of  his  own  baseness  in  telling  it. 

3.  Sustain  thy  neighbor's  good  name.  In  reality  there  can  be 
no  personal  dishonor  to  a  man  except  through  his  own  deed. 
It  must  be  the  man's  own  disposition  which  forms  his  character, 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  QI 

/ 

and  this  disposing  of  himself  must  be  at  his  own  responsibility. 
But  detraction  and  defamation  may  effect  the  estimation  in 
which  he  is  held  by  others.  The  good  name  of  a  man  in  so- 
ciety may  be  determined  by  our  representation  of  him.  His 
true  character  may  be  belied,  and  his  good  reputation  lost  by 
no  fault  of  his  o\\ti.  He  has  the  right  not  only  to  form  his 
own  virtuous  character,  and  possess  his  own  conscious  self- 
respect  and  approbation,  but  the  right  also  to  his  good  name  in 
the  estimation  of  his  fellow-men.  It  is  a  great  breach  of  re- 
spect to  humanity  to  detract  from  a  good  reputation  among 
men. 

All  reproach  for  physical  infirmities  or  bodily  deformity  will 
be  a  violation  of  the  maxim  of  kindness,  and  thus  a  vice  in  the 
case  of  him  who  so  reproaches  his  unfortunate  fellow-man ; 
but  this  is  not  the  vice  which  is  induced  by  a  violation  of  the 
present  maxim.  Such  reproaches  do  not  reach  to  the  moral 
personality  and  take  away  the  man's  good  name.  The  maxim 
we  here  consider  requires  that  we  do  nothing  to  detract  from 
a  man's  personal  character,  but  that  we  sustain  his  good  reputa- 
tion by  all  proper  methods.  The  adoption  of  it  will  exclude 
many  vices. 

I.  Slander.  This  may  include  all  forms  of  detraction  by 
word  of  mouth.  It  ranges  from  petty  scandal,  that  imputes 
minor  faults  and  failings,  up  to  malicious  slanders  that  aim  di- 
rectly at  the  foundation  of  the  entire  character.  The  tattler 
and  slanderer  not  only  induce  jealousies,  suspicions,  and  angry 
contentions  in  society,  but  the  very  act  of  tale-bearing  and 
detraction  is  vicious.  One  man  has  no  right  to  be  injuring  the 
good  name  of  another,  even  by  reporting  that  which  may  be 
true  of  him,  unless  some  grave  interest  of  the  public  may  de- 
mand it.  If  a  man  is  plotting  mischief  against  society,  or  any 
individuals  in  it,  an  exposure  of  his  iniquity  for  the  defence  of 
the  community  may  be  righteous.  But  no  exposure  can  be 
made  by  any,  for  the  mere  end  of  giving  a  bad  reputation  in 


92  PURE    MORALITY. 

public,  even  though  the  man  may  deserve  it.  Morality  gives 
him  the  right  to  the  reputation  he  acquires,  unless  some  higher 
right  come  in  and  make  it  your  duty  to  defend  that,  even  at 
the  expense  of  an  exposure  of  his  unworthiness.  To  do  this 
for  virtue's  sake  is  not  slander. 

The  vice  of  slander  appears  directly  in  its  disrespect  to  the 
humanity  in  the  person  slandered.  Spiritual  worthiness  is  the 
highest  treasure,  and  without  this  the  humanity  had  better  never 
have  been  raised  above  the  animal  being.  And  yet  the  reputa- 
tion for  this,  the  slanderer  would  wholly  destroy.  He  would  do 
to  him  that  indignity  which  is  expressed  in  saying,  that  it  were 
better  he  were  wholly  the  brute  than  such  a  man.  And  the 
wantonness  or  the  malignity,  that  can  so  reproach  another,  sinks 
the  author  to  the  deepest  debasement.  It  is  this  conscious  deg- 
radation in  the  eye  of  the  community,  that  makes  the  name  of 
the  slanderer  so  despicable.  His  infamy  becomes  quite  as  deep 
as  that  to  which  he  would  consign  his  victim.  The  contempt  he 
manifests  towards  another,  returns  upon  himself;  and  his  de- 
famation of  another  man,  turns  to  be  a  true  record  against  his 
owii  soul.  The  slanderer  is  himself  usually  conscious  of  the 
baseness  of  his  course,  and  betrays  it  in  the  innuendoes  and 
covert  insinuations  he  uses,  and  attempts  to  reach  his  end  by 
hints,  suspicions,  and  dark  surmises,  when  he  would  be  ashamed 
to  avow  his  direct  purpose,  and  stand  fully  out  before  his  object 
and  take  the  consequences  of  his  designed  indignity  to  his 
fellow-man.  His  deed  is  one  for  which  manifestly  his  own  spirit 
condemns  him. 

2.  Libel.  This  wTites  or  prints  the  slander,  and  publishes  it. 
The  same  principles  apply,  as  before,  and  the  offence  is  the 
same,  except  as  it  may  be  aggravated  by  the  greater  notoriety 
given.  \^Tiatever  is  thus  pubhshed  for  purposes  of  detrac- 
tion, or  AAath  a  carelessness  and  recklessness  of  the  rights  of  all 
men  to  reputation,  that  sacrifices  this  to  gossip  or  for  gain,  is 
libellous,  and  strongly  condemned  by  pure  morahty.     It  cannot 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  93 

be  justified  by  the  conductors  of  the  public  press  on  the  ground 
of  dealing  in  facts,  retailing  news,  nor  even  of  general  benefit  in 
exposing  depravity.  The  claim  of  the  public  to  the  facts  must 
have  some  specific  ground  in  its  own  rights,  in  the  circum- 
stances, and  such  as  makes  the  neglect  to  disclose,  to  be  a 
greater  treachery  and  indignity  to  it,  than  the  disclosure  is  of 
disrespect  to  the  exposed  party ;  and  in  such  a  case  the  publi- 
cation is  no  libel,  but  a  virtuous  and  manly  fulfilment  of  duty  in 
the  higher  interests  of  humanity.  When,  precisely,  the  facts 
come  within  such  a  principle,  each  man  must  judge  in  his  own 
case,  and  oftentimes  with  most  distressing  convictions  of  respon- 
sibility on  either  hand. 

A  false  statement  is  libellous,  for  whatever  purposes  made ; 
for  no  man  may  malign  an  innocent  person  for  any  supposed 
good  end,  and  a  true  statement  is  still  libellous,  if  not  specifically 
demanded  by  the  higher  rights  of  humanity ;  yea,  the  more 
truth  the  more  libellous,  for  it  destroys  reputation  the  more,  and 
this  when  no  public  rights  are  to  be  subser\-ed  by  it.  Still,  as 
in  all  cases,  so  here,  the  claim  of  the  public  is  higher  than  the 
private,  and  no  man  has  the  right  to  a  good  reputation  falsely, 
at  the  expense  of  public  freedom  and  virtue. 

3.  Censoriousness.  By  this  is  meant  the  spirit  of  fault- 
finding and  suspicion  of  bad  motives  and  intent,  and  which 
exhibits  itself  in  numberless  ways  of  complaining  and  detracting, 
and  induces  the  habit  of  backbiting  and  petty  defaming,  when 
no  serious  attack  upon  character  and  good  name  is  attempted 
or  intended.  It  always  looks  upon  the  dark  side  of  human 
character,  and  suspects  every  man  to  be  a  knave  that  has  not 
pretty  fully  proved  his  virtue. 

True  respect  for  the  spiritual  being  of  man  demands,  that  we 
look  upon  the  multitude  of  human  faults  and  failings  with  as 
lenient  an  eye,  and  speak  for  them  as  apologetic  a  word  as 
reason  will  allow.  Instead  of  magnifying  and  aggravating 
human  offences,  it  would  soften  and  palliate  as  far  as  circum- 


94  '  PURE    ?iIORALITY. 

Stances  will  admit.  Even  vices  and  crimes  will  not  be  divulged, 
and  the  wicked  reproached  for  them,  except  as  the  rights  of 
humanity  demand.  Such  a  spirit  will  not  allow  itself  to  become 
censorious,  uncharitable,  sarcastic  and  sour  towards  others,  nor 
be  disposed  to  assail  even  the  vicious  tauntingly  or  scornfully. 

If  satire  may  sometimes  be  righteously  applied  in  castigation 
of  human  vices  and  follies,  the  virtuous  satirist  will  not  choose 
that  his  position  and  vocation  should  make  his  spirit  harsh  and 
bitter  towards  the  objects  of  his  censure ;  but  having  chastised 
them  for  their  good,  he  would  still  rather  soothe,  encourage, 
and  excuse,  when  that  tenderer  spirit  may  work  them  as  much 
good.  A  censorious  spirit  loves  censure,  and  gratifies  itself  in 
fault-finding,  distrusting,  and  maligning,  and  has  itself  great 
need  of  the  forbearance  and  apology  it  denies  to  others.  A 
spirit  that  "  hopeth  all  things,"  is  better  than  that  which  habit- 
ually fretteth  itself  against  evil.  Respect  for  man  will  induce 
apologies  rather  than  censures,  and  morality  demands  a  chari- 
table rather  than  a  censorious  judgment. 

4.  Be  obedient  to  Government.  The  manner  of  right  author- 
ity, as  a  source  of  obligation,  is  to  receive  an  examination  in  a 
subsequent  Part  of  our  work ;  but  we  here  consider  it  solely  as 
an  existing  fact  with  which  man  comes  into  connection,  and  in 
reference  to  which  he  has  duties  declared  directly  in  the  man- 
date of  his  own  reason.  "We  do  not  here  inquire  in  what 
respects  patriotism  may  bind  in  subjection  to  civil  government, 
but  in  what  respects  is  it  a  moral  virtue  to  submit  to  the  ordi- 
nance of  man.  It  is  one  part  of  our  duty  to  mankind,  in  pure 
moralit)^,  to  be  "  obedient  to  the  powers  that  be." 

The  majesty  of  civil  authority,  so  far  as  we  have  now  any 
occasion  to  consider,  is  found  in  the  rational  dignity  of  humanity 
itself,  where  mankind  stand  together  in  a  collective  capacity. 
God  may  add  his  owoi  revealed  sanction  to  human  government, 
and  thus  lay  under  obligation  "for  the  Lord's  sake,"  yet  is  there 
an   inherent   excellency  in   righteous   human   authority   which 


RELATIVE    DUTIES.  95 

demands  respect  for  its  own  sake.  Under  whatever  form  of 
sovereignty  it  may  present  itself,  it  is  the  ofiicial  representation 
of  the  pubHc  will  in  regard  to  its  own  rights,  and  if  the  spiritual 
excellency  of  each  man  presents  rights  which  in  his  own  dignity 
demand  universal  respect,  much  more  must  official  state  author- 
ity which  has,  collected  within  itself,  the  right  and  dignity  of 
every  citizen,  demand  a  respectful  recognition.  If  that  man  is 
vicious  who  treats  individual  rights  contemptuously,  much  more 
is  that  man  vicious  who  "  despises  governments."  Not  merely 
that  civil  authority  is  useful,  is  it  therefore  venerable ;  it  could 
not  itself  be  useful,  except  as  arbitrary  tyranny,  were  it  not  first 
in  itself  entitled  to  respect  and  reverence.  The  public  person- 
ality speaks  out  in  its  governmental  legislation,  and  the  execu- 
tive magistrate  bears  the  sword  of  the  whole  body  politic,  and 
is  official  consen'ator  of  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  entire 
commonwealth,  and  has  thus  in  its  own  right  the  claim  of  re- 
spectful allegiance  from  every  citizen. 

Pure  morality,  thus,  demands  submission  to  government  and 
obedience  to  human  law,  not  merely  in  a  legal  spirit  which  is 
moved  solely  in  the  consideration  of  pains  and  penalties,  but 
"for  conscience  sake."  The  government,  being  the  true  ex- 
pression of  the  public  will  and  the  conservator  of  the  public 
rights,  is  venerable  in  its  authority,  and  all  rebellion  or  disobedi- 
ence is  a  contempt  of  "dignities,"  and  thus  a  debasement  of 
the  spirit  of  the  rebel.  His  contempt  of  government  is  the 
making  of  himself  unworthy,  and  is  thus  a  vice  condemned  by 
morality.  The  important  duties  under  this  maxim  of  obedience 
to  government  are  : 

I.  Subjection.  This  is  to  be  manifested  in  obeying  law; 
in  cheerfully  yielding  to  the  prerogatives  of  the  officers  of  gov- 
ernment ;  in  paying  respect  to  all  official  forms,  and  complying 
with  all  its  proclamations  and  special  orders.  The  whole  de- 
meanor is  to  be  that  of  a  peaceful,  quiet,  contented,  law-abiding 
citizen.     All  factions,  mobs,  riots,  insurrections,  lynch-law  pro- 


96  PURE    MORALITY. 

ceedings,  are  not  only  political  crimes,  but  vices  condemned  by 
pure  morality.  All  incendiary  speeches  or  publications,  and  all 
illegal  attempts  to  coerce  the  government  in  its  political  meas- 
ures, are  morally  unworthy  of  every  citizen. 

2.  Tribute.  If  government  exist  it  must  be  sustained  in 
its  expenses  by  the  citizens.  The  revenue  may  come  from 
varied  sources,  but  in  whatever  way  taxes  are  legally  levied, 
morality  forbids  all  evasion  of  the  pubUc  claim.  All  frauds  on 
the  revenue  laws,  secretion  of  ratable  property,  or  embezzle- 
ment of  public  money,  are  as  much  more  immoral  than  the  de- 
frauding of  a  private  person,  as  the  dignity  and  rights  of  the 
State  exceed  in  their  claims  to  respect  ^hose  of  the  individual. 
Tribute  is  as  really  due  to  the  State,  as  the  fulfilment  of  con- 
tracts with  individuals,  and  the  things  of  Caesar  are  as  truly  to 
be  rendered  as  the  things  of  God. 

3.  Service.  Every  man  is  bound  to  render  that  service  to 
the  State  which  in  his  circumstances  is  legally  demanded.  He 
may  not  shrink  from  official  stations,  or  military  duties  when  his 
country  calls.  He  must  judge  if  higher  claims  clash  with  the 
commands  of  his  country  and  responsibly  act  accordingly,  but 
in  a  righteous  call  of  his  country  to  any  service,  no  citizen  may 
hesitate  and  delay  without  becoming  immoral.  No  government 
can  last  which  cannot  control  the  services  of  its  citizens.  All 
disrespect  to  the  State  is  a  disgrace  to  the  man. 


II.  DUTIES  TO  OTHER  THAN  MANKIND. 


CHAPTER    V. 
I.   Duties  to  Nature. 

DUTIES  to  other  than  man  must  embrace  all  other  being  to 
which  man  owes  any  obligation.  This  will  include  Nature, 
both  animate  and  inanimate,  and  God.  We  assume  that,  with- 
out a  positive  revelation,  the  existence  of  God  would  be  known 
from  his  works  ;  and  this  knowledge  of  the  being  of  God  would 
impose  its  duties  upon  us  in  the  light  of  our  own  reason,  and 
thus  in  pure  morality.  Natural  religion  would  bind  to  duties 
from  the  motive  of  love  or  loyalty  to  the  God  of  nature,  but  as 
we  here  view  the  duties  only  in  the  light  of  man's  highest  worthi- 
ness, we  do  not  at  all  enter  the  field  of  natural  theology,  but 
still  keep  within  the  field  of  pure  morality.  We  only  consider 
what  are  the  duties,  out  of  regard  to  his  own  highest  worthiness, 
induced  by  adding  to  communion  with  his  fellow-men  commun- 
ion with  nature  and  with  God. 

1.  Duties  to  Nature. 

2.  Duties  to  God. 

Our  acquaintance  with  other  orders  of  being  is  dependent 
upon  revelation,  and  the  intercourse  of  man  with  any  other 
finite  beings  than  the  human  family,  is  too  partial  to  admit  of 
any  consideration  in  an  ethical  system. 

In  first  considering  our  duties  to  Nature,  we  remark  that  no 
portion  of  nature  has  any  endowment  of  rationality,  and  has 
thus  no  intrinsic  excellency  but  only  a  relative  utility.     It  is 

97 


98  PURE    MORALITY. 

means  not  end,  and  cannot  thus  bind  in  any  duties  for  its  own 
sake.  It  is  for  the  use  of  such  as  have  reason ;  a  thing  sub- 
subservient  to  personahty ;  and  while  used  by  persons,  may 
never  be  permitted  to  use  them.  Neither  animate  nor  inani- 
mate nature  has  any  rights,  and  can  be  controlled  by  no  ethical 
rules ;  nor  can  either  have  any  place  in  a  moral  system  on  its 
own  account,  since  it  can  neither  push  obligations  upon  others 
nor  feel  obligations  imposed  upon  it. 

But  while  for  the  sake  of  nature  itself  man  can  owe  no  duties 
to  nature,  yet  for  his  own  sake  many  duties  originate  in  his 
connection  with  the  world  of  nature  around  him.  Nature  has 
a  reflex  ethical  bearing  upon  man,  and  he  owes  many  duties  to 
himself  which  refer  to  nature.  As  rational  spirit  he  is  bound  to 
use  nature  rationally,  not  for  any  end  in  nature,  but  for  the 
grand  end  of  reason,  and  thus  all  of  nature  animate  and  in- 
animate, that  can  in  any  manner  be  made  subservient  to  the 
ends  of  human  dignity  and  worth,  come  within  the  sphere  of 
ethical  science  and  are  involved  in  the  considerations  of  pure 
morality.  In  the  light  of  what  is  due  to  his  own  reason,  man 
may  see  many  duties  incumbent  upon  him  in  reference  to  his 
treatment  of  nature. 

The  general  maxim  is  :  Use  but  not  abuse  nature,  and  this 
will  include  the  following  maxims  in  particular. 

I,  Not  wantonly  to  mar  Nature.  Nature,  animate  and  in- 
animate, is  given  into  the  hand  of  man  so  far  as  he  can  reach, 
and  he  is  permitted  to  use  it  in  any  way  conformed  to  his  own 
ultimate  end.  He,  as  free  cause,  can  affect  nature  and  work 
many  changes  in  her  successions.  But  he  is  not  permitted  to 
mar  the  face  of  nature,  nor  wantonly  and  uselessly  to  injure 
any  of  her  products,  since  nature  is  made  reasonably,  and  he 
cannot  wantonly  mar  it  without  doing  despite  to  reason. 

It  is  a  disgrace  to  any  man's  spirit,  if  he  has  come  to  take 
pleasure  in  the  destroying  of  a  crystal,  or  the  defacing  of  a 
gem ;  if  he  can  amuse  himself  by  wantonly  crushing  a  flower. 


DUTIES    TO    NATURE.  99 

or  lapng  desolate  any  portion  of  nature's  works.  He  is  there- 
by fitting  himself  to  engage  in  any  ruthless  undertaking.  The 
next  step  will  bring  him  to  be  cruel,  and  to  delight  in  worrying 
and  torturing  sentient  beings  and  destroying  animal  life.  This 
debases  still  further,  and  when  the  man  has  descended  so  low 
that  he  can  make  animal-suffering  his  sport,  and  delight  to 
inflict  pain  upon  any  living  thing  in  air  or  earth  or  water,  he 
has  become  not  only  an  unsafe  member  of  civil  society,  but  a 
reproach  and  disgrace  to  humanity.  We  \'ery  properly  call  him 
inhuman. 

There  often  appears  a  very  early  propensity  to  delight  in 
destruction,  and  to  exert  the  power  possessed  in  desolating 
deeds ;  but  it  is  an  early  immorality,  and  the  sad  precursor  of 
coming  enormous  viciousness. 

2.  Convert  Nature  to  thy  use.  Man  may  not  wantonly  mar 
nature,  yet  must  he  directly  use  nature,  that  she  may  minister 
to  the  high  ends  of  his  spiritual  being.  Nature  possesses  no 
product  too  sacred  for  man.  All  nature  is  for  man,  not  man 
for  it.  When  reason  requires,  it  is  imperative  upon  him  to  use 
any  thing  that  nature  puts  within  his  reach.  Mineral,  vegetable, 
animal,  all  are  his ;  and  over  the  whole  realm  of  nature  he  is 
enthroned  in  dominion.  It  is  a  virtue  to  use  nature  for  his 
worthiness  in  any  way ;  it  is  a  vice  to  neglect  to  serve  himself 
of  nature  in  any  offered  benefit. 

3.  Beautify  and  perfect  Nature.  It  is  now,  as  in  Paradise, 
man's  duty  "to  dress  the  earth  and  to  keep  it."  It  is  no  longer 
a  paradise  ;  yet  is  it  the  duty  of  man,  by  industry  and  taste,  to 
bring  the  whole  earth  as  near  as  possible  again  to  the  primeval 
garden.  A  neglect  to  cultivate  and  adorn  the  earth  and  bring 
upon  it  the  beauty  which  it  might  possess,  is  very  much  akin 
to  that  wanton  mischief  which  would  mar  the  beauty  and  good- 
ness that  it  already  possesses.  Man  uses  nature  ethically  right, 
only  when  he  strives  to  bring  her  as  much  as  may  be  to  sub- 
serve his  wants,  his  taste,  and  his  morals. 


TOO  PURE    MORALITY. 

4.  Explore  Nature  scientifically.  Universal  nature  in  its 
whole  structure,  tlie  conformation  of  all  its  minute  parts,  and 
the  entire  order  of  its  development,  are  as  if  there  were 
rationality  in  nature  herself,  putting  and  keeping  her  la\\'s  in 
perfect  analogy  with  the  laws  and  forms  of  reason  in  the  human 
mind.  Had  nature  herself  been  otherwise  connected,  slie 
would  have  been  utterly  unintelligible.  All  her  phenomena 
must  have  been  connected  in  their  permanent  substances  and 
successive  causes,  or  they  could  never  have  been  determined, 
by  any  mind,  to  their  places  in  space  nor  their  periods  in  time. 
All  objects  of  sense  would  have  been  a  mere  hap-hazard  dance 
of  appearances.  Nature  does  not  determine  reason  to  be  as 
it  is ;  she  must  herself  conform  to  reason  to  be  intelligible  by 
reason. 

Here  is  the  grand  text-book  for  the  reason  of  man  to  study. 
When  he  has  found  the  true  law  of  nature  in  any  of  her  thou- 
sand departments,  he  will  ever  find  it  conformed  to  the  de- 
mands of  reason,  and  the  working  without  and  the  law  within 
will  completely  harmonize.  In  all  departments  of  natural  science 
there  are  necessary  and  universal  laws  binding  up  all  the  parts 
in  unity,  and  man  is  fulfilhng  the  imperative  of  his  moral  being 
when  engaged  in  investigating,  classifying,  and  systematizing 
whatever  of  nature  he  can  bring  within  his  observation.  He  is 
thus  studying  and  more  fully  apprehending  himself,  as  he  studies 
and  apprehends  the  conformities  of  nature  to  himself.  The 
Absolute  Reason  has  enstamped  himself  upon  his  works,  and 
the  true  interpretation  of  nature  cannot  contradict  the  eternal 
truths  of  reason  in  the  soul  of  man.  He  has  little  faith  in 
reason  or  God,  who  fears  that  truths  in  any  department  of  God's 
revealing  shall  contradict  each  other. 

5.  Use  Nature  as  a  discipline  in  virtue.  Nature  is  no  more 
conformed  to  the  reason  of  man  in  her  philosophical  order,  than 
she  is  in  her  ethical  connections.  She  is  everywhere  as  right  as 
she  is  beautiful  and  true.     If  the  vice  of  man  has  not  perverted 


DUTIES    TO    GOD.  Lc'  "  IQI 

the  order  of  nature,  she  will  be  everywhere  working  out  what 
should  be,  and  as  it  should  be.  If  any  thing  works  ethically 
wTong,  it  toII  be  found  to  have  had  its  perversion  through  some 
vicious  interference.  Thus  the  study  of  nature  in  its  ethical 
connections  is  everywhere  adapted  to  moral  instruction  and 
discipline.  Not  because  there  is  greatest  happiness  in  certain 
courses,  and  thus  nature  herself  made  the  end  of  morality ;  but 
that  greatest  happiness  comes  in  such  courses  as  it  should,  and 
thus  that  nature  herself  is  conditioned  by  morality. 

And  now  man's  highest  dignity  demands  the  perfection  of 
moral  culture,  and  thus  that  he  use  nature  as  his  schoolmastei 
to  bring  him  to  virtue.  All  his  wisdom  may  and  should  termi- 
nate in  righteousness. 


CHAPTER   VI. 
2.   Duties  to  God. 


It  was  a  doctrine  long  ago  held  by  Plato  that  there  could  c  '^ 
be  any  truth  if  there  w^ere  no  God.  A  truth  independent  of  God, 
a  truth  which  does  not  imply  His  absolute  being  and  fulness  is 
not  only  impossible,  but  is  in  itself  a  contradiction,  and  thus  no 
truth,  but  a  lie.  The  existence  of  God  being  apprehended, 
there  immediately  arises  the  consciousness  of  moral  obligations 
to  Him.  That  the  finite  spirit  and  the  Absolute  Spirit  exist  to- 
gether, is  sufficient  to  impose  duties  upon  the  finite  in  pure 
morality. 

The  general  maxim  inclusive  of  all  these  duties  is,  "  Worship 
God."  The  worship  of  which  we  here  speak  is  that  moral 
homage  which  it  is  a  man's  virtue  to  render  to  the  Absolute 
Spirit,  and  which  it  would  be  a  vice  to  withhold.  We  do  not 
bring  in  the  facts  of  dependence  and  perpetual  communications 


102  PURE    MORALITY. 

of  good,  which  appeal  to  the  sentiment  of  love  ;  nor  the  facts  of 
unbounded  fulness  and  goodness  in  God,  which  appeal  to  the 
confiding  feeling  of  faith  and  hope ;  for  these  are  the  basis  of 
religious  worship  and  service.  We  simply  take  the  conception 
of  finite  spirits,  not  merely  as  existing  in  society  with  each  other, 
but  now  as  existing  also  in  communion  with  God,  the  Absolute 
Spirit ;  and  on  the  ground  of  intrinsic  excellency  of  spiritual 
being,  there  are  the  moral  claims  in  the  Absolute  to  a  spiritual 
adoration  from  the  finite,  which  pure  morality  alone  can  recog- 
nize. Such  community  of  existence  cannot  be,  but  the  finite 
spirit  will  debase  itself  if  it  will  not  bow  in  prostrate  homage 
before  the  Absolute. 

When  the  man  stood  alone  in  the  sanctuary  of  his  own  spirit- 
ual being,  he  found  an  authority,  which  he  was  conscious  would 
awaken  the  conviction  of  eternal  infamy  in  himself  not  to  re- 
spect and  obey ;  and  when  he  stood  in  the  presence  of  other 
spirits  like  his  own,  he  was  obliged  to  respect  their  rights,  and 
to  know  that  it  would  be  a  perpetual  degradation  in  himself  to 
trample  on  the  least  of  those  rights  ;  but  now  his  eye  sees  the 
absolute  God,  and  the  sphere  of  his  morality  greatly  changes. 
The  claim  to  respect  himself,  and  to  honor  the  spirit  of  his  fel- 
low, becomes  the  claim  to  the  profoundest  homage  in  the  pres- 
ence of  Jehovah.  A  much  deeper  infamy  is  incurred,  in  his 
own  sight,  not  now  to  fall  prostrate  and  adore.  The  same  con- 
sciousness of  what  is  due  to  spiritual  excellency  is  here,  but  not 
now  solely  in  the  light  of  finite  attributes ;  he  is  here  amid  the 
glory  that  fills  immensity  and  inhabiteth  eternity ;  and  he  deeply 
feels  tliat  a  refusal  to  worship  in  such  a  presence  must  be  the 
infamy  of  the  second  death.  Of  all  immoralities,  the  greatest 
is  to  be  morally  irreligious. 

This  maxim,  to  "worship  God,"  includes  many  duties,  among 
the  most  considerable  of  which  we  here  notice  : 

I.  Reverence.  This  is  purely  a  spiritual  emotion.  Noth- 
ing but  a  spirit  can  experience  it,  and  this  only  in  the  presence 


DUTIES    TO    GOD.  IO3 

of  a  spirit.  The  animal  may  be  made  afraid,  but  never  to  re- 
vere ;  and  man  may  be  made  afraid  in  the  presence  of  an  ani- 
mal, but  never  there  to  feel  reverence.  The  respect  which  man 
is  constrained  to  feel  for  the  spiritual  through  all  humanity,  rises 
in  proportion  to  the  attributes  of  rationality  there  disclosed ; 
and  in  the  presence  of  some  hoary  sage,  he  involuntarily  uncov- 
ers his  head  and  bows  in  obeisance ;  but  it  is  only  before  the 
Absolute  that  reverence  is  consummated  ;  and  here,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  God,  the  finite  soul  knows  that  nothing  should  hinder 
the  complete  surrender  of  all  that  he  is,  in  humble  consecration. 
Unreserved  homage  is  due  to  God,  and  the  profoundest  rever- 
ence is  itself  the  dignity  of  the  human  spirit.  No  man  is  so 
exalted  as  when  utterly  losing  himself  in  his  reverence  for  the 
Deity. 

2.  Godly  Fear.  This  is  other  than  simple  reverence,  though 
reverence  may  always  accompany  it ;  and  we  express  the  differ- 
ence when  we  speak  of  reverential  awe.  There  is  a  fear  which 
is  altogether  distinct  from  a  constitutional  apprehension  of  dan- 
ger. The  apprehension  of  great  impending  evil  is  a  "  fear  that 
hath  torment."  It  is  a  most  unwelcome  emotion,  and  man 
and  beast  shrink  away  from  its  experience.  But  godly  fear  has 
no  pain,  and  excites  no  revulsion  in  the  presence  of  its  object. 
The  most  dreadful  majesty  is  revealed  ;  a  glory  that  is  terrible  ; 
the  place  is  holy,  and  he  puts  off  the  shoes  from  his  feet,  and 
even  expresses  himself  by  saying,  "  I  exceedingly  fear  and 
quake,"  and  yet  the  man  chooses  to  be  there.  He  would  with- 
draw from  this  presence,  and  change  this  emotion,  for  no  other 
possible  place  or  feeling.  His  full  confidence  in  this  dreadful 
Being  makes  even  his  terrible  greatness  delightful.  This  awful 
God  is  his  father  and  his  friend,  and  by  so  much  the  more  as 
his  majesty  is  fearful ;  is  his  protection  delightful.  That  very 
glory,  which  in  its  purity  is  to  the  wicked  "  a  consuming  fire,"  is 
to  him  a  defence  and  an  honor ;  and  his  own  soul  burns  with 
love  and  joy  while  he  gazes  with  holy  amazement.     The  fear 


I04  PURE    MORALITY. 

that  would  else  be  insupportably  tormenting,  becomes  by  his 
own  congeniality  of  spirit  with  the  object  an  adoring  awe,  which 
is  sublimely  ennobling. 

3.  Humility.  This,  in  its  true  meaning,  is  a  virtue  that  pro- 
portions itself  relatively  to  the  being  that  exercises  it.  To  the 
Absolute,  there  can  be  no  place  for  humility ;  but  to  all  finite 
beings,  humility  is  a  duty  and  a  virtue.  It  consists  in  the  assent 
of  the  spirit  to  take  the  precise  position  which  is  due  to  its  own 
proportional*  intrinsic  excellency.  We  speak  not  now  of  the 
humility  of  a  sinner,  which  must  partake  of  shame  and  re- 
morse, but  the  humility  of  spiritual  beings  in  the  presence  of 
the  absolute  Jehovah,  as  a  moral  virtue.  Whatever  grades  of 
spiritual  life  there  may  be  froAi  human  to  angel,  and  through  all 
the  ranks  of  "thrones,  dominions,  principalities,  and  powers," 
that  is  humility  in  each,  which,  in  reverent  adoration  of  the 
Most  High,  cordially  assents  to  its  own  place  among  the  wor- 
shippers, and  the  highest  in  this  classified  rank,  while  he  casts 
his  crown  before  the  throne  and  veils  his  face  with  his  winss. 
will  be  as  truly  virtuous  in  his  humility  as  the  lowest.  The 
righteous  order  would  be  as  truly  broken  in  the  degradation  of 
the  higher  as  in  the  undue  exaltation  of  the  lower ;  and  each  is 
truly  humble  and  morally  virtuous  in  his  humility,  when  he  bows 
rejoicingly  before  God  in  the  very  place  which  his  relative  ex- 
cellency assigns  to  him.  There  is  no  pride,  no  self-conceit,  but 
the  virtue  of  universal  humility,  in  that  world  where  God  is  too 
great  to  be  either  proud  or  humble,  and  where  all  finite  being 
fills  just  the  sphere  of  its  own  spiritual  excellence  with  divine 
adoration  and  praise. 


In  the  foregoing  Chapters  we  have  applied  the  ultimate  Rule 
of  right  to  the  entire  field  of  human  conduct,  so  far  as  the 
duties  in  this  field  can  be  determined  by  the  direct  application 
of  this   Rule.     Tlie    requirements   of   Positive   Authority   still 


DUTIES    TO    GOD,  IO5 

need  to  be  considered,  but  our  S3'stem  of  Moral  Science  as 
embraced  in  Pure  Morality,  is  now  complete.  We  here  close 
this  Part  of  our  work  by  a  few  Aphorisms  elicited  from  the  in- 
vestigation. 

1.  Humanity  can  never  escape  from  the  colliding  influences 
of  animal  appetites  and  spintual  imperatives.  Sometimes  ap- 
petite and  duty  may  fully  accord ;  sometimes  an  unruly  appe- 
tite may  seem  to  be  mortified ;  but  at  no  time  can  the  animal 
nature  and  the  rational  spirit  be  in  combination,  where  there 
will  not  often  be  "  the  flesh  lusting  against  the  spirit,"  and  calling 
for  a  constant  watch  and  a  strong  restraint.  Man's  ethical  Hfe 
must  perpetually  be  militant,  and  his  highest  worth  can  only  be 
gained  in  that  manly  valor  which  alone  conquers  by  a  perpetual 
conflict.  He  should  have  the  complacency  of  perpetual  mastery, 
but  he  will  never,  in  the  flesh,  have  the  blessedness  of  complete 
conquest.  To  find  the  serene  bliss  of  heaven,  he  must  drop 
the  animal  tabernacle,  and  thus  lose  the  conflicting  "  law  in  the 
members." 

2.  Virtue  cannot  consist  in  habit.  Man's  ultimate  rule  de- 
mands great  care  in  forming  habits,  inasmuch  as  many  actions 
of  his  life  will  flow  from  habit,  and  have  their  effect  upon  him- 
self and  others  ;  but  no  action  from  mere  habit  can  constitute 
virtue.  This  involves  watchfulness  and  activity,  valor  and  con- 
flict ;  the  good  will  striving  and  ruling.  However  long-contin- 
ued and  apparently  confirmed  the  habit  may  be,  it  is  not  safe 
trusting  to  it.  An  unwonted  trial  may  at  any  hour  come,  and 
the  long  habit  at  once  be  broken  through.  While  the  good 
habit  controls,  it  is  not  virtue  ;  and  there  is  no  security  for  any 
day  that  it  will  still  control.  Habit  is  mere  facility  from  fre- 
quent repetition  ;  virtue  is  constant  victory  from  stem  perpetual 
conflict. 

3.  Casuistry  is  not  iii  finding  principles,  but  whether  par- 
ticular facts  cojne  under  the  principles.  The  ultimate  Rule  is 
clear  in  the  self-knowledge  of  reason.     Its  imperatives  are  di- 


106  PURE    MORALITY. 

rect  from  what  is  due  to  the  inherent  excellency  of  the  spirit. 
The  principles  of  pure  morality  are  thus  clear  in  their  own  light, 
when  seen  in  their  own  ground.  They  stand  in  necessity,  and 
are  universal.  Moral  Philosophy,  as  a  science,  has  thus  only 
to  deal  with  principles,  and  to  set  them  out  clearly  in  their  true 
grounds. 

But  often  real  or  supposed  facts  may  be  so  ambiguous,  and 
terms  may  cften  be  so  equivocal,  that  the  nicest  discernment 
may  be  needed  to  determine  whether  they  come  under  the 
principle  or  not ;  and  all  such  cases  give  rise  to  questions  of 
casuistry. 

The  science  of  pure  morality  has  nothing  to  do  with  casuistry  ; 
though  the  application  of  its  principles  in  experience  give  occa- 
sion for  frequent  and  often  very  difficult  questions  of  casuistry. 

4.  The  following  precise  application  of  terms  in  morality  may 
be  here  given :  All  action  under  the  constraint  of  the  ultimate 
Rule  is  duty :  and  all  action  against  duty  is  tra?isgression.  A 
transgression  may  be  from  physical  weakness,  and  we  thus  term 
it  the  man's  infirmity.  It  may  be  through  the  man's  careless- 
ness, and  we  call  it  his  fault.  It  may  be  deliberate  and  deter- 
mined, and  we  then  call  it  his  vice.  There  will  be  seen  occasion 
hereafter  for  the  distinction  of  vice  as  against  a  purely  moral 
rule,  and  transgression  of  civil  law  which  is  crime,  and  also 
transgression  of  God's  law  which  is  si7i.  To  the  personal  author 
of  the  transgression  we  impute  the  intention,  and  term  this  his 
guilt ;  and  when  we  refer  to  the  retribution  with  which  guilt  is 
to  be  visited,  we  term  the  person  to  whom  the  guilt  is  imputed, 
responsible. 


SECOND    PART. 


POSITIVE    AUTHORITY. 


I. 

THE  OCCASION  FOR  POSITIVE  AUTHORITY. 

A  DIFFICULTY  meets  us  iii  moral  science  the  moment  we 
step  beyond  the  province  of  pure  morality.  If  the  ulti- 
mate rule  of  right  be  truly  ultimate  it  must  be  universal ;  why  is- 
it  not  then  all-sufificient,  and  how  can  there  then  be  any  other 
province  in  moral  science  than  that  of  pure  morality  ? 

This  difficulty  is  partly,  not  wholly  removed  when  we  remem- 
ber that  there  are  wTong-doers  whom  no  constraint  of  the  ulti- 
mate rule  can  control.  Pure  morality  requires  that  these  should 
not  be  left  to  their  unbridled  wills.  It  would  be  wrong  if  there 
were  no  power  above  them  by  which  they  should  be  restrained 
and  constrained.  Positive  authority  is  therefore  righteously  de- 
manded wherever  there  is  any  immorality. 

But  supposing  there  is  no  immorality  ?  What  if  all  are  pure 
and  virtuous,  is  there  then  any  occasion  for  positive  authority? 
At  first  view  we  might  say  no,  for  it  might  seem  that  pure  mo- 
rality should  be  ample  for  all  the  requirements  of  such  a  condi- 
tion. But  in  fact  we  find  in  civil  society  that  positive  authority 
instead  of  lessening  actually  increases  in  the  extent  of  its  exact- 
ions as  man  grows  more-  upright.  The  more  civilized,  the  more 
virtuous  a  community  becomes,  the  more  laws  it  requires.  In- 
deed so  essential  is  law  to  civilization,  and  so  characteristic  of 

I07 


I08  POSITIVE    AUTHORITY. 

it,  that  wherever  man  is  found  without  law  he  is  as  Homer  calls 
him/  a  savage.  The  progress  to  a  better  state  is  actually  seen, 
not  in  an  increasing  emancipation  from  law,  but  in  an  increasing 
subjection  thereto.  That  is  not  the  best  government  therefore 
which  governs  least,  but  that  which  enters  most  largely  into  the 
wants,  the  interests,  and  the  daily  life  of  its  subjects.  This  is 
certainly  true  as  an  historical  fact,  and  may  help  us  in  the  ap- 
prehension of  the  true  principle. 

The  whole  difficulty  vanishes  in  the  vision  that  finite  wills  are 
fallible,  and  that  individuals,  however  willing  to  act  wisely,  will 
be  constantly  meeting  with  questions  where  their  actions  will 
need  to  be  determined  by  a  higher  wisdom  than  their  own. 
Such  a  need  will  ever  give  occasion  for  exactly  that  control 
over  human  character  and  life  which  positive  authority  repre- 
sents. So  long  as  men  are  finite  they  will  need  the  guidance 
of  a  government. 

But  while  authority  is  another  mode  of  constraining  human 
conduct  than  pure  morality,  it  may  by  no  means  contradict  or 
subvert  morality.  Authority  must  conform  to  morality,  and 
this  brings  its  consideration  within  the  field  of  Moral  Science. 
The  ultimate  Rule  of  right  must  be  so  applied  to  all  authority, 
as  to  determine  that  it  is  not  an  immoral  and  vicious  authority. 
It  is  introduced  as  a  necessary  means  of  constraint  where, 
either  from  the  wickedness  or  the  weakness  of  the  finite  will, 
pure  morality  will  not  admit  of  application,  but  as  in  no  case 
and  for  no  reason  may  authority  ever  be  used  in  conflict  with 
morality,  all  authority  needs  to  be  submitted  to  the  rigid  crite- 
rion of  the  ultimate  Rule.  It  must  thus  come  within  the  field 
or  a  pure  moral  science.  It  will  not  govern  by  morahty,  but  it 
must  govern  in  full  accordance  with  morality. 


1  Iliad,  ix.  62. 


THE  PECULIARITY  OF  AUTHORITY.        ICQ 


II. 

THE  PECULIARITY  OF  AUTHORITY. 

Authority,  as  brought  within  the  province  of  Moral  Science, 
is  a  right  to  legislate.  ^Vhen  this  right  promulgates  its  precepts 
\nthout  revealing  its  own  reasons,  and  guards  these  precepts  by 
pains  and  penalties,  without  giving  an  account  of  its  own 
grounds  of  action  to  its  subjects,  it  is  termed  Positive  Authori- 
ty. The  point  in  whicli  this  authority  is  vested  is  termed 
Sovereignty.  The  same  point  of  sovereignty  is  the  source  for 
all  legislative,  judicial,  and  executive  action  in  the  government. 

In  pure  morality  the  rule  by  which  the  subject  is  to  be  guided 
reveals  its  reason  in  its  own  light ;  but  in  positive  authority  the 
subject  is  guided  by  a  rale  whose  reason  is  not  revealed.  In 
pure  morality  the  ultimate  Rule  shows  the  subject  by  its  own 
shining  what  he  ought  to  do  ;  but  in  positive  authority  his  duty 
is  reflected  to  him  through  the  medium  of  an  outward  procla- 
mation. In  pure  morality  the  subject  justifies  his  conduct 
through  his  knowledge  of  the  ultimate  Rule  ;  but  in  positive 
authority  his  justification  rests  upon  his  faith  in  his  sovereign's 
will.  In  a  word,  the  whole  difference  is  the  difference  between 
a  duty  disclosed  in  the  inward  consciousness^  and  a  duty  de- 
clared through  an  outer  command.  In  positive  authority  that 
which  is  whollv  out  of  me  is  made  to  have  dominion  over  that 
which  originates  within  me,  and  the  will  of  another  is  to  be  the 
lord  over  my  will. 

The  claim  of  positive  authority  always  demands  and  shou.d 
ever  receive  the  closest  scrutiny  ;  fcyt  unless  the  authority  be  fully 
legitimated  in  its  morality,  it  becomes  the  most  vicious  and  de- 
testable tyranny.  It  is  the  whole  business  of  this  Second  Part 
of  Moral  Science  to  examine  this  claim,  and  to  this  we  now 
betake  ourselves. 


no  POSITIVE    AUTHORITY. 

Positive  Authority,  as  already  found,  has  varied  modes  of 
applying  its  constraint  to  human  conduct,  and  thus  we  need 
to  consider  it  under  distinct  Divisions.  When  applying  pains 
and  penalties,  or  offering  rewards,  it  appeals  solely  to  hope  and 
fear,  and  the  obedience  so  resulting  is  that  of  mct-e  legality. 
When  applying  the  constraint  of  love  and  reverence  for  the 
sovereign,  and  thus  appealing  solely  to  respect  and  regard  for 
the  authority  itself,  the  obedience  induced  is  that  of  complete 
loyalty.  These  may  also  be  blended  in  one  sovereignty,  and 
the  government  use  both.  The  first  is  found  in  Civil  Govern- 
ment; the  second  in  the  Divine  Government ;  and  the  last  in 
Family  Government.  We  shall  examine  each  at  large  in  its 
own  order. 


FIRST   DIVISION. 


CIVIL    GOVERNMENT. 


CHAPTER   I. 

THE  STATE. 

EITHER  authority  is,  and  this  makes  the  state,  or  the  state 
akeady  is,  and  this  makes  its  own  authoritative  govern- 
ment. On  tlie  supposition  of  the  first,  there  may  be  two  posi- 
tions assumed  by  different  parties.  One,  that  God  commissions 
some  directly  to  govern,  and  their  divine  right  gives  authority  to 
government  and  estabhshes  the  state.  The  other,  that  each  per- 
son has  tlie  sovereignty  over  himself,  and  many  such  persons 
coming  together  make  a  state  and  a  government  by  compact. 

The  theory  of  divine  right  makes  all  civil  government  Theo- 
cratic. God  is  the  Supreme  civil  ruler,  and  the  human  magis- 
trate is  his  vice-gerent.  Such  was  the  government  of  ancient 
Israel.  For  special  ends,  not  here  necessary  to  detail,  God  pro- 
posed to  be  the  civil  ruler  as  well  as  the  tutelar  Deity  of  the 
Hebrews,  and  was  formally  accepted  as  such  by  the  popular 
voice.  A  constitution  or  platform  of  government  was  also  pro- 
posed and  formally  adopted,  and  a  solemn  ratification  of  the 
whole  and  inauguration  of  the  government  occurred,  as  fully 
given  in  Exodus,  19th  Chap,  to  the  25th.  All  the  subsequent 
legislation  given  by  God  conformed  to  this  original  platform, 
called  "  the  Book  of  the  Covenant,"  and  which  was  kept  in  the 
Ark,  called  hence  "  the  Ark  of  the  Covenant."    God  was  hence- 

III 


112  MERE    LEGALITY. 

forth  their  constitutional  King,  and  the  human  magistrate  held 
office  and  ruled  under  his  appointment. 

In  this  one  instance  only  has  God  assumed  such  a  relation. 
And  in  this,  he  so  sanctioned  and  regarded  popular  rights,  that 
he  admitted  the  sovereignty  of  the  Jewish  people,  and  would 
not  himself  take  the  civil  rule  over  the  nation  except  by  their 
express  consent.  Had  the  nation  refused  to  accept  the  offer,  it 
would  have  been  the  sin  of  ingratitude  and  contempt  of  such 
distinguished  favor,  but  not  the  crime  of  rebellion  against  po- 
litical sovereignty.  Here,  a  thousand  years  before  the  time  of 
Pericles,  is  the  most  ancient  and  valid  recognition  of  the  rights 
of  popular  freedom.  We  can  better  afford  to  lose  all  the  exam- 
ples of  free  institutions  in  Greece  and  Rome,  than  this  one 
divine  acknowledgment  of  the  sovereign  right  of  a  people  to 
determine  their  own  form  of  government.  The  Divine  Right 
of  Kings  is  not  here  found,  except  as  God  has  himself  been 
popularly  chosen  as  national  ruler,  and  then  as  such  adopted 
King  he  commissions  whom  he  will  to  stand  in  his  name  before 
the  people  as  the  Lord's  annointed.  Since  God  has  never 
offered  and  been  accepted  thus  by  any  second  nation,  no  other 
Kings  than  those  of  ancient  Israel  have  so  ruled  by  divine  right. 

The  theory  of  a  voluniary  compaci  is  a  mere  figment.  Primi- 
tive governments  were  not  so  established.  No  state  ever  thus 
originated.  Such  a  compact  if  made  would  pre-suppose  an  au- 
thority already  existing  to  which  the  terms  of  the  compact  would 
need  to  conform  in  order  to  carry  with  them  any  obligation.  A 
compact  of  buccaneers  for  purposes  of  piracy  would  give  no 
authority  to  its  decrees.  An  agreement  to  rob  does  not  make 
it  right  to  rob.  Moreover,  if  the  compact  were  made  according 
to  righteousness,  it  could  not,  on  the  supposition  we  are  now 
considering,  put  its  laws  upon  any  recusants,  nor  rightfully  drive 
away  these  non-complying  persons.  The  compact  could  right- 
eously bind  no  longer  than  the  lives  of  the  original  contractors, 
and  the  next  generation  must  have  its  own  option  to  perpetuate 


THE    STATE.  I  1 3 

the  state  or  not.  Neither  of  these  methods  can  make  a  state, 
for  neither  of  them  can  authoritatively  carry  themselves  into 
execution  without  already  assuming  the  state  itself  to  exist. 

The  second  is  the  true  position,  that  the  state  itself  must 
exist  in  order  that  any  civil  government  may  be.  And  yet  the 
state  is  in  no  sense  a  human  product ;  though  found  wherever 
man  is  found,  man  no  more  makes  the  state  than  he  makes 
himself.  It  is  a  condition  of  life  into  which  he  is  born,  as  he  is 
born  into  his  manhood.  He  is  by  nature,  as  Aristotle  terms 
him,  a  creature  living  in  states.^ 

What  then  is  the  state  ?  It  would  be  easy  to  term  it  the 
source  of  law,  the  fountain  of  authority,  the  regulator  of  man's 
relations  to  his  fellow-man,  and  either  of  these  statements  would 
be  perfectly  true,  while  no  one  of  them  would  reach  the  full 
truth  we  need.  Our  definition  should  tell  us  what  the  state  is 
in  terms  which  contain  its  full  explanation. 

We  approach  such  a  definition  if  we  note  that  the  actual 
relationship  among  men  is  that  of  reciprocity  and  inter-depen- 
dence. Men  are  bound  together  as  are  the  members  of  the 
living  body,  wherein  if  one  member  suffer  all  the  members 
suffer  with  it,  or  one  member  be  honored  all  the  members 
rejoice  together.  Every  member  of  the  human  family  is  a 
fellow-member  of  all  the  rest.  Each  has  something  to  do  for 
every  other,  and  all  have  something  to  do  for  him.  No  man 
liveth  unto  himself,  and  no  man  dieth  unto  himself.  No  man 
finds  good  in  the  evil  of  his  fellow-men.  No  nation  prospers 
because  another  nation  suffers  adversity.  The  ill  of  one  dis- 
turbs, and,  in  its  degree,  destroys  the  well-being  of  all.  Each 
is  so  dependent  upon  all  the  rest,  and  all  the  rest  are  so 
dependent  upon  him,  that  there  can  be  no  blessing  nor 
calamity,  no  deed  of  virtue  or  of  vice,  no  birth  nor  death, 
though  on  another  continent  or  in  a  distant  isle  of  the 
sea,   but   that   brings   its  living  influence  to  each  one   of  us. 


I  llokiriKuv  ^uov :  Polit.  i.  1. 


I  14  MERE    LEGALITY. 

and  to  every  member  of  the  race.  The  union  of  men  is  that 
of  an  organism,  wherein  each  part  is  at  the  same  time  the 
means  and  end  of  all  the  rest. 

This  is  not  only  true,  but  it  is  the  most  essential  truth  of  hu- 
man life.  There  is  nothing  so  distinctively  characteristic  of  a 
man  as  these  reciprocal  relations  to  his  kind.  If  we  could  sup- 
pose him  severed  from  these  relations,  he  would  be  no  longer  a 
man,  as  a  hand  cut  off  from  the  body  would  be  no  more  a  hand, 
but  only  a  compound  of  blood,  bone,  and  muscle^  going  to  de- 
cay. The  old  saying,  one  man,  no  man,  unus  homo,  nullus 
ho?no,  simply  means  that  a  man  alone  is  not  a  man ;  his  man- 
hood means  his  fellowship  with  other  men. 

But  if  the  human  family  is  thus  connected,  —  connected  as 
an  organism,  —  then  the  place,  the  work,  the  obligations  of  each 
are  fixed,  and  must  be  authoritatively  declared  by  the  principle 
of  the  organism  itself.  But  this  is  exactly  what  is  done  by  the 
state.  All  the  obligations  which  the  state  imposes,  the  place 
and  work  which  it  assigns,  are  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the 
most  perfect  reciprocity  and  interdependence  among  its  sub- 
jects requires.  All  the  laws  of  the  state  do  but  express  the 
principle  of  this  organic  relationship  among  men.  Civil  law 
only  affirms  what  place  and  work  and  obligations  belong  to  men 
by  virtue  of  the  organic  bond  which  holds  them  together.  If 
truly  law,  it  does  but  represent  and  declare  the  principle  of  a 
brotherhood  of  human  hearts.  If  it  attempts  any  thing  other 
than  this,  and  seeks  the  good  of  one  person  or  class,  and  not 
the  good  of  all,  it  is  tyranny  and  not  law. 

All  this  prepares  us  for  our  definition  of  the  state  as  the  Or- 
ganic Unify  of  Mankind.  This  definition  explains  and  justifies 
the  authority  of  the  state.  The  principle  of  human  fellowship 
and  brotherhood  is  true  and  good  in  itself,  for  it  is  the  principle 
of  love,  and  the  sufficient  reason  for  all  the  requirements  of  love, 
and  the  all-sufficient  ground  for  its  authority  is  in  the  simple 
truth  that  love  is  reason. 


THE  STATE  REQUIRES  A  GOVERNMENT.      II5 

The  State  is  not  the  laws,  nor  the  rulers,  nor  the  collective 
body  of  the  people  ;  for  all  these  change  while  the  state  remains 
the  sam-\  The  laws  are  but  the  mouthpiece  of  the  state  ;  the 
rulers  do  but  express  and  execute  its  will,  and  laws  and  rulers 
and  people  are  all  subject  thereunto. 

In  this  ideal  conception  the  state  is  one,  and  yet  there  are 
actually  many  states,  as  we  say  that  man  is  one  while  there  are 
many  men.  But  as  the  indi\-idual  man  is  a  man  only  as  the 
universal  manhood  is  mirrored  and  expressed  in  him,  so  the 
individual  state  is  a  state,  only  as  the  universal  state,  the  ideal 
state  finds  itself  typified  and  actualized  therein.  In  other 
words,  a  given  community  can  only  justify  its  claim  to  be  a 
state  on  the  ground  that  the  organic  unity  of  mankind  requires 
its  separate  existence  as  such. 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE  STATE   REQUIRES   A   GOVERNMENT. 

Civil  government  is  not  the  state  any  more  than  are  a  man's 
words  and  actions  the  man  himself.  As  a  man's  words  express 
his  thoughts,  and  his  actions  accomplish  his  will,  so  civil  gov- 
ernment should,  and  at  its  best  estate  does,  only  announce  and 
fulfil  the  idea  and  the  requirements  of  the  state.  But  as  a  man's 
words  may  be  false  and  his  actions  contradictory,  so  a  govern- 
ment may  belie  the  behests  of  the  state,  and,  like  a  false  man, 
become  a  detestation  and  a  curse.  Yet,  however  perverse  it 
may  be,  and  however  liable  to  abuse,  civil  government  is  an 
indispensable  necessity  for  the  state.  The  organic  unity  of 
mankind  could  not  have  a  history  without  it. 

This  is  seen  in  the  light  of  the  following  particulars  : 

I.   Many  must  be  governed  who  cannot  see  what  is  politically 


Il6  MERE    LEGALITY. 

right.  The  end  of  all  political  authority,  and  the  ground  of  all 
right  to  exercise  it,  is  found  in  the  requirement  of  the  organic 
unity  of  man.  But  if  some  minds  cannot  see  this  principle,  or 
how  the  facts  come  under  it,  and  cannot  thus  be  controlled  by 
it,  this  would  not  abolish  the  rights  of  the  public,  nor  the  claim 
upon  the  state  that  the  public  peace  remain  unbroken. 

Such  subjects  every  state  has,  and  is  bound  to  control  them. 
Children  in  minority,  and  ignorant  but  well-meaning  adults,  need 
the  constant  interpretation  of  their  duty  by  the  state  through  its 
legitimate  government. 

2.  Many  who  see  their  duty  7uiU  not  do  it.  No  matter  how 
much  enlightenment  of  the  intellect  there  may  be,  a  perverse 
will  loves  darkness  rather  than  light,  and  in  the  actual  state  of 
human  society  upon  earth,  there  are  always  those  whom  no 
other  constraint  than  that  of  pains  and  penalties  can  control. 
Civil  government  is  necessary,  therefore,  not  only  to  declare 
their  duty  to  the  well-disposed,  but  to  secure  its  performance 
from  the  ill-disposed. 

3.  TJiere  are  many  practical  matters  zvhich  only  a  govern- 
ment can  settle.  Society  has  many  wants  which  cannot  be 
supplied  from  individual  study  and  action,  and  can  only  be 
established  by  governmental  authority. 

At  what  age  shall  a  man  be  rendered  civilly  competent  to 
make  contracts?  What  forms  shall  make  contracts  binding? 
How  shall  property  be  regulated,  exchanged,  or  transmitted  by 
hereditary  descent  ?  How  shall  the  litigation  of  human  rights 
be  determined,  and  what  shall  be  the  forms  of  judicial  decisions? 
Who  shall  be  authorized  Judges  ?  And  what  forms  of  electing 
them?  And  how  invest  with  their  office?  All  these,  and  a 
thousand  other  matters,  must  be  regulated  in  some  way  in  every 
community  ;  the  business  of  society  could  not  go  on  a  day  with- 
out it.  There  must  be  here  some  uniform  order  of  operation, 
and  no  one  method  settles  its  own  expediency  above  all  others. 
Only  governmental  authority  can  avail  here.     The  rights  and 


THE  STATE  REQUIRES  A  GOVERNMENT.      11/ 

peace  of  a  community  cannot  be  presen-ed  without  laws  enforc- 
ing such  regulations  by  adequate  sanctions. 

Man  is  thus  manifestly  made  to  be  governed.  Without  posi- 
tive law  society  cannot  exist.  It  cannot  be  shown  that  even 
holy  beings  can  be  kept  holy  without  positive  enactments  ;  and 
in  a  community  of  depraved  beings,  the  public  freedom  cannot 
be  safe  an  hour  without  law.  A  state  of  anarchy  is  a  state  of 
violence  and  -WTong.  Man,  as  a  social  being,  is  in  his  normal 
condition  only  when  under  law. 

That  Positive  Authority  is  precisely  adapted  to  meet  those 
necessities  which  the  nature  of  man  in  society  creates,  will  still 
farther  appear  in  the  following  particulars  : 

It  augments  to  the  guilty  the  dangers  of  disturbing  the  publie 
freedom.  Leaving  all  the  ethical  restraints  of  duty  and  remorse 
for  its  violation  in  full  force,  it  goes  further  and  threatens  its 
own  positive  punishments  against  transgression.  There  is  the 
strong  probabihty  at  least,  put  before  every  one  who -would 
invade  the  public  freedom,  that  he  will  be  detected,  convicted, 
and  punished.  This  probability  is  proportioned  to  the  virtue 
and  vigor  of  the  state  government,  and  by  so  much  is  the 
danger  of  guilt  enhanced  and  the  wicked  restrained. 

It  adds  all  the  influence  of  personality  to  ethical  principle. 
Ethical  principle  is  as  much  violated  in  criminal  action  as  before 
the  law  was  declared,  but  in  the  law  there  is  something  more 
than  a  principle.  It  represents  all  the  interests,  sympathies,  and 
immunities  of  personality.  The  crime  is  not  against  abstrac- 
tions and  idealities,  but  against  the  real  persons  represented  in 
the  legislation.  It  violates  their  will  and  invades  their  social 
freedom  and  peace,  and  is  an  outrage  to  their  sentiments  and 
feelings,  and  thus  an  offence  against  sentient  rational  beings. 
Thus  law,  as  the  expressed  will  and  embodied  sentiment  of  the 
community,  appeals  to  all  that  is  kind,  tender,  and  humane  in 
c'/eiy  subject  that  he  should  not  selfishly  violate  it,  and  thereby 
adds  much  strength  to  ethical  restraint. 


Il8  MERE    LEGALITY. 

It  puts  the  retribution  beyond  all  inte7positio7i  from  the  crimi- 
nal. If  there  were  nothing  but  .the  pangs  of  remorse  and 
conscious  self-debasement,  the  guilty  might  find  many  ways  of 
softening  or  stifling  these  retributions  of  pure  morality.  The 
criminal  would  need  only  to  cover  his  conscience  by  prejudices, 
apologies,  excited  passions,  or  to  keep  his  attention  perpetually 
absorbed  in  other  interests.  But  here  the  injured  public  is  the 
executor  and  avenger  of  law,  and  all  the  interests  and  freedom 
of  the  community  press  upon  the  state  sovereignty  to  see  that 
the  commonwealth  receive  no  detriment. 

The  duty  is  made  plain  by  the  distinct  declaration  of  the  law. 
Where  ignorance  might  hesitate  from  its  weak  apprehension, 
the  law  speaks  clearly ;  where  practical  principles  are  equivocal, 
the  law  expresses  them  distinctly  and  definitely ;  where  prac- 
tice must  have  some  standard,  and  which  from  the  nature  of 
the  case  might  be  any  one  of  many  methods,  the  law  directly 
settles  which  and  how.  Statute  law,  thus,  in  all  practical  mea- 
sures, gives  clearness  to  duty  beyond  what  the  reason  in  pure 
morality  would  supply. 

The  state  must  legislate,  and  by  legislation  it  meets  the  want 
of  social  freedom. 

Wliile  the  state,  as  the  organic  unity  of  mankind,  can  never 
be  A\Tong,  and  the  law  as  expressive  of  the  requirements  of  tliis 
unity  must  always  be  right,  and  always  authoritative,  yet  govern- 
ments and  statutes,  made  by  men,  are  not  only  often  faulty  but 
are  always  faUible,  and  therefore  never  can  be  absolutely  uni- 
versal in  their  application.  Civil  government  at  the  best  is  ever 
liable  to  meet  with  particular  cases  like  the  following  where  it 
must  waive  what  in  general  would  be  its  undisputed  right  of 
coercion. 

I.  Cases  where  all  civil  penalty  is  impotent.  Providential 
occurrences  may  throw  the  citizen  into  circumstances,  where 
the  danger  will  prompt  to  action  as  much  or  even  more  than 
any  threatening  which  the  government  might  apply  in  counter- 


THE  STATE  REQUIRES  A  GOVERNMENT.      II9 

action.  The  government  is  here  wholly  paralyzed,  and  can  only 
pass  by  in  inaction.  Nature  is  stronger  than  a  statute  could  be 
made,  and  all  legislation  would  be  empty.  When  two  ship- 
^\Tecked  men  seize  an  oar,  or  are  in  a  boat  that  can  save  only 
one ;  or  when  in  any  other  condition  a  man  is  already  in  a 
greater  extremity  than  any  tlireatening  of  the  law  can  be  to  him, 
the  attempt  to  interpose  civil  law  will  be  folly.  The  question  is 
not  for  the  claim  of  morality,  or  the  demands  of  piety  ;  whether 
conscience  or  God  will  condemn  ;  but  solely,  what  can  human 
law  do  ? 

In  all  such  cases  the  government  excuses  itself  from  any  inter- 
ference, and  throws  off  all  responsibility  by  admitting  its  own  im- 
potence. Its  valid  defence  to  all  claim  from  public  freedom,  in 
such  cases,  is  in  the  standing-law  maxim  for  the  occasion,  — 
Necessity  has  no  law.  This,  however,  does  not  apply  to  cases 
of  great  personal  hazard  and  recklessness  in  the  exposure  of 
others.  The  engineer  of  a  steam-engine  may  be  more  exposed 
than  any  other  man,  but  this  is  not  a  case  where  his  carelessness 
or  recklessness  would  be  beyond  the  reach  of  law.  He  may  be 
made  to  feel  that,  in  addition  to  all  the  hazard  of  death  by  an 
explosion,  there  may  be  the  still  additional  hazard  of  penal  law 
if  he  escape  the  first  danger.  The  cases  where  law  fails  are 
where  law  at  the  time  can  add  no  stronger  coercion  than  the 
exigencies  already  existing. 

2.  MHicre  civil  law,  in  its  general  enactment,  would  induce 
particular  injustice  and  inpiry.  All  legislation  must  be  more  or 
less  general  in  its  included  application.  There  cannot  be  laws 
designed  and  adapted  to  every  particular  case.  Their  particu- 
lar application  depends  wholly  upon  the  facts  of  each  case  as 
coming  within  the  general  scope  of  the  law.  The  general  laws 
of  currency  may  liquidate  a  claim  by  a  very  depreciated  value  in 
the  coin  ;  a  bargain  in  any  kind  of  property  may  be  legally  en- 
forced, even  though  the  action  of  the  government  may  have 
very  much  changed  the  market  price  of  the  commodity.     Not 


I20  MERE    LEGALITY. 

unfrequently,  the  very  laws  designed  by  the  government  for  the 
conservation  of  the  rights  of  men  and  the  public  freedom,  when 
carried  literally  out  in  execution,  would  greatly  violate  equity  in 
particular  cases,  and  be  greatly  oppressive  to  the  citizen.  The 
government  cannot  legislate  against  itself,  nor  can  it  permit  that 
its  legislation  should  be  disregarded,  but  here  the  execution  of 
its  own  laws  is  a  plam  miquity. 

In  such  cases  the  government  relieves  itself  from  responsibil- 
ity, and  sustains  its  authority,  by  giving  jurisdiction  to  courts  of 
equity.  The  statute  law  is  left  to  all  future  use  upon  its  proper 
principle,  but  a  higher  principle  of  moral  equity  overrules  the 
particular  case,  and  under  well-known  regulations  the  court  of 
chancery  decides  the  case  as  the  general  statute  would  not. 
The  apology  to  law  is  the  maxim,  "  TJie  extremity  of  the  law  is 
extreme  injury." 

3,  Critical  exigencies  in  the  nation  itself.  A  special  distress, 
a  national  calamity,  the  danger  from  hostile  invasion  or  internal 
insurrection,  may  throw  a  state  into  such  critical  exigencies  as 
no  existing  laws  could  meet,  and  the  administration  carried  out 
in  its  legal  forms  would  jeopard  the  commonwealth.  Various 
expedients  have  been  resorted  to  in  such  cases.  A  dictator  has 
been  appointed  for  the  occasion,  with  discretionary  power. 
The  magistrate  has  set  the  law  aside,  and  taken  the  responsi- 
bility to  the  state  to  act  without  law ;  the  general  has  declared 
martial  law,  and  subjected  civil  authority  to  military  rule ;  and 
thus  the  nation  may  have  been  saved  at  the  expense  of  discard- 
ing its  own  legislative  authority.  When  the  state  afterwards 
reviews  such  violence  done  to  its  own  laws,  it  apologizes  for  the 
temporary  usurpation  or  exercise  of  arbitrary  power,  by  saying, 
"  the  laws  are  silent  amid  arms." 

While  thus  the  state  has  authority  to  legislate,  and  to  coerce 
by  pains  and  penalties  obedience  to  its  legislation  for  the  ends  of 
freedom,  there  are  cases  where  either  this  is  impracticable,  or 
where  it  would  defeat  the  very  end  of  law,  and  in  such  cases  all 
coercion  is  dispensed  with. 


RECTITUDE  OF  STATE  AUTHORITY.        121 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE  RECTITUDE  OF  STATE  AUTHORITY. 

While  government  is  a  necessity  for  the  state,  and  may  right- 
eously enforce  its  enactments,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  every 
government  is  necessary  or  righteous.  We  are  not  bound  to 
obey  because  some  have  assumed  to  command,  nor  because 
they  have  acquired  power  to  crush  resistance.  This  power  may 
still  be  usurpation  and  t)Tanny.  On  the  other  hand,  authority 
may  constrain  conscience  as  a  duty  without  the  application  of 
its  power.  Even  when  the  rightness  of  the  precept  is  not  at  all 
apprehended,  the  naked  will  of  sovereignty  is  enough  to  fix 
obligation,  but  it  must  be  sovereignty  standing  on  right  authority. 
This  is  where  the  principles  of  moral  science  reach  to  the  very 
foundation  of  all  civil  government,  and  it  is  a  matter  of  the 
highest  importance  to  determine  the  ground  on  which  the  recti- 
tude of  human  authority,  as  it  goes  out  in  legislation,  must 
be  made  to  stand.  The  consideration  will  demand  two  par- 
ticulars : 

I.    The   POINT   IN  WTIICH   SOVEREIGNTY  SHOULD   BE   PLACED. 

II.   The  lines  within  which  sovereignty  should  act. 

All  civil  legislation  must  emanate  from  some  point,  and  that 
point  must  be  determined  by  ethical  principles,  in  order  that  the 
behests  of  state  sovereignty  may  reach  the  public  conscience 
and  bind  to  obedience  in  its  own  right,  and  not  merely  because 
of  its  power. 

The  first  topic  of  inquiry  is  :  Where  shall  the  sovereignty 
be  placed? 

This  inquiry  must  be  answered  in  the  light  of  the  ultimate 
end  of  all  action  in  civil  authority.  We  need  civil  government 
solely  that  men  may  find  themselves  in  a  brotherhood  of  fellow- 


122  MERE    LEGALITY. 

helpers  everywhere.     All  political  action  must  be  subordinate 
to  this  end  of  the  organic  unity  of  men.     It  is  thus  manifest : 

I.  That  the  general  sovereignty  is  in  the  state  itself.  Civil 
government  does  not  make  the  state,  but  the  state  makes  the 
government,  and  gives  it  all  its  authority.  The  state  is  not  only 
without  a  king,  but  before,  above,  and  in  order  to  all  kingly  pre- 
rogative. No  possible  claims  of  a  jure  divino  authority,  in  the 
sense  that  God  has  made  the  governors  and  they  make  the  state, 
can  be  sustained  by  any  ethical  principle.  God  has  not  otherwise 
ordained  the  powers  that  be,  than  by  making  men  social,  rational, 
and  free,  and  thus  necessary  to  be  governed ;  and  then  in  his 
providence  throwing  them  togetlier  where  they  must  institute 
such  government,  and  be  ethically  bound  to  respect  and  obey  it. 

But  while  the  state  is  thus  the  general  depository  of  all  sov- 
ereign authority,  this  can  only  be  exercised  through  the  estab- 
lishment and  administration  of  civil  government.  Competent 
officials  must  be  provided  and  clothed  with  the  authority  of  the 
state  sovereignty,  and  as  thus  authorized,  they  govern  in  the 
name  of  the  state.  In  this  is  found  the  occasion  for  the  varied 
forms  of  civil  government  prevalent  in  different  ages  and  places. 
Monarchies,  Oligarchies,  Republics,  Democracies,  have  been 
instituted  accordingly  as  the  genius  of  the  state  has  brought 
out  and  executed  its  powers  of  sovereignty. 

Without  resting  in  the  dictum,  "  that  the  form  which  is  best 
administered  is  best,"  we  will  look  for  the  deeper  principle  on 
which  all  forms  must  be  administered,  and  thus  that  form  which 
can,  in  a  given  case,  alone  be  legitimate.  The  least  deviation 
from  the  point  of  ethical  right  so  far  vitiates  the  sovereignty, 
that  as  the  less  consistent  it  should  remove  and  give  place  for 
the  more  consistent ;  but  in  practice,  the  infringement  of  the 
organic  unity  must  ever  be  estimated  in  determining  upon  any 
forcible  change  of  sovereignty. 

2.    Certain  relations  may  indicate  the  probable  point  of  right 
sovereignty.     The  relation  of  Creator  and  creature,  parent  and 


RECTITUDE    OF    STATE    AUTHORITY.  1 23 

child,  might  be  an  index  of  where  we  should  look  for  the  point 
of  sovereignty  in  the  Divine  and  the  Family  Government. 
From  the  relation  alone  we  should  doubtless  conclude,  that  the 
Creator  is  to  govern  the  creature,  and  the  parent  to  govern  tlie 
child.  And  in  the  same  way,  it  might  be  a  general  index  that 
the  relations  between  experience  and  inexperience,  learning 
and  ignorance,  age  and  youth,  majority  and  minority,  etc., 
should  give  sovereignty  to  the  former  in  each  case. 

But  there  is  nothing  in  these  relations  which  can  do  more 
than  indicate  a  priori  probabilities.  No  one  of  them  can  be 
an  ethical  ground  out  of  which  springs  tiie  right  to  govern. 
If  a  Creator  could  be  conceived  who  was  malevolent,  he  would 
from  his  creative  agency  have  derived  no  right  to  enforce  his 
malevolent  will.  The  father  may  become  so  imbecile,  or  be  so 
depraved,  that  though  a  father  in  his  relation  still,  yet  shall 
he  have  no  right  to  govern  his  own  children.  And  so  expe- 
rience, and  learning,  and  age,  and  the  will  of  a  majority  may  be 
leagued  with  tyranny  and  altogether  wrong  in  governing.  The 
inherent  qualifications  required  in  a  righteous  civil  government 
are  only  seen  in  the  light  of  what  the  organic  unity  requires. 

3.  There  vmst  be  pcadiar  natural  qualifications.  Where 
there  is  natural  incompetency  to  attain  the  ends  of  human  gov- 
ernment, there  can  be  no  right  to  the  place  of  sovereignty  ;  and 
if  assumed  sovereignty  be  in  that  position,  the  duty  is  to  abdi- 
cate it  at  once.  If  in  the  state  there  be  not  found  the  posses- 
sion of  natural  qualities  for  a  perfect  civil  rule,  then  must  the 
government  be  so  far  imperfect.  AU  civil  government  must,  in 
the  nature  of  the  case,  partake  more  or  less  of  human  imperfec- 
tion ;  but  the  ethical  claim  for  the  sovereignty  is  the  highest 
natural  qualities  attainable  ;  and  this  highest  qualification  attain- 
able, though  not  perfect,  will  give  a  valid  ground,  so  far  as  nat- 
ural qualities  are  concerned,  for  sovereign  authority  in  the 
administration. 

There  should  be  the  highest  attainable  intelligence  to  appre- 


124  MERE    LEGALITY. 

hend  the  ends  of  government  and  the  means  for  attaining  them, 
and  the  most  efficient  faculties  to  use  these  means  in  the  attain- 
ment of  such  ends.  If  from  any  failure  of  knowledge  or  power  the 
government  fails  of  attaining  its  legitimate  end,  the  sovereignty 
is  inherently  in  fault,  and  the  right  of  every  citizen  is  plain  in  its 
demand  that  the  sovereign  administration  be  changed.  Where 
there  is  natural  incompetency  to  govern,  nothing  can  give  an 
ethical  right  to  the  place  of  sovereignty. 

4.  Tliere  must  be  the  peculiar  moral  qualifications.  Com- 
petency of  natural  faculty  may  be  connected  with  moral  quali- 
fications so  unfit  or  perverse  as  to  vitiate  all  title  to  sovereignty. 
The  power  that  can  govern  well,  but  will  not,  can  have  no  more 
right  to  the  place  of  sovereignty  than  that  which  is  naturally 
incompetent.  The  ethical  claim  is  for  the  highest  security  of 
attaining  the  end  of  government,  and  for  tliis,  moral  no  less  than 
natural  qualifications  are  essential. 

There  must  be  the  love  of  public  liberty,  patriotisni,  benevo- 
lence, righteousness,  veracity,  and  in  fine  all  the  moral  qualities 
which  secure  that  the  natural  competency  shall  be  faithfully 
applied.  In  a  word,  there  must  be  self-forgetfulness  and  a 
readiness  to  make  all  sacrifices  for  the  public  good.  The 
ri'ihtcous  ruler  will  not  seek  his  own.  His  unwillingness  to 
contribute  himself  and  his  to  the  requirements  of  the  universal 
love  and  brothorhood,  would  vitiate  his  title  to  sovereignty  as 
truly  as  his  inability  to  see  what  these  requirements  are.  The 
government  may  quite  as  well  fail  for  incompetency  as  for 
depravity. 

It  should  be  remarked  here,  that  the  perfect  freedom  and 
execution  of  the  public  choice  may  not  be  attainable  by  any 
human  sovereign,  inasmuch  as  still  some  subjects  may  transgress, 
and  each  act  of  transgression  is  so  far  an  interference  with  pub- 
lic peace  and  freedom ;  but  the  sovereignty  has  a  valid  moral 
title  when  it  possesses  and  exerts  the  highest  attainable  qualifi- 
cations in  the  service  of  good  government.     Its  title  to  sover- 


RECTITUDE  OF  STATE  AUTHORITY.        125 

eignty  is  not  vitiated  by  the  offences  and  crimes  which  it  could 
not  prevent. 

And  it  should  also  be  further  remarked,  that  the  characteristics 
and  condition  of  a  community  must  be  consulted  to  determine 
where  this  highest  qualification  for  sovereignty  may  be  found. 
In  proportion  to  the  intelligence  and  virtue  of  a  people,  the 
action  of  sovereignty  may  be  democratic,  but  in  proportion  to 
the  ignorance  and  depravity  of  the  people  is  a  popular  govern- 
ment the  most  destructive  of  public  freedom.  Nothing  is  more 
tyrannical  than  an  excited  passionate  populace ;  and,  in  such  a 
community,  for  the  sake  of  the  state,  the  sovereignty  must  be 
removed  from  the  people  proportionally  to  their  degradation, 
and  the  government  become  monarchical.  The  point  of  sover- 
eignty must  be  just  where  there  is  the  highest  natural  and  moral 
qualifications  for  securing  the  requirements  of  the  state.  There 
Morality  must  place  it,  and  if  any  thing  put  the  sovereignty 
somewhere  else,  the  right  is  so  far  perverted  and  discarded. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE   RECTITUDE  OF  STATE  AUTHORITY, 

II.   The   Lines  within  which   Sovereignty   should  act. 

When  the  sovereignty  is  legitimate,  it  has  still  its  sphere  of 
action,  and  may  legislate  and  administer  its  laws  only  within  a 
prescribed  field  of  jurisdiction.  Beyond  the  lines  drawn  by 
certain  clear  principles,  the  attempted  action  of  sovereignty 
becomes  assumption  and  usurpation,  and  all  allegiance  to  it  is 
nullified  in  its  own  wrong  action.  The  principles  by  which  the 
lines  are  drawn  for  the  right  action  of  sovereignty  are  as  fol- 
lows : 


126  MERE    LEGALITY. 

1 .  The  sovereignty  may  not  attempt  action  beyond  its  own  ca^ 
pacity  for  governing.  When  sovereignty  attempts  to  legislate  or 
execute  law  beyond  its  capacity,  it  acts  in  blindness  and  weak- 
ness, and  most  surely  perverts  its  end  and  puts  in  jeopardy  the 
public  good,  by  its  own  ignorant  and  imbecile  attempts  to  sub- 
serve it.  Ignorant  legislation  and  feeble,  inconstant  adminis- 
tration are  sure  precursors  of  many  oppressive  burdens,  and 
ultimately  induce  anarchy.  All  things  and  all  persons  which 
the  sovereignty  is  competent  to  use  in  the  service  of  the  com- 
munity are  legitimately  in  its  hand  for  this  purpose,  but  what 
it  knows  not  how  to  use  for  this  end  it  may  not  rightfully  touch. 
All  ignorant  tampering  with  the  laws  and  blind  experiments  in 
legislation,  by  any  sovereign,  and  all  crude  attempts  at  reforma- 
tion beyond  his  clear  discernment,  are  as  much  morally  forbid- 
den to  him  as  to  any  private  citizen.  The  sovereignty  is  con- 
ferred that  it  may  wisely  and  not  blindly  administer  the  govern- 
ment of  the  state. 

2.  Sovereignty  7nay  not  legislate  beyond  the  subjecfs  capacity 
for  obedic7ice.  In  a  realm  of  free  wills  there  is  no  obedience  to 
law  where  there  is  no  choice  to  obey.  But  there  can  be  no 
choice  to  obey  and  hence  no  righteous  requirement  of  obedience 
where  there  is  no  ability  to  obey.  No  tyranny  can  be  more  in- 
tolerable than  a  government  demanding  impossibilities ;  and 
such  demands,  if  made,  can  impose  no  other  obligation  than 
that  of  indignant  resistance. 

3.  //  may  not  attempt  the  execution  of  law  beyond  its  plain 
promulgation.  It  is  the  business  of  sovereignty  to  provide  for 
the  promulgation  of  its  enactments,  and  it  is  stopped  in  execu- 
tion righteously  where  the  law  has  not  been  proclaimed.  This 
involves  the  intelligible  nature  of  the  legislation,  the  language  in 
which  the  laws  are  communicated,  and  the  manner  of  publica- 
tion to  the  people.  Laws  in  themselves  beyond  the  subject's 
power  of  apprehension,  or  inadequately  expressed,  or  imper- 
fectly published,  carry  no  binding  force  to  the  subject,  and  of 


RECTITUDE  OF  STATE  AUTHORITY.        12/ 

course  the  sovereign  can  in  such  cases  righteously  apply  tio 
penalties  for  not  observing  them.  The  wilful  or  careless  neglect 
of  the  subject  to  ascertain  what  the  published  law  is,  must  rest 
upon  his  own  responsibility ;  but  there  must,  previously  to  such 
responsibility,  have  been  the  opportunity  given  by  the  sover- 
eign for  knowing  liis  edicts. 

4.  //  may  not  legislate  in  violation  of  ptire  morality.  The 
public  good  can  consist  only  with  public  morality,  and  any  civil 
restraint  against  ethical  claims  would  itself  be  tyranny.  Sover- 
eignty may  often  righteously  legislate  in  matters  indifferent  to 
morality,  where  public  practice  must  have  some  authorized  and 
fixed  standards,  and  thus  make  that  a  matter  of  duty  which  be- 
fore had  no  obligation ;  but  when  civil  authority  attempts  to 
break  over  the  barriers  of  moral  right,  and  command  any  thing 
which  it  would  be  unworthy  of  man  to  perform,  it  nullifies  its 
own  authority  by  running  against  the  ultimate  test  of  all  au- 
thority, and  can  only  provoke  contempt  and  universal  reproba- 
tion from  all  virtuous  beings. 

5.  //  may  not  legislate  against  Divine  Authority.  The  Di- 
vine Authority  is  the  authority  of  the  Absolute  Reason,  and 
there  can  be  nothing  reasonable  or  authoritative  which  conflicts 
with  its  claims.  The  state  therefore,  which,  as  the  organic  unity 
of  mankind,  is  reason  expressed  in  human  fellowship,  is  and 
must  be  ever  in  accord  with  reason,  and  no  government  or  stat- 
ute can  express  the  real  will  of  the  state,  or  be  righteous  or  obli- 
gatory, which  sets  itself  against  a  command  of  Absolute  Reason. 
In  such  an  attempt  of  civil  sovereignty,  it  is  every  man's  duty 
to  respect  the  old,  noble  declaration  of  the  primitive  Apostles, 
"  Whether  it  be  right  in  the  sight  of  God  to  hearken  unto  men 
more  than  unto  God,  judge  ye."  acts,  iv.  19.  God  is  the  right- 
ful sovereign  of  all  sovereignties,  "  the  King  of  kings  and  the 
Lord  of  lords." 

These  principles,  fairly  applied,  will  give  the  true  point  of 
sovereignty,  and  the  lines  within  which  it  should  act,  cither  as 


128  MERE    LEGALITY. 

legislator,  judge,  or  executor  of  the  law.  The  commands  of 
righteous  sovereignty  are  binding  upon  every  subject,  and  with 
righteous  authority,  it  may  often  be  necessary  to  stand  upon  its 
own  sovereignty  alone,  and  in  the  eye  of  the  subject  present 
nothing  else  than  the  unequivocal  declaration  of  its  own  will. 
The  public  good  often  demands  obedience  to  sovereign  man- 
dates, in  which  no  other  right  is  seen  than  the  rightness  of  the 
authority  commanding,  and  the  conscience  of  every  subject  is 
bound  by  it. 


There  are  some  peculiarities  in  the  action  of  sovereignty,  de- 
manded by  considerations  of  public  freedom,  the  statement  of 
which  may  most  appropriately  be  made  in  the  closing  of  this 
Chapter. 

Division  of  the  functions  of  sovereignty.  In  practical  work- 
ing, it  is  found  expedient  to  separate  the  functions  of  sover- 
eignty, and  distribute  the  legislative,  the  judicial,  and  the 
executive,  each  into  different  hands.  The  imperfection  of 
humanity  renders  the  legislator  liable  to  a  partial  and  undue 
estimate  of  the  laws  of  his  own  enacting,  and  that  he  should 
regard  them  in  some  measure  from  his  o^vn  share  in  the  making 
of  them,  and  not  solely  from  their  bearing  upon  public  freedom. 
It  is  not  safe  that  the  legislator  should  be  the  judge  of  his  own 
laws,  nor,  for  the  same  reasons,  that  the  judge  should  execute 
his  own  decisions.  The  bias  of  personal  prejudice  and  private 
interest  is  best  excluded  by  separating  these  functions  of  sover- 
eignty to  different  officials. 

And  then  again,  each  one  of  these  has  in  practice  further 
checks  and  balances  imposed,  in  popular  governments,  for  the 
sake  of  securing  the  public  freedom  better. 

In  the  case  of  the  legislative,  there  are,  fii-st,  the  con- 
stituting of  the  same  into  two  bodies,  or  houses.  One  a  more 
popular  representation,  and  the  other  standing  upon  a  more 


RECTITUDE    OF    STATE    AUTHORITY.  1 29 

general  constituency,  and  all  legislation  necessarily  receiving 
the  majority  of  votes  in  each.  And,  secondly,  the  interposi- 
tion of  a  veto.  To  arrest  and  check  rash  and  hasty  legislation, 
this  power  of  putting  a  veto  upon  legislative  enactments  is  in- 
stituted under  certain  regulations,  and  ordinarily  lodged  in  the 
chief  magistrate  of  the  nation,  who  may  refuse  to  give  his  sanc- 
tion to  particular  bills  which  have  already  passed  both  houses. 
When  such  veto  is  interposed,  another  deliberation  of  the  legis- 
lature is  demanded,  and  usually  a  larger  vote  than  a  majority  is 
required  for  the  final  enactment  of  the  vetoed  law.  When  all 
this  is  instituted  and  used  for  the  greater  security  of  the  public 
freedom,  it  is  in  full  accordance  with  the  imperatives  of  political 
ethics. 

In  the  case  of  the  judiciary,  there  are,  — first,  courts  of 
appeal.  In  this  way  the  decisions  of  one  court  are  reviewed  by 
another,  and  if  found  erroneous,  the  former  decision  is  reversed 
or  set  aside.  Such  appeals  may  be  made  to  pass  through  cer- 
tain forms,  and  the  way  lie  open  to  several  successive  tribunals, 
but  the  end  of  all  is  to  be  found  in  the  greater  security  of  the 
public  freedom.  And,  secondly,  courts  of  equity.  The  oper- 
ation of  general  laws  may  bring,  in  particular  cases,  a  denial  of 
justice,  or,  indeed,  great  injustice.  Courts  of  equity  are  estab- 
lished for  judging,  under  certain  fixed  principles,  otherwise  than 
the  arbitrary  claims  of  law  would  demand. 

In  the  case  of  the  executive,  there  is  granted  the  power  of 
pardon.  The  ends  of  freedom  may  sometimes  be  consistent 
with,  and  perhaps  frequently  be  best  attained  by,  the  pardon  of 
convicted  criminals.  If  there  has  been  any  error  in  judgment, 
or  if  it  be  deemed  that  the  ends  of  justice,  or  which  is  the  same 
thing,  the  public  freedom,  may  be  as  well  subserved ;  the  power 
of  pardon  is  lodged  ordinarily  with  some  member  of  the  execu- 
tive, and  sometimes  with  particular  conditions  and  restrictions. 
The  remission  of  punishment  consistently  with  the  demands  of 
the  organic  unity,  is  the  end  to  be  attained  in  such  a  power,  and 


130  MERE    LEGALITY. 

should  be  so  used  only.     It  is  always  a  responsible  and  a  diffi- 
cult matter  to  dispense  pardons  safely. 

The  whole  adjustment  and  operation  of  the  civil  government, 
must  be  solely  in  the  light  of  what  the  organic  unity  of  men 
demands.  That  is  the  best  government  and  those  the  best 
statutes  which  will  best  bind  individuals  and  nations  together  as 
a  brotherhood  of  fellow-helpers.  The  government  which  the 
state  requires  is  that  which  shall  express  the  principle  of  the 
state,  and  when  this  principle  is  expressed  it  has  authority,  not 
because  a  monarch  or  a  legislature  has  decreed  it,  or  because 
it  has  been  adopted  by  the  agreement  of  a  majority,  but  be- 
cause it  is  the  voice  of  the  original  reason  in  man,  which  is, 
says  Richard  Hooker,^  "  laid  up  in  the  bosom  of  God,"  which 
commands,  says  Cicero,-  "what  ought  to  be  done,"  which  de- 
clares, says  Demosthenes,^  "what  is  just  and  honorable,"  and 
whose  utterances,  says  Sophocles,^  "  are  not  of  to-day  nor  of 
yesterday,  and  no  man  can  tell  when  they  came." 


CHAPTER  V. 
REWARDS  AND   PUNISHMENTS. 

Rewards  and  punishments  are  technically  termed  the  sanc- 
tions of  Law.  They  are  the  retributions  annexed  to  the  precept 
by  which  the  precept  becomes  a  law.  Both  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments are  included  as  retributions,  but  the  meaning  of  both, 
and  the  idea  at  the  basis  of  each  may  be  best  seen  from  a  clear 
view  of  the  true  doctrine  of  punishment. 

I .   The  meaning  and  ground  of  punishment.     Literally  pun- 


1  Ecclesiastical  Polity,  I.  iii.  i.  ^  Qrat.  I,  cont.  Aristog. 

2  Pe  Legibus,  i.  6.  «  Antigone,  v.  456. 


REWARDS    AND    PUNISHMENTS.  I3I 

ishment  means  pain ;  it  is  pain  inflicted  upon  the  breaker  of  a 
law  by  the  giver  of  the  law. 

Whenever  the  subject  of  a  law  breaks  the  law  his  will  is 
thereby  brought  in  exact  conflict  with  the  will  of  his  sovereign. 
But  since  both  these  two  wills  cannot  be  maintained,  one  must 
yield,  which  cannot  be  that  of  the  sovereign,  since  if  the  sover- 
eign yields,  he  yields  his  throne  ;  and  if  his  sovereignty  is  just, 
he  becomes  thereby  unjust.  Of  course  therefore  he  must  make 
the  subject  yield,  which  he  can  only  do  by  inflicting  upon  him 
as  his  sovereign's  will  what  he  could  never  choose  as  his  own 
will,  and  this  he  does  by  making  him  suffer.  Suffering  is  the 
one  thine:,  the  onlv  thing  which  no  one  could  choose  to  ex- 
perience  for  its  own  sake,  and  it  is  therefore  the  very  means, 
the  true  and  perfect  means  by  which  the  sovereign  shall  compel 
the  transgressor  to  acknowledge  the  supremacy  which  he  had 
chosen  to  refuse.  By  this  suffering  the  transgressor  is  punished. 
Suffering  is  thus  the  means  and  not  the  end  of  punishment. 
The  transgressor  is  punished  not  that  he  may  suffer,  but  he  is 
made  to  suffer  that  he  may  thereby  be  punished.  The  end  of 
punishment  is  to  assert  the  supremacy  of  the  sovereign  over  the 
subject  who  by  his  transgression  had  affirmed  himself  supreme. 

Punishment  is  not  retaliation,  as  though  the  subject  had  in- 
jured the  sovereign  in  a  certain  degree  for  which  an  equal 
injury  is  returned  to  him.  This  would  be  the  absurdity  of 
making  one  evil  or  injury  cancel  another.  Moreover,  tlie 
action  of  the  sovereign  upon  the  subject  in  punishment  is  of 
a  wholly  different  sort  from  the  action  of  the  subject  upon  the 
sovereign  in  transgression.  The  transgression  has  not  injured 
the  sovereign,  but  only  the  subject ;  and  tlie  punishment  is  in 
reality  only  the  manifestation  or  expression  of  the  injury  which 
the  subject  has  wrought  upon  himself.  In  other  words,  the  free 
will  of  the  subject  maintains  its  normal  freedom  only  in  obedi- 
ence to  his  righteous  sovereign.  Disobedience  is  the  surrender 
of  freedom.     "  Whosoever  committeth  sin  is  the  servant  of  sin." 


132  MERE    LEGALITY. 

In  the  ver)'  transgression,  whereby  the  subject  afifirms  himself 
a  sovereign,  he  becomes  in  reality  a  slave.  His  freedom  is 
actually  gone,  though  he  does  not  yet  know  it ;  and  his  punish- 
ment manifests  this  to  himself,  and  to  all  beholders.  His  choice 
has  become  his  destiny. 

2.  The  righteousness  of  punishment.  Punishment  may  there- 
fore be  defined  as  sovereignty  asse7-ting  itself  over  the  trans- 
gressor, and  its  righteousness  is  clearly  seen  in  the  righteousness 
of  the  sovereignty  which  it  asserts  and  vindicates.  The  require- 
ments of  the  organic  unity  of  mankind  are  right,  for  they  are 
the  requirements  of  reason  itself.  The  civil  government  which 
embodies  and  executes  these  requirements  is  therefore  right, 
and  the  sanctions,  —  whether  rewards  or  punishments,  — 
whereby  such  a  government  is  maintained,  must  also  be  right. 
The  righteousness  of  the  state  and  of  its  requirements,  and  their 
execution,  is  the  same  righteousness  throughout.  It  is  the 
righteousness  of  reason  expressing  and  actualizing  itself. 

Hence  the  righteousness  of  punishment  is  not  grounded  in 
its  tendency  to  reform  the  transgressor.  The  reform  of  the 
transgressor  is  of  course  important  to  the  community  of  which 
he  is  still  a  member,  but  beyond  any  good  to  any  transgressor, 
whether  it  be  his  reform,  his  freedom,  his  happiness,  or  his  life, 
is  the  one  supreme  good  of  the  unimpaired  supremacy  of  the 
government  on  which  every  good  of  the  community  depends. 
Moreover,  if  we  think  a  moment,  we  see  that  the  righteousness 
of  punishment  must  rest  in  something  back  of  its  tendency  to 
reform,  for  it  could  have  no  such  tendency  unless  it  were 
righteous  to  start  with. 

Again  if  it  be  said  that  the  threat  of  punishment  Avill  restrain 
from  crime,  and  we  seek  in  this  its  justification,  the  immediate 
and  sufficient  answer  is  that  punishment  cannot  be  right  be- 
cause it  is  threatened,  but  it  can  only  be  righteously  threatened 
because  itself  is  right. 

Still  farther,  if  one  claims  that  the  iniliction  of  punishment  is 


REWARDS    AND    PUNISHMENTS.  1 33 

right  only  on  the  ground  that  it  will  restrain  others  from  crime, 
the  question  comes  :  Why  then  is  one  person  punished  rather 
than  another?  And  if  the  answer  be  that  the  person  punished 
has  transgressed,  the  question  at  once  presents  itself :  \Vhat  is 
it  in  transgression  which  causes  the  transgi^essor  to  be  selected 
for  punishment  ?  To  this  there  is  no  stable  and  self-sufficient 
answer  if  we  ignore  that  denial  of  a  righteous  sovereignty  in 
which  the  very  core  and  marrow  of  transgression  consists,  and 
that  affirmation  of  the  sovereignty  which  is  the  stable  ground 
and  self-sufficient  end  of  punishment. 

3.  The  degree  of  punishmejit.  There  must  be  some  measure 
for  the  penalties  annexed  to  laws ;  and,  on  the  one  side,  this 
must  not  be  so  lenient  as  to  invite  the  public  contempt,  nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  may  it  be  so  severe  as  to  provoke  the  charge  of 
cruelty  and  excite  the  horror  and  hatred  of  the  community.  A 
number  of  considerations  must  come  into  the  account,  in  order 
rightly  to  estimate  the  degree  of  penalty  which  the  sovereign 
authority  righteously  requires. 

(i.)  Tlie  extent  to  which  the  vicious  choice  intei'feres  with 
the  public  freedom.  As  the  civil  authority  is  to  maintain  the 
freedom  through  which  alone  the  organic  unity  of  its  subjects 
has  play,  the  heinousness  of  any  crime  must  be  measured  by  the 
degree  in  which  this  freedom  has  been  thereby  violated.  Petty 
larceny  does  not  so  extensively  conflict  with  this  as  midnight 
robbery,  nor  the  taking  of  property  clandestinely  as  the  taking 
of  life  violently.  The  constraint  against  the  greater  crime  must 
be  by  the  greater  penalty,  other  things  being  equal.  Hence,  in 
all  cases  of  estimating  the  due  degree  of  legal  penalty,  one  item 
to  be  carefully  weighed  is  the  enormity  of  the  offence  against 
the  liberty  of  the  people.  The  purpose  to  vindicate  authority 
must  be  proportioned  to  the  importance  of  the  law,  and  this  is 
determined  only  in  the  light  of  the  end  of  all  civil  authority. 

(2.)  Tlie  strerigth  of  the  critjiinal  choice  is  also  to  he  esti- 
mated.    Public  freedom  is  the  more  endangered,  the  more  de- 


134  MERE    LEGALITY. 

termined  and  inveterate  is  the  choice  in  conflict  with  it.  A 
settled,  long- cherished  purpose  to  do  evil  is  more  heinous  than 
the  same  act  put  forth  under  sudden  temptation  or  high  excite- 
ment. Against  the  former  there  must  be  interposed  the  stronger 
restraint.  Whatever  indicates  the  greater  strength  of  the  crimi- 
nal choice  will  give  an  index  also  of  the  higher  penalty  which 
must  be  pi^t  to  guard  against  it.  This  may  be  seen  in  the  rep- 
etition of  the  offence,  the  surrounding  restraints  that  have  been 
overcome,  or  the  violent  and  outrageous  manner  of  committing 
the  crime.  Whatever  determines  the  deeper  depravity  of  the 
criminal  choice  must  also  demand  a  corresponding  degree  of 
severity  in  the  penalty. 

(3.)  TJie  difficulty  of  detection  must  also  be  regarded.  The 
danger  to  the  community  is  not  always  in  the  direct  proportion 
to  the  invasion  of  the  public  freedom  in  the  act  itself.  Some 
crimes  are,  in  their  own  nature,  more  difficult  of  detection  than 
others,  and  more  impracticable  to  be  guarded  against  by  the 
public.  On  this  account  there  is  the  greater  hazard  from  them, 
in  the  stronger  expectation  of  secrecy,  or  of  non-resistance,  and 
thus  the  higher  probability  of  impunity.  This  difference  should, 
as  nearly  as  practicable,  be  counterbalanced  by  the  greater  de- 
gree of  penalty.  Thus  with  the  counterfeiting  of  the  coin  of 
the  country,  forgery,  perjury,  etc.  In  the  case  of  some  aggra- 
vated crimes,  the  penalty  itself  being  death,  there  is  a  compen- 
sation given  for  the  difficulty  of  detection  by  a  more  hberal  rule 
for  admitting  testimony.  In  the  case  of  rape,  arson,  etc.,  the 
injured  party  may  be  a  competent  and  sufficient  witness,  with 
the  corroborating  circumstances. 

(4.)  Mlien  the  crime  is  directly  against  the  sovereignty,  the 
highest  penalties  a7'e  demanded.  Sovereignty  holds  the  con- 
densed authority  of  the  state  in  one  point,  and  a  crime  against 
this  is  the  highest  the  state  can  know,  or  the  subject  can  com- 
mit. All  other  crimes  are  against  individuals ;  but  an  offence 
against   the   sovereignty,  as  such,  strikes  directly  against   the 


REWARDS    AND    PUNISHMENTS.  1 35 

authority  of  the  whole,  and  would  cleave  down  the  public  free- 
dom in  the  destruction  of  its  only  safeguard  at  a  single  blow. 

In  this  is  the  crime  of  liigh  treason,  and  it  should  call  forth 
all  the  force  of  state  authority  to  its  utmost  extent.  The  occa- 
sion and  circumstances  of  the  crime,  except  as  indicating  the 
desperate  and  determining  choice  of  the  traitor,  cannot  be  taken 
into  the  account.  Whatever  the  occasion,  this  stroke  direct  at 
the  sovereignty  involves  the  very  existence  of  the  government, 
and  must  be  met  and  overcome,  if  necessary,  by  calling  out  all 
the  resources  of  the  commonwealth.  It  is  a  commitment  in 
which  is  at  stake  the  existence  of  the  parties.  If  one  lives,  the 
other  must  fall ;  and  thus  if  the  government  would  not  consent 
to  its  o\vn  destruction,  it  can  have  no  other  resource  but  the 
destruction  of  its  enemy.  Here,  the  highest  penalty  is  de- 
manded, for  the  sovereignty  is  bound  to  sustain  its  own  being 
to  the  full  extent  of  its  power. 

These  are  the  principles  to  be  applied  in  determining  the 
degree  of  penalty.  It  may  often  be  difficult  to  give  the  exact 
degree,  and  questions  of  political  casuistry  may  arise,  demand- 
ing the  highest  political  experience  and  wisdom  ;  but  the  true 
course  is  to  attain  the  right  principles,  and  apply  them  as  judi- 
ciously as  practicable.  Criminal  codes  will  demand  frequent 
revision ;  the  principles  will  last,  the  facts  perpetually  vary. 

Sanctions  which  are  completely  within  the  interest  of  public 
freedom  can  never,  on  one  side,  become  weak  and  contempti- 
ble, nor  on  the  other,  cruel  and  revengeful.  All  that  is  within 
the  reach  of  the  state  is  given  into  its  hand  that  it  may  be  used 
for  the  end  of  freedom  in  the  maintenance  of  the  organic  unity 
of  its  subjects,  and  the  most  severe  penalties  are  righteous  if 
inflicted  in  subserviency  to  this  end.  Should  it  be  objected  that 
capital  punishment  is  no  longer  necessary  to  the  administration 
of  a  safe  government,  since  the  elevation  in  morals  and  patriot- 
ism, and  the  degree  of  civilization  attained,  has  secured  that 
milder  penalties  will  sufficiently  guard  human  life  ;  this  might 


136  MERE    LEGALITY. 

be  an  open  inquiry  for  fair  discussion  and  decision,  whether  in 
the  given  circumstances  sucla  has  become  a  matter  of  fact  or 
not.  But  the  principle  does  not  admit  of  question,  whether,  if 
the  organic  unity  or  the  public  freedom  demand  capital  punish- 
ment, the  government  has  a  right  to  threaten  and  inflict  it.  If 
something  may  as  securely  sustain  the  public  freedom,  the  gov- 
ernment may  dispense  with  this  and  yet  fulfil  its  end ;  but  if 
nothing  else  will  do,  the  state  must  use  capital  punishment, 
since  it  must  guard  and  maintain  itself  by  any  means  practica- 
ble. Life  is  not  so  sacred  as  that  for  which  life  is  given,  and  if 
the  opportunity  to  attain  the  ends  of  human  life  cannot  be 
maintained  but  by  the  infliction  of  death  upon  such  as  disturb 
it,  the  government  of  the  state  is  bound,  by  its  mission  to 
humanity,  to  inflict  that  extreme  penalty. 

It  may  be  argued  that  sanguinary  punishments  tend  to  make 
the  people  barbarous ;  but  in  the  one  crime  of  murder,  it  is  a 
more  important  and  probable  opinion,  that  a  disuse  of  capital 
punishment  will  directly  tend  to  demoralize  the  public.  The 
conviction  that  the  murderer  deserves  to  die  must  be  met  by 
civil  sanctions,  or  the  very  teachings  and  influence  of  the  law 
will  be  to  lower  the  standard  of  pure  morality,  and  deprave  the 
public  sentiment,  by  making  the  life  of  man  less  sacred  in  the 
statute  book  than  it  is  in  natural  conscience. 


A  general  view  of  the  nature  and  rectitude  of  State  Authority 
has  now  been  attained,  but  a  particular  application  may  be 
assisted  by  giving  some  prominent  examples.  We  shall  need 
three  Chapters,  under  the  following  captions  :  — 

The  position  of  the  citizen  in  reference  to  the  government. 

The  position  of  the  government  in  reference  to  the  citizen. 

The  position  of  one  state  in  reference  to  others. 


THE  CITIZEN   IX    REFERENCE   TO  THE  GOVERNMENT.     1 37 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   POSITION    OF   THE    CITIZEN    IN    REFERENCE  TO    THE 

GOVERNMENT. 

While  the  state  as  the  organic  unity  of  mankind  must  ahvays 
be  right,  and  its  requirements  ahvays  obligatory,  civil  govern- 
ment will  always  be  restricted  in  its  rights  by  the  rights  of  its 
subjects,  and  it  is  important  for  us  to  note  here,  what  the  citizen 
may  claim,  and  what  he  may  not  claim,  as  against  the  govern- 
ment to  which  he  is  amenable. 

I.  Every  citizen  is  in  some  respects  quite  beyond  all  inter- 
ference from  civil  authority.  The  grand  originary  right  of  all 
rights  is  the  freedom  of  every  man  to  seek  the  attainment  of  his 
highest  worth  of  moral  character.  It  is  in  his  capacity  to  attain 
and  maintain  a  moral  character,  that  man  becomes  a  person  and 
is  not  a  thing. 

His  right  to  pursue  the  choice  of  his  highest  happiness  is 
always  subservient  to  this,  that  in  attaining  his  happiness  he 
should  always  subordinate  it  to  his  righteousness.  Freedom  in 
the  pursuit  of  hapj^iness  is  always  to  be  controlled  by  what  is 
due  to  righteousness.  This  originary  right  can  never  be  given 
up  by  any  one,  nor  forcibly  taken  from  another  by  any  one,  nor 
even  claimed  as  a  sacrifice  from  any  one  for  the  freedom  of  all. 
The  state  never  can  demand,  and  the  government  never  should 
demand,  the  immo.rahty  of  its  humblest  citizen,  as  the  price  to 
be  paid  for  its  political  liberty.  Inasmuch  as  civil  authority  ex- 
ists only  for  the  organic  unity  of  its  subjects,  and  as  this  can 
never  be  found,  but  is  always  lost  through  unrighteousness,  it  fol- 
lows that  no  high  political  sovereignty  can  at  all  lay  its  hand 
upon  the  citizen's  originary  fight  to  the  attainment  of  his  high- 
est moral  wortli. 

There  are  thus  individual  rights  which  lie  quite  above  all 


138  MERE    LEGALITY. 

righteous  interference  from  the  civil  authority;  against  which 
no  statute  should  lift  up  its  sanctions  ;  and  for  the  sake  of  which, 
if  the  operation  of  general  statutes  come  in  conflict,  the  gov- 
ernment in  its  judicial  capacity  should  declare  the  statute  a 
nullity  and  set  aside  its  penalty. 

Among  such  original  rights,  may  be  mentioned  the  follow- 
ing:  — 

Equality  in  freedom.  I  may  demand  of  the  civil  authority, 
that  it  shall  permit  me  to  be  as  free  as  another,  in  my  own  right. 
The  state  can  never  use  its  law,  nor  can  it  permit  any  citizen 
so  to  use  it,  as  to  domineer  over  and  oppress  any  individual. 
A  government  which  legislates  against  the  many  f©r  the  sake  of 
a  few,  or  agamst  any  part  of  the  community  for  the  sake  of 
another,  contradicts  the  very  idea  of  the  state,  and  is  a  tyranny 
which  has  belied  itself. 

Unrestrained  thought  and  belief.  Thought  and  belief  have 
not  yet  become  choice,  and  as  thought  and  faith,  can  never 
come  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  authority.  No  con- 
servation of  public  freedom  demands  any  interference  with 
private  thought  and  belief,  and  it  is  only  as  choices  and  pur- 
poses are  formed  which  go  out  in  overt  action  after  their  ob- 
jects, that  the  government  has  any  power  or  right  to  interpose 
and  repress. 

Freedom  of  cojiscience.  Pure  morality  and  religious  piety 
stand  quite  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  civil  sovereignty.  My 
right  to  my  own  self-approbation  in  both  morals  and  religion  is 
beyond  all  other  requirements,  and  were  I  to  follow  any  other 
requirement  in  opposition  to  conscience  in  either,  I  could 
neither  be  virtuous  nor  pious.  Not  what  the  government  im- 
poses, but  only  v/hat  I  myself  propose,  as  ultimate  end  and  aim, 
can  give  to  me  either  righteousness  or  holiness. 

Unrestrained  action  in  all  t/migs  not  subversive  of  the  public 
freedom.  Freedom  to  ^vrite,  print,  or  speak  what  I  will,  if  I  do 
not  therein  invade  the  pubUc  freedom,  is  mme  beyond  the 


THE  CITIZEN  IN  REFERENCE  TO   THE  GOVERNMENT.     1 39 

reach  of  all  civil  legislation.  The  public  prosecutor  must  make 
out  the  invasion  of  the  public  freedom  in  what  I  have  uttered 
to  the  world,  and  the  choice  going  out  in  overt  action  to  do  so, 
or  there  is  neither  slander  nor  libel  in  any  communication  I  may- 
make  public.  Others  are  free  to  hear  what  I  speak,  or  read 
what  I  publish,  as  they  please,  and  neither  myself  nor  they  can 
come  under  any  legal  restraint,  until  the  invasion  of  the  pubUc 
freedom  is  first  established. 

To  be  held  as  innocent  until  legally  proved  to  be  giiilty.  If  the 
end  of  government  has  not  been  hindered,  and  thus  no  conflict 
has  come  in  the  maintaining  of  the  public  freedom,  the  sover- 
eignty has  no  penal  claim  upon  any  citizen ;  and  it  is  the  right 
of  all  to  possess  the  immunities  of  the  government  until  the 
charge  of  violation  has  been  legally  made  and  proved.  It  is 
the  business  of  the  government  to  arraign,  try,  and  convict ;  and 
until  convicted,  every  citizen  may  claim  exemption  from  civil 
penalty. 

The  sovereign  as  fully  as  the  citizen  has  the  right  to  decide 
for  himself  what  cases  come  within  his  proper  jurisdiction,  and 
where  he  may  apply  his  pains  and  penalties  in  constraint  of  the 
subject,  and  must  exonerate  or  coerce  accordingly.  But  the 
principle,  as  given  above,  which  allows  some  original  rights 
to  the  citizen  beyond  the  reach  of  civil  sovereignty,  must  be 
admitted  by  all  righteous  government ;  and  if  there  come  any 
collision  between  the  sovereign  and  the  subject,  it  can  only 
be  a  question  of  casuistry  whether  the  particular  case  comes 
within  the  principle  or  not.  In  such  unhappy  discrepancy  of 
original  personal  right  and  claim  of  governmental  authority, 
the  power  of  the  sovereignty  may  for  a  while  carry  all  things 
its  own  way ;  but  the  appeal  is  to  the  ultimate  standard  of  right 
which  involves  the  judgment  of  posterity  and  of  God,  and  at 
length,  before  this  final  tribunal,  the  assumption  and  oppression 
of  the  sovereign  is  as  surely  and  severely  rebuked  as  the  trans- 
gression or  rebellion  of  the  subject.     The  subject  is  justified, 


140  MERE    LEGALITY. 

in  all  such  collisions,  in  his  resort  to  all  legal  preventions  and 
hindrances  practicable,  and  the  sovereign  judiciary  should  set 
aside  all  legislation  which  violates  fundamental  principles. 

2.  The  subject  has  no  right  to  evade  law.  From  necessity, 
inasmuch  as  human  government  must  be  made  and  administered 
by  fallible  men,  all  political  regulations  must  have  their  imper- 
fections. The  eye  of  the  sovereign  cannot  detect  every  crime, 
nor  his  arm  arrest  and  punish  every  transgressor.  But  this 
defect  is  only  in  fact,  not  in  principle.  The  sovereign  has  his 
right  to  arraign  and  punish  every  delinquent,  and  if  any  criminal 
evade  the  law  in  its  penalty  which  he  has  violated  in  precept, 
it  has  been  against  ethical  right,  and  a  moral  vice  has  been 
thereby  added  to  a  political  crime. 

Wherever  state  authority  reaches,  there  the  majesty  of  sov- 
ereignty is ;  and  no  man  may  be  permitted  to  put  forth  any 
choice,  which  is  not  constrained  by  the  law  in  harmony  with  the 
public  choice.  Just  so  far  as  this  fails  the  organic  unity  is  in- 
vaded, and  a  wound  to  this  is  as  fatal  in  one  part  of  the  state  as 
another.  The  organic  unity  is  vital  in  every  part,  and  the  a^gis 
of  sovereign  authority  must  cover  the  whole  or  no  portion  can 
be  safe.  The  state  itself,  through  all  its  organization  of  con- 
nected choices  and  interests,  rights  and  claims,  is  eye,  ear,  and 
hand  to  detect  and  arraign  every  transgressor.  And  in  every 
subject,  through  all  the  body-politic,  there  is  a  nerve  of  political 
sensation  which  carries  up  to  the  seat  of  sovereign  authority  and 
redress  the  notice  of  any  violence  anywhere  suffered.  All  un- 
redressed wrong-doing  remains  as  a  festering  wound  in  the  state, 
and  creates  so  much  disease  and  danger  in  the  commonwealth. 
No  matter  how  clearly  and  effectually  the  criminal  may  have 
evaded  the  law,  he  has  left  the  virus  of  his  crime  working  its 
mischief  in  the  political  life  of  his  country,  and  the  evil  is  no 
more  sure  in  the  state,  than  is  the  moral  retribution  in  his  own 
conscious  degradation.  No  secrecy  of  wickedness,  nor  any 
successful  resistance   to  law,  has  in  any  manner  mitigated  or 


THE   CITIZEN   IN   REFERENCE  TO   THE  GOVERNMENT.     I4I 

abolished  the  moral  turpitude  of  the  transgression.  All  evasion 
of  revenue  laws,  taxes,  and  regulations  of  the  right  of  suffrage, 
are  breaches  of  morality,  inasmuch  as  an  ethical  imperative 
Sanctions  every  regulation  of  righteous  authority.  ^ 

3.  TJie  cf'Wiinal  has  no  right  fo  sympathy  against  law.  A 
righteous  subject  of  human  government  may  sympathize  v.iih 
human  misery,  in  all  cases  of  its  manifestation.  It  is  an  in- 
dignity to  his  humanity  to  harden  the  heart  and  steel  the  breast 
agamst  any  suffering.  It  is  worthy  of  any  man  that  he  com- 
passionate human  sorrow,  and  even  all  cases  of  sin  and  guilt. 
But  while  a  righteous  man  may  allow  all  the  overflowings  of 
constitutional  sympathy  for  the  sufferings  of  a  criminal  rightly 
punished,  and  would  render  himself  inhuman  if  he  looked  on 
the  anguish  of  another  with  unfeeling  indifference,  yet  may  he 
not  permit  this  sympathy  to  magnify  itself  against  the  law,  and 
prompt  to  any  action  that  would  withdraw  from  the  full  in- 
fliction of  penalty,  and  leave  the  authority  of  law  unvindicated. 
This  morbid  compassion  to  the  guilty  is  by  no  means  uncom- 
mon ;  but  it  is  always  a  criminal  weakness  in  the  man  who 
cannot  control  constitutional  emotions  by  moral  principle,  and 
includes  within  it  a  criminal  treachery  to  the  state. 

The  criminal  who  suffers  under  righteous  penal  retribution 
has  still  all  the  rights  of  humanity,  and  may  properly  demand 
that  his  punishment  shall  not  be  inhuman  in  kind  or  degree, 
and  that  no  innocent  man  shall  look  on  his  sufferings  without  a 
feeling  heart,  but  he  has  no  right  to  appeal  to  any  sympathy, 
that  he  may  through  it  secure  a  lighter  stroke  of  penal  justice. 
The  good  man  may  pity  all  his  sorrows,  and  yet  rejoice  most 
righteously  in  the  law  which  smites  him.  The  criminal  may 
righteously  take  the  solace  of  the  good  man's  sympathy,  but 
should  not  wish  to  abate  at  all  his  loyalty  to  the  law. 

4.  The  citizen  can  stand  against  all  claims  of  the  civil  gov- 
ernment, on  the  groii7id  of  mere  legality.  Legality  implies 
obedience  to  law  through  the  constraint  of  its  sanctions.     Not 


142  MERE    LEGALITY. 

from  virtuous  regard  to  duty,  from  love  to  the  sovereignty,  from 
patriotic  regard  to  freedom,  nor  from  general  benevolence  to 
mankind,  but  solely  from  the  good  offered  or  the  evil  threat- 
ened. It  is,  ethically  considered,  a  servile  and  mercenary 
spirit ;  obedience  from  motives  which  give  no  moral  virtue ; 
and  yet  the  citizen  can  stand  on  this  ground,  and  civil  govern- 
ment can  make  no  further  exactions.  His  whole  political  life 
is  thus  justified. 

The  sovereign  may  wish  every  citizen  to  be  virtuous,  patriotic, 
and  even  pious  ;  but  he  can  do  nothing  as  a  sovereign  to  en- 
force any  thing  but  overt  obedience,  and  can  never  question  the 
motive  from  which  that  obedience  springs.  Morality  has  its 
sanctions  to  answer  its  ends,  and  Religion  has  its  means  to  at- 
tain its  purposes  ;  but  neither  can  have  recourse  to  state  author- 
ity for  the  sake  of  making  men  either  virtuous  or  pious.  The 
hand  of  civil  authority  is  quite  too  clumsy  to  meddle  with  the 
human  conscience,  and  secure  action  from  the  pure  love  of  vir- 
tue or  the  holy  love  of  God.  The  political  sovereign,  even 
when  he  has  fortified  his  authority  by  the  full  measure  of  all  the 
claims  of  morality  and  religion,  and  has  thus  made  himself  in 
the  eye  of  the  sage  and  the  saint  to  stand  forth  as  a  righteous 
moral  governor,  does  not  rely  upon  moral  and  religious  motives 
to  secure  political  obedience.  He  is  set  to  guard  the  public 
freedom,  and  constrain  the  execution  of  all  individual  choices 
in  harmony  with  the  choice  of  the  whole,  and  for  this  purpose 
he  promulgates  the  public  will  in  his  preceptive  legislation, 
and  constrains  to  obedience  by  the  application  of  legal  sanc- 
tions, and  is  obliged  to  be  quite  satisfied  if  either  by  hope  or 
fear  he  can  keep  what  has  been  committed  to  his  care  un- 
broken. 

When,  therefore,  the  citizen  can  vindicate  his  overt  action 
before  the  tribunal  of  his  country,  and  no  charge  can  be  sus- 
tained against  him  of  any  violation  of  public  freedom,  he  may 
with  a  bold  face  stand  in  the  presence  of  his  political  sovereign, 


THE   CITIZEN    IN   REFERENCE   TO    THE  GOVERNMENT.    I43 

though  at  the  ver)-  moment  he  must  blush  with  the  conviction 
of  his  baseness  before  his  own  conscience,  or  tremble  with  fear- 
ful forebodings  before  God.  Civil  government  must  stop  at  its 
own  standard ;  it  sets  out  to  conserve  the  public  freedom  by 
pains  and  penalties,  and  if  it  has  secured  the  end  by  its  own 
means,  it  must  ask  no  more. 

5.  The  citizen  viay  righteously  expatriate  himself.  That  which 
makes  any  man  a  component  element  of  a  particular  state 
is  the  fact  that,  in  the  providence  of  God,  the  rights  and  inter- 
ests, which  call  forth  his  choices  and  prompt  to  their  execution, 
lie  commingled  in  the  same  community  with  others ;  and  the 
freedom  of  the  whole,  in  the  choices  of  all  demands  that  each 
should  be  restrained  for  the  sake  of  the  whole.  If  a  ship  at  sea 
should  lose  all  its  officers,  or  a  shipwrecked  crew  be  cast  upon  a 
desert  island,  this  little  community  would  then  stand  in  the  con- 
dition of  a  state.  The  whole  would  have  the  right  to  restrain 
and  constrain  each  one  for  the  freedom  of  all. 

But  this  narrower  relation  must  be  always  subject  to  the 
broader  one.  The  organic  unity  which  binds  the  whole  race 
of  men  together,  may  as  easily  require  the  dissolution  of  any 
particular  community  as  its  formation.  The  one  universal  state, 
itself  unchanged  in  its  requirements  or  its  ends  through  all  the 
generations,  creates  and  destroys  individual  states  as  its  own 
ends  determine,  and  when  an  individual  person  finds  that  the 
interests  of  the  universal  state  demand  his  separation  from  the 
particular  community  where  his  lot  may  have  been  cast,  that 
community  should  leave  him  to  obey  these  without  restriction. 
Generally,  it  will  be  wiser  and  safer  to  leave  the  determination 
of  this  question  to  the  judgment  and  the  conscience  of  the 
person  himself,  though  special  exigencies  may  occur  where  a 
given  state  may  find  it  necessary,  not  only  for  its  own  preserva- 
tion, but  for  the  widest  interests  of  mankind,  to  keep  its  citizens 
within  its  borders  even  against  their  will.  But  the  ethical  prin- 
ciple, to  which  also  the  actual  practice  of  modern  states  tends 


144  MERE    LEGALITY. 

to  conform,  is  soundly  expressed  in  the  Act  of  Congress,  ^  which 
declares  that  ''  the  act  of  expatriation  is  a  natural  and  inherent 
right  of  all  people." 

If  the  theory  of  a  state  were  that  of  a  compact,  it  might  be 
said  the  social  contract  cannot  be  righteously  severed  without 
an  assent  of  both  parties  ;  or,  if  it  were  patriarchal,  it  might  be 
said  that  one  child  could  not  leave  the  paternal  dwelling  rightly 
without  parental  permission ;  or,  if  it  were  government  by  divine 
right,  it  might  be  said  by  the  monarch,  "  I  am  the  state,"  and 
no  vassal  may  leave  without  orders ;  but  on  the  true  basis  of 
state  existence  and  legitimate  political  authority,  though  the 
sovereign  may  bind  every  conscience  to  obedience  while  within 
the  jurisdiction,  yet  can  he  bind  no  conscience  to  remain  there 
by  the  right  of  his  authority  alone. 

6.  77^1?  merit  or  demerit  of  the  citizen  is  determined  in  his 
relation  to  the  sanctioii  of  the  law.  Desert  of  legal  reward  is 
7nerit,  and  desert  of  legal  penalty  is  demerit.  If  the  law  is  \n\h- 
out  positive  reward  annexed  to  the  precept,  the  consequential 
security  and  immunities  guaranteed  in  the  protection  of  every 
good  government  is  a  sufficient  reward,  and  those  are  implied 
.in  the  legislation  itself,  and  this  is  expressed  when  it  is  said 
of  an  obedient  citizen,  he  deserves  well  of  the  state. 

Merit  is  used  with  some  modification  of  meaning.  A  citizen 
may  have  come  under  the  condemnation  of  the  law,  and  subse- 
quently do  that  which  deserves  the  favor  of  the  government, 
and  in  this  point  of  light  he  has  the  merit  of  co7igrnity, —  it  is 
fitting  that  he  should  be  rewarded  though  he  cannot  make  his 
legal  demand  for  it.  The  same  also  applies  when  an  innocent 
citizen  has  done  some  signal  service  to  the  state  for  which  no 
law  has  offered  a  reward.  Some  heroic  deed,  some  scientific 
or  literary  work,  some  useful  invention,  may  truly  merit  some 
reward  from  the  government,  but  for  which  the  man  has  no 


1  July  27,  1868. 


THE  CITIZEN   IN   REFERENCE  TO  THE  GOVERNMENT.     I45 

legal  claim.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the  citizen  has  complied 
with  some  claim  of  the  law  in  which  there  is  an  express  stipula- 
tion, he  may  then  use  the  law  itself  and  claim  of  the  government 
his  reward ;  and  in  this  point  of  view  he  has  the  merit  of  con- 
dignity.  This  may  also  apply  to  demerit,  where  the  law  claims 
the  penalty,  and  we  term  it  condign  punishment.  The  first 
case  is  an  instance  of  what  is  sometimes  termed  an  imperfect 
right,  while  the  last  is  a  case  of  perfect  right. 

A  citizen  accused  of  crime,  and  legally  arraigned,  is  called  an 
accused  criminal,  but  this  is  not  yet  determinative  of  his  guilt. 
When  he  has  been  legally  sentenced  to  punishment,  he  is  called 
a  convicted  criminal  or  a  convict.  When  a  citizen  has  be- 
trayed a  pecuniary  poHtical  trust,  he  is  termed  a  defaulter ;  and 
should  he  be  adjudged  to  suffer  legal  penalty,  he  too  would 
in  that  case  become  a  convict.  If  his  trust  has  been  some  high 
commission,  as  foreign  ambassador,  or  ofificer  of  the  army  or 
navy,  and  he  has  there  sacrificed  the  Hberties  of  his  country,  he 
is  known  as  a  traitor.  A  citizen  who  opposes  by  violence  the 
direct  action  of  the  state  sovereignty,  whether  singly  or  in  com- 
bination, is  a  rebel.  Should  the  rebel  put  himself  upon  the 
ground  of  original  personal  independence,  and  admit  no  gov- 
ernment as  a  restraint  upon  his  choices,  and  thus  utterly  disre- 
gard all  the  rights  of  jDuplic  freedom,  he  becomes  an  outlaw. 
In  the  carr}ang  of  his  choices  out  to  execution  against  the 
rights  of  all  citizens,  he  is  a  robber;  and  viewed  as  acting 
against  the  rights  of  all  states,  he  is  a  freebooter.  When  in 
combination,  many  thus  engage  in  practices  of  violence,  they 
arc  known  as  banditti ;  and  when  upon  the  high  seas  they 
assault  the  flags  of  all  nations,  they  are  pirates. 

A  rebel  may  la\vfully  l>e  restrained  or  destroyed  by  any  citi- 
zens of  the  government  against  which  he  rebels ;  and  all  forms 
of  outlawry  may  be  resisted  and  punished  by  any  portion  of 
the  human  family,  since  the  outlaw  stands  against  the  rights  of 
mankind. 


146  MERE    LEGALITY. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

THE    POSITION    OF    THE    GOVERNMENT    IN    REFERENCE    TO 

THE   CITIZEN. 

Civil  government  we  have  seen  to  be  the  agency  whereby 
the  state,  as  the  organic  unity  of  its  citizens,  manifests  and 
maintains  its  will.  This  will  is  always  righteous,  and  always 
authoritative,  since  it  only  demands  that  contribution  of  each 
for  all,  and  of  all  for  each,  which  the  original  reason  in  man 
demands ;  and  for  this  demand  the  aU-sufficient  reason  is,  that 
love,  which  is  self-surrender,  or  the  leaving  of  oneself  for 
another,  is  reason.  The  sole  end  of  civil  government  is  to 
announce  and  enforce  this  demand  of  reason ;  but  as  there  may 
be  often  a  difficulty  in  determining  what  is  this  demand,  and  thus 
a  liability  on  the  part  of  the  government,  which  at  the  best  is 
only  an  imperfect  agency  for  the  work  committed  to  its  charge, 
to  be  mistaken,  it  is  quite  desirable  for  us  here  to  notice  how 
in  certain  cases  the  position  of  the  government  in  reference  to 
the  citizen  is  determined  by  the  application  of  our  general 
principle.  It  is  true  that  this  whole  question  is  really  a  broad 
question  of  casuistry,  and  might  not  improperly  be  altogether 
omitted  in  a  higher  philosophical  analysis.  Having  attained  the 
universal  principle  of  poHtical  ethics,  we  might  leave  the  par- 
ticular facts  to  be  brought  within  the  principle,  and  each  one 
to  be  expounded  according  to  the  good  sense  and  judgment  of 
the  student.  But  this  general  principle  is  itself  so  broad  that 
to  many  it  may  seem  quite  vague,  and  thus  incapable  of  definite 
application  to  many  practical  cases.  Indeed,  its  application, 
in  some  of  the  higher  matters  of  civil  government,  gives  secon- 
dary principles  still  so  extensive,  as  often  to  be  apprehended  in 
the  light  of  fundamental  truths  of  political  science. 

For  the  two-fold  purpose  of  attaining  some  of  these  more 


THE  GOVERNMENT   IN   REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.     1 4/ 

important  political  truths,  in  the  central  light  of  all  political 
morality,  viz.  :  the  organic  unity  of  all  men  as  members  of  the 
universal  state,  and  their  organic  unity,  also  as  citizens  of  a  par- 
ticular state,  and  of  accustoming  the  mind  to  make  the  applica- 
tion of  this  great  ultimate  principle  to  all  cases,  we  shall  extend 
this  Chapter  over  much  more  ground  than  has  been  done  here- 
tofore ;  and  shall  give,  in  distinct  Sections  within  it,  an  investi- 
gation of  the  more  prominent  duties  of  the  government,  as 
specimens  for  determining  all  its  legitimate  functions. 

The  preliminary  remark,  comprehensive  of  these,  and  of  all 
governmental  regulations,  is  —  that  the  government  can  be  satis- 
fied with  nothing  but  obedience  to  its  laws.  An  offence  against 
law,  anywhere  occurring,  is  a  wound  to  the  organism,  and  this 
the  state  everywhere  deprecates.  The  punishment  of  this  offence 
is  not  at  all  what  the  state  wishes,  rather  than  obedience  and  no 
punishment ;  but  the  punishment  is  to  vindicate  sovereignty 
that  it  may  still  subserve  the  organic  unity.  The  threatening, 
and  when  the  legal  threat  has  failed,  the  executing,  of  the  pen- 
alty, have  but  one  end,  —  the  securing  the  least  infraction  of  the 
public  good  possible  to  be  attained  by  authority.  Not  punish- 
ishing  because  crime  has  been  committed,  as  if  that  could  satisfy 
and  was  an  equivalent  for  the  obedience  demanded,  but  punish- 
ing that  the  sovereignty  may  be  maintained,  and  that  wrong 
may  cease,  and  the  obedience  of  the  citizen  leave  the  public  free- 
dom henceforth  uninvaded.  The  breach  already  made  by  crime 
is  as  irremediable  as  the  fact  is  unalterable  ;  a  calamity  which  the 
government  can  never  redress,  that  it  should  not  lament  its  oc- 
currence. What  the  sovereign  wishes  is  perpetual  and  univer- 
sal obedience  to  his  law ;  for  in  this  way  only  can  the  end  for 
which  the  civil  authority  has  any  right  to  act  be  attained. 

In  following  out  the  consideration  of  the  position  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  reference  to  the  citizen,  by  Sections,  we  will  take  up 
the  topics  in  the  order  of  their  more  intimate  connection  with 
the  sustaining  of  the  state  authority,  and  then  pass  onward  to 


148  MERE    LEGALITY. 

such  as  have  a  more  direct  and  important  bearing  upon  the  in- 
terests of  the  community. 

Section  I.  Judicial  Oaths.  The  Scriptures  condemn  all 
swearing  in  our  ordinary  communications.  "  Again,  ye  have 
heard  that  it  hath  been  said  by  them  of  old  time,  thou  shalt  not 
forswear  thyself,  but  shalt  perform  to  the  Lord  thy  oaths.  But  I 
say  to  you,  swear  not  at  all :  neither  by  heaven  ;  for  it  is  God's 
throne  :  nor  by  the  earth ;  for  it  is  his  footstool :  neither  by 
Jerusalem ;  for  it  is  the  city  of  the  great  King.  Neither  shalt 
thou  swear  by  thy  head,  because  thou  canst  not  make  one  hair 
white  or  black.  But  let  your  commnications  be  yea,  yea ;  nay, 
nay  :  for  whatever  is  more  than  these  cometh  of  evil."  Matth.  v. 
33  to  37.  "  But  above  all  things,  my  brethren,  swear  not ;  neither 
by  heaven,  neither  by  the  earth,  neither  by  any  other  oath ;  but 
let  your  yea  be  yea ;  and  your  nay,  nay ;  lest  ye  fall  into  con- 
demnation." James,  v.  12.  That  thesc  prohibitions  extend  only 
to  the  practice  of  using  oaths  in  communications  between  man 
and  man,  is  manifest  from  the  context,  the  Jewish  practice,  and 
especially  the  facts  hereafter  given. 

The  examples  of  good  men  and  of  God  himself  sanction  sol- 
emn oaths  on  serious  and  important  occasions.  In  the  case  of 
Paul :  "  For  God  is  my  witness,  whom  I  serve  with  my  spirit," 
etc.  Rom.  i.  9.  "  Moreover,  I  call  God  for  a  witness  upon  my 
soul,  that  to  spare  you  I  have  not  as  yet  come  to  Corinth." 
2  Cor.  i.  23.  "  For  neither  at  any  time  used  we  flattering  words,  as 
ye  know,  nor  a  cloak  of  covetousness  ;  God  is  witness."  i  Thess. 
ii.  5.  In  the  case  of  God  :  "  I  have  sworn  by  myself,  the  word 
is  gone  out  of  my  mouth  in  righteousness,  and  shall  not  return," 
etc.  isA.  xiv.  23.  "  For  I  have  sworn  by  myself,  saith  the  Lord, 
that  Bozrah  shall  become  a  desolation,"  etc.  Jer.  xHx.  13.  "  The 
Lord  God  hath  sworn  by  himself,  saith  the  Lord  God  of 
Hosts ;  I  abhor  the  excellence  of  Jacob,  and  hate  his  pal- 
aces," etc.      Amos,  vi.  8. 

The  judicial  oath  is  fully  sanctioned.     By  the  Jewish  law : 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN   REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.     1 49 

"Then  shall  an  oath  of  the  Lord  be  between  them  both, 
that  he  hath  not  put  his  hands  to  his  neighbor's  goods,"  etc. 
Ex.  xxii.  II.  "  Thou  shalt  fear  the  Lord  thy  God,  and  serve  him, 
and  shalt  swear  by  his  name."  Deut.  vi.  13.  "  Thou  shalt  fear 
the  Lord  thy  God,  him  shalt  thou  serve,  and  to  him  thou  shalt 
cleave,  and  swear  by  his  name."  Deut.  x.  20.  The  Saviour's  ex- 
ample :  "  And  the  High  Priest  answered  and  said  unto  him,  I 
adjure  thee  by  the  living  God,  that  thou  tell  us  whether  thou  art 
the  Christ,  the  son  of  God.  Jesus  said  unto  him,  thou  hast 
said."  Matth.  xxvi.  63.  Apostolic  admission  and  divine  example  : 
"  For  when  God  made  promise  to  Abraham  because  he  could 
swear  by  no  greater,  he  swore  by  himself,"  etc.  "  Wherein  God, 
willing  more  abundantly  to  show  to  the  heirs  of  promise  the  im- 
mutability of  his  counsel,  confirmed  it  by  an  oath,"  etc.  Heb. 
vi.  13  to  17.  "  For  those  priests  were  made  without  an  oath  ;  but 
this  with  an  oath,  by  him  that  said  to  him,  the  Lord  swore  and 
will  not  repent,"  etc.     Heb.  vii.  20, 21. 

The  dictate  of  pure  morality  is  precisely  of  the  like  purport. 
It  would  be  an  indignity  to  humanity  and  a  debasement  of  the 
spirit,  that  ordinary  conversation  and  daily  communications  of 
man  with  man,  by  speech  or  writing,  should  be  interlarded  with 
oaths.  A  man's  character  for  veracity  is  more  secure  in  public 
estimation  when  his  categorical  declaration  is  all  that  he  uses. 
The  dignity  of  truth,  ordinarily,  needs  only  the  simple  yea  or 
nay.  But  on  the  other  hand,  in  extraordinary  and  solemn  occa- 
sions, where  more  is  depending  on  the  declaration,  and  special 
confidence  in  it  is  demanded,  there  is  no  indignity  to  man  in  a 
solemn  and  religious  appeal  to  God  for  the  truth  of  the  declara- 
tion given.  It  is  to  the  honor  of  the  human  spirit  that  it 
acknowledge  its  dependence  and  responsibility  before  the  Su- 
preme Being,  on  all  proper  occasions,  and  such  is  precisely  the 
nature  of  an  oath.  If  the  occasion  on  which  the  oath  is  taken 
be  proper  for  such  acknowledgement,  religion  and  morality  can 
have  nothing  to  object  to  it,  but  would  be  both  promoted  by  it. 


150  MERE    LEGALITY. 

We  have  here  no  inquiry  except  in  reference  to  the  judicial 
oath.     And  we  remark  in  reference  to  it : 

1.  The  state  needs  its  use.  As  the  generations  of  men  are  or 
have  been,  or  as  it  is  probable  that  the  mass  of  mankind  long 
will  be,  it  will  be  found  impracticable  to  sustain  civil  govern- 
ment without  bringing  in  the  religious  considerations  of  depend- 
ence upon  God  and  responsibility  to  him.  The  discarding  of 
all  future  retributions  leads  directly  to  anarchy.  But  the  defence 
of  judicial  oaths  does  not  need  that  we  insist  upon  their  necessity 
for  civil  governments ;  if  by  them  the  ends  of  government  may 
be  better  promoted,  this  is  sufficient. 

In  many  cases,  from  necessity,  the  eye  and  the  hand  of  civil 
sovereignty  are  ineffectual  to  detect  and  arrest.  An  appeal  to 
an  Omniscient  eye  and  an  Omnipotent  hand,  in  a  way  consist- 
ent with  the  faith  of  the  state  and  the  citizen  swearing,  is  an 
immense  augmentation  of  security  for  truth  and  confidence  in 
the  declaration ;  and  by  just  such  augmentation  is  the  public 
freedom  the  more  secure.  All  that  can  so  be  gained  to  the  use 
of  the  state  is  needful  for  it,  and  what  it  uses  directly  to  the 
legitimate  end  of  government,  it  rightly  uses.  Neither  public 
morality  nor  religion  is  in  any  way  desecrated  by  this,  but  pub- 
licly sustained  and  promoted.  Tliey  are  used  by  the  state  to 
purposes  which  both  morality  and  religion  approve.  To  deny 
the  right  to  employ  oaths,  and  discard  their  use,  would  fatally 
weaken  all  jurisprudence. 

2.  The  state  is  the  administrator  of  the  oath.  In  whatever 
way  the  oath  may  be  lawful  between  man  and  man  on  private 
or  particular  occasions,  or  in  what  way  ecclesiastical  judicatories 
may  resort  to  the  oath  for  confirmation,  is  not  here  inquired. 
In  all  cases  where  the  end  is  the  conservation  of  the  public 
freedom,  the  state  only  is  the  rightful  guardian,  and  the  civil 
authority  alone  should  administer  the  oath.  As  the  state  im- 
poses the  oath,  so  the  person  swearing  must  take  the  interpre- 
tation from  the  state  authority.     The  oath  is  binding  secundwn 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      I5I 

animum  imponeiitis.  No  other  can  determine  for  what  or  when 
it  is  needed ;  and  as  it  is  used  in  the  interest  of  its  owai  ends, 
the  state  must  decide  in  what  way  it  is  to  be  interpreted  to 
subserve  its  own  purposes. 

But  while  the  state  imposes,  and  this  makes  it  necessary 
that  the  state  should  through  its  government  be  the  interpreter 
of  the  oaths  it  administers,  and  may  insist  that  the  citizen 
swearing  shall  be  held  to  its  own  meaning,  yet  is  the  govern- 
ment bound  to  make  its  oaths,  as  well  as  its  laws,  plain  to  the 
capacity  of  those  on  whom  they  are  imposed.  If  an  old  form 
of  the  oath  have  an  antiquated  and  obscure  phraseology,  and 
one  that  involved  a  meaning  in  its  original  enactment  which 
could  not  in  modem  use  be  applied,  yet  inasmuch  as  the  state 
is  a  permanent  agent,  and  exists  the  same  while  successive 
legislatures  come  and  go,  its  interpretation  by  declaratory  acts, 
or  decisions  of  courts,  or  the  explanation  of  the  judge,  is  to  be 
that  which  the  person  swearing  is  to  apprehend  and  bind  him- 
self to  sustain.  The  ethical  rule  is,  that  the  state,  as  imposing, 
shall  give  meaning  to  its  oath,  and  see  that  this  meaning  is 
made  plain  to  the  one  swearing,  and  that  he  feel  bomid  to  get 
and  conform  to  the  state  meaning. 

3.  The  oath  may  imply  a  prayer  for  Divine  help,  or  an  im- 
precation of  Divine  vengeance.  The  usual  phrase,  "So  help 
you  God,"  ita  te  Deus  adjuvef,  may  imply  conscious  assump- 
tion of  increased  responsibility  and  conscious  frailty  under 
temptations  and  perverting  influences,  and  thus  an  ajjpeal  to 
God  to  add  his  help  to  sustain  the  enchanced  responsibility; 
as,  "may  God  so  strengthen  me,  as  in  my  sincerity  I  tlarow 
myself  upon  his  grace."  Or,  it  may  imply,  as  is  more  com- 
monly understood,  the  imprecation  of  Divine  desertion  if  the 
man  prove  false ;  "so  God  help  me  only  as  I  speak  the  truth." 

In  either  case  it  is  a  solemn  appeal  to  Omniscience  and 
Omnipotence  specially  to  regard  the  entire  agency  of  the  man 
in  this  transaction,  and  bringing  the  whole  directly  before  God. 


152  MERE    LEGALITY. 

It  excludes  all  levity  and  carelessness ;  it  precludes  all  fear  or 
favor  from  man ;  it  renounces  all  pleas  of  interest  or  expedien- 
cy j  and  disclaims  all  palliations  or  excuses  for  falsehood.  It 
secures  watchfulness,  careful  recollection,  definite  statement, 
and  considerate  expression. 

4.  Oaths  a?-e  fnai/ily  of  two  kinds,  —  testimony  or  engagement. 
Oaths  of  testimony  involve  careful  recollection  and  assertion. 
The  assumed  obligation  is  the  whole  truth,  no  more  and  no 
less.  To  go  beyond,  and  add  that  which  exaggerates  or  miti- 
gates, or  in  any  way  falsely  colors ;  to  suppress  and  thus  give  a 
garbled  statement  of  an  incomplete  representation ;  each  alike 
subjects  to  the  crime  of  perjury. 

Oaths  of  engagement  bind  to  fidelity  in  the  fulfilment  of  offi- 
cial functions  and  committed  trasts ;  and  involve  a  careful 
apprehension  of  the  duty  imposed,  and  a  scrupulous  fulfilment. 
Sometimes  a  trust  may  have  been  of  long  standing,  and  passed 
tlirough  generations  of  trustees,  as  in  the  case  of  incorporations  ; 
in  which  case  the  oath  binds  according  to  the  intention  of  the 
instrument.  If  changes  have  occurred  making  such  execution 
impossible,  the  permanent  state,  which  is  the  regulator  and 
imposer  of  all  oaths,  must  detennine  the  manner  in  which  the 
trust  shall  be  executed ;  and  this  should  be  as  nearly  as  it  can 
be  judged  the  founder  would  have  wished,  in  the  changed  cir- 
cumstances. 

5.  The  state  may  find  tiuo  obstacles  in  imposing  oaths.  Some 
minds  may  question  the  lawfulness  of  oaths  on  moral  or  religious 
grounds,  and  thus  plead  the  right  of  conscience  against  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  state.  This  brings  up  the  question  already  suf- 
ficiently settled,  viz. :  that  each  must  have  the  right  of  interpre- 
tation and  decision,  and  while  the  state  decides  to  pursue  its 
own  course,  the  citizen  can  only  decline  violating  his  con- 
science, and  leaving  the  case  to  the  tribunals  of  his  country, 
and  taking  the  penal  consequences  if  they  must  come. 

But  ordinarily  a  real  question  of  conscience  will  have  in  it 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      I  53 

SO  much  of  humility,  forbearance,  and  discretion  on  one  side, 
that  it  will  call  forth  respect  and  regard  on  the  other  ;  and  some 
compromise  will  be  effected,  by  which  both  private  conscience 
and  public  freedom  will  be  subserved.  In  this  case,  the  scru- 
ples of  the  Quaker  and  jNIoravian,  against  taking  judicial  oaths, 
are  met  by  the  expedient  of  a  solemn  affirmation,  under  the  like 
civil  pains  and  penalties  as  an  oath.  The  same  safeguard  to 
liberty  is  thereby  attained,  for  the  meaning  of  a  soletnn  affirma- 
tion, to  a  serious  mind,  brings  up  the  same  reference  to  eternal 
retributions,  and  induces  the  same  careful  recollection  and 
guarded  statement,  and  the  civil  magistrate  visits  a  violation 
wth  the  same  penalties. 

At  other  times  the  state  authority  may  meet  at  its  tribunals, 
citizens  who  believe  in  no  future  retributions,  and  acknowledge 
the  existence  of  no  God.  If  the  belief  of  God  and  futurity  be 
other  than  the  Christian,  a  Christian  state  can  administer  the 
oath  according  to  the  faith  of  the  witness,  and  bring  his  con- 
science under  this  argumented  obligation  to  veracity,  and  then 
leave  his  testimony  to  receive  credit,  proportioned  to  the  eleva- 
tion of  the  religious  creed  and  the  purity  of  its  sanctions.  An 
oath  on  the  Koran  or  the  eastern  Shasters,  should  not  give 
equal  validity  to  the  testimony  as  an  oath  on  the  Gospels, 
though  each  may  be  made  subject  to  the  same  civil  penalties 
for  perjury.  But  when  there  is  no  faith  in  the  being  of  a  per- 
sonal Deity,  or  if  a  God  be  acknowledged  there  is  still  no  belief 
in  any  future  retributions,  the  case  is  quite  different.  An  oath 
can  to  such  be  of  no  possible  significancy,  as  a  sanction  to  tes- 
timony. There  is  either  no  God  to  swear  by,  or  no  regard  to 
the  oath  by  God,  if  the  being  of  a  God  be  admitted.  In  all 
such  cases  the  administration  of  an  oath  would  be  wholly  im- 
pertinent. 

There  may  be  various  opinions  about  the  right  course  for  the 
state  in  its  use  of  such  citizens,  either  for  testimony  or  trust, 
but  the  principle  is  itself  plain,  viz.  :  credit,  in  proportion  to  the 


154  MERE    LEGALITY. 

sanctions  upon  conscience.  The  civil  pains  and  penalties  may- 
be alike  in  each,  but  this  cannot  give  equal  validity  to  testimony. 
In  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  believer  in  future  rewards  and 
punishments,  distributed  by  a  personal  God,  must  feel  claims  to 
veracity  and  fidelity  which  cannot  be  made  to  reach  the  con- 
science of  an  atheist,  or  any  rejector  of  future  punishment  for 
sins  committed  in  this  life.  Yet  just  in  proportion  to  the  proper 
validity  of  his  testimony,  may  that  of  an  atheist  be  desirable  and 
demanded  by  the  state.  The  full  fact  of  his  religious  belief  is  a 
fair  matter  of  inquiry  by  the  state,  and  his  affirmation,  without 
any  oath,  is  to  be  estimated  by  the  greater  or  less  restraint 
which  his  religious  faith  would  throw  upon  his  conscience.  If 
all  religion  be  discarded,  his  availability  for  any  political  use  in 
the  state  will  be  small  indeed.  Public  confidence  cannot  be 
very  strong  in  the  protestations  of  any  man  who  has  not  the 
guard  of  religious  sanctions  against  the  bias  of  selfish  interests. 
The  freedom  of  the  public  can  have  only  feeble  guarantees  in  a 
nation  of  infidels,  and  to  the  extent  of  the  individual's  destitu- 
tution  of  religious  obligation,  must  the  state  necessarily  distrust 
his  testimony. 

6.  Oaths  should  be  imposed  only  upon  importaiit  occasions. 
The  oath  is  of  no  benefit  to  the  state,  except  as  it  quickens  the 
conscience  and  thus  strengthens  the  sense  of  moral  obligation. 
And  it  is  an  evidence  of  the  public  sentiment  in  its  favor,  that  it 
comes  to  be  used  so  frequently  in  cases  of  testimony  and  prom- 
issory engagements.  The  strong  need  of  religious  sanctions  to 
veracity  and  fidelity  is  universally  felt,  and  the  tendency  is  to  in- 
troduce them  on  every  occasion.  This  too  frequent  imposition 
of  oaths  tends  directly  to  the  destruction  of  the  end  proposed 
by  them>_  Instead  of  increasing  general  religious  obligation, 
the  oath  becomes  common  and  familiar,  and  really  loses  its 
hold  upon  the  conscience.  Applied  to  unimportant  and  even 
trivial  cases,  it  becomes  a  mere  civil  formality,  and  awakens  but 
little  serious  reflection  and  caution  in  the  person  who  has  re- 


THE   GOVERNMENT  IN    REFERENCE   TO  THE  CITIZEN.     1 55 

ceived  it.  Such  effects  are  not  to  be  chargeable  to  the  impos- 
ing of  oaths  by  the  state,  as  if  necessary  to  the  fact,  but  are  the 
consequences  only  of  an  improper  administration  of  oaths. 

The  principle  of  using  an  oath  only  where  its  religious  sol- 
emnity will  quicken  the  conscience  in  its  sense  of  obligation,  is 
the  only  one  that  can  be  gi\'en,  and  this  must  direct  in  the  par- 
ticular cases  according  to  the  soundest  judgment.  The  state 
destroys  its  own  means  of  securing  its  ultimate  ends,  if  it  uses 
the  oath  so  frequently  and  so  lightly  as  to  weaken  its  religious 
obhgation  upon  the  public  conscience. 

Section  II.  Property.  Some  articles  of  property  may  be 
transferred  from  place  to  place,  used  and  consumed,  and  which 
may  thus  be  considered  as  merely  appendages  to  the  person,  as 
his  dress  or  his  instruments  of  labor,  and  these  are  known  as 
mm'eable  or  personal  property. 

Again  there  are  other  kinds  of  property  which  are  immoveable 
and  cannot  be  made  mere  personal  appendages,  and  which 
from  their  permanency  are  property  by  special  eminence,  and 
such  property  is  termed  real  estate.  This  is  land  and  that  which 
is  permanently  attached  thereto,  as  buildings  and  improvements. 

One  kmd  of  property  may  be  exchanged  for  another,  and 
this  induces  some  standard  of  value,  which  may  be  a  fair  repre- 
sentative of  the  personal  labor  that  the  particular  commodity 
has  cost.  This  standard  is  money,  and  has  its  own  value  from 
the  amount  of  labor  or  difficulty  with  which  it  is  attained,  and 
is  selected  from  other  things  for  such  use  from  its  scarcity,  im- 
perishability, and  easy  divisibility.  Usually  gold  and  silver,  are 
taken  for  this  purpose,  which  are  hence  called  the  precious 
metals,  while  for  small  values,  copper  and  nickel  are  used. 
The  coining  afidxes  an  authoritative  stamp,  by  which  is  certified 
both  the  purity  and  gravity  of  the  particular  piece  ;  and  in  this 
way  different  coins  are  made  subservient  to  all  the  transfers  of 
property  in  buying  and  selling.  By  the  use  of  money  there  is 
effected  in  one  transfer,  with  the  greatest  convenience,  all  the 


156  MERE    LEGALITY. 

exchanges  of  the  most  comphcated  trade  in  barter.  The 
money,  as  bullion  and  as  coinage,  has  an  intrinsic  value,  and 
this  is  always  inversely  as  the  quantity  which  is  thrown  into 
circulation. 

The  right  to  property  lies  in  a  naan's  right  to  the  products 
of  his  own  labor.  What  a  man  produces  is  ethically  his,  and 
thus  whatever  he  may  make  by  his  own  powers  is  his  property 
by  a  natural  right.  To  the  doer  belongs  his  deed.  Irrespec- 
tive of  all  civil  legislation,  a  man  might  thus  attain  the  natural 
right  to  personal  property,  and  so  far  as  he  could  mingle  his 
own  products  with  the  soil,  he  would,  by  cultivating  the  earth 
and  building  upon  it,  attain  a  natural  right  to  real  estate.  A 
community  of  such  persons,  as  a  state,  would  ethically  be  re- 
quired in  the  civil  legislation  to  regard  such  rights  of  property 
as  truly  as  all  other  personal  rights,  but  its  legislation  should 
accord  with  the  following  principles  : 

1.  77^1?  state  must  have  the  sovereign  control  of  all  property. 
It  can  never  be  right  for  a  person  to  find  profit  in  a  labor  which 
inures  to  the  harm  of  another.  Neither,  in  the  long  run,  can 
this  be  possible.  The  organic  unity  which  binds  men  in  a 
fellowship  of  reciprocal  interdependence,  does  not  permit  the 
welfare  of  any  one  to  be  gained  except  through  the  welfare  of 
every  one.  If  one  member  of  an  organism  suffers,  all  the  mem- 
bers suffer  with  it,  or  if  any  member  be  honored,  all  the  members 
rejoice  together.  Thus  the  natural  right  by  which  a  man  holds 
his  property  as  the  product  of  his  own  labor  is  never  absolute. 
No  rights  of  property  can  become  inalienable,  like  the  right  to 
religion,  reputation,  conscience,  etc.,  and  thus  all  rights  of 
property  come  under  state  control.  The  state  alone  must  de- 
termine in  each  case  what  the  property  of  each  citizen  should 
be.  All  right  to  property  is  thus  in  a  social  community  resolved 
into  a  state  right.  No  man  can  call  any  property  his  own, 
except  as  he  holds  it  under  the  law  of  the  country  where  it  is. 

2.  The  state  must  in  all  cases  be  considered  as  the  supreme 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      1 57 

proprietor  of  the  soil  of  the  nation.  Since  the  subsistence  of 
man  is  from  the  soil,  the  very  existence  of  the  community 
might  be  imperilled,  if  the  supreme  ownership  of  the  soil  were 
vested  elsewhere  than  in  the  community  itself.  The  territory 
of  a  state  must  therefore  belong  first  of  all  to  the  state  itself. 
This  accords  also  with  the  historical  fact.  The  origiy^al  owner- 
ship of  the  soil  was  held  by  the  community  and  not  by  the  indi- 
vidual members  thereof.  These  have  derived  their  titles  to 
their  lands  only  from  the  state,  and  each  citizen  as  proprietor 
still  holds  his  land  only  under  the  supreme  title  of  the  state. 

3.  The  state  vitist  regulate  all  transfers  and  descent  of  prop- 
erty. As  it  is  not  right  for  any  man  to  hold  property  for  his 
own  ends  irrespective  of  the  ends  of  others,  as  any  man's 
right  to  his  property  is  subordinate  to  the  right  of  all  men  to  be 
served  thereby,  —  a  man's  property  being  bound  by  the  law  of 
the  organism  as  truly  as  the  man  himself,  —  so  all  contracts, 
bargains,  bequests,  deeds  of  sale  and  trust  deeds,  and  all  devises, 
wills,  and  descent  of  intestate  property,  must  be  subject  to  the 
control  of  state  authority.  There  is  no  way  of  making  property 
contribute  to  the  welfare  of  the  community  as  truly  as  to  the 
wealth  of  the  individual  who  holds  it,  unless  the  state  has  the 
right  to  determine,  between  the  holder  and  his  contemporaries, 
what  power  of  transfer  he  shall  have  ;  and  also  between  the 
holder  and  coming  generations,  what  control  his  acts  shall  have 
upon  the  world  that  shall  be  after  him.  Inasmuch  as  no  one 
generation  can  foresee  what  will  be  the  need  of  all  coming  gen- 
erations, so  no  one  generation  can  have  the  right  to  control  all 
property  for  all  coming  generations,  and  no  one  man  can  have 
the  right  to  say  what  shall  be  the  perpetual  descent,  manage- 
ment, and  use  of  his  own  estate.  The  state  lives  on  in  posterity, 
and  that  must  determine  how  far  the  living  generation  may 
throw  its  choices  down  upon  others.  For  the  one  great  end  of 
all  its  generations,  must  the  permanent  state  sovereignty  regu- 
late and  settle  all  transfers  and  descent  of  property,  and  bind 
righteously  all  the  consciences  of  its  citizens  accordingly. 


158  MERE    LEGALITY. 

4.  TJie  State  must  also  regulate  the  right  of  property  which 
the  7fian  may  have  in  his  own  published  thoughts.  If  any  thino- 
by  natural  right  is  a  man's  own  property,  such  must  the  product 
of  his  own  thinking  be.  But  the  man  not  only  has  a  right 
in  the  product  of  his  own  intellect,  the  public  have  also  their 
right  in  it.  Every  man  is  bound  in  the  community  to  which 
he  belongs,  and  the  state  authority  exists  and  acts  legitimately 
only  for  this  very  thing,  to  see  that  no  man  shall  live  for  his  own 
cads,  but  as  a  means  for  the  ends  of  all.  The  product  of  his 
mind  .is  not  therefore  all  his  own. 

The  truth  he  has  discovered,  the  facts  he  has  observed,  or  the 
forces  in  nature  which  he  has  combined  for  new  ends,  were  not 
created  by  him,  but  were  in  being  before  his  invention.  He 
found  them,  and  had  he  overlooked  them  they  might  have  been 
found  by  some  other  student.  The  right  of  discovery  is  thus 
ethically  a  limited  right  in  the  nature  of  the  case.  Unless  other 
reasons  intervene,  it  would  not  be  just  that  the  discoverer  and 
his  heirs  should  have  the  endless  monopoly  of  the  things  in- 
vented. The  pubUc  has  its  rights  in  them  from  their  original 
and  independent  being,  separate  from  the  consideration  of  who 
first  discovered  them.  In  the  case,  also,  of  such  products  as 
are  the  direct  creations  of  genius,  and  which  could  have  been 
brought  out  by  none  but  their  author,  the  principle  also  still 
applies  to  this  as  to  all  property,  that  nothing  is  so  much  a 
man's  own  that  it  must  not  be  held  by  the  state  subservient  to 
its  own  ends.  The  civilization  of  humanity  is  higher  than  any 
individual,  secular,  or  pecuniary  interest,  and  the  state  must 
have  the  right  to  determine  and  use  all  means  that  may  sub- 
serve the  ends  for  which  its  authority  is  holden. 

But  the  government  should  always  be  careful  to  recognize 
that  the  rights  of  the  state  and  the  rights  of  its  individual  citi- 
zens can  never  be  in  conflict,  and  that  the  good  of  all  requires 
a  certain  use  and  ownership  of  his  products  by  him  who  has 
produced   them.      The   author    and   the   inventor,   like   every 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      I  59 

laborer,  has  his  rights  which  the  state  requires  its  government 
to  maintain.  No  person  may  appropriate  the  products  of 
another's  thinking  and  observing  to  his  pecuniary  profit,  nor 
may  the  government  come  in  and  control  them  or  give  them 
over  to  the  public,  without  full  acknowledgement  of  the  author's 
right,  and  compensation  for  it.  While  the  state  controls  all 
property  and  possessions,  it  could  not  interfere  with  any  pos- 
session, and  alienate  it  to  the  public  use  without  a  full  equiva- 
lent, since  this  would  be  to  make  one  part  of  its  organic  body  a 
means  Avithout  being  at  the  same  time  the  end  of  all  the  rest. 

On  such  grounds  the  state  for  the  public's  sake  may  rightly 
say  just  how  far  the  author's  copy-right  or  the  inventor's  patent- 
right  shall  last,  and  then  the  pubHc  shall  own  what  once  was  his. 
Yet  is  there  a  strong  tendency  towards  too  little  discrimination, 
and  too  summary  and  arbitrar)^  action  in  all  regulations  of  copy- 
right and  patents.  The  interest  of  the  public  in  appropriating 
all  new  inventions  and  discoveries  for  its  benefit,  and  the  ready 
combination  of  the  many  against  the  few,  make  it  incumbent 
upon  the  government  to  guard  with  special  care  the  interests 
and  rights  of  the  discoverer.  Civilization  cannot  avail  itself  of 
new  truths  and  inventions  until  they  are  attained  and  brought 
out,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  government  to  strongly  encourage 
all  scientific  and  artistic  thinking.  It  will  as  effectually  retard 
social  progress  to  discourage  thought  and  invention,  as  to  give 
to  inventors  a  monopoly  of  their  products  against  the  public. 
The  laws  must  regulate  all  property,  but  they  must  be  scrupu- 
lously exact  between  private  and  public  rights,  and  while  the 
principles  are  plain  between  the  author  of  new  discoveries  and 
the  people,  the  facts  are  often  very  partially  and  with  great  diffi- 
culty subjected  to  them. 

5.  The  government  may  never  on  its  own  account  nse  any 
property  as  a  monopoly.  The  government  can  have  no  ends  of 
its  own  welfare  in  distinction  from  the  welfare  of  its  subjects. 
It  only  exists  for  the  sake  of  its  subjects,  and  can  therefore 


l60  MERE    LEGALITY. 

never  come  in  as  a  distinct  corporation,  and  for  itself  on  its  own 
account  engage  in  business,  and  make  exchanges  of  property, 
witli  other  corporations  and  individuals.  Whenever,  in  order 
to  furnish  itself  with  the  means  for  its  maintenance  and  enforce- 
ment, the  government  is  obliged  to  come  into  the  market,  and 
buy  and  sell  in  competition  with  its  own  citizens,  it  is  ever  to 
restrain  itself  by  the  principle  of  its  own  right  to  exist,  viz.  :  tlie 
owning  nothing,  and  transacting  no  business,  except  as  the  di- 
rect agent  of  the  state  in  subserving  the  organic  unity  of  its 
citizens. 

Nothing  can  be  more  odious  than  that  the  strong  arm  of  the 
government  should  be  thrusting  itself  into  the  movements  of  ex- 
change and  mercantile  business,  monopolizing  by  its  wider 
grasp  the  production  or  sale  of  merchantable  commodities,  and 
rejoicing  as  a  separate  self  in  the  gains  it  is  making  from  its  own 
citizens.  If  the  government  have  soldiers,  or  prisoners  of  war,  or 
criminals  imprisoned,  whom  it  would  employ  in  some  branches 
of  productive  labor  for  their  own  support,  this  should  always  be 
regulated  by  the  principle  so  to  employ  them  that  the  whole 
commonwealth  may  be  benefited,  and  not  that  the  government 
as  an  independent  corporation  may  be  making  money  of  its 
own  particular  subjects.  If  the  government  have  public  lands 
which  it  must  bring  into  the  market,  it  must  regulate  the  sale, 
not  by  the  profits  it  can  make  out  of  the  people  as  a  monopoly, 
but  by  such  a  disposition  of  them  as  shall  best  subserve  the 
organic  unity  of  the  people.  The  government  has  no  right  to 
do  any  thing  but  with  its  single  eye  to  this. 

Section  III.  Taxes  and  Imposts.  We  have  already  noticed 
that  the  individual  person  has  no  inalienable  right  except  that 
to  his  own  righteousness.  His  labor,  his  property,  his  liberty, 
his  life,  are  not  inalienably  his.  He  may  forfeit  them  by  his 
own  act,  or  the  state  may  require  them  for  its  own  needs,  in 
which  case  the  individual  yields  them  justly  to  the  state.  The 
state  may  demand  everything  that  belongs   to   a  man,  except 


THE   GOVERNMENT   IN   REFERENCE   TO   THE  CITIZEN.    l6l 

his  manhood  and  his  moral  integrity,  which  he  has  no  right  ever 
to  surrender. 

The  truth  of  this  is  revealed  in  the  true  theory  of  the  state. 
As  the  organic  unity  of  its  citizens,  the  state  requires  from  each 
whatever  each  can  render  towards  the  well-being  of  all.  But  in 
this  well-being  of  all  is  the  only  true  good  of  each,  and  the 
actual  requirement  which  the  state  makes  is  therefore  not  a 
burden  but  a  blessing..  All  the  enjoyment  which  a  man  can 
receive  from  his  property  comes  from  his  connection  with  so- 
ciety. Cut  off  from  all  social  relations,  a  man's  wealth  would 
be  worthless  to  him.  In  fact  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as 
wealth  without  society.  Wealth  is  what  may  be  exchanged,  and 
requires  for  its  very  existence  a  community  of  persons  with 
reciprocal  wants.  Gold  and  silver  to  any  amount  is  not  wealth 
till  it  is  put  into  the  hands  of  some  member  of  society,  and 
becomes  a  means  wherewith  he  can  serve  others,  and  receive 
some  service  from  them  in  return.  But  not  only  are  the  enjoy- 
ment and  even  the  existence  of  wealth  wholly  a  social  creation ; 
not  only  would  they  cease  entirely  if  men  were  only  individuals, 
living  each  one  alone  or  apart  from  others ;  but  in  like  manner 
all  social  progress  gives  an  increasing  value  to  wealtii,  and  a 
man's  possessions  grow  in  worth  as  he  grows  in  the  intimacy 
and  perhaps  also  in  the  intricacy  of  his  relations  to  his  kind.  It 
is  wise  and  right,  therefore,  for  society  to  exact  its  due  propor- 
tion of  these  its  products.  Such  exaction  is  taxation,  respecting 
which  the  following  principles  appear  : 

I .  Taxation  should  be  relatively  proportioned  to  the  ability  of 
those  on  whom  it  is  laid.  As  the  demands  of  the  state  are 
made  only  upon  persons,  taxation  is,  strictly  speaking,  laid  upon 
persons  and  not  upon  property  ;  but  it  is  generally  laid  upon  per- 
sons in  proportion  to  their  property,  because  their  property  may 
generally  be  supposed  to  measure  their  ability  to  render  this 
particular  service  which  the  state  requires.  This  is  not  always 
the  case,  for  we  have  capitation  or  poll-taxes  levied  irrespective 


1 62  MERE    LEGALITY. 

of  property,  or  we  have  taxes  levied  upon  a  person  in  view  of 
his  occupation  or  profession.  But  the  occupation  or  profession 
is  rated  according  to  the  ability  which  it  gives  the  person  to  pay 
the  tax,  and  the  poll-tax  —  which  is  usually  small  —  is  put  upon 
the  ground  that  every  person  has  some  ability  to  give  labor  or 
its  equivalent  products  to  the  state.  The  easiest,  simplest,  andj 
on  the  whole,  the  most  equitable  taxation  is  that  which*  is  pro- 
portioned to  the  person's  income  on  whom  it  is  laid. 

2.  Taxation  should  only  be  levied  tender  due  process  of  law. 
The  person  taxed  is  an  end  as  well  as  a  means  in  the  organic 
unity  which  embraces  him,  and  the  taxation  laid  upon  him  is  as 
much  to  be  measured  by  what  is  due  to  him  as  by  what  the 
whole  body  requires.  Such  a  measurement  is  not  easy.  It  re- 
quires the  greatest  wisdom  to  adjust  and  apportion  taxes  so  that 
each  and  all  shall  be  duly  benefited  thereby.  Human  selfish- 
ness in  a  matter  of  this  sort  is  peculiarly  liable  to  resist  the  de- 
mands of  the  organic  unity,  and  human  short-sightedness  is  just 
as  liable  to  fail  in  seeing  what  these  demands  are.  A  govern- 
ment therefore  needs  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  caution  here. 
It  should  avoid,  of  course,  in  this  as  in  all  matters,  whatever  is 
fitful  or  arbitrary,  and  its  entire  procedure  in  the  assessment 
and  collection  of  its  taxes  should  be  clear  and  open  to  every 
inspection  of  the  person  taxed.  He  should  not  be  liable  to 
any  sudden  surprises  ;  he  should  not  be  singled  out  with  any 
disproportionate  requirement ;  he  should  know  just  what  is  ex- 
pected of  him,  and  wlien,  and  why ;  and  all  this  requires  that 
the  whole  method  of  taxation  should  not  only  be  carefully 
considered  by  the  government,  but  should  proceed  upon  defi- 
nitely-stated laws.  A  person's  ability  to  pay  taxes  is  in  part 
proportioned  to  the  clearness  and  precision  with  which  the  laws 
respecting  taxation  are  stated  and  followed. 

3.  The  government  can  rightfully  have  no  interest  of  its  own 
in  taxation  contrary  to  the  ititerests  of  its  subjects.  Civil  gov- 
ernment is  not  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  its  subjects. 


THE   GOVERNMENT  IN   REFERENCE  TO   THE  CITIZEN.     163 

Its  taxation  is  not  to  benefit  itself,  but  to  give  it  the  means  of 
benefiting  them.  Taxation  to  enrich  the  government,  or  to 
aggrandize  any  one  person  or  class  at  the  expense  of  another, 
is  unrighteous  exaction  and  t}Tanny. 

Section  IV.  Representation.  The  government  may  make 
no  arbitrary  requirements ;  it  should  have  no  will  of  its  own, 
but  should  express  only  the  universal  will  of  the  state.  But  this 
universal  will  not  only  holds  in  its  mandate  every  person  be- 
longing to  the  state,  it  also  finds  itself  represented  in  every  such 
person ;  he  is  a  person  only  as  in  him  is  seen  the  light  and 
heard  the  voice  of  this  universal  will ;  he  is  a  free  person  only 
as  he  obeys  this  will,  and  he  is  a  citizen  only  as  he  is  first  a  per- 
son to  whom  this  will  assigns  his  place  w'ith  other  persons  in  the 
organic  unity  of  the  state.  The  government  is  thus  as  properly 
the  representative  of  its  subjects  as  it  is  the  representative  of  the 
state  which  is  mirrored  in  them,  and  should  therefore  readily 
yield  to  them  as  their  privilege,  what  they  also  might  properly 
claim  as  their  right  to  have  some  direction  by  their  own  suf- 
frages in  its  administration.  Suffrage  is  in  one  sense  a  privilege 
which  the  government  confers,  but  it  is  as  truly  a  right  which  a 
free  citizen  might  claim. 

Section  V.  Religion.  There  has  never  been  a  nation  with- 
out some  sort  of  religion,  nor  a  civil  government  which  religious 
influences  have  not  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  moulded.  If 
among  any  human  family  or  tribe  some  observers  have  failed  to 
detect  any  religious  faith,  this  has  only  been  among  the  wildest 
and  rudest  of  the  race,  who  are  as  destitute  of  nationality  or 
any  thing  like  an  organized  government  as  of  religion.  As  an 
historical  fact,  nations  and  governments  and  religions  have 
everywhere  a  connection,  not  only  most  intimate,  but  which 
has  thus  far  shown  itself  indissoluble. 

If  we  look  more  closely  into  this  historical  fact,  we  find  that 
the  controlling  element  in  their  connection  has  ever  been  the 
religious  one.     Nations  and  governments  have  not  formed  their 


164  MERE    LEGALITY. 

religion,  but  their  religion  has  formed  them.  It  is  only  by 
their  religion  that  they  are  ever  brought  into  the  relations  of  a 
national  life.  If  we  should  suppose  that  such  relations  could 
originate  in  men's  love  of  ease,  or  fear  of  danger,  or  instinct  of 
self-preservation,  such  a  supposition  ceases  when  we  remember 
that  these  sentiments  are  just  as  strong  among  savages  where 
there  is  no  nationahty  as  among  the  best  governed  nations. 
Neither  is  the  lust  of  conquest,  nor  the  love  of  gain,  nor  inter- 
est in  art  or  letters  or  social  refinement  ever  the  source  of  na- 
tional life,  for  all  these  pre-suppose  the  nation  already  started, 
and  are  only  found  after  its  origin  has  been  through  some  othef 
means  secured.  Common  descent  will  not  make  a  nation  of 
savages,  neither  will  any  common  interest  create  or  preserve  a 
government.  A  nation  finds  its  unifying  bond,  and  a  govern- 
ment it5  vivifying  power,  only  in  religion.  Religion  is  not  the 
flower,  nor  the  fruit,  but  it  is  the  living  seed  and  root  of  all  na- 
tional and  political  growth.  Any  prominent  changes  in  the  his- 
tory of  any  people  or  government  are  always  found,  when  closely 
scanned,  to  originate  in  prior  changes  of  religion. 

Nor  is  this  historical  fact  without  a  clearly  obvious  reason. 
The  principle  of  authority  which  governments  express  has 
neither  stability  nor  power  save  as  it  expresses  and  rests  upon 
an  ultimate  Divine  authority.  The  finite  will  can  only  find  its 
regulative  sovereignty  in  the  Absolute  Will,  and  people  are  rest- 
less, and  civil  governments  groundless,  unless  held  by  what,  in 
the  last  issue,  is  regarded  as  a  Divine  command.  God's  abso- 
lute sovereignty  is  recognized  by  the  human  reason,  and  rever- 
enced by  the  human  will,  even  where  the  understandings  and 
actions  of  men  theoretically  deny  or  practically  discard  it. 

It  is  not  only  true,  therefore,  that  civil  governments  always 
have  had,  they  also  always  must  have,  some  connection  with 
religion.  To  attempt  to  separate  these  two  would  be  as  un- 
reasonable, as  to  succeed  in  such  an  attempt  would  be  impossi- 
ble.    We  only  need  to  note  the  fact  of  this  connection,  and 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      l6$ 

then  inquire  into  the  attitude  which  pohtical  morality  requires  a 
civil  government  to  take  towards  its  religion. 

1.  Civil  government  should  use  religion  as  a  means  and  not 
as  an  end.  To  the  individual  religion  is  an  end.  He  may  not 
use  it  as  a  means  to  any  thing  farther  than  itself,  for  there  is 
nothing  farther  which  he  can  attain,  or  which  he  can  even  wish 
to  attain.  Religion  is  a  union  with  God  ;  and  when  this  is  found 
there  is  perfect  joy  and  perfect  life,  beyond  which  there  can  be 
nothing  better  to  be  sought  or  gained.  But  this  would  have  no 
significance  for  civil  government.  Civil  government  uses  relig- 
ion as  a  means  to  the  farther  end  which  the  government  itself 
is  designed  to  subserve.  The  government  is  the  mouthpiece 
of  the  state.  It  exists  solely  to  express  the  organic  unity  of  its 
subjects.  All  its  machinery,  its  laws,  its  functionaries,  as  well 
as  its  own  existence,  have  no  other  justification  or  end  than  as 
means  to  educate  and  perfect  the  citizens  of  a  state  into  the 
knowledge  and  enjoyment  of  their  organic  unity.  A  govern- 
ment makes  use  of  its  religion  for  just  this  purpose.  A  people 
wholly  irreligious  could  not  be  governed,  and  a  government 
therefore  seeks  to  extend  the  influences  of  its  religion  not  at  all 
for  the  sake  of  the  religion,  but  only  that  it  may  thereby  be 
aided  in  the  better  government  of  its  people.  Religion  itself 
is  not  an  end  of  civil  government,  but  only  a  means  whereby 
the  government  finds  itself  able  to  go  forward  and  fulfil  its 
mission. 

2.  Civil  Government  should  leave  the  largest  lilerfy  to  the 
individual  eonscienee  in  religion.  The  religion  of  no  one  of 
its  citizens  can  be  indifferent  to  the  state.  Holding  its  citizens 
as  it  does  in  tlic  unity  of  an  organism,  the  religion  which  will 
most  favor  such  a  unity  is  of  course  the  most  favorable  to  the 
state.  The  wisest  government,  therefore,  will  most  clearly  see 
and  most  confidently  rest  upon  the  religion  which  most  suc- 
cessfully actuahzcs  the  conception  of  a  brotherhood  among 
men,  and    will   desire   that   all   its   subjects  shall  be  actuated 


l66  MERE    LEGALITY. 

thereby.  But  a  wise  government  also  sees  that  no  outside 
apphance  hke  its  own  can  ever  secure  the  adoption  of  any 
religion  by  a  single  individual.  Religion  has  no  meaning  to 
the  individual,  it  becomes  to  him  something  quite  other  than 
religion,  unless  he  adopts  it  as  an  end ;  but  an  end  can  be 
adopted  by  no  person  nor  power  for  another.  It  must  be  self- 
adopted,  if  adopted  at  all ;  and  while  a  government  may  wisely 
make  provision  for  instructing  its  people  in  the  religion  which  it 
can  best  use  as  a  means,  it  will  also  wisely  leave  them  free  to 
choose  the  religion  which  commends  itself  best  to  them  as  an 
end.  Constraint  of  such  a  choice  would  be  impossible  and 
absurd,  and  a  wise  government  will  not  attempt  it. 

This  does  not  of  course  imply  that  civil  government  should 
tolerate  any  and  every  religious  practice.  Religious  practices 
may  be  as  hostile  as  any  other  to  the  organic  unity,  and  if  a 
man's  religion  leads  him  to  a  conduct  subversive  of  the  public 
good,  this  conduct  is  not  to  be  tolerated  because  we  leave  his 
conscience  free. 

Section  VI.  Education.  It  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  the 
intelligence  of  its  citizens  is  a  matter  of  prime  importance  to 
every  state.  Civil  government,  therefore,  will  have  much  to  do 
in  reference  to  the  education  of  its  subjects. 

I.  //  should  establish  and  regulate  a  general  system  of  educa- 
tion. Strictly  speaking  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  self- 
education.  No  person  ever  makes  any  improvement  in  wisdom 
or  knowledge  without  some  help  from  another.  It  marks  the 
truly  organic  connection  and  interdependence  in  human  life 
that  neither  the  birth  nor  the  growth  of  the  mind  is  any  more 
possible  than  is  that  of  the  body  through  its  own  agency  alone. 
And  this  which  is  true  of  every  individual  of  a  community  is 
just  as  true  of  the  community  as  a  whole.  No  community  ever 
educates  itself  without  outside  aid.  History  gives  us  no  in- 
stance of  an  unenlightened  people  rising  by  its  own  spon- 
taneous and  self-directed  efforts  to  an  enlightened  life.     The 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.     16/ 

efforts  are  always  first  kindled  and  then  directed  by  some  agency 
from  without.     All  upward  impulses  come  first  firom  above. 

Moreover  it  is  a  fact,  however  striking  or  strange,  that  neither 
a  person  nor  a  people  having  begun  a  course  of  education,  or 
having  carried  it  forward  to  any  degree,  can  be  safely  left  to 
continue  it  unaided.  However  we  may  explain  the  fact,  the  fact 
remains,  that  human  nature  has  always  shown  an  inherent  ten- 
dency to  throw  away  its  privileges,  and  can  never  be  trusted  to 
maintain  them. 

The  education  of  its  citizens,  therefore,  so  important  to  the 
state,  cannot  safely  be  left  to  the  citizens  themselves.  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  state  must  superintend  and  control  this.  How- 
ever advanced  in  intelligence  a  people  may  be,  their  advancing 
education  will  continually  need  governmental  supervision  and 
control.  This  governmental  supervision  is  actually  exercised 
in  the  greatest  degree  where  the  people  are  themselves  the  most 
intelligent ;  their  intelligence,  instead  of  relieving  the  government 
from  the  necessity  of  continuing  its  charge  of  their  education, 
only  making  this  necessity  all  the  more  apparent.  The  best 
educated  communities  on  the  globe  are  those  where  govern- 
mental direction  in  matters  of  education  is  most  constant  and 
careful. 

2.  TJiis  governmental  regulation  will  include  the  higher  as 
well  as  the  lower  schools.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  higher  schools 
do  not  grow  out  of  the  lower,  and  do  not  rest  upon  these  ;  but 
the  higher  school  is,  in  actual  occurrence,  first,  and  the  lower  one 
is  not  its  precursor,  but  its  product.  There  is  no  law  of  evolution 
by  which  the  common  school  grows  up  into  the  college,  for,  as 
an  historical  fact,  the  college  is  first  and  gives  birth  to  the  com- 
mon school.  It  is  not  by  the  lower  education  of  the  many  that 
we  come  to  have  the  higher  education  of  the  few,  but  the  exact 
converse  of  this  is  the  universal  rule.  The  education  of  the 
many  is  always  dependent  upon  the  education  of  the  few. 
It  is  no  unseemly  favoritism,  therefore,  when   the   govern- 


l68  MERE    LEGALITY. 

ment  levies  upon  all  an  educational  tax  for  the  support  of  schools 
which  only  a  few  can  attend. 

3.  Civil  government  should  make  adequate  provision  for  the 
religiotcs  instruction  of  its  subjects.  The  course  of  education 
anywhere  will  have  its  direction  and  character  ultimately  deter- 
mined by  the  religious  life  there  prevailing.  A  religious  quicken- 
ing always  precedes  and  gives  birth  to  the  intellectual  quickening 
of  any  people,  and  where  the  religious  impulse  grows  weak,  the 
intellectual  impulse  also  begins  to  decline.  It  is  quite  as 
important,  therefore,  for  a  government  to  attend  to  the  basis 
upon  which  all  its  educational  structure  must  rest,  as  to  attend 
to  the  building  of  the  structure  itself. 

But  there  is  a  deeper  reason.  The  virtue  of  its  subjects  is 
far  more  important  to  any  government  than  their  intelligence. 
No  amount  of  intelligence  ever  saved  any  people,  and  the 
most  costly  educational  system  may  be  pregnant  with  peril. 
A  people  may  be  very  intelligent,  and  yet  very  corrupt;  and 
wherever  this  is  found,  there  is  a  disease  which  is  surely  fatal 
unless  abated.  A  government  maintains  itself  in  permanent 
power,  not  by  the  intelligence  nor  by  the  wealth  or  the  number 
of  its  subjects,  nor  by  any  extent  of  territory  over  which  it 
rules,  but  only  by  the  virtue  which  reigns  in  its  subjects'  hearts. 
But  the  virtue  of  any  people  will  never  rise  higher  than  their 
religious  faith  requires.  Virtue  is  the  fruit  of  religion,  and 
religion  is  its  only  root.  Religious  instruction  is  therefore  nec- 
essary to  the  moral  well-being  of  any  people.  Without  it,  any 
people  is  morally  dead. 

If  it  be  said  that  other  agencies  than  those  of  civil  govern- 
ment may  be  safely  left  to  furnish  this  instruction,  the  same 
claim  might  just  as  well  be  made  in  reference  to  any  kind  of 
instruction.  But  we  have  already  noted  that  however  well  edu- 
cated a  people  may  be,  they  do  not  need  any  the  less,  but 
in  fact  do  receive  all  the  more  governmental  supervision  and 
control  in  their  educational  affairs ;  and  in  like  manner,  whatever 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      1 69 

the  number  of  religious  organizations,  or  whatever  the  degree  of 
religious  culture  any\vhere  found,  both  history  and  human  na- 
ture warrant  the  statement  that  for  a  government  to  be  indifferent 
to  the  religious  instruction  of  its  people,  is  the  first  step  to  a  cor- 
responding indifference  on  the  part  of  the  people  themselves. 

If  it  be  said,  as  it  often  is,  that  religious  instruction  must  im- 
part the  tenets  of  some  particular  faith,  and  that  when  civil  gov- 
ernment undertakes  to  do  this,  some  other  faith  of  its  subjects 
is  liable  to  be  outraged,  this  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  but  if  the  gov- 
ernment is  to  be  kept  from  religious  instruction  for  this  reason, 
it  might  be  prevented,  for  the  same  reason,  from  ever  going  to 
war,  from  all  levies  of  taxes  for  the  support  of  its  army  or  navy, 
from  all  police  regulations,  and  indeed  from  punishment  of 
every  sort ;  for  there  are  many  people,  honest  and  intelligent, 
too,  who  have  religious  scruples  against  war,  and  are  religiously 
opposed  to  all  its  agencies ;  and  there  are  many,  also,  whose 
honesty  we  need  not  question,  who  plead  their  conscientious 
objections  against  all  maintenance  of  law  and  order  by  force 
or  by  penalty.  No  wise  government  will  ever  treat  lightly  the 
religious  scruples  or  conscientious  convictions  of  any  of  its  sub- 
jects ;  neither  will  a  wise  government  yield  to  these  when  they 
set  themselves  against  any  course  which  it  has  adopted  for  the 
public  good.  To  do  so  would  be  to  abdicate  its  authority,  and 
acknowledge  that  it  had  no  right  to  be. 

A  government  may  of  course  make  mistakes  —  as  has  fre- 
quently been  done  —  respecting  the  religion  which  it  teaches. 
It  would  be  a  very  great  mistake  for  it  to  teach  any  other 
religion  than  that  which  should  best  promote  the  organic  unity 
of  its  subjects.  But  when  such  a  mistake  is  made,  its  evils  are 
to  be  rectified  precisely  like  those  of  any  other  governmental 
mistake,  not  by  denying  to  the  government  its  authority,  or 
its  right  of  judgment,  but  by  bringing  to  bear  upon  it  whatever 
light  that  may  reveal  its  error,  and  whatever  power  that  may 
change  its  course. 


I/O  MERE    LEGALITY. 

The  real  difificulty  in  this  whole  question  comes  from  con- 
founding two  things  radically  different.  With  civil  government 
religion  is  a  means,  with  the  individual  conscience  it  is  an  end ; 
when,  therefore,  these  two  come  in  conflict,  we  need  not  ask 
which  should  yield  to  the  other,  for  each  should  triumph  on  its 
own  ground.  This  distinction  clearly  apprehended,  and  the 
principle  at  its  base  followed,  would  equally  preserve  civil  gov- 
ernment from  religious  indifference  or  religious  persecution. 

Sechon  VII.  Internal  improvement.  The  question  with  us 
here  is  not  one  of  political  economy,  but  of  political  morality. 
Many  things  may  hinder  the  expediency  of  a  particular  measure 
of  internal  improvement,  when  on  its  own  ground  its  morality 
might  be  unquestionable.  Having  established  the  right  of  a 
government  to  make  internal  improvements,  the  expediency  of 
doing  it  in  any  particular  case  is  then  an  open  question  to  be 
settled  by  the  circumstances. 

1.  The  govej'nment  may  have  a  broad  field  for  legitimately 
ca?'rying  forward  a  system  of  internal  improvements.  There 
are  many  works  of  national  benefit  too  heavy  for  private  capital 
to  sustain ;  many  where  the  national  benefit  would  be  great, 
though  the  pecuniary  income  would  not  reward,  and  thus  would 
not  enlist  private  enterprise  ;  many  where  the  income  would  be 
so  remote  in  time,  that  a  generation  might  pass  away  before 
private  capital  would  be  brought  to  it ;  and  thus  an  eye  watchful 
for  the  public  good  might  find  much  for  the  government  to  do 
for  the  sake  of  its  subjects,  where  private  interest  and  enterprise 
would  find  nothing  to  invite  their  attention. 

2.  The  government  has  fiot  the  right  to  carry  out  its  internal 
improvements  in  a  course  of  partiality.  One  of  the  strongest 
objections  to  internal  improvements  on  the  part  of  the  govern- 
ment, is  the  partiality  it  encounters.  Scarcely  can  any  one 
improvement  be  of  universal  equal  benefit,  and  by  as  much  as 
it  helps  one  part  and  not  the  other,  it  is  the  dishonest  principle 
of  taxing  the  many  for  the  benefit  of  the  few.     But  this  sweep- 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN   REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.     I /I 

ing  objection  proves  far  too  much.  The  navy  and  the  army, 
the  forts  and  arsenals,  in  fine,  all  public  works  and  institutions, 
and  even  the  sessions  of  the  legislature  itself,  may  give  their 
benefits  in  quite  unequal  degrees  to  different  portions  of  the 
country.  The  objection  is  available  thus  far,  that  the  carrying 
out  of  the  system  must  not  be  in  a  way  of  favoritism,  nor  in  a 
manner  that  shall  operate  unequally  and  thus  partially.  If  one 
measure  favor  one  portion,  an  equal  benefit  should  be  secured 
to  other  portions  by  other  measures.  If  a  break-water  be  made 
in  one  place,  a  harbor  may  be  improved,  a  river  cleared,  a  ship- 
canal  dug,  etc.,  in  other  places.  The  system,  as  such,  must  be 
made  to  operate  impartially. 

3.  The  government  should  not  prosecute  internal  improve- 
ments, as  a  monopoly,  in  competition  with  any  of  its  subjects. 
Here  is  another  source  of  objections  to  all  systems  of  internal 
improvements,  that  it  at  once  introduces  a  government  monop- 
oly, and  overpowers  or  excludes  all  private  competition.  To 
this,  in  its  broad  extent,  it  may  again  be  answered  that  it  proves 
too  much.  The  same  thing  would  exclude  all  possible  mercan- 
tile business  transactions  by  the  government.  But  it  is  a  valid 
objection  to  this  extent,  that  the  government  shall  not  interpose 
its  action  to  the  hindrance  and  discouragement  of  private  enter- 
prise. We  have  already  seen  how  odious  must  be  all  govern- 
ment monopolies,  which  rejoice  themselves  against  the  prosperity 
of  the  citizen.  The  system  of  internal  improvement  must  not 
crush,  nor  supplant  and  exclude,  piivate  enterprize.  A  govern- 
ment canal  should  not  tax  a  private  railroad,  nor  a  government 
river-improvement  tax  a  private  canal,  for  the  sake  of  monopo- 
lizing the  transport. 

Section  VIII.  Commerce.  Every  state  will  have  produc- 
tions in  one  portion  that  must  be  consumed  in  another  portion, 
and  thus  necessarily  an  internal  trade  must  spring  up  and  extend 
itself  in  any  community.  So  also  every  state  will  need  to  ex- 
change its  productions  with  other  states,  or  to  buy  theirs  and 


1/2  MERE    LEGALITY. 

sell  its  own,  and  thus  foreign  commerce  must  more  or  less 
spring  up  in  all  nations.  Peculiarity  of  production,  and  extent 
of  navigable  rivers,  and  amount  of  sea-coast  or  facilities  for 
international  land  transport,  will  modify  the  nature  and  amount 
of  commerce,  but  all  states  will  be  called  to  attend  more  or  less 
to  the  operations  of  internal  trade  or  foreign  commerce. 

1 .  Tlie  authority  of  the  state  must  be  applied  to  the  regulation 
of  commerce.  The  conflicting  choices  of  interested  tradesmen 
will  interfere  with  individual  right  and  the  public  good  in  a 
thousand  ways,  if  left  to  execute  themselves  in  the  internal  bus- 
iness and  exchange  of  the  country  in  their  own  manner.  In 
many  respects,  trade  may  be  left  free  not  only  from  protective 
duties,  but  free  from  all  state  legislation,  and  the  mutual  inter- 
ests of  buyer  and  seller  will  regulate  their  commercial  negotia- 
tions. But  this  is  by  no  means  universal.  The  nature  of  the 
case,  and  especially  the  self-interest  of  the  parties,  will  present 
many  instances,  where  the  choices  will  not  reciprocate,  but 
where  collisions  will  be  engendered.  And  this  is  especially  so, 
where  tlie  mutual  interests  of  a  common  country  are  excluded 
in  foreign  commerce.  And  such  collisions  with  the  citizens  of 
foreign  states  would  at  once  provoke  reprisals,  private  violence, 
and  national  war. 

No  other  agency  can  be  brought  in  to  regulate  these  mer- 
cantile transactions,  but  the  state  sovereignty ;  and  in  all  cases 
where  public  freedom  is  concerned,  the  state  has  a  valid  right 
to  interpose  its  authority,  and  bind  the  action  and  conscience 
of  its  citizens.  What  else  might  be  wholly  indifferent,  when 
made  a  legal  commercial  enactment,  is  henceforth  a  moral  obli- 
gation upon  every  citizen. 

2 .  T7u'  question  of  revenue,  or  protection  to  certain  produc- 
tions, is  quite  distinct  f-ovi  "the  regulatiotts  of  cotntnerce.^'  A 
revenue  may  be  raised  othenvise  than  by  duties  on  importations, 
and  certain  products  can  be  encouraged  and  protected  other- 
wise than  by  taxing  the  foreign  article.     To  regulate  commerce 


THE  GOVERNMENT   IN   REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.     1 73 

is,  in  its  real  meaning,  to  so  control  it  that  the  collisions  of 
interest  therein  excited  shall  be  suppressed  and  guarded  from 
disturbing  the  common  freedom.  Revenue  and  protection  may- 
be made  collateral  with  this,  and  the  commerce  may  be  so  reg- 
ulated that  they  shall  be  incidental  to  it ;  and  cornmerce  may 
also  be  regulated  in  various  ways,  with  no  regard  to  either  rev- 
enue or  protection.  That  a  state  may  regulate  commerce  is  not 
therefore  a  ground  of  inference,  that  it  may  do  something  else 
wholly  distinct  from  it.  The  question  of  the  right  to  raise  rev- 
enue, or  protect  certain  products,  should  be  put  upon  the  right 
of  a  state,  from  the  very  existence  of  its  sovereignty,  to  do  all 
that  the  end  of  the  state  demands,  and  not  as  an  inference 
from  some  other  right. 

Section  IX.  Postal  arrangements.  The  post-office  depart- 
ment has  long  been  one  of  the  prominent  matters  of  govern- 
ment arrangement  in  civilized  nations.  It  has  doubtless  been 
deemed  to  be,  and  to  a  great  extent  doubtless  has  been,  a 
necessary  part  of  the  public  interest  for  the  government  to 
control.  It  stands,  however,  on  the  same  principle  as  all  other 
matters  which  come  under  the  state  authority.  If  private 
choices  cannot  here  be  executed  in  their  free  operation  without 
trenching  upon  the  freedom  of  the  whole,  then  should  they  be 
controlled  by  the  government ;  and  if  the  regulation  of  the  whole 
postal  system  be  necessary  to  the  efficient  operation  of  every 
part,  then  has  the  government  a  right  to  assume  the  whole,  and 
exclude  all  private  competition,  and  determine  the  way  and 
means  of  the  entire  correspondence  of  the  country,  by  its  own 
sovereign  enactment. 

SEcriON  X.  Prohibitory  laws.  Individual  choices  may  de- 
mand complete  prohibition  in  many  cases,  on  account  of  their 
contradiction  to  the  public  freedom,  and  in  all  such  cases  the 
government  has  the  right  to  enact  and  enforce  prohibitory  laws. 
The  very  end  of  state  sovereignty  is  to  guard  the  public  freedom 
against  all  particular  encroachment,  and  if  it  has  a  right  to  l>e, 


174  MERE    LEGALITY. 

and  to  do  any  thing,  its  right  to  restrain  any  thing  which  infringes 
upon  the  publi-c  freedom  is  manifest.  The  plea  of  any  man 
that  he  has  a  right  to  use  his  own  as  he  will,  is  wholly  imperti- 
nent. Nothing  is  a  man's  own  in  such  a  sense  that  he  may 
thereby  violate  the  organic  unity  in  which  he  is  bound  to  other 
men.  His  very  life  is  forfeited,  when  his  action  puts  the  state 
in  jeopardy. 

In  all  such  cases,  where  individual  passion  or  interest  induces 
some  to  disregard  the  public  rights  of  man,  and  invade  the  free- 
dom of  the  commonwealth  by  putting  in  jeopardy  the  property, 
the  morals,  the  health,  or  lives  of  others,  by  any  occupation, 
manufacture,  or  traffic,  the  state  authority  is  righteously  exerted 
in  effectually  putting  a  stop  to  the  v/hole  business.  This  may 
apply  to  houses  of  assignation  and  ill-fame,  gaming  establish- 
ments, immoral  speech  or  publications,  manufacture  and  traffic 
in  hurtful  drugs  and  ardent  spirits,  and  the  practice  of  carrying 
concealed  arms,  or  any  thing  else  by  which  the  public  peace  is 
endangered. 

I .  The  practice  of  government  licenses  in  such  cases  is  im- 
moral. License  to  some  men  and  prohibition  of  others,  in  the 
same  thing,  must  be  on  the  ground  that  a  promiscuous  engage- 
ment in  that  thing  would  be  a  public  injury,  while  a  regulated 
engagement  would  be  safe.  Such  cases  may  be,  where  particu- 
lar knowledge  and  skill  are  requisite  to  public  safety,  as  in  the 
case  of  licensed  pilots,  physicians,  etc. ;  or  where  municipal 
regulations  are  necessary  for  general  control,  as  in  the  case  of 
licensed  porters,  hackmen,  and  public  carriers.  Free  compe- 
tition may  often  regulate  all  such  matters,  but  where  the  public 
need  such  protection,  the  license  is  righteous. 

But  the  government  itself  becomes  a  party  to  the  immorality, 
in  licensing  any  to  do  that  which  at  all  times,  and  in  all  modes, 
violates  the  public  freedom.  It  deserts  its  trust  in  permitting 
the  public  peace  to  be  invaded,  and  adds  to  this  delinquency 
the  positive  vice  of  taking  wages  for  pubhc  injuries. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN   REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.     1/5 

2.  The  government  has  the  righteous  control  of  both  pat-ties. 
If  the  manufacturer  be  dangerous,  and  the  user  of  the  product 
also ;  if  the  seller  and  the  buyer  both  contribute  to  the  public 
disturbance,  they  are  both  alike  within  the  sovereign  authority 
to  be  restrained  or  prohibited.  It  is  thus  no  apology  for  the 
one  to  plead  that  he  forces  no  individual ;  he  traffics  only  with 

/the  wiUing ;  they  both  force  an  injury  upon  the  public,  and 
wound  the  freedom  of  the  state,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  restrain  the  hurtful  choices  of  them  both. 

3.  //  is  righteous  to  make  the  hurtful  products  not  only  con- 
traband but  a  forfeit.  Where  the  article  is  itself  pernicious, 
it  should  have  no  protection  from  law.  If  in  some  uses  only  it 
can  be  salutary,  and  in  all  others  pernicious,  the  government 
may  righteously  protect  it  as  property  in  the  one  use,  and  make 
it  contraband  or  forfeit  in  the  other.  It  may  often  be  the  most 
expedient  measure  to  preserve  the  pubhc  freedom  by  a  regu- 
lated destruction  of  the  pernicious  product,  and  in  all  such  ways 
of  protection  the  government  has  a  righteous  authority.  It  may 
restrain  the  business  by  pains  and  penalties  against  those  who 
engage  in  it,  or  by  officially  destroying  the  injurious  article. 

4.  Governtne7ital  interference  is  righteous  only  in  cases  of 
real  injury  to  freedom.  As  in  all  cases,  so  here,  civil  govern- 
ment may  cease  to  be  the  conservator  of  pubhc  liberty  and 
become  the  tyrant.  It  may  prohibit  the  traffic  in  that  which 
really  is  not  pernicious,  but  highly  salutary.  The  Bible  itself  is 
prohibited  in  many  Christian  countries.  There  may,  thus,  often 
be  much  tyranny  in  prohibitory  laws,  and  the  individual  duty 
of  obedience  or  disobedience  is  found  only  in  a  conscientious 
regulation  of  the  action  by  the  higher  law,  and  taking  the  con- 
sequences. 

Section  XI.  Sumptuary.,  sanitary,  and  poor  laws.  Under 
certain  stages  of  social  advancement,  it  may  be  necessary  that 
civil  government  should  regulate  private  expenses  in  food,  dress, 
equipage,  and  dwellings.     But  this   must   be    for   a  rude  and 


1/6  MERE    LEGALITY. 

ignorant  people,  whose  uncultivated  habits  and  almost  savage 
manners  demand  the  stimulant  of  stringent  laws  to  start  them 
on  the  course  of  improvement ;  or,  for  a  weak  and  effeminate 
community,  which  needs  the  hand  of  power  to  check  their 
prodigality  and  luxury.  Sumptuary  laws  can  hardly  be  de- 
manded among  an  intelligent  and  virtuous  population. 

There  may  be  much  more  occasion  for  sanitary  regulations, 
inasmuch  as  the  mass  even  of  an  ordinarily  intelligent  commu- 
nity may  be  very  liable  to  neglect  measures  necessary  for  the 
healing  of  the  sick,  and  preventing  the  spread  of  disease.  Laws 
for  cleansing,  draining,  and  ventilating  towns  and  cities,  regulat- 
ing the  licenses  of  physicians,  apothecaries,  and  surgeons,  estab- 
lishing public  hospitals  and  quarantine  regulations,  are  called 
for,  and  for  the  present,  at  least,  seem  indispensable  in  the  most 
intelligent  communities. 

The  poor  will  be  in  every  age  of  every  nation.  Misfortune, 
sickness,  and  vice  will  multiply  the  creatures  of  want  in  every 
community.  The  hand  of  private  charity  may  not  often  be  lib- 
eral enough  for  a  supply.  Public  choice  would  have  the  poor 
relieved,  but  individual  choice  may  not  effect  it ;  hence  the  inter- 
ests of  public  freedom  demand  the  interference  of  state  au- 
thority to  this  end.  It  is  thus  probable  that  state-pauper 
regulations  will  be  long  demanded  in  all  nations. 

The  highest  civilization  determines  what  should  be  the  public 
choice,  and  thus  what  public  freedom  demands,  and  this  the 
state  authority  should  strive  to  execute.  Its  sovereignty  is  legiti- 
mately applied  to  such  an  end. 

I.  The  government  should  make  timely  and  adequate  provi- 
sions for  the  poor.  That  government  has  been  unrighteously 
negligent,  which  has  not  made  provision  for  meeting  effectually 
all  cases  of  extreme  want  that  may  arise.  Sudden  calamities 
may  bring  wants  beyond  present  supplies,  but  the  general  ar- 
rangement should  be  constant  for  calling  in  supplies  for  sudden 
emergencies  and  unusual  distress. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFfiRENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      I// 

2.  TJie  government  should  leave  all  encouragement  open  to 
private  charities.  The  public  choice  would  not  hinder  but  en- 
courage the  application  of  private  alms,  and  all  voluntary  acts 
of  benevolence.  It  would  only  make  up  for  the  poor  what  is 
lacking  from  individual  benefactions.  State  laws,  in  any  way 
discouraging  private  charity,  would  be  both  immoral  and  irre- 
ligious. The  poor-rate  is  not  instead  of  charity,  but  a  supply 
for  the  deficiencies  of  charity. 

3.  The  government  should  so  legislate  for  the  poor  as  to  discour- 
age idleness  and  vice.  The  idle  should  be  made  industrious, 
and  the  vicious  externally  obedient  to  wholesome  laws,  as  the 
condition  of  receiving  help.  Distinctions  may  righteously  be 
made  in  the  amount  of  comforts  supplied  for  the  poor,  in  a 
way  that  shall  promote  virtue  and  industry  ;  and  when  the  capa- 
bility of  self-support  returns,  the  pubhc  assistance  should  be 
withdrawn.  Injudicious  poor-laws  may  often  become  the  great- 
est promoters  of  poverty  and  idleness,  and  thus  an  oppressive 
perpetuation  of  the  evils  they  should  have  relieved. 

Section  XII.  JVeights  and  measures,  currency  and  interest. 
There  is  no  natural  standard  of  weights  and  measures  which 
may  be  applied  to  universal  use.  The  pressure  from  gravity 
is  not  uniform  over  the  surface  of  the  earth,  and  there  is  no 
absolute  representative  of  extension  and  capacity.  Exchanges 
and  sale  of  products  by  weight  and  measure  are  so  convenient 
in  society,  that  some  general  standard  becomes  a  necessity,  and 
civil  government  only  can  regulate  and  establish  such  standards 
of  weights  and  measures  as  shall  become  universally  known  and 
authorized.  There  must  be  the  specific  material  instruments 
which  give  a  determined  weight  or  measure,  and  to  these  must 
all  such  as  are  of  public  use  be  brought  and  compared,  and 
then  officially  sealed  as  approved  by  the  state  authority.  The 
government  has  the  right  to  demand  of  all  its  subjects  that  they 
regulate  their  commercial  transactions  by  the  use  of  its  own 
approved  weights  and  measures. 


178  MERE    LEGALITY. 

There  is  no  more  any  standard  of  absolute  value,  than  above 
of  weights  and  measures.  The  amount  of  labor  which  any 
product  may  have  cost  cannot  be  such  a  standard,  for  labor 
itself  can  only  be  estimated  by  its  comparative  products.  The 
amount  of  business-transfer  demands  a  given  amount  of  coin- 
age-value, and  an  accumulation  of  coinage  beyond  the  business 
of  any  place  cheapens  its  value  in  that  place,  and  secures  its 
exportation  to  places  of  greater  scarcity.  The  relative  value  of 
the  precious  metals  to  other  products,  added  to  the  value 
accruing  in  the  coinage,  must  determine  the  amount  of  circu- 
lating currency  necessary  for  the  facility  of  transfers  ;  and  other 
things  being  equal,  the  scarcity  of  the  metal,  unless  to  an  ex- 
treme degree,  is  the  more  favorable,  inasmuch  as  thus  the 
greatest  values  are  transferred  with  the  least  bulk  and  weight. 
Authority  determines,  by  its  coinage,  what  precious  metals  it 
will  make  into  money  ;  and  this,  as  a  legal  tender,  is  the  ultimate 
legal  means  for  cancelling  all  indebtedness. 

The  introduction  of  a  paper  currency  is  by  promissory  notes, 
obligating  to  so  much  specie-payment,  which  notes  stand  thus 
as  the  representative  and  voucher  of  so  much  coin-money ;  and 
such  banking  privilege  must  be  regulated  by  the  authority  of 
the  state,  and  the  amount  of  bank-stock  and  bank-circulation 
be  controlled  by  its  legislation  according  to  the  commercial 
wants  of  the  community.  This  paper  circulation  may  not,  how- 
ever, be  put  as  the  substitute  for  the  current  coin,  but  only  as  a 
voucher  for  so  much  of  it  as  is  indicated  on  the  face  of  the 
note,  and  may  not,  therefore,  become  an  ultimate  standard  of 
value  and  a  legal  tender  in  liquidating  debts.  A  forced  paper 
currency,  by  legal  enactment,  substitutes  a  mere  voucher  of 
money  for  the  money  itself,  and  thus  attempts  to  force  the 
shadow  to  effect  the  same  results  as  the  substance,  thereby 
cheating  the  public  choice  by  giving  it  an  empty  name  in  the 
place  of  the  promised  thing,  and  thus  civil  government  becomes 
a  traitor  to  the  freedom  it  is  appointed  to  guard.     A  nation  too 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      IJC) 

poor  to  get  credit  except  through  immoralities  is  already  beyond 
self-redemption  and  recovery. 

The  inquiry  whether  morality  permits  the  government  to 
regulate  interest  for  money,  is  two-fold,  viz. :  Is  any  interest  for 
the  use  of  money  right?  and  if  it  is,  may  the  government  inter- 
fere and  establish  usury  laws?  The  difficulty  with  the  first 
question  is  found  mainly  in  the  determination  of  the  represen- 
tative-character of  money.  If  it  be  only  a  representative  of 
value,  and  not  at  all  possessing  any  intrinsic  value,  why  should 
it  be  itself  taxed,  or  made  to  command  a  price  for  its  use,  as  if 
its  use  had  a  real  value  ?  The  products  which  it  represents  have 
their  value,  and  they  are  rightfully  taxed  ;  but  why  should  their 
mere  representative  be  again  taxed,  when  it  is  of  no  value  in  its 
own  use  ?  It  is  paying  for  the  substance,  and  then  paying  over 
again  for  it  in  its  shadow.  All  the  products  of  a  country  are  all 
its  real  wealth,  and  all  the  money  of  the  country  is  only  a  rep- 
resentative of  the  real  value,  and  yet  we  are  doubling  the  profit 
by  striving  to  use  the  property  of  the  country  twice  over,  —  once 
in  the  products  and  then  again  in  the  money  which  only  repre- 
sents these  products. 

But  this  perplexity,  originating  in  a  false  principle,  is  removed 
by  removing  the  fallacy  which  occasions  it.  It  is  not  true  that 
money  is  a  mere  representative  and  has  no  intrinsic  value.  It 
has  in  itself  intrinsic  useful  properties  as  money,  and  is  thus  an 
addition  to  the  wealth  of  a  country  in  all  its  other  valuable 
products.  We  take  first  such  products  as  are  the  necessaries  of 
life,  the  materials  for  the  food,  clothing,  and  shelter  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, and  their  intrinsic  value  is  in  their  direct  subserviency  to 
the  necessities  of  mankind.  But  even  such  essential  products 
cannot  subserve  man's  necessities,  except  in  their  distribution. 
The  grain  in  one  portion  of  a  country  cannot  feed  those  in 
other  portions,  except  as  distributed  to  them.  The  means  of 
conveyance  are  as  necessary  as  the  food  to  be  conveyed.  The 
ships  and  canals  and  railroads  and  freight- trains  cannot  be  eaten, 


l80  MERE    LEGALITY. 

and  yet  the  food  cannot  any  more  be  eaten  without  them. 
And  thus  with  all  the  implements  and  utensils  for  raising  grain, 
and  all  the  mills  and  machinery  for  preparing  the  grain  to  be 
eaten,  they  become  as  necessary  as  the  grain,  and  in  this  con- 
nection have  as  truly  an  intrinsic  value.  They  are  all  products 
which  have  a  valuable  property,  and  all  go  to  make  the  wealth 
of  a  nation.  The  accumulation  of  such  products,  beyond  the 
demand  made  for  them  in  the  grain  to  be  raised  and  distribu- 
ted, would  be  valueless ;  and  in  this  sense  they  are  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  grain  of  a  country ;  but  up  to  the  demand  the 
grain  makes  for  them,  in  its  being  grown,  distributed,  and  manu- 
factured, they  are  not  mere  representatives,  but  necessary  prod- 
ucts of  intrinsic  value  for  mankind,  and  enter  dirjctly  into  the 
capital  of  the  country. 

Even  so  with  the  money  of  a  nation.  Attempt  to  bring  to- 
gether all  these  means  for  raising  and  distributing  grain,  without 
so  much  money  as  shall  give  facility  to  the  transfer,  and  the 
intrinsic  value  of  money  will  be  made  apparent.  If  all  ex- 
changes in  building  ships,  canals,  railroads,  etc.,  must  be  made 
through  the  repeated  bartering  of  one  heavy  product  for  another, 
the  means  for  an  extensive  distribution  of  grain,  and  so  also  of 
any  other  necessary  of  Hfe,  would  be  wholly  unattainable.  The 
money  which  facilitates  such  distribution  is  itself  as  real  prop- 
erty as  the  farming  implements  or  the  wagons  and  freight-trains 
by  which  the  grain  is  transported  to  the  consumer.  It  is  as 
morally  right  that  it  should  be  taxed,  or  that  it  should  receive  an 
interest  for  its  use,  as  any  other  product  of  value. 

The  answer  to  the  second  inquiry  is  direct  from  the  very  end 
of  the  government.  If  the  practice  of  loaning  money  is  regu- 
lated as  naturally  in  the  commercial  operations  of  society,  as 
that  of  building,  using  and  selling  ships,  railroad  cars,  etc.,  then 
there  will  be  no  need  of  usury  laws  forbidding  more  than  cer- 
tain rates  of  interest.  But  if  the  possession  of  money  give  the 
opportunity  for  taking  an  advantage  of  the  necessities  of  a  busi- 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.       l?[ 

ness  man,  and  thus  capital  be  found  to  oppress  labor,  as  prob- 
ably in  its  unhindered  action  it  often  will,  then  is  it  the  right  and 
the  duty  of  the  government  to  interpose  its  authority  and  its 
penalties  for  the  defence  of  the  oppressed  laborer.  The  govern- 
ment is  bound,  however,  to  so  apply  its  usury  laws,  and  all  legis- 
lation for  defence  against  extortion,  as  not  to  aggravate  the  evil 
it  would  cure,  by  making  loans  more  difficult  and  more  burden- 
some in  the  end  to  be  effected  by  the  laborer.  A  law  may  often 
aggravate  the  very  grievance  it  proposes  to  cure. 

Section  XIII.  Revolution.  The  state  is  distinct  from  its  gov- 
ernment. The  forms  of  government  may  change  ;  dynasties  rise 
and  pass  away ;  official  administrators  be  forcibly  displaced  for 
others ;  but  the  one  organic  state  continues  through  all  these 
changes.  Revolutions,  thus,  take  place  in  government,  not  in 
the  state.  A  state  may  be  subjugated,  annexed,  annihilated, 
but  not  revolutionized.  When  we  speak  of  a  revolution,  we  are 
to  understand  a  sudden  and  violent  change  in  the  point  of  sov- 
ereign authority.  Reforms  may  change,  more  or  less  suddenly, 
important  portions  of  the  government  and  its  administrative 
functions,  but  it  is  not  a  revolution  except  as  the  entire  place  of 
sovereign  authority  turns  over, 

I .  Revolutio7is  are  justifiable  when  the  public  freedom  de- 
mands them.  Reforms  may  be  demanded  in  the  same  govern- 
ment, from  the  changes  in  the  people  and  their  circumstances, 
in  order  that  the  public  choice  may  be  more  fully  executed ;  and 
in  all  such  cases  the  reform  is  righteous,  and  thus  a  true  and  not 
a  misnamed  reform.  But  changes  may  also  become  so  great  in 
a  people  or  their  circumstances,  that  no  possible  reform  in  the 
government  can  reach  the  demand  of  public  freedom  ;  but  there 
must  be  a  complete  revolution  of  the  sovereignty  in  the  govern- 
ment itself.  When  this  is,  truly  demanded  by  the  end  of  all 
government,  then  for  liberty's  sake  a  revolution  is  as  righteous 
as  in  the  above  case  was  the  reform.  That  government  which 
cannot  subserve  the  ends  of  public  freedom  to  the  greatest 


1 82  MERE    LEGALITY. 

practicable  degree  ethically  should  give  way  to  one  that  can  ; 
and  if  it  selfishly  resists,  it  should  be  put  out  by  force. 

But  in  the  estimation  of  the  public  freedom,  the  evil  to  it  in 
the  violence  of  the  revolution  itself  must  be  included,  as  truly  as 
that  which  accrues  from  the  present  perversion  and  oppression 
of  sovereignty.  If  the  evil  to  freedom  is  greater  from  the  vio- 
lence necessary  to  change  the  sovereignty,  than  that  in  its  pres- 
ent perversion,  the  time  has  not  yet  come  for  revolution.  There 
is  oppression  which  lies  as  an  immorality  at  the  door  of  the  gov- 
ernment, but  this  cannot  justify  a  greater  oppression  from  any 
one  in  correcting  or  expelling  it. 

2.  //  is  the  state  only  which  has  the  right  to  revolutionize. 
The  only  real  authority  for  political  government  is  the  state. 
Sovereignty  is  righteously  of  the  state,  and  if  it  has  become 
Avi-ongly  placed,  the  state  only  has  the  right  to  determine  when 
and  how  to  turn  it  over,  and  to  what  point.  A  Brutus  may  be 
as  truly  a  tyrant  as  a  Caesar,  if  he  be  not  executing  the  mani- 
fested choice  of  the  state.  It  is  not  any  individual,  nor  any 
combination  of  individuals,  who  can  righteously  revolutionize 
their  government ;  if  the  nation  does  not  go  with  them,  they  are 
rebels  in  their  attempts  at  subversion. 

A  portion  of  a  state,  a  colony,  may  be  oppressed  by  the  other 
portion,  or  the  parent  country,  and  seek  to  revolutionize  in  its 
own  independence ;  and  the  same  ethical  principles  apply. 
That  portion,  which  is  to  become  a  state  by  revolution,  has  in  it 
the  right  of  independent  sovereignty  morally,  if  its  cause  be 
just ;  and  it,  not  any  individual  or  combination  of  persons,  has 
the  right  to  revolutionize. 

3.  Individuals,  or  combinations  of  persons,  begin  the  work 
of  7-evolutionary  agitation  at  their  peril.  The  state  only  has 
the  right  to  revolutionize,  but  the  state  in  its  whole  social  com- 
munity cannot  be  expected  at  once  to  arouse  itself,  and  in  the 
primary  assemblies  of  the  people  assert  its  grievances,  arrange 
its  manner  of  action  against  the  tyranny,  and  go  forth  orderly 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  CITIZEN.      1 83 

and  unitedly  to  put  out  the  pen^erse  sovereign  and  put  in  its 
owTi.  This  would  be  the  righteous  method  of  revolution  were 
it  practicable. 

But  some  watchful  patriots  see  and  feel  the  oppression  sooner 
than  others.  They  arouse  others  to  sympathize  with  them  ;  the 
agitation  commences,  —  within  the  forms  of  law  very  probably, — • 
and  then  passes  on  to  the  more  direct  attacks  upon  the  govern- 
ment. The  only  righteous  course  for  the  true  patriot,  who  aims 
to  revolutionize  his  government,  is  thus  to  call  out  the  state  to 
the  expression  and  execution  of  its  own  sovereign  authority.  It 
is  not  for  him  nor  his  associates  to  assume  the  sovereignty,  to 
dethrone  that  which  is,  and  put  up  another ;  it  is  only  to  awake 
the  state  to  do  it.  And  in  attempting  this  work,  they  should  all 
know  distinctly  the  position  they  assume.  To  them,  the  cause 
may  be  good ;  the  call  may  be  the  real  cry  of  the  public  free- 
dom ;  but  if  the  state  does  not  awake,  and  act,  and  take  this 
work  into  her  o\mi  hands,  then  verily  they  may  not  usurp  it. 
And  they  attempt  to  so  arouse  the  state  at  their  own  peril. 
They  assume  the  responsibility  of  the  first  step ;  and  if  the  state 
awake  and  throw  off  her  oppressors,  she  will  probably  hail  them 
as  the  saviours  of  her  liberty ;  or  if  she  does  not  put  forth  her 
sovereignty  and  make  the  political  revolution,  she  will  probably 
act  through  her  already  existing  government,  and  hang  them  on 
the  gibbet.  Another  alternative  may  still  be,  that  what  was 
taken  as  the  state  does  awake  and  struggle  manfully  against  the 
powers  that  be,  but  that  the  existing  sovereignty  is  found  too 
strong  and  crushes  all  before  it,  and  both  the  assumed  state  and 
her  heroes  go  down  together.  Thus  it  is  that  in  revolutions  the 
successful  agitator  is  the  saviour  of  his  country,  and  the  success- 
less one,  a  rebel.  He  takes  the  responsibility  of  the  issue,  and 
posterity,  the  tribunal  of  ultimate  ethical  equity,  will  determine 
whether  he  conquered  or  died  as  a, patriot. 

4.    Those  that  resist  a  revolution  take  their  position  also  at 
their  peril.     It  may  prove  that  the  sovereign  whom  they  upheld 


1 84  MERE    LEGALITY. 

will  be  cloven  down  by  the  state,  and  all  his  defenders  with  him. 
They  may  act  sincerely  in  sustaining  the  attacked  government, 
but  they  may  be  made  to  die  with  it.  Thus  in  times  of  revolu- 
tion all  is  peril,  and  all  heads  sit  loosely  on  their  shoulders.  The 
foundations  of  civil  law  and  order  are  shaken,  and  we  are  made 
to  feel  how  fearful  is  a  time  of  anarchy. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

THE    POSITION    OF   A   STATE   IN    REFERENCE   TO   OTHERS. 

The  boundaries  of  nations  are  fixed  by  many  contingent 
circumstances.  Distinctions  of  race,  colonial  origin,  conquest, 
or  arbitrary  conventional  regulation,  may  have  determined  the 
people  and  the  extent  of  country  which  shall  be  embraced  by 
one  state,  and  thus  the  lines  of  its  political  jurisdiction.  Many 
state  sovereignties  are  in  this  way  cotemporary  and  some  con- 
terminous with  each  other.  It  is  a  natural  consequence  that 
nations  must  have  more  or  less  intercourse,  and  it  is  important 
to  apprehend  the  principles  in  moral  science  which  must  con- 
trol all  international  connection  and  communion. 

I .  The  sovereignty  of  each  state  is  independent.  The  progi^ess 
of  events  in  the  ongoing  of  history,  and  not  the  application  of 
ethical  principles,  determines  the  distinct  identity  of  nations. 
We  have,  thus,  no  occasion  for  applying  moral  science  to  the 
origin  of  nations  and  the  determination  of  particular  sovereign- 
ties, but  only  to  such  sovereignties  as  already  exist  together. 

But  where  we  find  an  existing  state,  occupying  a  given  terri- 
tory, and  inclusive  of  a  specific  population,  and  thereby  sepa- 
rating itself  from  all  other  communities  in  the  responsibility  of 
guarding  its  own  rights  and  conserving   its  own  freedom,  it 


THE    STATE    IN    REFERENCE    TO    OTHERS.  l8$ 

should  possess  complete  and  independent  sovereignty.  Its 
progress  in  civilization  is  to  be  directed  by  its  own  choice,  and 
its  constraint  of  individual  choices  is  to  be  determined  by  this 
public  choice  ;  and  thus  in  the  preservation  of  its  own  freedom, 
it  must  exclude  all  interference  and  discard  all  higher  political 
authority  than  its  o^vn.  It  is  not  a  question  of  numbers,  but  of 
independent  jurisdiction  ;  and  thus  complete  sovereignty  knows 
no  great  or  small  but  only  independent  state  existence,  and 
then  its  authority  is  as  legitimate  and  supreme  in  a  state  of 
small  as  of  large  population.  Sovereignty  is  a  unit  and  com- 
plete in  itself,  and  any  extension  or  diminution  of  its  area  does 
not  alter  its  nature.  Its  power  to  execute  may  be  in  different 
degrees,  but  its'right  is  absolute  in  its  own  jurisdiction  and  not 
a  thing  of  degrees.  Any  interference  from  another  state  in  its 
own  prerogatives  must  be  resented  as  the  highest  insult,  and 
resisted  to  the  last  extremity. 

One  nation  may  be  partially  conquered  by  another,  and  made 
tributary  to  it,  but  so  far  as  this  is  the  case,  it  ceases  to  be  a 
state  ;  its  liberty  is  cloven  down  ;  its  sovereignty  has  departed ; 
and  its  citizens  must  look  to  the  state  sovereignty  which  has 
subjugated  it  for  the  protection  of  the  public  freedom.  The 
sovereignties  have  become  adjunct,  or  rather  the  one  has  been 
absorbed  in  the  other.  So  long  as  the  particular  community 
has  its  standing  as  a  state  among  other  nations,  its  sovereignty 
is  independent  and  absolute. 

States  may  exist  as  separate  from  each  other  in  a  Republic, 
but  they  are  no  longer  sovereign  states  amid  the  nations ;  the 
true  state,  as  such  in  its  national  indentity,  is  in  the  one  repub- 
lican sovereignty. 

2.  International  regulations  7nust  thus  7'est  upon  the  basis  of 
pure  morality.  It  may  be  an  ethical  claim,  in  the  right  of  uni- 
versal freedom,  that  nations  shall  be  restrained  in  their  inter- 
course with  each  other  by  some  well-understood  and  mutually- 
admitted  regulations.     National  consent,  by  long  precedent  and 


1 86  MERE    LEGALITY. 

practice,  has  given  validity  to  many  such  regulations,  and  which, 
as  combined  in  written  treatises,  are  known  as  the  Law  of 
Nations. 

But  no  political  authority  exists  which  can  throw  its  restraint 
over  independent  sovereignties.  This  code  of  national  law 
emanates  from  no  sovereign  legislative,  and  can  be  adminis- 
tered by  no  political  executive,  and  is  thus  no  law  as  based 
upon  positive  authority.  It  stands  only  as  an  appeal  to  the 
public  conscience  of  mankind  ;  that  which  is  ethically  due  from 
one  nation  to  another  in  national  community;  and  holds  thus  all 
to  the  claims  of  each  in  the  right  of  pure  morality.  The  precept 
can  only  appeal  to  that  which  is  the  highest  worthiness  of  a 
nation,  —  in  the  best  sense,  to  the  national  honour ;  and  while 
its  end  is  the  conservation  of  the  liberties  of  nations,  as  national 
law  is  for  the  conservation  of  public  liberty  in  a  state,  yet  can  it 
bring  in  no  sanction  of  pains  and  penalties  ;  no  judicial  tribunal 
nor  executive  administration ;  nothing  which  can  be  termed 
positive  authority,  that  holds  to  obedience  simply  because  it  is 
enacted.  The  only  origin,  and  the  only  sanction,  is  the  public 
conscience.  There  will  come  the  self- degradation  of  the  state 
which  violates  it ;  and  the  public  abhorrence,  moral  contempt, 
and  indignant  condemnation,  of  all  people  towards  it ;  but  if 
there  be  not  a  violation  of  sovereignty,  and  an  invasion  of  the 
liberty  of  independent  states,  there  is  no  way  for  the  other  na- 
tions to  inflict  positive  punishment  for  it.  Jehovah  only  is  the 
sovereign  arbiter  of  nations,  and  to  him  vengeance  belongeth ; 
other  nations  may  conscientiously  condemn  and  abhor,  but  they 
have  no  jurisdiction  authoritatively  to  arraign,  convict,  and  punish. 

With  this  end  of  universal  freedom  in  view,  and  the  appeal 
only  to  the  public  conscience  of  mankind  to  attain  it,  we  may 
apply  the  principle  in  various  ways,  and  determine  what  is  the 
righteous  position  of  one  nation  to  another  in  many  particulars. 
As  in  the  last  Chapter,  so  here,  we  will  put  the  particulars  under 
different  sections,  and  give  some  of  the  more  important  as  ex- 
amples for  all. 


THE    STATE    IN    REFERENCE    TO    OTHERS.  1 8/ 

Section  I.  Co?nity  of  Nations.  States  stand  to  each  other 
in  many  ways  as  persons,  and  thus  reciprocal  respect  and  cour- 
teous treatment  should  be  manifested  among  nations.  The 
methods  of  manifesting  this  national  civility  are  various,  but 
long  habit  and  precedent  have  settled  many  customs  which  are 
now  demanded  in  the  intercourse  of  states  by  the  comity  of 
nations,  and  a  disregard  of  such  customs  would  be  derogatory 
to  the  civilization  of  the  state  which  carelessly  permitted  it,  or 
a  mark  of  disrespect  and  an  insult  to  the  nation  to  whom  it 
should  designedly  be  exhibited. 

Some  of  the  methods  of  manifesting  such  national  respect 
and  courtesy  are  the  customary  salutations  of  the  national  flag ; 
the  honor  given  to  all  accredited  ministers,  embassadors,  and 
plenipotentiaries,  in  their  persons  and  the  communications  they 
may  make ;  the  usual  forms  of  diplomatic  intercourse  and  eti- 
quette of  courts ;  and  in  the  admission  of  the  citizens  of  other 
countries  to  travel  or  reside  among  them  on  equal  conditions. 
Special  marks  of  honor  may  also  be  given  by  special  national 
salutes,  the  participation  in  the  signals  given  of  national  rejoicing 
or  mourning,  and  in  public  attention  and  honors  paid  to  the 
officers  or  statesmen  who  may  be  present  from  another  nation. 

Such  acts  of  courtesy  and  comity  are  demanded  by  morality 
among  friendly  nations,  not  only  as  they  conciliate  mutual  good 
will  and  strengthen  the  bonds  of  peace,  but  from  the  same  rea- 
son that  respect  is  due  from  one  person  to  another.  Nations 
are  composed  of  persons,  and  a  state  itself  in  its  sovereignty 
may  be  said  to  have  a  personal  character,  and  the  intrinsic 
dignity  and  excellency  of  moral  personality  ethically  demands 
tokens  of  respect  and  appropriate  regard  from  all  other  persons. 
It  is  as  truly  a  disgrace  and  degradation  to  a  state  to  disregard 
these  claims  to  national  respect  and  honor,  as  it  would  be  to  an 
individual  to  treat  his  fellows  insolently  and  contemptuously. 
The  common  sense  of  the  world  would  mark  such  disrespect 
with  disapprobation,  and  the  nation  offending  against  the  claims 


I  88  MERE    LEGALITY. 

of  general  comity  would  lose  much  in  its  character  and  influ- 
ence among  all  civilized  people. 

Section  II.  Treaties.  Various  reasons  in  the  intercourse 
of  nations  demand  specific  treaties,  which  are  of  the  nature  of 
national  contracts  between  one  state  and  another.  If  the  claims 
of  political  ethics  be  apprehended  in  the  light  of  the  organic 
connection  which  binds  all  members  of  the  human  family  to- 
gether, and  which  as  truly  determines  the  relations  of  states  as 
of  individuals,  the  general  principles  which  should  regulate  all 
treaties  between  states  would  be  easily  found  and  applied, 
though  doubtless  strongly  condemning  the  frequent  license 
taJien  in  national  negotiations.  Selfishness  and  all  dishonesty 
between  nations  is  as  truly  an  immorality  and  as  highly  deroga- 
tory to  the  moral  character  of  the  offending  party,  as  the  like 
iniquity  between  individuals.  The  Rule  of  right  is  as  strict  and 
peremptory  in  its  imperatives  upon  states  as  upon  persons. 
These  treaties  may  refer  to  commercial  interests,  boundary 
questions,  fisheries,  colonial  intercourse,  articles  of  peace,  and 
indeed  in  reference  to  any  mutual  interests  between  different 
states. 

1.  Each  state  is  sovereign,  and  has  equal  rights  as  party  in 
the  treaty.  The  stronger  nation  has  no  ethical  prerogative  over 
the  weaker,  but  must  come  into  the  negotiation  as  an  equal, 
fuUy  admitting  all  the  rights  of  sovereignty  in  the  entire  transac- 
tion. If  one  state  has  been  beaten  in  war,  weakened  and  crip- 
pled by  the  army  and  navy  of  the  other,  so  long  as  there  is  not 
complete  subjugation  and  thus  the  merging  of  one  sovereignty 
in  the  other,  there  is  no  right  in  the  victorious  nation  to  take 
advantage  of  the  weakness  of' its  adversary,  and  impose  hard 
and  oppressive  conditions  of  future  peace  and  amity.  Power 
no  more  gives  right  in  a  nation  than  in  an  individual,  and  the 
dishonesty  is  the  more  dastardly  which  takes  advantage  of 
weakness  to  wrong  and  oppress. 

2.  No    treaty   stipulations    may   involve    any    immoralities 


THE    STATE    IN    REFERENCE    TO    OTHERS.  1 89 

Whatever  is  against  pure  niorality  or  the  higher  law  of  rehgion 
is  preckided  ethically  from  all  treaty  stipulations.  No  matter 
how  apparently  advantageous  or  expedient  to  one  or  to  both 
of  the  parties,  the  claims  of  morality  or  of  a  higher  authority 
cannot  righteously  be  violated  by  either  party.  The  treaty  is 
ethically  a  nullity  so  far  as  it  includes  unrighteousness. 

3.  Each  party  must  have  the  right  to  withdraw  from  a  treaty 
of  indefinite  time,  by  giving  suitable  notice  to  the  other.  Na- 
tional sovereignties  are  permanent,  and  in  process  of  time  the 
treaty  which  has  been  mutually  beneficial  may  become  onerous 
and  unjust  to  one  party.  Equity  demanded  that  at  first  one 
nation  should  not  wrong  or  oppress  the  other,  and  the  same 
imperative  is  constant.  If  the  circumstances,  therefore,  have  so 
changed  that  the  perpetuation  of  the  treaty  stipulation  is  in- 
jurious, that  party  has  the  right  to  withdraw  from  it  without 
censure.  This  should  not  be  done  suddenly  and  arbitrarily, 
but  comity  demands  that  it  should  be  officially  asked  by  the 
one,  and  equity  demands  that  it  should  be  granted  by  the  other. 

If  a  time  is  stipulated  for  the  treaty  to  run,  such  advantage 
cannot  be  taken ;  for  the  fixing  of  the  time  manifests  that  both 
parties  agreed  to  run  the  hazard  of  all  changes  until  its  expi- 
ration, and  thus  have  given  up  the  claim  which  the  changes  of 
circumstances  would  else  have  made  equitable.  If,  however, 
this  lead  to  great  oppression  and  injury,  the  benefited  party 
should  not  take  the  advantage. 

4.  .A  treaty  has  all  the  force  of  a  law.  The  treaty  is  a  stipu- 
lation and  agreement  between  t\vo  or  more  independent  nations, 
and  is,  therefore,  binding  in  national  honor  and  morality  upon 
all  the  parties.  Each  nation,  thus,  is  bound  to  see  that  all  its 
subjects  respect  and  fulfil  the  express  terms  of  the  treaty,  and 
without  any  further  legislation,  the  ratification  and  promulgation 
of  the  treaty  becomes  the  law  of  the  land  in  each  nation  in- 
cluded by  it.  It  has  been  fur  the  freedom  of  each  that  llie 
treaty  has  been  made  and  ratified,  and  the  citizens  of  each  are 


I  go  MERE    LEGALITY. 

as  much  bound  by  it,  as  by  any  positive  legislation  of  their  re- 
spective governments.  There  is  even  added  to  the  authority 
upon  its  own  citizens,  the  claims  of  honor  and  good  faith 
towards  the  other  national  party  in  the  treaty,  and  hence  a 
treaty  may  be  termed  the  highest  law  of  the  land. 

Section  III.  Alliance.  There  may  be  occasion  for  two  or 
more  states  to  combine  in  the  prosecution  of  a  national  object, 
and  thus  each  attain  by  the  co-operation  of  all  what  would  else 
be  unattainable  by  either.  Thus  there  may  be  alliances  in  pros- 
ecuting discoveries ;  in  carrying  on  any  hazardous  enterprise ; 
in  resistance  to  a  common  enemy ;  and  which  may  sometimes 
lead  to  a  mutual  agreement,  that  the  enemies  or  the  friends  of 
each  shall  be  so  considered  and  treated  by  both,  and  hence  made 
an  alliance  both  offensive  and  defensive.  The  contract  ratify- 
ing the  alliance  may  sometimes  be  called  a  treaty,  but  we  have 
above  confined  the  application  of  treaties  to  such  contracts  only 
as  include  no  combination  of  powers.  The  treaty  of  alliance 
is  rather  a  league,  and  includes  the  idea  of  mutual  assistance. 
This  may  sometimes  be  very  extensive  and  almost  universal 
among  civilized  nations,  as  in  the  suppression  of  piracy  or  the 
slave-trade. 

The  same  principles  apply  here  as  in  the  case  of  all  treaties 
or  contracts. 

Section  IV.  Confederation.  This  applies  more  especially  to 
the  league  which  may  be  formed  by  several  smaller  states,  for 
mutual  convenience  and  safety.  Internal  jealousies  and  diffi- 
culties in  separate  administrations,  or  external  dangers,  may  in- 
duce a  number  of  neighboring  smaller  states  to  band  together 
for  their  common  advantage.  The  representatives  of  each 
state,  meeting  in  a  council  or  congress,  deliberate  and  decide 
on  matters  of  common  interest,  and  their  acts  have  all  the 
weight  which  the  wisdom  of  the  congress,  and  the  moral  influ- 
ence of  the  combined  public  sentiment  that  they  represent  may 
give  to  them,  within  the  sphere  contemplated  in  the  articles  of 
confederation. 


THE    STATE   IN    REFERENCE    TO    OTHERS.  IQI 

1.  Such  a  cojjgjrss  can  exercise  none  of  the  prerogatives  of 
sovereignty.  Each  state  still  maintains  its  own  independent 
sovereignty,  and  is  responsible  for  the  public  freedom  of  its  own 
citizens  ;  and  the  congress  of  delegates  representing  them  has 
nothing  of  sovereign  authority  over  all  or  either.  They  cannot 
properly  legislate,  and  their  acts  are  only  advisory  and  recom- 
mendatory measures,  depending  for  their  general  observance 
upon  the  interest  which  all  feel  in  the  confederation,  and  the 
weight  of  moral  character  which  it  embodies.  They  can  neither 
levy  taxes  nor  execute  any  laws,  but  all  acts  of  sovereignty  are 
confined  to  each  state  within  its  own  jurisdiction  ;  and  any  one 
may  at  pleasure  withdraw  from  the  confederation,  or  refuse  to 
carry  out  the  resolves  of  the  congress,  and  there  is  no  authority 
to  call  to  an  account  or  to  compel  co-operation. 

2.  An  army  and  navy  for  the  com}non  defence  may  be  en- 
trusted to  it.  The  congress  has  no  sovereign  authority  to  raise 
an  army  and  support  it,  but  it  may  apportion  the  proper 
amount  of  men  and  military  supplies  to  each  state  ;  and  when 
the  states  have  made  their  particular  levies,  they  may  commit 
the  whole  to  the  more  effective  management  and  use  of  the 
congress.  According  to  the  articles  of  agreement,  the  congress 
may  appoint  general  officers,  direct  the  campaign,  and  call  their 
o\vn  officers  to  account ;  and  any  thing  may  be  committed  to  it 
not  inconsistent  with  the  preservation  of  sovereignty  in  each 
state. 

3.  If  articles  of  war  or  peace  are  concluded  by  the  confedera- 
tion, there  must  be  the  sovereign  assent  of  each  state.  The  con- 
gress may  be  the  agent  of  the  confederated  states  in  appointing 
plenipotentiaries  for  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  treaties,  but 
the  full  power  of  these  ambassadors  is  derived  from  the  common 
consent  of  the  state  sovereignties,  and  the  treaties  formed  are 
ratified  by  their  authority,  and  not  that  this  congress  has  any 
sovereign  jurisdiction,  or  is  other  than  an  accredited  agent  of 
each  of  these  distinct  sovereignties. 


192  MERE    LEGALITY. 

The  congress  may,  perhaps,  in  cases  of  urgent  interest,  some- 
times exceed  the  articles  of  agreement  and  presume  a  tacit 
consent  of  the  states ;  but  it  is  on  the  same  ground  that  under 
special  exigencies  any  agent  may  transcend  his  instructions, 
subject  to  the  subsequent  approval  or  rejection  of  the  principal. 
They  should  in  all  critical  cases  consult  the  supposed  intentions 
of  the  states,  but  no  case  of  their  unauthorized  responsibility 
can  bind  the  states. 

Section  V.  Republic.  A  number  of  distinct  independent 
states  may,  for  their  common  benefit,  go  much  further  than  in 
forming  an  alliance  or  a  confederation,  even  to  the  bringing  of 
themselves  into  one  nation  so  far  as  all  international  intercourse 
is  concerned,  and  giving  to  this  national  government  all  the 
powers  of  their  individual  sovereignty  under  a  constitution,  and 
this  constitution  thus  forms  them  all  into  one  Republic,  which 
has  as  complete  and  undivided  sovereignty  in  its  sphere  as  that 
of  any  single  sovereignty  among  the  nations.  The  republic  be- 
comes the  sovereign  nation,  and  acts  legitimately  as  a  sovereign 
among  nations  ;  and  within  the  constitution  has  no  more  respon- 
sibility to  its  own  states  than  to  any  foreign  state.  What  is  not 
given  for  national  purposes  may  not  be  assumed,  but  lies  still  in 
the  authority  of  the  several  states  for  the  adjustment  and  man- 
agement of  their  own  internal  concerns,  but  what  has  been 
given  into  the  hands  of  the  general  government  for  the  conser- 
vation of  public  freedom,  that  it  uses  and  applies  in  an  uncon- 
trolled and  independent  sovereignty.  The  entire  states  stand 
in  one  republic,  and  that  becomes  a  single  and  independent 
nation,  and  has  henceforth  its  own  right  to  be  and  to  act  accord- 
ing to  the  terms  of  its  constitution. 

I.  States  have  the  right  to  form  such  a  republic.  The  free- 
dom of  the  citizens  of  each  state  may  be  seen  to  be  thus  best 
sustained,  and  thus  each  state  is  fulfilling  its  o\vn  duty  to  its  citi- 
zens in  providing  for  the  public  freedom,  by  the  institution  of  a 
sovereignty  which  will  more  completely  effect  this  than  it  could 


THE    STATE    IN    REFERENCE    TO    OTHERS.  1 93 

in  the  exercise  of  its  own  single  authority.  Its  citizens  have  the 
right  to  the  highest  practicable  measures  of  public  freedom,  and 
it  would  itself  be  defeating  the  end  of  its  own  being,  if  it  held 
on  to  its  own  state  sovereignty  when  that  end  could  be  best  at- 
tained in  the  sovereignty  of  a  constitutional  republic.  A  repub- 
lic thus  stands  upon  a  sound  ethical  basis,  when  the  public 
freedom  of  each  state  is  better  conserved  by  its  own  defined 
sovereignty,  than  it  would  be  if  those  sovereign  powers  were  still 
left  in  the  states. 

2.  A  power  of  sovereignty  lies  in  the  Republic  to  enforce  its 
cofistitutional  authority  agaiyist  either  or  all  of  the  states. 
The  republic  does  not,  like  a  confederation,  stand  upon  the  mere 
moral  force  of  public  sentiment  as  expressed  in  the  league,  but 
it  has  sovereign  authority  to  raise  armies,  collect  taxes,  and  en- 
force its  constitutional  laws  against  any  opposition  from  its  own 
members.  If  it  can  control  sufficient  force,  from  the  well  affect- 
ed towards  it,  to  subject  to  its  laws  any  combination  from  one 
or  many  states,  it  has  the  righteous  authority  so  to  do,  and  thus 
to  vindicate  and  defend  its  own  rights  of  sovereignty. 

3.  //  77iust  confine  the  exercise  of  authority  within  a  strict 
cofistmction  of  the  constitution.  What  the  states  have  given 
to  a  republic,  they  must  have  fully  expressed  in  the  articles 
which  constitute  it.  The  very  nature  of  the  work,  where  many 
states  give  uj)  their  own  sovereignty  to  constitute  a  republican 
sovereignty,  determines  that  there  will  be  clearness  and  explicit- 
ness  in  stating  what  is  granted,  and  thus  advantage  is  not  to 
be  taken  of  remote  inferences,  implications,  and  deductions. 
What  has  been  granted,  it  is  the  right  of  the  general  govern- 
ment to  use  J  but  that  only  has  been  granted  which  is  plainly 
expressed,  or  is  quite  necessary  to  carry  out  the  expressed  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution.  Beyond  this  the  republic  has  no 
authority.  Any  other  than  a  strict  construction  leads  directly 
to  oppression. 

4.  Each  state  must  by  its  own  vote  adopt  tke   constitution. 


194  MERE    LEGALITY. 

No  matter  how  great  a  share,  in  the  deliberations  and  concki- 
sions  of  the  body  forming  the  constitution,  any  state  by  its  dele- 
gation may  have  had,  that  imposes  no  obligation  upon  the 
state,  until  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  by  its  own  sovereign 
choice.  Its  sovereignty  cannot  be  rightfully  taken  from  it,  and 
transferred  to  a  republic,  but  by  its  own  free  act. 

5 .  When  the  assent  is  once  given,  and  the  sovereign  j-epublic 
constituted,  no  state  has  theti  the  right  of  secession  or  nullifica- 
tion except  by  a  strict  co7istniction  of  the  constitution  itself.  A 
national  sovereignty  is  thus  constituted,  and  the  public  freedom 
is  entrusted  to  it,  to  the  extent  of  the  constitutional  provision, 
and  a  common  interest  is  created  which  no  separate  part  has  a 
right  to  disregard.  If  there  is  no  express  article  regulating 
nullification  or  secession,  then  is  there  no  right  in  any  to  either  • 
for  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  creates  the  republican  sov- 
ereignty indefinitely,  and  its  right  to  exist  perpetually  and 
forever,  for  the  public  freedom  of  all,  is  good  and  valid  against 
any  of  its  component  states.  A  constitution  with,  and  one 
without  the  rights  of  nullification  or  secession,  are  two  very 
different  things ;  and  if  the  right  is  not  plainly  expressed,  then 
does  it  not  exist,  and  those  who  have  adopted  it  have  vested 
rights  under  it  which  no  separate  state  can  amend  or  disregard. 
The  public  freedom,  to  the  extent  of  the  constitutional  provi- 
sion, is  henceforth  committed  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  republic 
as  fully  and  irreversibly  as  the  entire  public  freedom  is  in  any 
independent  nation,  and  the  crime  of  treason  attaches  to  all 
armed  resistance  to  it,  as  in  the  rebellion  of  any  part  of  any 
nation. 

6.  Each  state  is  completely  and  independently  sovereign,  with- 
in its  own  Jurisdiction,  in  all  things  not  granted  in  the  general 
constitution.  The  different  states  in  a  republic  do  not  stand  in 
the  same  position  as  the  different  cities  and  towns  in  a  state. 
If  these  cities  and  towns  have  incorporated  rights  and  munici- » 
pal  prerogatives,  they  hold  them  from  their  own  state  authority. 


THE    STATE    IN    REFERENCE    TO    OTHERS.  1 95 

and  have  in  themselves  no  independent  sovereignty.  But  the 
separate  states  were  originally  sovereign,  and  instead  of  holding 
their  authority  from  the  repubHc,  they  have  themselves  consti- 
tuted the  republic  by  putting  away  their  own  authority  into  it. 

What  is  granted  to  the  repubhc  has  now  become  an  inde- 
pendent sovereignty,  as  its  own  ;  but  what  is  not  granted  is 
still  in  the  hands  of  each  state,  and  exercised  by  it  at  its  own 
pleasure,  and  upon  its  own  responsibility.  No  sister  state  has 
any  right  to  interfere  in  the  internal  regulations  of  another,  any 
more  than  among  independent  nations  j  nor  is  one  state  any 
more  responsible  for  what  another  does,  than  in  the  case  of 
wholly  foreign  states. 

Section  VI.  War.  Every  sovereign  state  is  responsible  for 
the  public  freedom  of  its  members,  and  if  this  is  invaded  by 
the  disobedience  or  rebellion  of  its  citizens,  it  has  the  right  to 
execute  the  penalty  of  the  law  disobeyed,  and  to  crush  the  re- 
bellion or  any  part  by  an  armed  force.  The  freedom  of  the 
whole,  and  for  all  generations,  is  of  more  consequence  than  the 
lives  of  a  part  in  any  generation.  The  freedom  of  the  state 
must  then  be  maintained  by  it,  even  to  the  death  of  opposers 
if  necessary. 

But  sometimes  the  freedom  of  the  state  may  be  menaced 
from  without,  and  the  force  of  the  state  may  be  called  into 
requisition  against  a  foreign  enemy  to  its  liberty ;  the  action 
then  becomes  war,  and  the  morality  of  it  needs  to  be  de- 
termined. 

I.  War  is  righteous  in  defence  of  the  national  freedom.  The 
life  of  no  assailant  of  a  nation's  freedom  is  too  sacred  to  be 
cloven  down  in  its  defence.  The  state  is  responsible  for  the 
end  of  its  being,  as  a  sovereign,  to  the  full  extent  of  all  its  re- 
sources. Against  a  foreign  enemy,  it  cannot  maintain  its  rights 
by  law ;  it  can  only  resist  his  violence  to  the  public  freedom  by 
arms,  and  such  resistance  is  defensive  war.  There  can  be  no 
question  of  weaker  and  stronger,  for  the  weaker  nation  like  the 


196  MERE    LEGALITY. 

weaker  man,  when  driven  to  fight  for  life,  must  resist  and  de- 
fend as  it  may.  It  lias  no  alternative  but  to  go  down  if  it  must, 
struggling  for  its  liberties.  The  guilt  is  on  the  offender,  the  war 
of  defence  is  as  righteous  as  the  penal  execution  of  law. 

2.  JVar  is  justifiable  only  as  the  ultima  ratio.  It  is  an  ex- 
treme alternative,  terrible  and  horrible  at  the  best,  and  to  be 
resorted  to  only  in  the  last  extremity.  All  countervailing  meas- 
ures should  be  first  tried.  War  will  itself,  necessarily,  more  or 
less  abridge  the  freedom  of  the  state,  and  such  an  abridgement 
of  freedom  must  not  be  incurred  lightly.  Commercial  restric- 
tions, and  the  application  of  other  uncomfortable  regulations, 
complaint  of  grievances,  protests,  and  negotiation  should  all  be 
tried  before  war,  if  there  is  any  rational  hope  of  preventing 
this  last  resort,  and  only  when  war  must  come  is  it  right  to  let 
it  come. 

3.  In  all  wai-  there  inust  be  guilt,  at  least  with  one  nation. 
Two  nations  can  so  live  together,  and  maintain  the  freedom  of 
their  subjects,  as  not  to  make  it  necessary  that  one  should  en- 
croach upon  the  hberties  of  another.  That  nation  whose  action 
makes  it  necessary  for  another  to  fight  in  defence  of  its  freedom, 
is  guilty  of  an  immorality ;  and  if  the  other  nation  stand  only  on 
the  defensive,  the  whole  guilt  i?  with  the  former  state.  Both 
may  have  guilt,  one  of  them  must  have. 

4.  The  necessity  for  war  may  all  be  removed  by  national 
comity  and  equity.  If  there  were  no  violation  of  national  rights, 
and  thus  encroachment  upon  national  freedom,  there  would  be 
no  occasion  for  war.  Wars  and  fightings  come  from  unlawful 
lusts.  Any  influences  which  shall  make  the  nations  of  the  earth 
regard  courtesy  and  equity  wiU  exclude  all  wars.  And  so  long 
as  insult  and  injustice  prevail  among  the  nations  of  mankind, 
the  occasions  of  war  will  remain.  Each  nation  must  stand  its 
own  defender,  and  unrighteous  encroachment  must  be  resisted, 
and  may  force  to  resistance  unto  blood.  But  elevation  in 
national  character  diminishes  the  occasions  for  national  con- 


THE  STATE  IN  REFERENCE  TO  OTHERS.      IQ/ 

tention.  Complete  civilization,  which  is  the  perfection  of 
humanity  in  intelligence  and  virtue,  will  abolish  all  provoca- 
tion, and  thus  all  resort  to  war. 

5.  Much  might  be  done  in  prevention  of  war,  at  the  present 
day,  by  stipulated  arbitration.  In  the  body  of  some  important 
international  treaty,  or  by  a  separate  treaty  for  the  specific  pur- 
pose, nations  might  mutually  stipulate,  that  in  case  of  disagree- 
ments and  disputes  the  matter  shall  be  deferred  to  some  friendly 
arbitration.  An  umpire  may  readily  be  found  who  shall  be  im- 
partial, and  the  prosecution  of  the  claims  of  each  before  such  a 
mutually-constituted  tribunal  would  in  most  cases  remove  the 
bloody  interference  of  the  sword.  Even  when  war  has  done  its 
desolating  work,  negotiation  must  be  resorted  to  for  the  ends  of 
peace,  and  if  the  reference  can  be  made  to  an  arbiter  in  which 
each  party  has  confidence  beforehand,  the  horrors  of  war  may 
be  wholly  averted.  The  honor  of  each  nation  is  preserved,  for 
the  previous  agreement  establishes  this  mode  of  settlement ;  the 
peculiar  principles  of  each  government  remain  untouched,  for 
unless  a  war  of  political  propagandism  be  determined  upon, 
such  principles  do  not  engender  national  conflicts ;  and  even 
the  very  use  of  such  arbitration  diffuses  its  civilizing  influence 
over  the  parties  and  the  umpire.  The  modern  movement 
towards  such  an  arrangement  is  eminently  hopeful. 

Section  VII.  Congress  of  Nations.  Nations  stand  to  each 
other  separate  and  independent.  As  in  the  case  of  unprotected 
individual  persons,  the  weaker  is  liable  to  be  oppressed  and 
injured  by  the  stronger ;  on  this  account  it  has  been  an  inquiry 
whether  there  might  not  be  instituted  some  general  council  or 
congress  of  nations  which  should  stand  as  an  umpire  between 
sovereign  states,  and  hold  the  balance  of  sovereign  powers  with 
so  much  wisdom  and  steadiness  as  to  preserve  the  peace  and 
liberty  of  the  world.  It  may  be  worth  the  consideration,  to 
show  what  political  ethics  would  determine  about  the  morality 
of  such  an  arrangement. 


198  MERE    LEGALITY. 

1.  Such  a  congress  of  nations  could  have  no  force  beyond  the 
particular  states  represented  in  it.  Whatever  were  urged  as  the 
motive  to  nations  to  be  represented  in  the  proposed  congress, 
each  sovereign  state  would  be  at  full  liberty  to  accede  to  such  a 
proposition,  or  to  reject  it.  As  each  state  is  sovereign  in  itself, 
and  at  full  liberty  to  refuse  any  such  representation,  so  no  meet- 
ing of  any  council  by  any  number  of  the  representatives  of 
nations  could  at  all  affect  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation  not 
represented.  It  would  be  as  much  its  right  to  reject  all  its 
resolutions,  as  to  reject  the  offer  of  a  representation  there. 
Nothing  done  in  the  congress  could  have  any  binding  force  be- 
yond those  states  there  represented. 

2.  Such  a  congress  could  not  righteously  be  invested  with 
sovereignty.  Whatever  expediency  there  may  be  found  in  the 
combining  of  the  sovereignty  of  several  small  states  into  one 
sovereign  constitutional  republic,  it  will  not  be  found  to  con- 
duce to  the  universal  freedom  of  man,  that  all  the  sovereign 
states  of  the  world  should  be  combined  in  one  universal  republic 
of  nations.  Such  is  the  limit  of  human  faculties,  that  a  univer- 
sal administration  of  a  government,  which  should  make  it  its 
end  to  conserve  the  public  freedom  of  all  mankind,  would  em- 
brace so  many  and  so  profound  matters  of  inquiry  and  exe- 
cution, that  no  human  political  wisdom  and  skill  would  be 
adequate  to  it.  A  division  into  sectional  interests  and  geo- 
graphical localities  would  be  necessary,  and  no  human  sover- 
eignty controlling  the  whole  would  be  competent  to  secure  the 
highest  freedom. 

But  much  more  from  the  moral  frailty  of  man  would  there  be 
an  incompetency.  The  temptations  to  ambition  and  lust  of 
power  would  here  be  presented  on  so  large  a  scale,  that  the 
danger  of  universal  tyranny  would  be  far  greater  than  the  ra- 
tional hope  of  universal  liberty.  A  universal  republic  would 
probably  give  less  freedom  to  the  race  of  man,  than  a  distribu- 
tion of  monarchy  through  all  the  separate  states.     Any  universal 


THE    STATE    IN   REFERENCE    TO    OTHERS.  I99 

sovereignty,  monarchical  or  republican,  would  be  found  incom- 
petent to  control  all  individual  choices  to  the  highest  freedom 
of  the  choices  of  all.  The  very  end  of  civil  government  would 
therefore  righteously  preclude  the  establishment  of  any  univer- 
sal sovereignty. 

But  if  this  congress  of  nations  be  desirable  at  all,  it  is  in  the 
same  sense  desirable  that  it  embrace  all.  Whatever  benefit  it 
may  be  hoped  to  possess  can  be  extended  only  to  those  repre- 
sented in  it ;  but  that  it  may  embrace  all,  it  must  not  be  an  all- 
embracing  sovereignty,  as  this  would  more  endanger  than  pro- 
tect the  freedom  of  the  human  race.  Such  a  congress,  thus, 
may  not  govern  the  nations. 

3.  T7ie  congress  could  be  otily  the  agent  of  a  confederation. 
Acting  for  the  best  interests  of  those  sovereign  states  represented 
in  it,  and  made  their  agent  for  the  transaction  of  any  common 
business  regularly  entrusted  to  it,  it  miglit  serve  the  purposes  of 
the  confederation  with  no  prejudice  to  their  individual  sov- 
ereignty, and  perhaps  with  much  favor  to  their  common  free- 
dom. According  to  the  interest  and  confidence  of  the  nations 
represented  in  it,  as  an  efficient  agent  for  their  purpose,  and  the 
wisdom  and  impartiality  of  its  deliberations  and  resolves  would 
be  its  success.  Different  and  opposing  interests  might  be 
adjusted;  national  alienations  and  antipathies  precluded  :  com- 
mon interests  promoted ;  war  prevented ;  and  thus,  in  various 
ways,  the  freedom  of  these  confederated  nations  would  be  sub- 
served. Morality  would  find  nothing  in  such  a  measure  to 
condemn  in  principle,  and  if  in  practice  it  were  found  to  work 
well,  morality  would  enforce  its  adoption.  It  might,  without 
ethical  objection,  be  made  an  oecumenical  political  council. 


SECOND   DIVISION. 


DIVINE    GOVERNMENT. 


CHAPTER   I. 

GOD'S   BEING  AND   COMMUNION   WITH    MAN. 

WE  here  assume  the  existence  of  a  personal  Deity.  The 
proof  for  the  being  and  perfections  of  God  belongs  to 
Natural  Theology  ;  and  though  the  foregoing  portions  of  our 
system  of  Moral  Philosophy  are  conclusive  in  their  obligations 
upon  an  Atheist,  yet  if  the  researches  of  Natural  Theology  find 
an  existing  personal  Deity,  our  system  of  Moral  Philosopliy 
cannot  here  terminate.  We  have  to  settle  the  moral  questions 
connected  with  the  communion  between  such  a  personal  God 
and  the  race  of  mankind. 

We  take,  then,  the  valid  proofs  of  Natural  Theology,  that 
there  is  a  personal  Deity  of  absolute  perfections,  and  proceed 
to  the  investigation  of  the  moral  questions  thus  presented. 

This  God  made  us  and  all  things.  He  perpetually  upholds 
and  supplies  all  being.  We  know  him  imperfectly,  but  still 
really,  and  in  many  things  adequately,  to  all  the  ends  of  our 
moral  and  religious  being ;  and  he  knows  us  thoroughly,  not 
only  our  wants,  but  the  thoughts  and  intents  of  our  hearts. 
And  our  first  inquiry  is  for  the  fiiamier  of  comjtiunion  between 
God  and  mankind. 

This  cannot  be  the  communion  of  equals  with  equals.  The 
perfections  of  the  Deity  raise  him  above  nature,  and  thus  make 
200 


GOD  S    BEING   AND    COMMUNION    WITH    MAN.         201 

him  to  be  supernatural  not  only,  but  also  above  all  creatures 
that  are  themselves  rational  and  personal,  and  thus  make  him 
to  be  contemplated  as  completely  superhuman.  Equality  of 
communion,  as  between  man  and  his  fellows,  is  impossible. 
There  can  be  no  society  in  which  God  and  man  come  together 
on  the  gi-ound  of  common  sympathies,  wants,  rights,  and  obli- 
gations. 

Nor  is  it  the  communion  of  parent  and  child.  In  some  re- 
spects an  analogy  may  hold  between  the  parental  relation,  and 
that  of  God  to  his  creatures.  But  the  analogon  is  in  few  points, 
and  in  these  to  an  inadequate  degree.  The  child,  by  a  process 
of  development,  may  become  equal  to  the  parent ;  but  no 
growth  of  the  human  brings  it  any  nearer  to  an  equality  with 
the  divine. 

The  communion  can  in  no  other  way  be  expressed  than  as 
the  absolute  and  the  dependent.  God  receives  nothing  from 
man,  and  gives  all  to  man.  Whatever  God  is,  he  is  in  himself 
independent  and  underived ;  whatever  man  is,  he  derives  from 
God  and  depends  upon  him  to  continue.  "  In  him  he  lives 
and  moves  and  has  his  being."  The  philosophical  modes,  by 
which  the  absolute  can  come  into  any  form  of  communication 
with  his  creatures,  are  here  no  topic  of  consideration ;  but  the 
communion  in  any  way  must  still  leave  the  Deity  to  be  con- 
ceived as  absolute  spirit,  existing  in  complete  personal  perfec- 
tion within  himself,  —  the  I  am  that  I  am  ;  and  man,  as 
created  finite  spirit,  having  proper  personality,  but  derived, 
dependent,  and  accountable. 

This  communion  of  the  absolute  and  the  dependent  will  also 
involve  the  relation  of  sovereign  ajid  subject.  Inasmuch  as  there 
is  moral  personality  in  each,  there  must  be  a  moral  communion  ; 
and  the  perfections  of  the  Deity  permit  him  to  stand  in  no  other 
relationship  to  man  than  that  of  his  rightful  sovereign.  God's 
attributes  and  man's  faculties  involve  the  ethical  behest  of  au- 
thority on  the  one  side,  and  of  subjection  on  the  other.     It 


202  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

would  be  unworthy  of  God  that  he  should  stand  to  man  in  any 
other  attitude  than  that  of  sovereignty,  and  unworthy  of  man 
that  he  should  come  before  God,  even  in  the  most  endeared 
communion,  but  as  his  subject,  "  with  reverence  and  Godly 
fear." 

Such  communion  as  sovereign  and  subject  introduces  a  pecu- 
liar moral  government.  There  must  be  some  form  of  legislation 
and  executive  administration.  But  it  must  in  many  things  differ 
from  all  civil  polity.  A  Being  of  absolute  sovereignty,  legislating 
and  executing  in  his  own  right,  will  give  to  us  a  polity  of  wholly 
another  kind  than  that  of  civil  legislation,  and  which  we  distin- 
guish as  a  Second  Division  of  Positive  Authority,  under  the 
head  oi  Divine  Government. 

These  positive  commandments  from  God  must  constitute 
man's  religious  duties,  and  religion  has  very  generally  been  con- 
sidered as  belonging  to  wholly  a  different  field  from  morality. 
If  the  moralist  determine  only  such  duties  as  belong  to  man, 
considered  merely  in  his  humanity,  then  is  it  left  to  the  divine 
to  determine  what  duties  God  has  positively  enjoined.  The 
fields  of  morality  and  divinity  are  thus  quite  distinct. 

But  we  have  contemplated  Moral  Philosophy,  not  as  if  teach- 
ing any  particular  duties,  but  as  systematizing  the  ethical  princi- 
ples which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  all  duties.  We  have  not 
taken  at  all  the  province  of  the  casuist,  and  determined  what 
facts  come  under  the  principles,  and  thus  settled  particular 
cases  of  conscience ;  we  have  taken  Moral  Philosophy  as  the 
science  of  principles  only,  and  thus  have  been  solicitous  in 
attaining  a  complete  system  of  ethical  principles,  which  all 
casuists  may  apply.  In  this,  which  is  the  true  field  of  morality 
as  a  science,  we  have  the  same  occasion  for  examining  the 
Divine  authority  that  we  had  for  the  civil  sovereignty.  We 
want  to  know  what  is  the  valid  ground  of  the  Divine  Govern- 
ment, as  truly  as  that  which  gives  obligation  to  Civil  Govern- 
ment ;  and  in  both  we  would  leave  the  particular  facts,  which 


THE    END    OF    THE    DIVINE    LEGISLATION.  2O3 

may  sometimes  be  difficult  to  settle  whether  they  come  within 
the  principles,  to  the  casuist,  be  he  either  jurist  or  preacher. 
We  are  seeking,  not  whether  such  a  thing  is  commanded,  but 
the  righteousness  by  which  any  commands  may  be  given ;  and 
in  this  point  of  view  morality  covers  all  authority,  the  Divine  as 
truly  as  the  human.  We  want  the  test  of  a  valid  religion,  as 
truly  as  of  a  vaUd  civil  polity ;  and  to  know  how  to  determine 
between  a  true  religious  worship  and  Ufe,  and  superstitious 
devotion  and  practice,  as  really  as  between  the  obedience  of 
patriotism  and  the  servitude  of  tjTanny.  Wherein  is  the  Chris- 
tian religion  ethically  more  valid  than  Mohammedanism  or 
Paganism  ?  The  IMoral  Philosophy  is  for  the  determination  of 
this  valid  authority ;  not  what  are  the  particular  duties  enjoined 
by  it. 


CHAPTER  II. 
THE  END  OF  THE  DIVINE  LEGISLATION. 

The  valid  ground  of  God's  government  we  have  already  ap- 
prehended in  his  intrinsic  perfections.  Such  a  being  as  God 
possesses  sovereign  authority  over  his  creatures  in  his  own  ab- 
solute right. 

But  the  process  of  the  Divine  administration  must  be  directed 
towards  that  end  which  is  to  be  consummated  by  it ;  and  thus, 
based  upon  the  intrinsic  validity  of  the  Divine  Authority,  the 
equity  of  God's  government  in  its  administration  can  be  deter- 
mined only  in  full  view  of  the  end  at  which  it  aims.  We  have 
then,  as  a  first  inquiry,  preliminary  to  all  examination  of  the 
process  of  God's  administration  of  a  moral  government,  to  de- 
termine the  end  which  it  behooves  God  to  seek,  in  all  his  legis- 
lation and  administration  of   a    moral    government.      In  the 


204  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

distinct  attainment  of  its  specific  end,  we  shall  be  able  to  avoid 
many  errors,  absurdities,  and  sometimes  very  serious  sceptical 
difficulties,  that  have  much  troubled  others. 

1 .  JVe  cannot  determine  the  specific  end  in  legislation,  as  we 
do  God's  itlti7nate  end  in  creatioji.  We  contemplate  God  in 
his  absolute  being,  and  then  the  only  moving  spring  to  the 
going  forth  of  creating  energy  must  be  found  in  himself.  As 
infinite  excellence,  his  own  intrinsic  worthiness  must  have  ethi- 
cally determined  what,  and  in  what  manner,  to  create.  He 
should  so  act  in  creating  as  to  be  worthy  of  his  own  accepting, 
and  this  must  determine  all  the  work  of  creation. 

This  will  still  be  ultimate  end  in  the  consummation  of  all  his 
works,  yet  as  distinct  and  pai-ticular  end,  his  legislation  n>ust 
come  in  to  subserve  some  excellency,  and  attain  some  benefit, 
in  the  created  system  itself.  It  must  be  to  meet  some  exigency 
induced  by  creation,  and  have  a  particular  reference  to  the 
constitution  and  nature  of  that  which  has  been  created.  Not 
like  creation  itself,  springing  at  once  into  being  from  the  inner 
ethical  behest,  that  so  it  must  be  to  be  worthy  of  God ;  but 
creation  having  taken  place,  so  it  must  be  governed  to  meet 
the  specific  wants  in  its  own  constitution.  We  cannot  stand 
with  only  the  absolute  God  in  our  contemplation,  and  find  the 
end  in  his  own  inherent  dignity ;  but  we  must  stand  with  the 
creation  itself  in  our  eye,  and  find  the  specific  end  in  its  wants. 

2.  The  Divine  legislation  must  have  its  end  in  the  capacities 
of  man's  religious  being.  As  a  spiritual  being,  man  has  capa- 
cities for  higher  communings  than  any  which  human  society 
offers.  As  a  creature,  in  his  own  constitutional  being,  there  is 
the  necessary  conviction  of  helplessness  and  dependence.  He 
neither  originated,  nor  can  he  perpetuate,  his  own  being.  He 
finds  himself  the  creature  of  many  wants,  that  from  himself  there 
is  no  capacity  to  supply.  With  all  his  intellectual  activity,  he 
still  finds  himself  ignorant  in  many  particulars  of  the  highest 
practical  importance,  and  which  nothing  short  of  a  revelation 


THE    END    OF    THE    DIVINE    LEGISLATION.  205 

from  heaven  can  remove.  He  has  spiritual  susceptibilities  to 
reverence,  gratitude,  and  love,  above  all  that  any  presented 
human  excellence  can  awaken,  and  is  truly  a  being  fitted  for 
religious  worship  and  service ;  and  he  can  never  rest  satisHed 
until  he  apprehends  a  Deity  whom  he  may  confidingly  praise 
and  adore.  There  is  a  deep  want,  even  in  the  purest  created 
nature,  for  some  revealed  source  of  all  excellence  and  dignity 
in  whom  the  spirit  may  trust,  and  before  whom  it  may  bow  in 
homage  and  religious  devotion.  The  deepest  want  in  the 
human  soul  is  a  divinely  appointed  and  authorized  method  of 
appearing  before  God,  and  in  confiding  love  and  trust  pouring 
out  the  whole  religious  being  in  adoration,  and  receiving  the 
pledges  of  the  Divine  approbation  and  favor.  Man  may  have 
wherewithal  to  satisfy  every  other  want  of  his  being,  but  in  the 
absence  of  this,  his  soul  will  be  wretched  and  his  spirit  desolate. 

And  now  it  is  precisely  in  this  interest  that  the  Divine  gov- 
ernment is  instituted.  Man's  religious  being  is  the  source  of 
all  the  need  of  God's  legislation  for  him,  and  the  end  to  which 
the  entire  administration  of  his  government  over  him  is  directed. 
In  some  way  the  Divine  administration  must  be  made  to  reach 
and  include  all  that  pertains  to  man's  religious  communion  with 
God,  and  direct  the  entire  outgoings  of  his  soul  in  humble 
dependence  and  confiding  worship.  Man  must  commune  with 
his  God,  not  as  a  social  or  political  personality,  but  wholly  in  a 
religious  capacity.  He  wants  no  legislation  from  God  as  a 
merely  ethical  or  political  sovereign,  but  solely  as  an  adorable 
Lord  and  Saviour,  to  be  loved  and  worshipped  while  his  authority 
is  revered  and  obeyed. 

The  end  of  the  Divine  legislation,  thus,  is  the  highest  piety 
of  its  subjects.  Piety  is  the  outgoing  of  man's  religious  being 
to  God  in  sacred  communion,  devotion,  and  worship.  It  in- 
cludes and  controls  all  the  susceptibility  to  divine  love,  grati- 
tude, and  reverence.  Every  feeling  and  affection  which  can  be 
awakened  in  communion  with  God,  and  employed  in  his  ser- 


206  COMPI,ETE    LOYALTY. 

vice,  needs  its  direction  according  to  his  will,  that  it  may  thus 
be  the  highest  and  purest  piety ;  and  to  this  end  all  God's  legis- 
lation and  administration  will  be  directed.  Man's  highest  ex- 
cellency as  a  religious  being  will  be  directly  and  specifically 
sought  in  the  Divine  government,  and  the  entire  administration 
turned  to  the  one  end  of  fitting  him  the  most  perfecdy  for 
Heaven,  which  is  God's  final  home  and  reward  for  consum- 
mated piety. 

That  this  must  be  so  is  proved  in  the  very  necessities  of  the 
case.  It  is  ethically  demanded  that  it  should  so  be,  and  nothing 
else  can  satisfy  morality.  Man  has  such  a  religious  capacity, 
and  God  only  can  legislate  for  it.  The  whole  must  come  under 
responsibility  to  law,  and  be  subjected  to  a  discipline  that  is  held 
in  positive  authority,  and  which  can  never  be  attained  in  pure 
morality,  nor  mere  legality,  but  solely  in  a  government  which 
holds  in  complete  loyalty,  and  induces  obedience  from  pure  love 
to  the  sovereign. 

Piety  cannot  be  attained  under  the  discipline  of  pure  morality, 
nor  can  it  any  the  more  be  cultivated  in  mere  legality.  The 
sole  constramt  in  piety  is  complete  loyalty,  —  the  love  of  the 
Lord  that  is  served  and  worshipped.  Co-action  from  any  source 
but  love  will  exclude  all  genuine  piety.  Piety  may  look  to  the 
recompense  of  reward ;  but  no  reward  will  be  worth  any  thing  in 
its  sight  except  solely  as  the  token  of  its  Lord's  approbation. 
There  may  be  the  exercise  of  Godly  fear :  but  it  is  a  fear  that 
is  awakened  in  love,  and  which  dreads  more  than  death  its 
Lord's  displeasure.  The  whole  moving  influence  in  piety  is 
love  to  God,  and  all  the  constraint  of  law  upon  it  is  solely  re- 
gard for  the  will  of  the  Sovereign  Lawgiver.  All  piety  is  glad- 
ness and  joy ;  for  it  obeys  out  of  love  to  the  Master  and  his 
service. 

Man  perishingly  needs  such  a  discipline ;  and  no  being  but 
God  can  legislate  in  such  a  way  as  to  effect  it.  It  behooves 
him  thus,  as  sovereign,  to  take  the  throne,  and  legislate  and 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRiVTION    IX   JUSTICE.  20/ 

administer  a  government  in  the  sole  end  of  piety,  and  to  raise 
man  to  the  highest  attainable  religious  service  and  worship, 
through  the  pure  influence  of  a  Divine  love  and  loyalty. 

As  under  the  First  Division  of  Authority,  we  found  the  end 
of  human  legislation  to  be  the  highest  freedom ;  so  now,  under 
this  Second  Division,  we  find  the  end  of  the  Divine  legislation 
to  be  the  highest  piety.  But  an  administration  directed  to  the 
ends  of  highest  piety  may  go  out  in  its  process  in  two  directions, 
accorf^ing  to  the  moral  characters  of  its  subjects.  There  may 
be  an  administration  over  completely  righteous  beings,  and  all 
its  process  may  be  to  the  end  of  cultivating  and  preserving  their 
piety.  Such  may  be  termed  an  administration  of  justice.  Or, 
there  may  be  an  administration  over  these  same  beings  when 
they  have  become  sinners  designed  to  restore  to  piety,  and  to  re- 
ceive to  the  Divine  favor  without  prejudice  to  the  piety  of  such 
as  had  not  sinned.  Such  may  be  termed  an  administration  of 
grace. 

The  end  in  view  is  the  same  in  each,  —  the  higlicst  piety  ;  but 
it  is  manifest  that  the  process  of  administration,  in  the  two  cases, 
must  differ  on  the  grounds  of  morality.  Righteousness  will  de- 
mand in  each  according  to  the  peculiar  principles  of  each ;  and 
it  is  the  business  of  moral  philosophy  to  find  and  bring  into  sys- 
tem these  specifically  distinctive  principles. 


CHAPTER  irr. 


THE    PROCESS    OF    THE    DIVINE   ADMINISTRATION    IN 

JUSTICE. 

God  is  righteously  the  sovereign  over  man  on  the  ground  of 
his  absolute  perfection,  and  in  the  interest  of  man's  highest 
susceptibilities,  he  will  legislate  for  the  end  of  piety.     Both  as 


208  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

the  Lord  to  be  worshipped  and  served,  and  as  the  searcher  of 
the  human  heart,  and  knowing  what  is  in  man,  he  alone  can 
adapt  his  legislation  and  its  execution  to  the  best  attainment  of 
man's  religious  interest,  and  regulate  the  whole  process  of  his 
administration  by  what  is  ethically  demanded  in  his  own  right 
and  man's  religious  wants.  By  keeping  the  great  end  of  God's 
administration  in  view,  we  shall  b.e  able  clearly  to  determine 
many  ethical  principles  which  must  be  applied  in  the  process 
of  the  Divine  administration. 

We  here  fix  attention  only  upon  those  principles  which 
stand  in  a  government  of  equity,  and  which  must  control  where 
no  provisions  of  grace  and  mercy  have  been  made.  It  will  thus 
give  the  general  principles  of  an  administration  of  strict  justice. 

I.  Positive  Authority  must  be  made  especially  prominejit. 
Piety  is  the  end  of  the  Divine  government,  and  the  most  essen- 
tial element  of  piety  is  faith.  By  this  is  meant  that  cordial 
confidence  in  God  which  induces  joyful  obedience  and  worship. 
It  thus  "  works  by  love,  purifies  the  heart,  and  overcomes  the 
world."  The  cultivation  of  the  strongest  faith  will  be  the 
means  for  attaining  the  highest  piety. 

From  the  very  constitution  of  man,  in  his  finiteness,  he  must 
often,  through  all  his  experience,  be  obliged  to  act  where  he 
cannot  estimate  the  general  consequences  of  his  conduct,  nor 
see  the  reasons  in  things  themselves,  why  he  should  do  one 
thing  and  not  another.  His  ignorance  and  weakness  are  the 
source  of  his  want,  and  they  make  it  imperative  that  he  should 
commit  himself  confidingly  to  the  direction  of  the  will  of  God 
in  its  admitted  wisdom  and  benevolence.  He  should  cultivate 
the  spirit  of  unquestioning  obedience,  in  whatever  way  God  dis- 
closes his  will,  and  make  it  to  be  abundantly  sufficient  for  his 
faith  and  practice,  that  he  has  a  plain  Divine  declaration  of 
what  God  would  have  him  to  believe  and  to  do. 

This  is  not  at  all  in  disparagement  of  his  reason,  but  from  the 
highest  demand  of  his  reason.    He  must  take  many  things  upon 


THE    DIVIXE    ADMINISTRATION    IN   JUSTICE.  2C9 

trust,  both  of  belief  and  practice  ;  and  it  is  the  highest  reason 
to  trust  God's  testimony  and  yield  to  God's  authority.  When 
in  the  hght  of  his  reason  he  has  found  the  source  of  all  truth  in 
the  Absolute  Reason,  it  is  the  highest  worthiness  of  man  to  trust 
himself  unhesitatingly  to  the  Absolute.  God  must  do  and  com- 
mand many  things  which  the  finite  cannot  comprehend,  but 
which  in  his  finiteness  he  may  know  cannot  be  unreasonable, 
since  they  come  from  the  fountain  of  all  reason.  It  is  his  dig- 
nity, and  thus  his  duty,  to  walk  by  faith,  since  he  cannot  walk 
by  sight,  and  since  his  faith  has  its  ground  in  the  absolute  per- 
fections of  God. 

In  this  very  point  is  the  essence  of  piety,  as  distinguished 
from  morality.  Morality  clearly  sees  the  ultimate  right,  in  see- 
ing in  the  spiritual  being  what  is  due  to  his  own  excellence ; 
and  thus  the  conscience  constrains  to  virtue  in  the  very  light 
of  reason  itself.  Piety  learns  the  ignorance  and  emptiness  of 
man,  and  the  wisdom  and  fulness  of  God ;  and  thus  is  con- 
strained to  unquestioning  submission  by  a  proper  distrust  of 
self,  and  a  lively  faith  in  God.  Only  by  this  cultivation  of  an 
unshaken  faith  in  God  can  the  human  soul  be  raised  to  the 
highest  elevation  in  piety.  Piety  is,  throughout,  a  most  intelli- 
gent grace,  for  it  most  clearly  apprehends  its  own  weakness  and 
God's  sufficiency,  and  thus  most  reasonably  withdraws  from  self- 
confidence  to  trust  in  God. 

The  Divine  administration  should,  therefore,  perpetually 
adapt  itself  to  such  a  want  in  man.  It  should  cultivate  an 
unwavering  confidence  in  the  Divine  declaration  and  character ; 
and  thus  keep  constantly  prominent  positive  commandments, 
which  throw  the  force  of  simple  authority  upon  man,  and  en- 
join obedience,  not  because  reason  can  see  why,  but  only 
because  such  is  God's  will.  That  God  commands  it  is  made 
the  only  reason  that  man  should  obey  it.  The  sole  motive  is 
made  to  be  in  faith ;  confidence  that  God  commands  nothing 
which  is  not  reasonable,  and  yet  disclosing  nothing  in  the  com- 
mand itself  to  show  that  it  is  reasonable. 


2IO  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

The  use  of  positive  authority  may  find  its  expression  in  the 
unquahfied  prohibition  of  the  fruit  of  a  particular  tree,  or  the 
unexplained  injunction  of  the  right  of  circumcision,  or  the  in- 
stitution of  a  broad  ritual  of  positive  ceremonies ;  but  in  many 
ways,  it  may  beforehand  be  determined,  that  God's  administra- 
tion will  keep  prominent  and  constant  the  use  of  positive  com- 
mandments, and  discipline  man  to  piety  by  cultivating  his 
simple  faith  in  God's  trustworthiness. 

2.  God^s  administration  nmst  regard  both  virtue  and  free- 
dom for  piety's  sake.  Piety  cannot  be  where  virtue  is  discarded ; 
and  hence  God's  legislation  will  enforce  all  morality  for  the  ends 
of  piety.  Piety  cannot  consist  with  the  disregard  of  human 
rights  and  public  freedom ;  and  hence  God's  legislation  will  en- 
force all  social  and  political  duties  for  the  ends  of  piety.  Piety 
consists  in  the  whole  rehgious  portion  of  our  being  going  out 
habitually  in  joyful  and  intimate  communion  with  God ;  and  this 
is  the  highest  life  of  humanity ;  the  deepest  want  of  the  soul ;  the 
greatest  dignity  of  an  immortal  but  dependent  spirit.  God's 
entire  government  regards  this  as  its  great  end,  and  as  this  can- 
not be  without  virtue  and  political  integrity,  so  God  commands 
them,  and  punishes  the  want  not  only  as  vicious  and  criminal, 
but  as  sinful,  —  a  transgression  not  only  of  reason,  and  of  hu- 
man law,  but  of  God's  commandments.  In  this  sense,  all  im- 
morality, or  disobedience  to  righteous  human  law,  is  also  impiety. 
They  become  as  really  dishonorable  to  God  as  idolatry  and 
blasphemy.  God  will  thus  hold  man  to  perpetual  morality,  and 
civil  allegiance,  for  the  end  of  piety. 

3.  God's  adtfiinistratio7i  should  especially  guard  those  sus- 
ceptibilities which  most  endanger  piety.  The  animal  appetites, 
when  left  to  their  passionate  impulses,  not  only  colUde  with 
man's  ethical,  but  more  especially  with  his  religious  interests. 
All  intemperance,  and  voluptuousness,  and  pride,  not  only  blunt 
the  sensibihty  of  the  conscience,  but  they  quite  as  effectually 
render  torpid  the  whole  rehgious  susceptibihty.     All  reverence 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    IN    JUSTICE.  211 

and  confiding  dependence  are  lost  in  audacity  and  vain-confi- 
dence, whenever  the  lusts  of  the  senses  prevail.  A  licentious 
man  will  necessarily  be  an  irreligious  man.  A  debauchee  is  ever 
a  religious  scoffer. 

The  Divine  administration,  therefore,  should  guard  all  those 
appetites,  especially,  which  so  readily  destroy  the  delicacy  of  all 
religious  feeling.  God's  legislation  should  control  the  occupa- 
tions and  pursuits  of  life  ;  the  manners  and  habits  of  mankind  ; 
the  food  and  the  dress,  so  far  as  they  minister  to  the  inordinate 
passions  of  the  race.  Especially  will  the  marriage  relation  be 
held  sacred,  and  all  divorce  and  "  putting  away"  be  forbidden, 
except  where  conjugal  infidelity  would  itself  tend  to  render 
impious  the  virtuous  party.  Such  legislation  in  God  looks  not 
merely  to  purposes  of  public  morality  and  of  civil  freedom,  but 
far  more  comprehensively,  to  the  ends  of  religion  and  piety. 
He  would  hold  man  back  from  all  intemperance  and  licentious- 
ness, that  he  might  have  pure  piety ;  a  sweet  trust  in  God ;  a 
joyful  communion  with  him,  and  a  spiritual  worship. 

4.  The  Divine  administration  7vill  enfoire  and  regulate  Divine 
zvorship.  Piety  must  go  out  in  many  acts  of  religious  devotion. 
Private  and  public  worship  must  be  recognized  ;  for  piety  must 
commune  with  God  both  in  secret  and  openly.  Religious 
instruction  must  also  be  secured ;  for  piety  would  offer  an 
intelligent  service.  God  only  can  give  the  necessarily  authori- 
tative regulations  for  such  rehgious  services,  and  secure  a  consis- 
tent and  harmonious  order  of  worship.  God,  therefore,  must 
directly  legislate  in  matters  of  religion.  The  time,  the  manner, 
and  perhaps  the  place,  for  offering  to  him  the  public  prayers  and 
praises,  must  be  determined  by  him,  at  least  in  so  general  a 
manner  that  man  may  thereby  gain  the  knowledge  of  what  shall 
be  acceptable  in  particulars.  .  A  religious  ritual,  more  or  less 
extensive,  must  somewhere  be  propounded  for  man,  with  all 
the  authority  of  a  Divine  sanction. 

A  Sabbath,  of  perpetual  and  universal  obligation,  is  itself  a 


212  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

want  in  the  human  constitution.  Not  merely  as  a  rest  from  all 
secular  employment,  and  thus  a  relief  and  necessary  relaxation 
from  physical  engagements,  and  thereby  salutary  for  both  body 
and  mind ;  but  more  especially  a  demand  for  the  wants  of 
man's  spiritual  and  immortal  being ;  an  uninterrupted  and  un- 
diverted flowing  out  of  the  religious  susceptibilities,  in  that  very 
communion  which  exercises  and  strengthens  the  soul  for  its 
coming  perpetual  employment  in  heaven.  The  absence  of  a 
perpetual  Sabbath  in  God's  legislation  would  seem  a  strange 
oversight,  in  the  attainment  of  the  very  end  for  which  all  his 
government  is  administered.  A  Sabbath  must  be  made  for 
man ;  his  piety  cannot  else  be  perfected ;  his  religious  wants 
cannot  otherwise  be  satisfied.  It  is  not  that  he  may  worship 
God  in  a  communion  every  day  alike.  He  has  secular  wants  to 
which  he  must  attend,  and  in  ministering  to  which  he  must  also 
thankfully  and  piously  acknowledge  God ;  but  his  religious  well- 
being  demands  transactions  and  communications  with  this  God 
in  a  special  and  exclusive  manner,  when  no  secular  cares  shall 
be  allowed  to  intrude,  and  no  sensual  interests  disturb.  He 
needs  a  regularly-recurring  day  of  rest  from  all  that  is  secular, 
and  an  opportunity  fully  to  absorb  himself  in  that  which  is 
sacred. 

With  a  Sabbath  there  may  also  be  expected  the  positive  in- 
stitution of  all  necessary  religious  ordinances  for  man's  cultiva- 
tion in  piety.  The  church  should  be  instituted  as  embodying 
the  company  of  the  pious;  its  officers  and  ordinances  should 
be  officially  established,  and  its  general  organization  settled,  to 
hold  on  through  all  time.  Man  cannot  say,  in  many  things, 
what  his  piety  needs,  nor  what  God  will  accept  at  his  hands ; 
hence  God's  own  legislation  must  fix,  at  least,  the  general  out- 
lines of  his  visible  kingdom  and  worship. 

5.  Divine  legislation  may  affix  the  sanctions  of  positive  pen- 
alties. Positive  penalties  might,  at  first  view,  appear  inconsist- 
ent with  the  end  of  Divine  legislation  for  piety's  sake.     Piety  is. 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    IN   JUSTICE.  21$ 

in  its  spirit,  complete  loyaltj' ;  it  obeys  solely  from  love.  Plow 
then  can  it  admit  of  the  constraint  of  positive  penalty?  Obedi- 
ence from  fear  of  the  penalty  cannot  be  piety.  Does  not,  then, 
the  Divine  administration,  in  its  use  of  threatenings,  expect 
obedience  from  other  motives  than  love,  and  consent  to  be 
satisfied  with  something  less  than  complete  loyalty? 

The  following  considerations  will  show  that  the  use  of  pains 
and  penalties;  in  the  Divine  government,  is  still  fully  consistent 
■with  its  end  in  piety  : 

First.  Penalty  is  of  service  to  piety,  even  m  its  restraints  as 
legality.  It  would  be  well  for  the  sinner  to  be  held  back  from 
transgression  by  fear,  though  the  law  was  not  satisfied  by  any 
such  constrained  innocence,  that  other  motives  consistent  with 
piety  might  come  in  and  induce  a  perpetuation  of  conduct  con- 
formed to  law  from  complete  loyalty.  Such  constraint  of  the 
wicked,  from  mere  fear,  would  exclude  the  influence  also  of 
their  open  transgression  upon  the  righteous,  and  withdraw  so 
much  of  temptation  from  man,  and  thus  find  an  end  in  the 
direct  interest  of  piety. 

Seco7idly.  More  directly,  penalty  is  necessary  for  the  sake 
of  piety,  as  an  expression  of  the  Divine  feeling.  Law  expresses 
the  feeling  of  sovereignty  in  no  other  manner,  adequately,  than 
ift  its  sanctions.  The  whole  emphasis  given  to  the  precept  is  in 
the  retribution  appended  to  it.  In  this  only  is  the  true  index 
of  the  sovereign  will.  Here  is  seen  just  how  much  God  hates 
disobedience,  and  though  the  direction  of  the  Divine  will  is 
given  in  the  precept,  yet  is  its  intensity  manifested  only  in  the 
penalty.  In  the  very  penalty  is  made  the  exhibition  of  God's 
regard  for  piety,  by  his  hatred  of  impiety  ;  and  thus  an  exliibi- 
tion  of  the  Divine  character  to  the  holy,  that  they  may  be  the 
more  loyal,  and  love  him  as  their  sovereign  the  more  on  that 
account.  This  is  the  very  end  that  God  seeks  in  the  disclos- 
ure of  his  judgments  ;  not  that  men  should  obey  through  slavish 
fear,  but  tliat  they  should  read  therein  his  hatred  to  sin,  and 


214  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

henceforth  serve  him  because  he  is  a  holy  God,  and  demands 
loyal  obedience. 

Thirdly.  Piety  finds  its  proper  motive  to  obedience  in  the 
very  sanctions.  The  reward  promised  to  the  pious  is  valued  by 
them  in  nothing  so  much  as  that  it  is  an  evidence  of  the  appro- 
bation of  the  Master  they  love  ;  and  the  punishment  threatened 
would  be  in  nothing  so  fearful,  as  that  it  was  the  index  of  God's 
disapprobation  and  displeasure.  To  the  loyal  soul,  it  is  thus 
more  God's  displeasure  that  is  dreaded,  than  hell  j  more  God's 
approbation  that  is  valued,  than  heaven.  All  that  is  seen  in  the 
threatened  hell  is  this  Divine  \vrath ;  and  all  that  is  noticed  in 
the  promised  heaven  is  this  Divine  approbation.  Sufficient  to 
the  loyal  soul  is  it  that  God  approves  and  manifests  the  tokens 
of  his  regard,  and  to  him  there  is  heaven  in  nothing  else.  He 
can  bear  all  sufferings,  if  God  sustain  by  his  approbation ;  he 
cares  for  no  happiness,  if  God  is  not  in  it.  "  His  favor  is  life, 
and  his  loving  kindness  is  better  than  life." 

Thus  in  many  ways  are  the  Divine  sanctions  motives  to  pious 
loyalty ;  and  their  Divine  intention  proves  that  the  end  of  the 
Divine  government  is  piety. 

6.  TJie  promised  reward  must  be  equal  and  coetaneous  with 
the  piety.  If  there  is  no  specific  promise  of  reward  to  obedi- 
ence attached  to  certain  precepts,  still  is  this  reward  always  im- 
plied in  the  converse  of  the  threatened  penalty.  "  In  the  day 
thou  eatest  thereof,  thou  shalt  die,"  no  more  fully  expresses  a 
threat,  than  it  implies  a  promise,  —  in  the  day  thou  eatest  not  of 
it,  thou  shalt  live.  To  all  piety  there  is  the  pledge  of  the  Divine 
approbation  ;  and  this  is  the  very  reward  which  loyalty  seeks,  no 
matter  how  manifested. 

This  is  due  to  loyalty.  It  behooves  God  to  show  his  favor  to 
all  pious  obedience.  When  there  is  piety,  then  must  God  ap- 
prove of  it.  So  long  as  there  is  piety,  and  so  much  as  there  is 
of  it,  so  constant  and  so  great  must  God  show  his  favor.  The 
pious,  from  the  equity  of  the  divine  character,  cannot  fail  of  the 
full  reward  for  all  their  loyalty. 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    IN    JUSTICE.  21 5 

7 .  Tlie  sin  of  the  subject  may  not  admit  of  his  annihilation.  A 
sin  committed  becomes  a  fact  in  the  realm,  and  brings  its  neces- 
sary influences  with  it.  It  is  a  new  causality  introduced  by  the 
sinner,  and  perpetually  working  out  its  effects.  Henceforth  the 
moral  universe  cannot  be  as  if  that  fact  of  sin  had  not  been. 
Henceforth,  therefore,  it  is  due  to  the  universe,  and  it  behooves 
God  in  his  own  righteousness,  to  manifest  a  mark  of  disappro- 
bation precisely  equal  to,  and  perpetually  counteractive  of,  the 
evil  influences  of  that  sinful  fact.  The  fact  admits  of  no  anni- 
hilation, and  the  consequences  of  the  fact  are  themselves  undy- 
ing and  perpetual ;  and  no  coetaneous  displeasure  can  do  that 
which  is  due  to  the  universe,  in  this  perpetual  evil.  That  mani- 
fested displeasure  must  go  down  parallel  with  the  evil  influences 
of  that  sinful  fact,  both  in  the  right  of  the  moral  universe  and 
of  God ;  and  how  shall  that  displeasure  have  its  manifestation 
in  any  annihilation  of  the  sinner?  Considerations  come  in, 
connected  with  sin,  which  may  not  morally  admit  that  the  sinner 
should  ever  cease  to  be,  or  cease  from  being  an  object  of  the 
Divine  disapprobation.  Terrible  as  is  such  a  consideration,  it 
seems  only  the  terror  of  strict  ethical  rectitude.  If  no  provis- 
ion of  grace  were  made,  the  Divine  administration  could  have 
no  corrective  for  sin,  except  perpetual  disapprobation  towards 
the  sinner. 

8.  Retribution  must  synchronize  with  the  sin.  We  have  already 
seen  that  the  reward  must  be  coetaneous  with  the  piety ;  and 
considerations  come  in  with  sin,  which  more  especially  admit  of 
no  delay  of  punishment.  The  penalty  expresses  God's  regard 
for  his  law  ;  how  much  he  hates  disobedience  to  it.  A  time  of 
respite  to  the  sinner  is,  in  its  continuance,  a  time  of  disregard 
to  law,  and  a  plain  contradiction  to  that  feeling  which  the  sanc- 
tion to  the  law  expresses.  All  that  can  ever  demand  the  man- 
ifested Divine  disapprobation,  does  this  at  once  upon  the 
conviction  of  tlie  sin ;  and  if  any  delay  be  given,  the  law  has 
nothing  to  show  why  it  may  not  forbear  as  well  its  threatened 


2l6  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

infliction  forever.  Why,  after  so  long  a  delay,  it  might  well  be 
said,  bring  up  the  punishment  now?  Such  capricious  punish- 
ment would  defeat  the  whole  end  of  penalty  in  upholding  piety. 

9.  An  administration  of  justice  can  allow  no  room  for  par- 
don. In  civil  legislation,  there  may  often  come  in,  from  some 
peculiar  circumstances  of  the  criminal,  considerations  which  will 
make  a  pardon  as  conservative  of  the  end  of  public  freedom, 
as  the  execution  of  the  punishment ;  and,  in  such  a  case, 
pardon  is  morally  righteous.  It  does  not  subvert  tlie  end  of 
the  law. 

But  the  end  of  the  law,  in  the  Divine  government,  is  piety. 
This  is  sustained  in  the  most  effective  manner,  only  through  the 
precisely  adequate  penalty.  The  perfection  of  the  government 
secures  perfect  equity  in  the  law,  and  in  the  conviction  of  the 
sinner,  and  thus  leaves  no  righteous  room  for  pardon.  Just  the 
righteous  threatening  has  been  appended,  and  just  the  amount 
of  guilt  has  been  disclosed,  and  thus  the  penalty  incurred  must 
be  executed,  or  the  ground  at  once  falls  away  on  which  the  law- 
giver's reward  for  piety  had  been  righteously  placed.  The  law 
regards  the  highest  piety  as  end  no  longer,  but  has  consulted 
some  other  end  in  the  pardon  of  the  sinner. 

With  a  penalty  appended  to  law  by  perfect  intelligence,  and 
the  detection  and  conviction  of  guilt  by  complete  omniscience, 
there  remains  in  full  force  the  ethical  claim  for  full  infliction  of 
the  penalty.  Any  remission  would,  so  far,  strike  down  the  end 
of  piety  which  the  law  was  designed  to  subserve. 

10.  The  obedient  can  bring  God  under  no  obligation  beyond 
the  due  approbation  of  their  piety.  The  whole  end  of  the  law  is 
fulfilled  in  love.  It  expresses  God's  love  to  piety.  It  is  de- 
signed to  draw  out  pious  obedience,  which  is  the  service  of 
love.  It  cancels  all  the  claims  of  piety,  in  the  manifestations 
of  God's  love  toward  the  pious.  If  God's  government  has  done 
all  that  love  to  piety  demands,  both  in  the  legislation  and  re- 
warding approbation,  it  has  done  all  that  law  and  government 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    IN    JUSTICE.  21/ 

can  do  ;  and  now  sovereignty  can  make  the  challenge  to  the 
universe,  and  say  what  more  could  1  have  done  for  my  king- 
dom, that  I  have  not  done  in  it. 

If  any  have  sinned,  they  have  done  so  under  all  the  opposing 
considerations  which  God  as  a  sovereign  in  justice  could  pre- 
sent. If  any  righteous  have  been  disturbed  by  sinners,  they 
have  had  all  the  redress  and  assistance  against  the  injury  that 
they  can  demand,  in  the  witness  of  God's  penal  abhorrence  of 
the  sin,  and  his  retributive  favor  for  their  piety.  Their  piety 
must  have  the  approbation  of  all  the  good,  as  truly  as  the  ap- 
probation of  their  own  consciences  ;  and  when  such  is  awarded 
to  them,  they  can  ask  God,  in  equity,  for  nothing  more.  The 
most  complete  piety  has  been  the  servant's  excellency,  and  not 
for  the  sovereign's  aggrandizement.  All  the  homage  rendered 
to  God  has  been  his  due,  and  has  added  nothing  to  him  which 
was  not  his  in  his  own  right ;  and  has  moreover  conduced  to  the 
servant's  highest  well-being  in  the  consummation  of  his  own  excel- 
lence and  dignity.  In  all  this  highest  service  and  God's  appro- 
bation for  it,  it  is  his  to  thank  God  for  the  privilege  of  life  and 
action  under  such  a  government,  not  for  God  to  thank  him  for 
having  performed  his  part  so  well  in  it.  He  has  done  to  God 
only  what  he  ought  to  have  done  in  equity,  and  has  no  claim 
beyond  the  approbation  already  given.  God  has  his  claim  to 
perpetual  gratitude,  that  he  gave  the  subject  his  being,  and 
continues  it  under  such  an  administration ;  the  subject  has  no 
claims  in  equity  for  his  piety,  that  have  not  already  been  can- 
celled in  the  Divine  favor. 

Complete  piety  is  thus  perpetually  a  legal  heaven ;  a  full  re- 
ward of  bliss  to  all  its  worshippers  ;  the  highest  heaven  to  which 
an  angel  can  ascend ;  and  in  that  heaven  spontaneous  praise 
and  gratitude  must  ever  flow  on  as  due  to  God,  and  no  arresting 
of  the  onward  stream  of  thanksgiving  can  occur,  as  if  sometimes 
God  must  reciprocate  and  the  tide  of  gratitude  flow  back  from 
him  to  his  pious  worshippers.     That  current  of  heavenly  praise 


2l8  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

can  never  set  but  in  one  direction ;  it  is  rightfully  and  forever 
flowing  out  from  each  worshipping  spirit  perpetually  toward  the 
throne,  and  received  and  absorbed  by  Him  who  sitteth  upon  it 
as  his  righteous  due  forever  and  ever. 

With  these  leading  principles,  which  must  ever  determine  the 
process  of  an  administration  of  God's  government  in  justice, 
we  have  sufficient  for  our  direction,  in  their  application  to  any 
assumed  system  of  religion,  to  decide  what  is  of  God,  and  what 
is  some  profane  invention  or  spurious  addition  from  man.  The 
pariicidar  duties  of  a  religion,  which  should  be  inculcated  in  an 
administration  of  pure  justice,  must  be  made  out  from  the  com- 
mandments given,  and  which  are  no  part  of  a  system  of  moral 
science  ;  but  the  principles  by  which  we  must  determine  the 
divinity  of  such  a  religion  are  above  made  sufficiently  plain. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE   PROCESS   OF  THE   DIVINE  ADMINISTRATION   IN   GRACE. 

Let  it  be  remarked  here  in  general,  that  ethical  science  is 
purely  a  system  of  ends.  Pure  Morality  has  its  ultimate  end 
in  the  excellency  of  man's  rational  spirit,  and  constrains  in 
duty  for  the  sake  of  the  highest  worthiness  of  reason  alone. 
But  in  other  directions,  other  ends  may  be  perceived  which  it 
may  be  important  to  attain,  but  which  may  never  be  pursued  in 
conflict  with  the  ultimate  end  of  morality.  The  determination 
how  such  ends  may  be  attained  in  consistency  with  morality, 
brings  them  all  within  the  province  of  Ethical  Philosophy. 

Civil  freedom  is  another  end  than  morality,  but  this  may  not 
be  sustained  at  the  expense  of  virtue.  State  authority,  legislat- 
ing for  freedom's  sake,  must  conform  to  pure  morality ;  and  the 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    IN    GRACE.  219 

determination  how  this  may  be  so  eHected,  brings  the  whole 
science  of  jurisprudence  as  a  system  of  ends  in  freedom,  also 
within  the  province  of  Moral  Philosophy. 

And  so  also  is  piety  another  end  than  morality,  yet  must  not 
piety  be  promoted  in  any  conflict  with  virtue.  The  Divine  au- 
thority in  the  end  of  piety  must  accord  with  pure  morality,  and 
the  determination  how  this  may  be  brings  religion  as  truly  as 
jurisprudence  within  the  province  of  Moral  Philosophy. 

And  this  holds  true,  not  only  in  the  Divine  administration  of 
justice,  but  equally  so  in  God's  administration  of  grace.  This 
contemplates  man  as  condemned  by  the  law  of  justice,  and 
hopeless  of  all  restoration  to  piety  and  favor  by  the  mere  action 
of  law,  and  seeks  out  a  way  of  restoration  and  pardon  for  the 
sinner,  and  thus  keeps  fully  in  view  the  end  of  piet)\  But  these 
provisions  of  grace  may  in  no  way  contravene  morality,  and  the 
determination  how  grace  may  prevail,  in  consistency  with  all 
the  claims  of  equity,  brings  the  Christian  scheme  of  Redemp- 
tion, still  in  the  end  of  piety,  within  the  province  of  Moral 
Philosophy. 

All  systems  of  ends  must  harmonize  with  morality,  and  thus 
all  come  within  Moral  Science. 

We  now  take  up  the  Divine  Administration  in  Grace,  and 
seek  to  determine  how  it  must  proceed  in  order  to  a  complete 
conformity  with  pure  morality ;  and  in  order  to  apprehend  tlie 
difficulty,  and  notwithstanding  which,  the  practicability,  also,  of 
such  determined  accordance,  we  shall  need  here  to  recapitulate 
and  bring  under  one  view  our  past  conclusions. 

We  have  already  seen  how  authority  stands  in  complete  con- 
formity with  morality.  Sovereignty  must  have  a  righteous  foun- 
dation in  its  inherent  qualifications  for  governing,  and  must  then 
go  out  within  the  lines  of  its  own  righteous  jurisdiction,  and  in 
this  view  authority  itself  will  bind  the  conscience.  The  man  will 
degrade  his  rationality,  and  act  unworthy  of  himself  as  a  s^jirit- 
ual  being,  if  he  violate  the  mandates  of  righteous  authority. 


220  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

But  authority  is  not  needed  simply  in  pure  morality.  That  is 
obedience  for  virtue's  sake  alone.  The  sole  constraint  is  high- 
est spiritual  worthiness,  and  neither  reward  nor  penalty  can  come 
in  as  any  coercion  in  the  fulfilment  of  moral  duty.  Other  ends 
than  morahty  are,  however,  found  important.  Man  must  hve  in 
societ}',  and  society,  through  its  interacting  choices,  becomes  an 
organic  community  known  as  a  state,  and  the  choices  of  each 
must  be  constrained  in  harmony  with  the  highest  freedom  of 
choice  in  the  whole,  and  hence  the  public  freedom  becomes  an 
important  end  to  be  attained,  and  which  can  only  be  subserved 
by  authority.  If  the  selfish  -will  not  be  restrained  by  purely 
moral  considerations,  then  it  is  perfectly  in  conformity  with  pure 
morality  that  the  state  should  restrain  them,  for  its  freedom's 
sake,  by  pains  and  penalties.  Obedience  from  mere  legality 
does  not  make  the  citizen  virtuous  ;  it  only  answers  the  end  of 
freedom,  and  perseveres  in  political  innocence.  For  freedom's 
sake,  authority  may  righteously  act,  and  constrain  by  pains  and 
penalties. 

So,  again,  man  is  dependent  and  helpless.  In  his  very  con- 
stitution he  finds  the  need  for  an  absolute  ground  of  trust  and 
confidence,  —  an  all-perfect  Being  whom  he  may  revere  and 
adore.  No  conformity  to  all  the  claims  of  pure  morahty,  as 
found  in  the  imperatives  which  a  knowledge  of  his  rational 
being  awakens,  can  satisfy  these  higher  wants  of  his  religious 
being.  "WHien  the  being  of  this  absolute  God  is  recognized, 
there  is  apprehended  at  once,  in  his  perfections,  a  valid  ground 
for  righteous  sovereignty,  and  a  need  that  his  authority  direct 
just  how  these  rehgious  susceptibilities  of  man's  being  should 
go  out  in  pious  service  and  homage.  The  sanctions  to  his  com- 
mandments indicate  his  regard  for  piety  and  his  abhorrence  of 
impiety,  and  these  are  designed  to  induce  obedience  from  the 
cordial  approbation  and  love  of  just  such  a  being.  Such  con- 
straint from  complete  lo}'ality  is  alone  piety.  Not  as  a  hireling 
or  a  slave,  but  solely  with  a  loyal,  trusting,  loving  heart,  does  any 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    IN    GRACE.  221 

obedience  satisf}^  the  Divine  law.  Legality  may  subserve  public 
freedom,  but  not  piety ;  complete  loyalty  only  can  stand  in 
God's  sight.  This  makes  more  than  the  highest  worthiness  of 
the  man,  viewed  in  the  fulfilment  of  all  the  claims  of  his  rational 
spirit  alone  ;  even  the  fulfilment  of  all  the  claims  of  his  religious 
being,  in  obedience  to  an  absolute  sovereign  from  love.  In- 
asmuch as  man  now  knows  himself  to  be  more  than  ethical, 
even  a  religious  being,  so  his  very  morality  demands  of  him  that 
he  should  fulfil  the  claims  of  that  higher  nature  and  obey  God 
from  love  to  him.  A  Divine  government  may  thus  righteously 
use  authority  for  the  end  of  highest  piety. 

But  the  next  step  brings  with  il  great  difficulty  of  explication. 
The  administration  of  justice  is  precisely  adapted,  in  the  Divine 
government,  to  every  claim  of  pure  morality.  The  law  and  its 
sanctions  are  exactly  adapted  to  reveal  the  character  of  God, 
and  throw  the  strongest  influence  upon  man  to  induce  obedience 
and  worship  from  pure  loyalty,  and  thus  in  the  highest  degree 
promote  piety.  But  this  administration  has  failed  to  secure 
universal  piety.  ISIultitudes  are  not  loyal,  but  rebellious.  The 
best  government  that  could  be  administered  in  the  end  of 
piety  has  proved  inefficient ;  and  now,  can  any  new  provision 
be  made  consistent  with  pure  morality?  Should  not  this  ad- 
ministration of  justice  go  on,  blessing  all  the  pious  that  it  may, 
and  punishing  all  the  impious  that  it  must?  So,  I  suppose,  all 
finite  intelligence  must  have  affirmed. 

The  strongest  objections  to  the  Christian  plan  of  redemption 
apply  just  at  this  point.  Among  others  less  profound  is  the 
weighty  difficulty  felt  by  Kant,  in  viewing  Christianity  as  having 
a  common  end  with  morality.  If  Christianity  be  judged  in 
reference  to  the  sole  end  of  pure  morality,  then  is  the  difficulty 
insuperable.  For  no  motive  may  be  allowed  except  the  pure 
love  of  virtue,  and  any  introduction  of  substitution  and  atone- 
ment i;;  immoral.  The  kindness  of  benevolent  sacrifice  may 
demand  gratitude  and  love  from  the  beneficiaries,  but  this  can- 


222  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

not  be  accepted  for  the  pure  love  of  virtue.  No  pure  love  of 
virtue  in  the  substitute  can  stand  for  others,  nor  be  vicarious  for 
theirs  ;  for  pure  morality  demands  personal  virtue.  An  accept- 
ance of  any  thing  else  is  the  subversion  of  immutable  right,  and 
could  only  reflect  at  once  immorality  and  unrighteousness  upon 
any  government  that  should  tolerate  it. 

An  ingenious  philosophical  explanation  is  then  attempted  by 
Kant,  by  which  God  may  ethically  accept  one  who  has  sinned, 
and  who  must  ever  be  imperfect,  but  it  admits  of  no  substitu- 
tion. An  Ideal  of  perfect  humanity,  he  supposes,  may  induce 
to  the  adoption  of  sentiments  leading  to  our  imitation  of  it ;  and 
these  sentiments  as  permanently  active,  though  only  inducing  a 
perpetual  process  toward  perfection  without  the  finite  ever  being 
able  to  complete  it,  may  be  accepted  as  comprehending  in 
them  the  principle  of  perfection.  This  adoption  of  the  Ideal  is 
the  man's  faith  in  the  Son  of  God. 

But  permanent  perpetual  progress  in  good  does  away  no  past 
guilt ;  no  supererogation  can  do  it ;  no  other  person  may  do  it. 
It  is  a  debt  of  sin  and  obligation  to  punishment,  and  the  sinner 
only  can  undergo  it.  No  innocent  being,  how  magnanimous 
soever,  can  bear  it  for  the  guilty.  The  adoption  of  the  new 
sentiment  is  a  self-crucifixion  of  the  old  man ;  and  this  perpetu- 
ated, in  the  perpetual  willingness  of  the  new  man  that  there 
should  be  such  self-crucifixion,  is  a  perpetual  sacrifice  that  gives 
the  ground  of  hope  for  complete  justification.  This  is  Kant's 
Gospel  according  to  pure  ethics. 

But  such  a  spurious  Christian  theory,  as  necessary  to  explain 
away  the  intrinsic  immorality  of  the  Scripture  atonement  from 
the  point  of  view  taken,  finds  no  occasion  from  the  true  point 
of  view,  viz. :  that  the  end  of  God's  government  is  piety,  not 
morality.  Benevolent  suffering  may  promote  love,  and  even 
kindle  it  anew,  if  lost ;  and  thus  secure  obedience  through  com- 
plete loyalty.  This,  not  pure  morality,  is  the  end  of  God's  gov- 
ernment, and  readily  admits  of  Christian  substitution.     But  this 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    OF    GRACE.  223 

gracious  administration  owes  still  to  morality  the  securing  of 
two  distinct  results.  One  is,  the  restoration  to  loyalty  of  so 
many  of  the  lost  as  shall  compensate  for  the  provision  made ; 
the  other,  the  confirmation  of  the  Divine  authority  in  the  pious 
regard  of  all  the  obedient,  at  least  as  effectually  in  the  grace  of 
redemption  as  could  have  been  done  in  the  justice  of  penal 
execution.  All  through  the  Divine  administration,  either  in  jus- 
tice or  grace,  the  grand  end  is  the  highest  piety  in  consistency 
with  righteousness ;  and  thus  the  authority  of  sovereignty  must 
be  sustained  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  shall 
most  strongly  constrain  to  piety  consistently  with  morality  on 
the  other.  In  the  gracious  administration,  the  authority  of  the 
old  administration  must  still  stand,  though  given  up  as  the  way 
of  securing  piety ;  and  higher  influences  to  love  and  loyal  obe- 
dience must  be  brought  in,  securing  the  return  to  allegiance  of 
many  who  would  otherwise  have  remained  incorrigible  in  their 
rebellion.  Without  each  of  these,  the  end  of  piety  and  the 
claim  of  morality  cannot  be  sustained.  We  have  thus  to  deter- 
mine the  process  of  a  gracious  administration,  with  these  two 
results  in  view : 

How  Divine  authority  may  be  sustained  ? 

How  stronger  motives  to  loyalty  may  be  introduced? 


CHAPTER   V. 


THE  PROCESS   IN   THE  DIVINE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  GRACE 
FOR  SUSTAINING  AUTHORITY. 

The  administration  of  justice  failing  in  its  end  by  the  sin  of 
the  subjects,  and  a  new  administration  of  grace  introduced  with 
provisions  for  recovering  the  sinner  to  piety  and  the  Divine 
favor,  it  is  yet  necessary  that  the  authority  which  instituted  and 


224  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

administered  the  old  government  of  justice  should  still  be  re- 
spected and  revered.  That  was  a  righteous  government,  con- 
formed in  all  its  parts  to  every  moral  claim,  and  thus  worthy  of 
everlasting  approbation.  The  same  sovereign  still  reigns  over 
the  same  subjects,  and  only  changes  his  administration,  as  in 
the  changed  circumstances  by  sin  he  must,  in  order  to  attain 
the  unchanged  end  of  piety ;  and  thus  both  for  the  conviction 
of  righteous  condemnation,  and  also  for  the  sustaining  the 
righteous  claims  to  repentance  and  confession  of  the  sin  com- 
mitted, the  authority  of  the  old  form  of  government  must,  in  all 
its  claims,  be  fully  sustained  as  having  been  wholly  righteous 
and  valid.  Some  of  the  principles  which  must  be  recognized 
in  the  process  of  the  administration  of  grace,  for  effecting  this 
vindication  of  authority,  will  here  be  given,  and  which  must  so 
far  determine,  on  ethical  grounds,  how  the  new  administration 
must  be  executed. 

I .  The  principle  of  positive  authority  must  be  peipetuated. 
The  very  end  of  piety  demanded  under  the  old  administration, 
that  laws  should  be  given  in  which  no  reason  could  be  seen 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  which  rested  their  whole  con- 
straint for  obedience  upon  God's  authority  alone.  Nothing 
could  so  effectually  cultivate  confidence  and  dependence  upon 
God,  and  love  to  his  supremacy,  as  the  throwing  of  the  subject 
upon  the  sole  sentiment  of  loyalty,  and  demanding  prompt  obe- 
dience where  no  other  reason  was  given  than  that,  "  thus  saith 
the  Lord."  But  under  the  new  administration  there  is  even  a 
stronger  claim  for  this  from  the  same  source.  Especially  as  a 
sinner  does  the  man's  whole  interest  in  a  religious  experience 
turn  upon  his  confidence  in  his  sovereign,  and  demand  such 
influences  as  shall  best  inspire  with  faith  and  love.  Precepts, 
resting  upon  God's  authority  solely,  must  still  be  given. 

But  more  particularly  is  this  required,  in  order  that  the  gra- 
cious administration  may  in  no  manner  weaken  the  authority  of 
that  in  justice.     There  is  an  ethical  claim,  in  which  it  behooves 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    OF    GRACE.  225 

God  for  his  own  consistency  of  character,  not  in  his  grace  by 
any  means  to  seem  to  discard  his  authority  in  justice.  If  the 
gracious  administration  have  no  precepts  resting  solely  on 
authority,  against  which  the  sin  and  rebellion  of  the  subject  in 
the  former  administration  was  directed,  it  would  necessarily  be 
deemed  a  relinquishment  of  the  whole  principle  of  positive 
authority,  and  stand  out  as  a  fair  implication  and  tacit  admis- 
sion that  God  had  grown  wise  by  experience,  and  now  saw  tlie 
inexpediency  of  introducing  again  that  principle  which  had  been 
the  occasion  of  so  much  disaster  in  the  former  method  of  legis- 
lation. No  such  implication  may  at  all  be  tolerated,  and  hence 
the  gracious  legislation  will  also  include  the  principle  of  positive 
authority.  The  end  of  piety,  consistency  with  morality,  and 
especially  the  vindication  of  Divine  authority  under  the  old 
administration,  all  demand  it. 

2.  The  penalty  of  law  must  not  be  remitted  except  on  some 
ground  of  equivalent  substitution.  The  design  of  the  gracious 
administration  is  to  restore  the  sinner  to  piety  and  the  Divine 
favor.  In  some  way,  therefore,  it  must  contemplate  the  remis- 
sion of  penalty.  The  infliction  of  penalty  is,  essentially,  the 
manifestation  of  Divine  displeasure.  The  very  element,  which 
gives  to  penal  evil  all  its  sting,  is  that  it  carries  to  the  conscience 
the  conviction  of  God's  abhorrence  and  displeasure.  Penalty, 
thus,  must  in  some  way  be  removed,  or  the  Divine  favor  can- 
not be  restored,  since  restoration  to  favor  would  be  the  anni- 
hilation of  that  very  element  which  made  the  evil  to  be  penal. 

As  penalty  itself  cannot  be  endured,  and  grace  prevail,  and 
as  penalty  cannot  be  discarded,  and  leave  the  divine  authority 
without  any  sanction,  some  other  sanction  must  come  into  its 
place.  The  sinner  is  to  be  freed  from  penalty  ;  no  other  being 
can  bear  it  for  him,  inasmuch  as  the  very  essence  of  penalty  is 
Divine  displeasure  against  the  sinner  punished,  and  no  suffering 
by  another  than  the  sinner  can  have  this  ingredient  of  Divine 
displeasure  ;    therefore  something  not  punishment,   but  which 


226  COMPLETE   LOYALTY. 

Other  than  it  is,  yet  to  take  the  place  of  it,  some  substitute  for 
it,  is  yet  to  be  provided. 

And  this  substitute  for  penalty  must  be  fully  equivalent  for  it, 
and  sustain  all  the  ends  which  it  was  designed  to  subserve  as 
well  as  the  full  penalty  inflicted  would  do.  The  penalty  was 
meant  to  be  an  adequate  expression  of  the  sovereign's  will, 
manifesting  how  much  he  was  pleased  with  piety,  and  dis- 
pleased with  impiety;  and  unless  he  designs  to  retract  that 
manifestation  of  his  will,  and  discard  the  equity  and  validity  of 
the  authority  which  has  gone  out  in  his  legislation,  he  must  put 
something  of  at  least  equal  efficacy  for  that  end  in  its  place, 
and  for  the  sake  of  which  the  penalty  may  be  remitted.  Any 
thing  not  a  full  equivalent  would  so  far  impeach  the  sovereign's 
consistency,  as  manifesting  formerly  too  much  regard  to  author- 
ity, or  now  too  little,  and  which  would  itself  be  fatal  to  all 
authority  as  convicting  it  of  immorality. 

3.  The  estimate  of  this  vicarious  equivaletit  must  be  made 
simply  171  reference  to  the  end  of  piety.  The  Divine  administra- 
tion is  not  in  the  end  of  morality,  nor  of  freedom,  but  solely  of 
piety.  We  are  not  at  all  to  look  here  for  that  which  will  sub- 
serve the  ends  of  morality  or  of  civil  polity,  but  solely  the 
interests  of  religion  in  securing  piety.  If  we  were  to  seek  for 
any  substitution  in  pure  morality,  we  should  be  at  once  stopped 
in  its  inconsistency.  The  constraint  in  morality  is  the  pure 
love  of  virtue,  in  the  worthiness  of  character  which  obedience 
secures  ;  and  the  alternative  to  this  is  that  which  alone  can  be 
called  penalty  in  pure  morality,  —  my  own  unworthiness  and 
sense  of  moral  degradation  in  my  immorality.  Here,  no  sub- 
stitute for  the  penalty  is  conceivable  ;  for  conscious  disapproba- 
tion and  debasement  are  as  necessary  for  my  vicious  action  as 
conscious  approbation  and  dignity  are  for  my  virtuous  action. 
Such  penalty  neither  can  be  nor  ought  to  be  changed.  Any  sub- 
stitution here  would  be  an  ethical  absurdity.  We  suppose  no 
such  change ;  we  carefully  discriminate,  and  attempt  to  intro- 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    OF    GRACE.  22/ 

duce  no  such  substitution.     Morality  can  admit  of  no  changes 
of  duty  or  of  penalty ;  of  no  expiation  or  atonement. 

Wlien  we  seek  for  remission  of  punishment  in  civil  govern- 
ment, all  we  need  is  something  to  sustain  the  sovereign  authority, 
in  the  interests  of  public  freedom,  as  well  as  the  penalty ;  and 
if  this  can  be  found,  righteous  commutations  of  punishment, 
and  pardons  of  criminals  may  be  effected  with  no  detriment  to  tlie 
commonweakh.  Substitutions  for  human  penalties  need  only 
to  be  estimated  in  the  interests  of  that  freedom  which  they 
were  designed  to  sustain. 

But  the  end  of  piety  demands  that  all  substitution  be  esti- 
mated solely  in  the  light  of  piety,  and  for  the  sustaining  of 
authority  as  bearing  upon  religious  interest.  The  penalty  may 
have  been  the  best  possible  sanction  to  law  in  its  original  enact- 
ment, and  sustained  the  ends  of  piety  as,  under  mere  law, 
nothing  else  could ;  but,  when  law  has  been  broken  and  piety 
become  lost,  if  there  is  any  substitute  which  will  then  sustain 
law  and  subserve  piety  as  well  as  the  penalty,  it  may  be  taken. 
But  in  estimating  what  it  must  be  that  is  equivalent,  the  end  in 
view  must  not  be  as  if  it  were  in  pure  morality,  nor  as  if  it  were 
in  civil  polity,  but  solely  in  the  end  of  religion  as  sustained  in 
the  authority  of  the  divine  government.  We  shall  be  greatly 
assisted  in  a  righteous  estimate  of  the  Christian  atonement 
when  we  have  accurately  distinguished  the  sole  end  which  it 
can  or  ought  to  subserve. 

4.  All  hope  of  restoration  to  the  Divine  favor  must  rest  on 
the  ground  of  this  eqtcivalent  substitute.  Were  it  supposable 
that  more  than  one  thing  could  be  an  adequate  substitution,  yet 
the  fact  that  one  had  been  instituted  must  necessarily  exclude 
all  others.  It  is  the  sovereign's  prerogative  to  affix  sanctions  to 
law,  and  when  penalty  is  to  .be  remitted  through  a  substitution, 
the  same  considerations  must  make  it  the  prerogative  of  the 
sovereign  to  fix  the  substitute.  Both  penalty  and  substitute  arc 
designed  as  adequate  expressions  of  his  will,  and  he  alone  is 


228  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

competent  to  settle  what  shall  precisely  express  his  regard  for 
piety.  If  the  sovereign  has  not  ratified  the  substitute  in  his  own 
appointment,  there  is  no  validity  in  it,  and  no  confidence  to  be 
put  upon  it ;  and  if  he  has  ratified  a  specific  substitute,  no  con- 
fidence may  be  placed  on  any  other.  God  cannot  righteously 
permit  the  sinner  to  determine  what  substitute  he  will  rest  his 
confidence  upon,  any  more  than  he  may  permit  the  sinner  to 
choose  what  penalty  he  will  consent  to  suffer.  The  penalty  must 
be  of  God's  imposing,  and  the  substitute  must  be  of  God's  in- 
stituting ;  and  the  sinner  who  presumes  to  rest  his  hope  on  any 
other  must  forfeit  all  the  advantages  offered  in  the  gracious  ad- 
ministration His  presumption,  in  putting  his  own  in  the  place 
of  God's  revealed  substitute  for  the  penalty,  must  really  aggra- 
vate his  condemnation,  and  augment  the  executed  penalty. 

All  penances,  ritual  observances,  self-righteous  impositions, 
and  substitutions  of  any  kind  for  the  one  grand  substitute  of 
God's  providing,  must  be  not  only  vain  but  truly  heaven-provok- 
ing. We  must  see  in  that  substitute  God's  own  expression  of 
feeling,  or  we  get  no  sanction  to  his  law,  nor  support  for  his 
authority,  and  of  course  nothing  which  ought  to  stand  instead 
of  the  literally-executed  penalty. 

5.  So7ne  ma7iifestation  of  the  Divi7ie  displeasure  must  be 
made  against  sin,  while  the  p?'obation  in  grace  is  progressing. 
The  old  penalty  is  forborne,  and  patience  spares  the  condemned 
sinner.  A  new  trial  on  thfe  footing  of  grace  has  commenced, 
and  if  this  trial  eventuate  in  reformation  and  return  to  pious 
loyalty,  the  old  penalty  is  to  be  wholly  abrogated,  and  the  re- 
formed sinner  received  into  everlasting  favor. 

But  while  this  delay  lasts  to  give  space  for  a  new  trial,  and 
holds  back  the  stroke  of  the  old  penalty,  it  is  due  to  God's 
authority,  and  demanded  in  the  end  of  piety,  that  God  keep 
up  some  manifested  displeasure  against  the  offence  which  has 
subverted  the  end  of  the  old  administration.  It  will  not  be  the 
execution  of  the  old  penalty,  for  that  is  held  in  abeyance  j  but 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    OF    GRACE.  22g 

it  will  be  some  form  of  suffering,  in  a  curse  which  will  mark  his 
displeasure  against  the  sin,  and  at  the  same  time  conform  to  the 
ends  of  recovery  in  the  gracious  administration.  It  will  serve 
as  a  discipline,  and  not  stand  out  as  a  vindictive  retribution. 

This  may  come  as  some  curse  upon  the  ground,  or  upon  man 
himself  in  his  sentient  being,  which  shall  last  through  all  the 
generations  of  the  spared  race,  and  under  which  the  creation 
shall  groan  and  travail  in  pain  from  the  beginning  of  sin  on- 
wards. The  displeasure  of  God,  and  his  abhorrence  of  the  old 
iniquity,  may  terribly  admonish  the  subjects  of  grace  through 
their  whole  life  of  suffering  and  bereavement  and  sickness  and 
final  death  of  the  body ;  yet  it  will  not  be  in  the  penal  infliction 
of  judgment  without  mercy,  but  a  severe  discipline  in  mercy,  so 
that  all  may  remember  the  great  fact  that  God  terribly  abhors  sin 
even  while  he  makes  provision  to  pardon  it,  and  waits  for  his 
spared  subjects  to  turn  from  it.  He  chastises  as  a  father ;  he 
admonishes  as  a  teacher ;  but  he  does  not  yet  punish  as  a  sov- 
ereign judge  and  executioner.  He  waits  to  be  gracious,  though 
his  waiting  is  amid  all  the  severe  but  salutary  discipline  which  is 
designed  to  bring  back  to  piety. 

In  all  the  above  principles,  the  new  administration  will  keep 
the  vindication  of  the  Divine  authority  out  permanently  before 
mankind,  for  the  end  of  highest  piety. 


CHAPTER    VI. 


THE  PROCESS   IN  A  GRACIOUS  ADMINISTRATION  BY  WHICH 
STRONGER   INFLUENCES   TO   LOYALTY  ARE  GIVEN. 

The  old  administration  of  justice  failed  of  its  end  in  securing 
piety,  and  the  new  administration  is  introduced  for  the  end  of 
restoring   multitudes  to   piety.     There    is    no   reason   for   this 


230  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

change  of  administration  from  justice  to  grace,  if  the  latter 
cannot  secure  the  sinner's  return  to  loyahty.  But  surely  all 
such  results  may  well  be  deemed  hopeless,  if  in  the  new  admin- 
istration there  be  not  provision  made  for  higher  motives  and 
stronger  influences  to  love  and  obedience  than  the  old  adminis- 
tration exhibited  and  exerted.  That  failed  to  secure  perpetu- 
ated piety,  though  beginning  in  loyalty ;  the  same  measure  of 
influence  cannot,  therefore,  be  deemed  adequate  to  restore  and 
confirm  piety  in  subjects  already  rebellious. 

There  is,  then,  an  ethical  claim,  if  a  gracious  administration 
be  introduced,  that  it  shall  provide  stronger  influences  to  piety 
than  the  old  administration  presented.  That  gave  as  strong  an 
exhibition  of  the  sovereign's  regard  to  piety  as  justice  could 
secure,  but  the  failure  of  that  may  give  occasion  for  presenting 
new  and  higlier  motives  than  could  at  first  have  been  possible. 
Such  occasions  for  subsequent  higher  gracious  influences  fore- 
seen, justified  the  introduction  of  the  first  form  of  adminis- 
tration, though  it  was  well  known  to  Omniscience  that  its 
introduction  would  be  followed  by  the  failure  of  its  own  direct 
end.  But  now  in  the  introduction  of  the  gracious  legislation, 
the  wisdom  and  consistency  of  the  sovereign  can  be  vindicated 
in  no  other  manner  than  by  introducing  means  of  greater  influ- 
ence. The  form  of  government  ought  not  to  change,  if  the 
interests  of  piety  can  gain  nothing. 

We  need,  thus,  to  determine  how  the  end  of  Divine  legisla- 
tion in  piety  may  be  reached  through  a  more  efficacious  process 
than  any  administration  of  justice  could  supply.  The  form  of 
justice  must  first  be  taken  ;  afterwards  grace  may  come  in,  and 
be  more  effective  in  the  apphcation  of  the  following  higher 
motives  : 

I,  The  benevolence  manifested  in  the  substitution  itself.  In 
the  administration  of  justice,  every  command  and  sanction  was 
in  full  conformity  with  morality,  and  thus  all  its  motives  to  piety 
fairly  appealed  to  the  conscience  of  the  subject.     Every  sinner, 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    OF    GRACE.  23 1 

therefore,  knows  his  desert  of  punishment,  and  that  its  infliction 
would  be  righteous.  But  if  just  at  the  point  when  the  arm  is 
uplifted  to  strike  the  terrible  blow  so  consciously  deserved,  the 
sovereign  at  his  own  expense  effects  a  way  for  deliverance  and 
arrests  the  descending  stroke  of  the  executioner,  nothing  can 
appeal  more  forcibly  to  the  sinner  to  repent  and  return  to 
loyalty,  than  this  melting  kindness  in  the  breast  of  offended 
sovereignty.  The  sternness  of  authority  changes  to  compassion, 
and  the  vengeance  of  sovereignty  relapses  into  the  most  benevo- 
lent regard  before  the  eyes  of  the  rebels  themselves.  They  see 
presented  a  plan  which  fully  sustains  his  own  authority  and 
majesty,  and  which  also  includes  the  reformation,  pardon,  and 
restoration  of  the  guilty ;  and  in  this  benovolence  there  is  alto- 
gether a  stronger  influence  to  melt  and  reclaim  the  guilty  than 
in  all  the  terrible  preparation  for  the  full  execution  of  the  legal 
penalty. 

Here  is  the  yearning  heart  of  kindness  ;  the  tenderness  of  a 
father  [  and  it  works  more  powerfully  upon  the  obdurate  heart 
and  the  stubborn  will  of  the  rebel,  to  melt  in  love  and  recover 
to  loyalty,  than  all  the  frowns  and  vindictive  penal  retributions 
of  offended  sovereignty. 

2.  T/ie  influence  of  patience.  In  a  government  of  justice 
there  is  no  place  for  patience.  This  is  delay  of  infliction,  when 
the  penalty  has  been  incurred ;  and  such  delay  is  injustice,  un- 
less some  substitute  for  penalty  be  presented.  On  the  ground 
of  an  adequate  substitution,  patience  may  endure  even  to  long- 
suffering.  And  such  delay  of  penal  infliction  not  merely  gives 
time  for  reflection,  and  tlie  working  of  conviction  and  self- 
condemnation  in  the  experience  of  the  sinner,  but  it  is  itself  a 
strong  motive  to  break  off  from  a  course  of  sin,  which  has  already 
exhausted  so  much  of  the  Divine  forbearance.  The  reflection, 
that  Divine  long-suffering  has  been  so  much  abused,  is  a  motive 
of  growing  intensity  to  abuse  no  longer,  but  to  confess  and  re- 
turn and  seek  reconciliation. 


232  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

A  wicked  heart  may  use  the  occasion  of  patience  to  sin  the 
more  determinedly,  and  "  because  sentence  against  an  evil  work 
is  not  executed  speedily,  therefore,  it  may  be  the  more  fully  set 
to  do  evil."  But  this  is  a  gross  perversion  and  resistance  of  its 
natural  influence.  The  proper  tendency  is  to  shame  for  the 
long  abuse,  and  a  discontinuance  of  it ;  and  this  must  be  re- 
sisted by  a  more  desperate  stubbornness  of  will,  in  order  to  be 
overborne  and  discarded.  "  The  goodness  of  God  leadeth 
to  repentance,"  and  especially  goodness  in  the  form  of  patient 
delay  of  deserved  punishment ;  and  that  heart  must  be  desper- 
ately wicked  which  takes  advantage  of  the  very  kindness  that 
spares,  to  sin  the  more  determinedly  against  it. 

3.  The  influence  of  offered  pardon.  A  conviction  of  utter 
hopelessness  in  sin  induces  sullen  despair  or  malignant  reckless- 
ness. A  state  of  mind  is  induced  which  will  not  admit  of  the 
salutary  reflection  of  ill-desert  and  well-merited  retribution. 
The  agony  of  present  punishment,  and  the  fearful  looking-for  of 
more  fiery  indignation,  drives  off  all  the  preliminary  conditions 
of  reformation,  and  shuts  out  the  considerations  which  might 
lead  to  a  return  of  piety  and  loyal  subjection.  Hopelessness  in 
sin  paralyzes  all  effort  to  escape  from  it. 

But  an  administration  of  grace  at  once  throws  the  light  of 
hope  upon  the  sinner's  condition.  The  way  is  open  to  return 
to  loyalty,  and  receive  an  entire  amnesty  for  the  past  and  per- 
petual favor  for  the  future.  Such  an  offer  of  pardon,  seen  to  be 
both  consistent  and  sincere,  is  an  affecting  motive  to  come  in 
confession,  to  ask  for  it,  and  gladly  take  it  from  the  gracious 
sovereign.  Self-moved,  God  prepares  the  way  for  it,  and  makes 
the  proposal.  Instead  of  vindicating  his  authority  by  judgment, 
he  provides  pardon  in  his  mercy.  Misery  may  now  be  avoided, 
and  bliss  secured ;  the  wrath  of  justice  may  be  averted,  and  the 
favor  of  grace  gained ;  the  pangs  of  conscience  in  its  guilt  may 
be  -relieved,  and  the  peace  of  self-approbation  acquired  ;  and 
such  considerations  must  tend  back  to    piety  and    allegiance 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    OF    GRACE.  233 

more  strongly  than  any  motives  which  justice  and  judgment 
may  offer.  \Vhat  the  law  could  not  do,  because  in  its  condem- 
nation it  works  "concupiscence"  and  '"death,"  the  grace 
in  the  Gospel  of  the  new  administration  may  effect,  through 
its  forgiving  spirit.  Hope  takes  away  the  sullenness  of  desper- 
ation. 

4.  The  ifispiring  appeal  to  personal  worthiness  and  dignify. 
The  fact  of  man's  conscious  guilt  does  not  destroy  his  con- 
sciousness of  rational  faculty  and  religious  endowment,  nor 
does  it  diminish  the  conviction,  that  his  true  dignity  can  be 
attained  only  in  the  way  of  piety  and  obedience  to  God.  The 
most  hardened  rebel  against  the  throne  of  heaven  knows  that 
his  suppression  of  all  reverence  and  homage,  and  his  withdraw- 
ment  of  all  trust  and  dependence,  is  really  his  degradation  and 
his  shame.  His  ingratitude  and  contempt  debase  him.  He 
well  knows  that  nothing  can  take  from  him  this  debasement 
and  shame,  but  returning  allegiance,  confidence,  and  love. 

Confession  of  sin,  contrition  of  heart  before  God,  deep  hu- 
mility manifested  in  all  ways  of  suitable  expression,  are  becom- 
ing to  the  sinner ;  and  it  is  a  very  false  sense  of  human  dignity, 
and  really  nothing  but  the  most  contemptible  self-conceit,  to 
stand  out  in  sullen  pride  before  the  majesty  of  an  offended 
sovereign.  Humility  before  God  is  man's  honor ;  prostrate 
adoration  is  the  subject's  dignity  and  glory,  in  the  light  of  eter- 
nal truth.  Even  angels  are  never  more  exalted  than  when 
"  covering  their  faces  with  their  wings,"  they  cry  before  the 
Divine  presence,  "  holy,  holy,  holy,  Lord  God  Almighty." 

The  new  administration  provides  for  such  return  to  allegiance 
and  homage,  and  gives  occasion  for  God  to  confirm  the  manli- 
ness and  dignity  of  such  restored  loyalty,  in  his  open  approba- 
tion and  acceptance  of  it ; .  and  surely  such  an  influence  must 
be  highly  arousing  and  inspiriting.  It  stimulates  to  renewed 
struggles  against  all  that  debases  man,  more  than  the  applica- 
tion  of   legal   severity   can   ever   effect.     Man   was   made   to 


234  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

confide  and  worship,  to  serve  and  adore  ;  and  if  in  his  impiety 
he  has  "  cast  off  the  fear  of  God  and  restrained  prayer  before 
him,"  it  is  his  shame ;  and  he  can  never  recover  his  lost  worthi- 
ness till  he  comes  back  in  confession  and  contrition,  and  owns 
again  his  obligations  of  obedience.  God's  gracious  interposi- 
tion invites  to  such  return,  and  appeals  to  all  such  sentiments 
of  true  dignity  and  honor,  and  works  more  strongly  to  reclaim 
to  this  manly  dignity  through  all  that  is  ingenuous  and  ennobling, 
than  any  penal  terrors  can  be  made  to  effect. 

5.  The  augmented  manifestation  of  the  Divine  regard  for 
piety.  The  sanction  was  designed  as  an  adequate  and  exact 
expression  of  God's  regard  to  law,  and  the  end  of  piety  it  had 
in  view.  It  said,  as  plainly  as  law  could  be  made  to  speak,  that 
God  desires  piety  in  his  subjects  with  a  strength  of  feeling  com- 
mensurate with  all  the  reward  promised,  and  that  he  hates 
impiety  proportioned  to  all  the  penalty  threatened.  And  when 
the  sin  has  been  committed  and  the  penalty  incurred,  the  exe- 
cution of  this  penalty  in  the  view  of  all  his  subjects,  whether 
obedient  or  rebellious,  is  simply  the  confirmation  of  this  regard, 
in  precisely  this  degree  of  intensity.  The  inflicted  penalty  only 
confirms  the  precise  degree  of  feeling  expressed  in  the  threatened 
penalty. 

Moreover,  while  the  actual  infliction  gives  no  augmented 
manifestation  of  God's  abhorrence  of  impiety  beyond  the 
original  threatening,  so  also  this  infliction  can  carry  its  influ- 
ence for  piety  only  to  the  spectator  and  not  to  the  sufferer.  To 
the  sinner  punished,  it  is  wrath  without  mercy.  It  is  wholly 
vindictive  and  not  disciplinary.  It  may  avail  to  restrain  others 
from  rebellion,  but  can  secure  no  reformation  in  the  punished 
sinner  himself.  As  penal,  it  is  not  God's  manifestation  of 
strong  feeling  for  the  sinner's  recovery,  inasmuch  as  that  is 
already  a  foregone  conclusion,  and  hopeless  of  all  realization 
in  justice.  He  is  treated  as  wholly  incorrigible,  and  the  judg- 
ment inflicted  is  in  no  expectation  of  repentance  and  restora- 


THE    DIVINE    ADMINISTRATION    OF    GRACE.  235 

tion,  but  as  a  vindication  of  authority  in  the  end  of  piety  on  the 
behalf  of  others. 

But  in  the  provisions  of  grace,  where  the  manifestation  is 
given  that  God  himself  makes  sacrifices  for  the  sinner's  return 
to  just  the  extent  of  the  manifested  sacrifice  in  the  substitution, 
does  God  augment  the  expression  of  his  regard  for  piety  above 
what  is  exhibited  in  the  penalty ;  and  this  not  merely  before 
those  subjects  who  have  remained  loyal,  but  before  and  directly 
in  behalf  of  the  guilty  themselves.  He  really  "  magnifies  "  his 
law  in  augmenting  the  expression  of  his  regard  for  piety  more 
than  the  penalty  threatened  or  inflicted  could ;  and  this  in  the 
most  melting  and  effective  method  possible,  by  his  own  sacrifice 
for  the  sinner's  redemption.  God  thus  commends  his  love  to 
the  lost,  and  in  this  gives  the  highest  possible  influence  for 
loyalty.  "  Herein  is  love,  not  that  we  first  loved  God,  but  that 
he  first  loved  us." 

And  this  influence  is  made  to  reach  over  the  whole  Divine 
government,  in  its  augmented  force  towards  universal  loyalty. 
The  already  loyal  see  here  the  feelings  of  the  sovereign  towards 
piety,  with  a  strength  and  tenderness  that  no  penal  infliction 
could  ever  manifest ;  and  the  guilty  themselves  have  the  most 
affecting  appeal  possible,  to  cease  at  once  from  all  rebellion  to 
so  much  love,  and  become  the  loyal  worshippers  and  servants 
of  their  rightful  Lord  again.  And  thence  onward,  when  restored 
to  piety  and  favor,  the  influence  of  this  sacrifice  in  their  redemp- 
tion lasts,  and  stimulates  their  obedience  in  love  and  their  songs 
of  praise  for  eternity.  The  feelings  of  God,  shining  through  all 
the  scene  of  prepared  and  accepted  substitution,  act  on  the 
universe  of  moral  beings  in  favor  of  pious  loyalty,  as  no  legal 
exhibitions  of  the  Divine  justice  could  ever  equal. 

6.  New  institutions  of  ritual  observances.  For  the  cultivation 
of  piety,  it  behooves  the  Divine  lawgiver,  by  positive  enact- 
ments, to  institute  religious  ordinances  and  ritual  observances, 
by  which  the  method  of  approach  to  God  shall  be  regulated. 


236  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

and  the  general  order  of  Divine  worship  promoted.  This  would 
be  ethically  required  under  an  administration  in  justice,  and  still 
more  especially  under  an  administration  of  grace.  As  a  sinner, 
man  will  be  less  able  to  order  his  manner  of  approach  to  the 
Deity  acceptably,  without  Divine  direction,  than  when  holy. 
Many  things  might  seem  to  discourage  and  perhaps  forbid 
approach  to  God  by  the  sinner,  did  not  God  himself  invite  to  it 
and  direct  in  the  manner  that  he  would  accept  it. 

A  system  of  legislation  in  grace  must  thus  continue  positive 
regulations  in  many  things,  and  direct  in  reference  to  the  times 
and  the  order  of  worship,  and  also  establish  positive  institutions 
bearing  upon  the  general  culture  of  piety  and  the  religious 
instructions  and  discipline  of  its  subjects.  The  manner  of  the 
sinner's  approach  to  God  must  necessarily  differ  from  that  which 
was  permitted  to  him  in  his  holiness,  and  all  ritual  observances 
must  be  modified  from  the  nature  of  the  substitution  which  is 
made  vicarious  for  penalty,  and  new  regulations  from  God  must 
determine  all  these  modifications. 

They  may  be  anticipated  as  of  two  varieties  :  such  as  are 
designed  to  prepare  the  fallen  race  to  apprehend  and  receive 
the  new  administration  in  its  clearness  and  completeness,  and 
such  as  are  adapted  to  build  them  up  on  the  foundation  of  the 
substitution  when  actually  laid  and  clearly  apprehended.  The 
first  will  be  typical  and  symbolical,  teaching  through  shadows 
which  foretoken  the  coming  substance ;  and  these  will  be  mul- 
tiplied, particular  and  precise,  according  to  the  darkness  of  the 
human  mind,  and  its  incapacity  to  directly  apprehend  spiritual 
realities.  The  second  will  be  more  direct,  simple,  and  spiritual, 
teaching  the  very  nature  and  principles  of  the  new  dispensation, 
and  corresponding  openly  to  the  plain  doctrines  and  duties  of 
the  gospel  system.  One  will  be  temporary,  and  only  as  a 
schoolmaster  to  teach  what  is  coming ;  the  other  will  last  to 
the  consummation,  and  be  adapted  to  the  open  vision  of  the 
things  in  the  new  covenant,  with  all  its  promises  and  duties. 


GENERAL  RESULTS  OF  A  GRACIOUS  ADMINISTRATION.     23/ 

And  now  all  these  ordinances  of  grace  will  have  a  higher 
meaning,  and  a  stronger  influence  for  piety,  tlian  any  of  the  in- 
stitutions of  the  old  administration  of  justice.  All  the  ritual 
observances  will  embody  those  affecting  manifestations  of  love 
and  mercy  which  are  contained  in  the  plan  of  substitution,  and 
will  thus  hold  constantly  forth  to  view  the  deeper  regard  for 
piety  expressed  in  the  sacrifice  the  sovereign  makes,  and  thus 
the  stronger  motive  to  bring  the  rebel  back  to  loyalty.  Some, 
as  the  Sabbath,  may  belong  to  both  dispensations ;  but  in  that 
of  grace  it  will  be  made  to  have  a  higher  import,  and  speak  of 
sacrifice  and  substitution,  and  not  merely  of  creation  and  provi- 
dential supervision.  Others  will  be  wholly  new,  organizing 
the  body  of  reclaimed  believers  and  worshippers,  bringing  them 
into  visible  communion  and  fellowship,  and  giving  to  them  all 
"  one  Lord,  one  faith,  and  one  baptism."  In  all  ways,  the  new 
ordinances  will  throw  upon  the  heart  a  tenderer  influence  to 
soften,  and  sweeter  to  win  the  sinner  again  to  duty ;  and  all 
conspire  to  hold  the  reclaimed  in  perpetual  loyalty,  beyond  what 
all  the  force  of  law  and  justice  could  accomplish. 


CHAPTER    VII. 


GRAND    RESULTS    IN    THE   INTRODUCTION   OF  AN   ADMINIS- 
TRATION  OF   GRACE. 

Some  necessary  conclusions,  resulting  from  the  provisions  in 
an  administration  of  grace,  stand  out  as  permanent  ethical  prin- 
ciples, and  which  should  be  here  concisely  stated. 

I .  Tlie  principles  of  grq.ce  do  not  subvert  those  of  justice. 
Legislation  must  commence  with  positive  institutions,  and  ordi- 
nances for  piety  on  the  ground  of  justice,  Grace  can  only 
come  in  when  justice  has  failed  in  securing  perpetual  loyalty. 


238  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

The  higher  influences  can  only  be  introduced,  when  the  sanc- 
tions of  law  have  been  propounded,  the  precept  violated,  and 
the  penalty  incurred. 

But  morality  forbids  that  the  substitution  for  penalty,  and  the 
provisions  for  reclaiming  to  loyalty,  should  subvert  equity  and 
justice.  No  means  for  reclaiming  to  piety  may  conflict  with 
immutable  morality  and  righteousness.  With  these  claims  of 
morality  the  administration  of  justice  fully  accorded,  and  thus 
no  gracious  provisions  can  subvert  the  old  administration.  Its 
principles  are  forever  ethically  sound  and  valid,  and  its  subver- 
sion is  an  ethical  impossibility.  The  Divine  government  may 
change  its  process  from  justice  to  grace,  but  may  never  deny  its 
valid  authority  in  either.  The  sovereign  may  change  his  throne 
and  sceptre,  but  in  taking  the  throne  and  sceptre  of  grace,  he 
does  not  demolish,  but  only  for  the  occasion  leaves  unoccupied, 
those  of  justice.  The  old  administration  is  not  subverted,  the 
new  is  only  on  occasion  substituted  for  it.  All  antinomian  con- 
clusions are  wholly  precluded  by  the  true  apprehension  of  the 
equivalent  substitution  in  grace. 

2.  The  incorrigible  sin?ier,  under  grace,  is  left  to  a  "  sorer 
punishment^  The  penalty  in  justice  has  been  held  back  in  the 
provisions  of  grace  that  there  might  be  an  opportunity  for  a 
new  trial  and  discipline  in  the  end  of  piety.  The  whole  reason 
and  aim  of  the  new  administration  is  recovery  to  loyalty,  and 
confirming  all  who  are  loyal.  At  no  time  has  it  released  any 
subject  from  the  obligations  of  perpetual  allegiance,  or  with- 
drawn ultimately  the  old  penalty,  if  a  return  to  allegiance  is 
not  gained. 

If  then,  in  any  case,  this  provision  of  mercy  through  an 
equivalent  substitution  fail  to  reclaim,  the  whole  provision  is 
made  useless ;  the  substitute  wholly  discarded ;  and  tlie  sub- 
ject continues,  by  his  own  stubbornness,  still  under  the  old 
penalty.  The  new  provision  profits  nothing  to  him,  without  a 
retiirn  to  piety.     But  this  old  penalty  does  not  now  stand  in- 


GENERAL  RESULTS  OF  A  GRACIOUS  ADMINISTRATION.     239 

curred  as  when  the  sin  was  solely  against  law.  There  is  the 
superadded  guilt  of  mercy  rejected,  grace  despised,  God's  sac- 
rifice reproached  and  dishonored.  The  impiety  is  far  more  dar- 
ing and  obstinate  than  that  which  slights  God's  will  as  expressed 
only  in  his  law.  The  condemnation  must  in  tlie  same  way  be 
aggravated.  The  impiety  is  greatly  augmented,  and  thus,  ethi- 
cally, the  ultimate  punishment  is  proportionally  enhanced. 

3.  The  one  plan  of  gracious  substitution  must  preclude  all 
further  gracious  interposition.  We  have  seen  that  there  may 
be  equivalent  substitution  for  penalty,  but  we  now  show  that 
there  can  be  no  new  substitution  for  the  rejected  vicarious  sub- 
stitute. An  adequate  substitution  for  penalty  involves  principles 
which  must  make  that  one  exclusive  and  ultimate.  Penalty  for 
piety's  sake  may  not  be  transmuted  for  something  which  may 
itself  have  its  substitute.  In  the  one  sacrifice  of  God  rejected, 
there  "  remaineth  no  more  sacrifice  for  sin  "  \  for  such  tamper- 
ing with  both  justice  and  grace  would  take  away  all  veneration 
for  either,  and  render  all  reclaiming  of  the  sinner,  and  confirm- 
ing of  the  righteous,  the  more  hopeless.  Mercy  would  become 
a  weakness,  and  grace  capricious,  and  the  plan  to  reclaim 
would  defeat  its  own  end  by  destroying  all  its  influence  for  piety, 
and  directly  encouraging  delay  and  perseverance  in  transgression. 

One  plan  of  substitution,  both  on  the  ground  of  the  nature  of 
the  sacrifice  and  of  the  influence  upon  piety,  must  exhaust  the 
gracious  provisions  of  sovereignty,  and  exclude  all  further  over- 
tures of  reconciliation.  An  ethical  barrier  would  lie  against 
more  than  one  equivalent  substitution  for  legal  penalty,  inas- 
much as  both  justice  and  grace  would  be  thus  degraded. 

4.  //  must  secure  the  permanent  piety  of  the  reclaimed.  Mercy 
should  not  rejoice  against  judgment,  only  to  have  judgment 
again  triumph  over  mercy.  If  God  had  not  foreseen  the  results 
which  might  be  secured  by  such  gracious  interposition,  there 
would  have  been  no  wisdom  in  bringing  in  the  gracious  admin- 
istration.    If  it  did  not  secure  that  many  should  become  again 


240  COMPLETE    LOYALTY. 

loyal,  it  would  have  behooved  him  not  to  have  introduced  it. 
The  end  of  piety  would  not  thus  have  been  promoted,  but 
hindered. 

And  if  the  perpetuation  of  such  reformed  sinners  in  their 
loyalty  were  not  secured,  and  their  voluntary  service  of  God 
henceforth  a  certainty  to  God,  the  same  ethical  regard  to  his 
own  excellency  must  have  prevented  the  entering  on  an  ex- 
pedient for  piety's  sake,  which  it  was  foreseen  would  only  at 
last  mock  the  mercy  that  had  adopted  it. 


Such  are  the  leading  Principles  of  all  Divine  legislation ;  the 
specific  Duties,  which  might  be  determined  from  them,  are  bet- 
ter found  in  the  revealed  commandments  divinely  proclaimed. 


THIRD    DIVISION. 


PARENTAL    GOVERNMENT. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  FAMILY. 

UNDER  the  head  of  Authority,  Family  Government  is  put 
last,  because  it  combines  in  itself  both  the  legality  and 
loyalty  which  are  distributively  in  civil  and  divine  legislation, 
and  is  on  that  account  better  examined  after  attending  to  them, 
though  its  end  is  preliminary  and  preparatory  to  them  both. 

By  the  Family  is  meant  those  habitually  resident  in  the  same 
dwelling ;  including  parents,  children,  and  servants.  It  is  the 
most  important  institution  in  the  social  being  of  any  community. 
It  is  in  some  respects  the  foundation  of  the  state,  and  the  source 
of  that  nurture  and  discipline  which  is  to  prepare  for  the  duties 
of  this  life  and  the  retributions  of  eternity. 

The  Family  is  itself  a  distinct  organic  community,  having 
within  itself  its  own  separate  rights,  wants,  and  interests  ;  its 
own  authority,  polity,  and  duties ;  and  society  is  not  so  much 
an  aggregation  of  individuals,  as  a  compoeition  of  many  distinct 
families  of  blended  sympathies  and  dependencies.  The  parents, 
as  the  social  head  of  the  family,  have  the  right  of  authority,  and 
the  children  and  servants  are  -in  their  respective  stations  the  sub- 
jects of  this  domestic  polity. 

Tlie  parental  right  to  authority  is  not  constituted  in  the  simple 
fact  of  the  parental  relation,  but  in  the  qualification  from  maturity 

241 


242  LEGALITY  ANO  LOYALTY. 

of  wisdom,  natural  affection,  dignity,  and  honor,  which  is  rela- 
tively in  the  parent,  and  which  best  secures  the  attainment  of 
the  ends  of  family  government.  If  the  parent  be  quite  intel- 
lectually imbecile,  or  very  morally  depraved,  the  government  of 
the  household  should  come  under  a  different  guardianship. 
But  ordinarily  the  characteristics  of  the  parental  relation  indicate 
the  possession  of  those  attributes  which  will  best  attain  the  ends 
of  domestic  authority. 

The  end  of  parental  authority  is  two-fold,  and  designed  to  fit 
the  silbjects  of  it  for  the  two  respective  governments  under 
which  it  ultimately  issues  them,  —  the  Civil  and  the  Divine 
legislation.  The  parent  stands  to  the  child,  in  an  important 
respect,  both  as  the  state  and  as  God.  The  magistrate  and  the 
Deity  both  govern  the  child  through  the  parent,  —  in  early  years, 
especially,  almost  wholly  so  ;  and  the  parent  is  directly  respon- 
sible both  to  the  state  and  to  God  for  the  administration  of  the 
entire  domestic  polity,  as  it  bears  ultimately  upon  these  two 
sovereignties  under  which  the  family  subjects  are  soon  to  be  in- 
troduced. The  fulfilment  of  the  duties,  in  the  end  of  one,  will 
not  compensate  for  any  neglect  in  those  which  relate  to  the  end 
of  the  other.  The  nurture  which  trains  for  God  will,  it  is  true, 
also  prepare  for  the  state,  inasmuch  as  a  loyal  subject  of  God's, 
government  will  necessarily  be  a  good  citizen ;  but  God,  will 
excuse  no  parent,  who  has  trained  his  child  to  legal  obedi- 
ence, if  he  has  not  also  taught  him  loyally  to  obey  God 
from  love. 

There  may  be  mentioned  another  end  of  family  government, 
in  the  peace  of  tJie  family  itself,  while  the  members  of  it  con- 
tinue their  residence  together.  This  will  really  be  of  precisely 
the  same  nature  as  the  end  of  civil  government.  The  family 
is,  in  this  view,  a  litde  state ;  and  the  individual  choices  of  its 
members  must  be  controlled  by  a  regard  to  the  righteous  choice 
of  the  whole,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  the  family  freedom. 
The  parent  is  bound  to  see  that  one  member  does  not,  in  the 


THE    FAMILY.  243 

execution  of  his  choices,  encroach  upon  the  rights,  and  thus 
upon  the  freedom  of  another ;  and  must  exercise  his  sovereignty 
to  preser\^e  the  freedom  of  all  from  the  encroachment  of 
any.  This  regard  to  the  end  of  the  family  freedom  will  be 
fulfilled  in  mere  legality.  If  the  child  keeps  the  family  peace, 
merely  from  fear,  this  will  be  all  that  the  family,  as  such,  can 
demand  ;  and  thus  the  securing  of  this  comes  wholly  within  * 
the  same  culture,  that  the  preparation  of  the  coming  responsi- 
bility to  the  state  demands,  —  viz  :  mere  legality.  But  the 
consideration,  that  the  child  is  also  to  be  trained  for  God,  will 
oblige  the  parent  to  feel,  that  though  obedience  from  fear  may 
secure  the  peace  of  the  family,  yet  such  culture  only  cannot 
answer  all  the  parental  responsibility.  The  parent  is  bound  to 
insist  on  the  child's  obedience,  not  merely  through  fear,  but  also 
to  teach  the  child  that  he  should  obey  from  filial  love.  Legal- 
ity, even  in  mere  family  interests,  will  not  be  enough ;  the 
parent  must  inculcate  the  principle  of  loyalty,  and  be  satisfied 
only  when  he  gets  obedience  from  love.  His  responsibility  to 
the  family  and  to  the  state  could  be  all  answered  in  securing 
the  legal  obedience  of  fear  or  reward,  but  his  responsibility  to 
God  can  be  only  answered  by  the  nurture  which  seeks  loyal 
obedience  from  love. 

Thus,  this  parental  authority,  in  the  end  of  family  peace  or 
freedom,  resolves  itself  into  the  same  two  principles ;  and 
whether  we  look  at  domestic  authority,  as  in  the  end  of  family 
peace,  or  as  training  for  the  state,  or  for  the  government  of 
God,  it  gives  in  all  only  the  two  ends  of  freedom  and  piety,  — 
the  obedience  of  legality  and  loyalty.  We  may  thus  put  the 
three  within  the  last  two  only. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  consider  that  obedience  from  filial 
love,  and  the  respect  and  reverence  rendered  to  a  parent  which 
is  due  to  the  dignity  and  authority  of  the  parental  standing,  give 
that  which  may  be  properly  characterized  as  piety.  /Eneas  had 
the  epithet  of  pious,  from  his  reverent  regard  and  care  for  liis 


244  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

father  Anchises ;  and  the  household  deities,  which  the  Latins 
venerated  and  even  adored,  were  but  the  shrines  of  their  de- 
parted ancestors.  It  is  obedience  from  love  ;  reverence  for  the 
dignity  and  majesty  of  rightful  authority  ;  cordial  response  to 
the  claims  of  respect  and  veneration ;  and  is  thus  the  essence 
of  religion.  It  becomes  truly  a  worship,  when  the  confidence 
and  reverence  is  directed  to  the  Divine  Spirit.  But  the  truly 
loyal  spirit  of  a  child  fits  for  the  transfer  of  allegiance  from 
a  father's  authority  to  God's ;  and  the  spirit  that  has  truly 
obeyed  a  father,  from  love  to  his  authority,  is  a  pious  spirit, 
and  in  the  first  full  view  of  God's  authority  and  majesty  will, 
in  cordial  loyalty,  bow  down  with  reverence,  and  lovingly  serve 
and  adore. 

That  the  parental  government  has  this  two-fold  end  is  quite 
manifest,  further,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case  in  tlie  civil 
point  of  view,  and  from  God's  direct  revelation  in  the  Divine. 
Such  is  the  direct  bearing  of  all  family  authority  and  discipline 
upon  the  interest  of  the  state,  that  the  parent  ought  ethically  to 
stand  responsible  to  the  law  for  his  administration  of  this  gov- 
ernment. The  citizen  must  come  up  into  the  state  tlirough  the 
family.  No  other  guardianship  for  childhood  and  youth  can 
take  the  place  of  this  training,  in  general,  so  well  as  the  parent ; 
and  the  infantile  and  youthful  training  must  precede  the  adult 
responsibilities  of  the  citizen,  and  the  state  take  the  consequen- 
ces of  the  family  training  in  the  characteristics  of  its  citizens, 
from  generation  to  generation ;  the  parent  thus  ought  to  have 
the  duties  to  the  state  in  his  design  through  all  his  culture ;  and 
tlie  state  ought,  for  the  freedom  of  its  perpetuated  generations, 
to  guard  the  family  authority,  and  hold  its  administration  per- 
petually subordinate  and  subservient  to  its  higher  claims. 

The  same  train  of  argument  would  also  show,  from  the  nature 
of  the  case,  that  God  must  hold  the  parental  authority  responsi- 
ble to  him  for  the  training  of  its  members  ;  but  we  have  abundant 
declarations  in  the  revelation  he  has  made  to  this  purport,  and 
to  which  the  Christian  moralist  may  go  direct  for  the  proof. 


MARRIAGE.  245 

Taking  these  ends  in  combination,  as  that  which  is  to  be 
attained  in  the  institution  of  the  family,  and  which  is  estabUshed 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  claims  of  moraUty,  and  the  rev- 
elation of  God ;  we  must  in  this  light  determine  the  principles 
which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  all  parental  government,  and  ib.& 
duties  embraced  within  the  domestic  relations. 

These  may  all  be  included  within  the  following  topics : 

1.  Marrlage. 

2.  The  Duties  of  Parents. 

3.  The  Duties  of  Children. 

4.  The  Duties  of  Servants. 


CHAPTER   II. 

MARRIAGE, 


MARRLA.GE  IS  the  UTiioji  of  One  man  and  one^  woman  in  ex- 
clusive cohabitation  for  life.  It  is  the  source  of  all  the  do- 
mestic relations,  and  must  be  determined,  in  its  nature,  rights, 
and  duties,  by  the  grand  ends  of  the  domestic  institution  itself. 
It  is  not  a  mere  private  and  special  agreement  between  the 
parties,  and  thus  only  a  particular  contract ;  its  end  and  impor- 
tance determine  for  it  universal  rules,  and  thus  make  it  to  be  a 
public  institution,  and  so  far  as  God  has  established  it,  a  Divine 
institution.  It  is  indispensable  to  the  continuance  and  eleva- 
tion of  human  society,  from  generation  to  generation. 

The  ground  for  the  institution  of  marriage  is  found  in  the  con- 
stitution of  human  nature.  The  spiritual  life  is  so  modified  in 
the  sexes  that  neither  is  entire  in  itself.  A  state  of  celibacy  is 
a  state  of  incomplete  being,  and  the  soul  of  neither  the  man 
nor  the  woman  is  satisfied  except  as  the  two  become  blended 
in  one.     The  essential  marriage  tie  is  a  spiritual  union.     The 


246  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

constitutional  propensities,  also,  both  of  natural  desire  and  social 
affection,  which  find  their  end  in  the  mutual  intercourse  of  the 
sexes,  need  to  be  regulated,  chastened,  and  balanced  by  some 
permanent  ordinance.  The  marriage  bond  refines,  directs,  and 
tranquilizes  all  these  propensities,  so  that  society  is  secured  from 
all  the  irregularities  and  disturbances  of  their  passionate  gratifi- 
cation. Mutual  confidence  is  imparted ;  tenderness  and  sym- 
pathy are  induced ;  feelings  and  interests  become  identified ; 
and  the  husband  and  wife  are  no  longer  merely  two  persons  of 
different  sexes,  but  conjunct  in  one  spirit.  A  new  charm  is 
added  to  Hfe  ;  and  while  every  joy  is  augmented  in  the  mutual 
participation,  every  sorrow  also  is  softened  in  reciprocal  support. 
This  balance  to  all  constitutional  propensity  keeps  its  regulated 
action  upon  the  successive  generations  of  youth  who  come  up 
under  this  influence ;  their  habits  and  expectations  are  formed 
under  it,  and  they  look  forward,  with  hopeful  anticipation,  to 
such  happy  selection  and  union  of  kindred  hearts  as  the  most 
interesting  and  important  event  in  life.  A  national  sentiment  is 
thus  created  and  cherished  which  works  perpetually  in  society 
to  give  security  and  serenity  to  domestic  life,  and  the  opportu- 
nity to  attain  the  great  ends  of  the  family  state,  in  the  nurture  of 
their  children  for  the  duties  of  the  state  and  the  service  of  God. 

These  children  are  a  common  object  of  affection  to  the  par- 
ents, binding  both  in  stronger  conjugal  attachment ;  and  the 
education  and  discipline  of  the  child  is  also  a  matter  of  common 
care  and  anxiety,  awakening  new  sympathies  and  hopes ;  and 
thus  the  family  institution  comes  to  be  the  strongest,  the  dear- 
est, the  most  effective  spring  to  human  activity  that  social  life 
possesses. 

But  while  the  ground  for  such  an  institution  is  in  the  consti- 
tution of  human  nature  itself,  the  establishment  and  ratification 
of  it  must  be  given  in  some  public  ordinance.  Nature  lays  the 
ground  and  reveals  the  reason  for  marriage,  but  some  positive 
authority  must  legally  ratify  and  guard  it.     When  a  selected 


MARRIAGE.  24/ 

application  of  these  desires  and  affections  has  been  voluntarily 
reciprocated  by  the  parties,  then  must  some  acknowledged 
authority  interpose,  and  by  some  formal  ceremony  solemnize 
the  nuptials.  The  public  have  rights  and  interests  in  it  as  really 
as  the  parties,  and  this  official  public  ratification  is  necessary  for 
the  public  notification,  the  public  assent,  the  perpetual  public 
regard ;  and  thus  the  preserved  safety  for  all  the  parties  in  this 
new  relation. 

For  the  greater  prominence  and  emphasis,  the  particulars 
which  enter  into  this  definition  and  description  of  the  ground 
and  nature  of  marriage  may  be  here  more  specially  enumer- 
ated : 

1.  The  sexual  desires  and  affectiojis  must  be  exclusively 
directed  to  one  person.  The  choice  which  fixes  upon  the  object 
of  conjugal  affection  must  include  one  person  of  the  other  sex 
alone.  A  true  marriage  can  include  the  union  of  one  man  and 
one  woman  only. 

2.  The  choices  must  be  reciprocal.  Both  must  be  each  other's 
choice  ;  that  is,  each  must  choose,  and  each  choose  recipro- 
cally the  other.  No  choice  of  one  alone,  however  ardent,  can 
make  "of  the  twain  one." 

3.  //  should  be  a  free  choice.  Each  party  is  a  voluntary 
agent,  alike  free  to  bestow  or  withhold  these  affections.  The 
conduct  of  one  party  may  give  a  moral  claim  to  esteem  or 
gratitude  from  the  other,  but  nothing  can  lay  the  other  under 
obligation  to  conjugal  affection,  except  a  personal  assent  and 
promise.  All  prudential  motives  should  be  regarded ;  but  in 
view  of  whatever  motives,  the  asking  and  assenting  must  be 
alike  free. 

4.  The  co7n?nitmejit  must  be  for  life.  Inviolability  is  de- 
manded, until  death  stop  all  exercise  of  earthly  affection,  or 
remove  its  object.  If  any  thing  but  death  come  in  to  sunder 
the  marriage  l^ond,  it  has  been  over  the  broken  marriage  vow, 
that  knows  no  moral  rupture  but  by  death. 


248  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTV. 

5.  TTiere  must  be  an  official  ratification.  The  leaving  of 
father  and  mother  and  cleaving  to  each  other  must  be  exhibited 
in  some  public  formal  manner,  in  which  the  authority  that  estab- 
lishes the  ordinance  is  recognized  as  speaking  out  in  ratification. 
No  private  agreement  can  confer  either  the  rights  or  the  obhga- 
tions  of  marriage. 

With  this  extended  statement  of  what  marriage  is,  we  proceed 
to  confinn  it  in  the  light  of  the  ends  of  marriage.  This  will  be 
done  in  several  distinct  sections. 

Seciion  I.  The  authority  which  shotud  settle  the  marriage 
institution.  There  are  public  ends  which  forbid  that  marriage 
should  be  a  special  contract  between  the  parties  alone,  and  thus 
there  must  be  some  positive  general  regulations  by  authority 
which  shall  make  it  a  public  institution  binding  upon  society. 
Whence,  then,  the  authority  on  which  the  institution  must  rest 
for  its  validity  ? 

One  end  is  found  in  the  interest  of  the  state.  The  civil  sov- 
ereignty has  the  right  to  control  marriage  for  the  sake  of  public 
freedom.  No  parties  have  the  right  to  so  cohabit  as  to  disturb 
the  rights  of  the  public.  In  order  that  family  government  and 
discipline  may  be  the  most  beneficial  to  the  interests  of  the 
state,  the  state  may  control  marriage  contracts  the  same  as  any 
other ;  and  since,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  promiscuous  and 
unregulated  cohabitation  cannot  consist  \vith  public  freedom, 
the  state  authority  must  make  positive  regulations  for  all  mar- 
riage unions.  The  authority  of  the  state  is  valid  against  all 
choices  of  the  parties. 

But  provision  is  to  be  made  for  another  end  than  civil  free- 
dom. Marriage  should  be  as  truly  modified  by  a  regard  to 
piety  as  to  the  ends  of  civil  polity.  God,  so  to  speak,  has  inter- 
ests in  the  results  of  family  government  certainly  no  less  than 
the  state.  He  has  the  right  to  control  marriage  for  the  ends  of 
piety,  as  truly  as  the  state  has  for  the  ends  of  freedom  ;  and  thus 
the  authority  of  both  the  state  and  God  are  good  against  any 


MARRIAGE.  249 

choices  of  individuals.  No  persons  have  the  right  to  so  use 
marriage  as  to  compromit  the  interests  of  either  liberty  or  piety. 
The  only  difficulty,  therefore,  in  the  marriage  institution,  so  far 
as  it  becomes  a  question  of  morals,  is  in  harmonizing  the  civil 
and  the  Divine  regulations. 

And  this  case  stands  precisely  like  all  matters  of  civil  and 
religious  polity.  The  civil  authority  is  not  to  be  brought  in  for 
the  restraint  or  control  of  religious  faith  and  conscience.  It  has 
its  own  end,  and  thus  its  own  jurisdiction.  But  God's  end  is 
higher,  and  his  authority  supreme  over  all  civil  authority  •  and 
when  he  legislates  for  piety's  sake  it  is  always  '*'  the  higher  law," 
and  binds  the  Christian  nation  in  making  laws  and  institutions. 
If  the  nation  disregard  this  higher  law  of  God,  the  contest  is 
between  the  state  and  heaven ;  and  if  individual  conscience  is 
thus  put  between  two  conflicting  authorities,  it  is  bound  not  to 
violate  the  Divine,  but  to  take  any  penal  consequences  that  it 
must  from  the  human.  The  ethical  principle  is,  that  God  may 
legislate,  in  marriage  as  in  any  other  case,  for  piety's  sake,  over 
the  state.  Civil  authority  is  ethically  a  nullity  when  it  contra- 
dicts Divine  authority.  The  institution  of  the  Sabbath,  or  of 
any  sacrament,  is  precisely  as  the  institution  of  marriage.  As  a 
religious  ordinance,  it  is  wholly  from  God's  authority,  and  civil 
polity  should  conform  to  it  in  such  a  way  that  any  citizen  can 
obey  both.  If  the  state  polity,  in  the  estimation  of  the  citizen, 
conflicts  with  religion,  he  must  obey  God  and  let  civil  govern- 
ment do  what  it  will. 

In  reality,  the  two  ends  of  freedom  and  of  piety  can  never 
clash.  That  family  arrangement  which  subserves  piety  best 
will  also  subserve  liberty  best. 

Section  II.  Breach  of  marriage  promise.  A  mutual  prom- 
ise of  marriage,  between  a  man  and  woman,  is  a  betrothment 
only,  and  not  marriage.  It  is  a  promise,  more  or  less  sacred  ac- 
cording to  the  manner  of  making  it,  at  some  future  time  to 
enter  the  marriage  relation.     It  confers  none  of  the  rights,  and 


250  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

imposes  none  of  the  duties  of  marriage.  A  breach  of  this  prom- 
ise is  no  violation  of  the  marriage  covenant. 

In  proportion  to  the  interests  involved,  however,  is  such  a 
promise  strongly  binding.  No  parties  are  at  liberty  thus  to 
plight  their  troth,  but  upon  the  most  serious  and  satisfactory 
reasons.  When  done,  it  must  bind  the  conscience  under  obh- 
gations  that  only  the  most  weighty  considerations  can  justify  in 
seeking  to  dissolve.  Specially  is  this  the  fact  on  the  part  of  the 
man,  as  the  receding  from  the  promise  must  probably  affect  the 
woman  the  most  severely.  If  affection  has  changed,  or  circum- 
stances thrown  great  obstacles  in  the  way,  it  may  be  a  justification 
for  a  mutual  release  ;  but  one  party  may  not  withdraw  without 
the  consent  of  the  other,  righteously,  except  in  the  full  convic- 
tion that  the  consummation  of  the  marriage,  in  that  case,  would 
be  an  immorality,  and  only  by  all  indemnity  as  far  as  practicable. 

Section  III.  Polygamy.  The  original  institution  of  marriage, 
by  God,  was  with  the  first  of  the  human  race,  and  united  one 
man  with  one  woman.  This  may  be  seen,  in  the  nature  of  the 
case,  to  be  the  most  congenial  to  humanity.  The  spiritual  in- 
completeness of  sex  demands  that  the  husband  and  wife  become 
spiritually  one,  and  no  such  blending  in  unity  can  be  possible  in 
a  marriage  at  the  same  time  with  more  than  one.  The  peace  of 
the  family  will  be  more  secure,  and  the  piety  of  the  children  bet- 
ter promoted.  This  was  the  consideration  that  induced  God  to 
institute  marriage.  He  made  one  woman  only,  though  he  had 
the  residue  of  the  creating  spirit  and  might  have  made  more ; 
but  he  made  one,  "that  he  might  seek  a  godly  seed."  Mal.  ii.  15. 
The  re-enactment  of  the  law  of  marriage,  by  Jesus  Christ,  is  of 
the  same  purport.  "And  he  answered  and  said  unto  them, 
have  ye  not  read  that  he  who  made  them,  at  the  beginning  made 
them  male  and  female.  And  said,  for  this  cause,  shall  a  man 
leave  father  and  mother,  and  shall  cleave  to  his  wife  :  and  they 
two  shall  be  one  flesh?  Wherefore  they  are  no  more  two,  but 
one  flesh.     Wherefore  what  God  hath  joined  together,  let  not 


MARRIAGE.  25 1 

man  put  asunder."  Matth.  xix.  4  to  6.  And  so  also  with  the 
Apostle  :  "  Know  ye  not,  bretliren  (for  I  speak  to  them  that 
know  the  law) ,  that  the  law  hath  dominion  over  a  man  as  long 
as  he  liveth  ?  For  the  woman  who  hath  a  husband  is  bound  by 
the  law  to  her  husband  so  long  as  he  liveth ;  but  if  the  husband 
is  dead,  she  is  loosed  from  the  law  of  her  husband.  So  then,  if 
while  her  husband  liveth,  she  is  married  to  another  man,  she 
shall  be  called  an  adulteress ;  but  if  her  husband  is  dead,  she  is 
free  from  that  law ;  so  that  she  is  no  adulteress,  though  she  be 
married  to  another  man."  Rom.  vii.  i  to  3.  If  polygamy  was  prac- 
tised by  the  Patriarchs  with  God's  permission,  it  still  had  no 
Divine  sanction ;  God's  legislation  has  been  always  against  it, 
even  when  for  other  reasons  he  has  not  enforced  it. 

The  end  of  all  human  government,  also,  demands  that  one 
man  be  united  only  to  one  woman.  No  nation  has  permitted 
polygamy,  but  at  the  expense  of  many  evils  to  the  community, 
and  the  sacrifice  of  many  things  vitally  connected  with  the  pub- 
lic welfare.  The  true  interests  of  the  family,  and  through  it  the 
true  interests  of  the  state,  can  be  secured  only  by  exclusive  single 
cohabitation.  The  state,  therefore,  as  rigidly  excludes  polygamy 
as  does  the  revelation  of  God.  Neither  piety  nor  freedom  can 
be  best  subserved  by  it.  The  great  fact  in  nature,  that  from 
generation  to  generation  the  law  of  perpetuation  in  the  human 
race  keeps  the  numbers  of  the  sexes  nearly  equal,  the  slight  ad- 
vantage of  numbers  being  on  the  male  side,  as  the  more  exposed 
to  casualities,  abundantly  teaches  what  God  ordains  in  marriage, 
and  what  states  should  regard.  Such  a  fact  in  nature  makes  the 
political  toleration  of  polygamy  immoral. 

Section  IV.  Incest.  The  law  of  God  has  prohibi:ed  mar- 
riage within  certain  degrees  of  consanguinity.  The  Mosaic 
code  is  given  in  Lev.  xviii,  6  to  18.  The  general  prohibition  will 
extend  in  the  direct  line  of  descent  indefinitely,  and  in  col- 
lateral degrees  of  kindred  to  all  such  as  are  brothers  or  sisters 
of  the  parents,  or  among  brothers  or  sisters  themselves.     And 


252  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

this  reaches  to  the  same  relations  through  marriage  as  by  blood. 
The  much  vexed  question  arising  from  the  sixteenth  verse, 
whether  a  man  may  marry  the  sister  of  a  deceased  wife,  need  not 
be  here  considered,  as  it  is  rather  a  question  of  casuistry  in  ref- 
erence to  whether  the  fact  comes  under  the  principle.  In 
other  cases,  beside  those  given  in  this  chapter,  God  has  regu- 
lated or  prohibited  marriage,  though  not  on  the  ground  of 
incest.  An  Israelite  was  not  to  marry  a  heathen,  Deut.  vii.  3;  nor  a 
beUever  to  marry  an  unbeliever,  iCor.  vii.  39;  2C0R.  vi.  14;  and  cer- 
tain offices  of  particular  sanctity  modified  the  law  of  marriage. 

Lev.  xxi.  7,  13,  14;  Ezek.  xliv.  22;  i  Tim.  iii.  2  and  12;  Tit.  1,6.  The  nCW  Tes- 
tament, also,  in  a  single  case,  refers  to  a  case  of  incest  with 
pointed  reprobation,     i  Cor.  v.  i. 

In  the  laws  of  incest,  two  things  are  mainly  regarded ;  one, 
the  deterioration  of  the  race  physically,  which  is  found  to  be  the 
fact  when  the  parents  are  within  certain  degrees  of  near  kin  by 
blood;  the  other  is  of  a  moral  nature,  and  would  repress  all 
sexual  inclinations  in  such  cases  as  from  family  connection 
there  must  be  daily  intimate  intercourse.  On  both  of  these 
accounts  the  laws  of  incest  have  a  basis  in  morality,  and  on  the 
last  account  they  apply  to  relationship  by  marriage,  where  there 
is  no  consanguinity. 

Without  exactly  settling  the  line  within  which  the  marriage  is 
incestuous,  other  than  by  an  application  of  the  above  reasons 
for  prohibiting  such  marriages,  and  observing  that  all  nations 
have  had  occasion  for  such  legislation,  though  differing  in  the 
degrees  of  kindred  prohibited,  we  may  apprehend  that  there  is 
the  same  ground  for  civil,  as  for  Divine  enactments,  against 
incestuous  marriages.  The  state  has  important  interests  in- 
volved as  well  as  the  churcli,  and  freedom  as  well  as  piety  is 
endangered  by  the  union  of  parties  of  too  near  a  relationship. 
The  practice  would  punish  itself  in  its  own  consequences,  but 
civil  polity  and  religion  would  be  both  injured,  and  thus  pro- 
hibition under  positive  penalties  should  be  enforced. 


MARRIAGE.  253 

Section  V.  Divorce.  The  considerations  already  gi\'en 
show  that  marriage  should  not  be  viewed  in  the  same  ethical 
light  as  private  contracts.  The  freedom  and  the  piety  of  the 
race  are  so  directly  involved  in  the  fact  of  marriage,  that  both 
the  state  and  God  must  legislate  in  the  regulation  of  it.  This  is 
of  the  highest  necessity  in  reference  to  the  right  of  divorce. 
No  matter  how  inconvenient  and  irksome  the  restraints  in  indi- 
vidual cases,  the  end  of  public  freedom  and  piety  should  be 
nevertheless  maintained. 

The  original  intention  of  marriage,  in  its  institution  by  God, 
was  manifestly  designed  for  perpetuity,  and  to  hold  the  parties 
in  union  during  life.  Hence  the  expression  of  unbroken 
union,  —  forsaking  all  other,  the  dearest  connections,  and  cleav- 
ing to  the  wife,  and  the  twain  becoming  one  flesh.  No  divorce 
was  contemplated  in  this  language,  but  by  the  death  of  one  of 
the  parties.  This  is  further  confirmed  by  our  Saviour's  com- 
ment. "  Moses,  because  of  the  hardness  of  your  hearts,  suffered 
you  to  put  away  your  wives,  but  from  the  beginning  it  was  not 

so."       Matt.  xix.  8. 

The  permission  in  the  Mosaic  law,  to  divorce  the  wife  under 
certain  regulations,  is  expressly  put  upon  the  perverseness  of 
man,  and  thus  the  civil  law  forebore  to  enforce  the  righteous 
principle,  since  in  that  state  of  depravity  the  nation  could  not 
bear  it.  The  tyranny  of  the  man,  with  his  hard  heart,  would 
have  made  the  condition  of  the  woman  worse  in  perpetual 
union  than  in  regulated  divorce.  This  was  man's  fault,  and 
thus  no  annulling  of  the  marriage  institution,  as  God  had  given 
it,  and  as  man  ought  to  use  it.  And  thus  Clirist  cut  short  the 
permission  to  divorce,  and  put  marriage  upon  the  original,  and 
the  perpetually  rigliteous  foundation  :  inviolability  but  by  death. 
One  cause  only  is  admitted  as  a  justification  of  divorce,  and 
that  an  already  sundering  the  nuptial  tie  by  the  adulterous  infi- 
delity of  one  of  the  parties.  "  I  say  unto  you,  whosoever  shall 
put  away  his  wife,  except  for  fornication,  and  shall  marry  another, 


254  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

committeth  adultery,  and  whoever  marrieth  her  who  is  put 
away,  committeth  adultery."  Matth.  xix.  9.  Neither  the  state 
nor  religion  could  profit  by  legalizing  the  connection,  and  im- 
posing an  obligation  of  nuptial  rights  and  duties  upon  one, 
when  the  other  went  after  fornication.  Morality  justifies  such  a 
case  of  divorce  on  the  part  of  the  faithful,  but  this  is  the  sole 
reason  that  the  end  of  piety  can  allow  as  an  occasion  for  the 
dissolution  of  the  marriage  bond.  God  has  legislated  emphati- 
cally and  finally  in  this  matter,  and  to  the  eye  of  reason  in  the 
best  manner  for  the  end  of  piety. 

Civil  society  has  also  been  regulated  in  this  matter  by  the 
state,  and  in  various  ways  and  for  varied  reasons  the  right  of 
divorce  has  been  granted.  Wilful  desertion  for  a  considerable 
time,  neglect  to  provide,  great  cruelty,  flagitious  crimes,  imbe- 
cility, and  sometimes  incorrigible  contrariety  of  temperament 
and  disposition,  have  been  made  state  reasons  for  divorce.  The 
ends  of  piety  will  always  be  found  in  full  conformity  with  the 
end  of  civil  polity,  and  God's  legislation  in  any  matter,  where 
the  same  can  apply  to  state  purposes,  will  be  a  fair  index  of 
what  is  most  for  public  freedom,  and  thus  the  institutions  of 
God  and  of  the  state  will  be  concurrent.  The  further  the 
state  deviates  in  the  law  of  divorce  from  the  law  of  God,  the 
less  will  it  subserve  the  end  of  state  government,  and  the 
only  apology  for  the  state  not  to  adopt  the  law  of  God,  must 
be  that  which  God  gives  for  Moses'  law,  viz. :  the  depravity  of 
the  people. 

It  may  sometimes  be  that  the  state  of  public  morals  will  not 
bear  such  civil. laws  as  would  be  demanded  by  the  highest  piety  ; 
and  thus  in  divorce,  as  in  the  case  of  intemperance  or  slavery, 
the  state  may  be  forced  to  endure  the  evil,  which  from  the 
strength  of  depravity  it  cannot  repress.  This  will  not  justify 
the  political  evil,  but  only  throws  the  burden  of  responsibihty 
from  the  legislator  on  to  the  hard-heartedness  of  the  commu- 
nity.     The  inability  to  make  and  sustain  the  right  law  may 


MARRIAGE.  255 

sometimes  be  the  very  occasion  for  perpetuating  the  political 
immorality,  and  the  state  be  in  that  desperate  condition  where 
the  sickness  of  the  moral  constitution  will  not  bear  the  remedies 
which  are  necessary  for  its  recovery.  There  can  then  be  no 
other  alternative  but  ultimate  dissolution.  In  all  cases,  where 
the  political  regulation  admits  practices  at  war  with  God's  regu- 
lations for  piety,  the  duty  of  every  good  man  is,  never  to  avail 
himself  of  the  political  license,  but  live  up  to  the  higher  law,  and 
thus  put  and  keep  as  much  virtue  into  the  political  constitution 
as  possible. 

When  any  cause  makes  the  marriage  union  a  hindrance  to  its 
own  end  in  freedom  and  piet}',  there  may,  by  mutual  consent, 
or,  in  extreme  cases,  at  the  will  of  one  party,  be  a  separation 
Jrom  bed  and  board ;  but  this  will  not  open  the  way  to  another 
nuptial  engagement.  So,  also,  where  moral  impediments  ex- 
isted before  marriage,  though  not  apprehended  until  afterwards, 
the  parties  are  justified  in  such  separation,  inasmuch  as  con- 
tinued co-habitation  would  perpetuate  the  immorality.  If  the 
immorality  were  of  such  a  nature  as  to  vitiate  the  legality  of  the 
marriage  union,  then  has  the  whole  marriage  been  a  nullity,  and 
must  be  treated  as  void. 

Woman  may  be  often  much  oppressed  by  an  ill-assorted  con- 
nection, but  an  easy  dissolution  of  the  marriage  bond  will  ulti- 
mately far  more  enslave  and  degrade  the  sex.  When  a  pure- 
minded  woman  allies  herself  to  the  man  of  her  choice,  it  must 
be  with  mutual  pledges  of  eternal  fidelity.  Take  away  her  con- 
fidence that  the  union  is  indissoluble  but  by  death,  and  the  sol- 
emn vow  becomes  only  a  base  assent  to  temporary  prostitution, 
and  the  soul  is  not  wedded  though  the  body  be  surrendered. 
An  attempt  to  attain  emancipation  for  woman  from  the  hard  lot 
of  an  ill-assorted  marriage,  by  an  easy  dissolution  of  the  nuptial 
bond,  must  augment  the  general  evil.  The  husband  and  wife 
must  be  one  in  sympathy,  in  will,  and  moral  personality ;  hold- 
ing all  interests  and  anxieties  in  perfect  transparency  to  each 


256  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

Other ;  and  any  thing  that  contravenes  this  will  necessarily  de- 
grade woman  from  the  high  sphere  in  which  a  righteous  mar- 
riage contemplates  her.  As  long  as  the  Christian  ordinance  of 
marriage  is  maintained,  woman  cannot  become  a  mere  servile 
and  sensual  appendage  to  man.  If  the  state  grant  divorces 
only  in  view  of  personal  inconveniences,  and  special  hardship, 
overlooking  the  public  end  of  marriage,  the  few  will  be  relieved 
at  the  expense  of  the  many,  and  both  man  and  woman  become 
morally  debased. 


CHAPTER   III. 

DUTIES   OF   PARENTS. 

The  whole  family  government  is  in  the  hands  of  the  parents, 
and  they  are  directly  responsible  to  the  state  and  to  God  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  administer  it. 

The  end  of  family  government,  in  its  bearing  upon  politics 
and  religion,  indicates  directly  the  duties  imposed.  The  house- 
hold is  to  be  trained  for  the  state  and  for  heaven,  and  the  par- 
ents are  charged  with  this  responsible  commission.  The  duties 
are  mainly  disciplinary.  The  family  is  but  a  nurser}^  for  higher 
and  broader  spheres  of  action.  In  it  are  to  be  planted  the 
seeds,  and  there  are  to  be  nurtured  the  germs,  which  are  to 
have  their  full  development  and  bear  their  fruit  in  future  years 
and  in  other  worlds.  A  regard  is  to  be  had  for  the  peace  and 
freedom  of  the  family,  while  its  members  continue  in  the  pater- 
nal mansion,  and  therefore  m.uch  is  demanded  in  securing  a 
quiet,  orderly,  and  happy  home ;  but  the  subjects  of  the  family 
government  are  supposed  to  spend  only  the  few  years  of  early 
life  under  its  training,  and  then,  as  adults,  come  under  the  im- 
mediate jurisdiction  of  the  state  for  life,  and  through  life  and  in 


DUTIES    OF    PARENTS.  2$y 

eternity  come  also  under  the  direct  authority  of  God,  and  re- 
ceive from  him  the  retributions  he  shall  award  for  personal 
character  and  conduct. 

The  authority  of  the  father  and  of  the  mother  are  concurrent, 
and  the  members  of  the  household  are  as  much  bound  by  the 
separate  commands  of  the  one  as  of  the  other.  There  is  no 
difference  of  end,  and  no  conflict  of  interest  in  the  parental  au- 
thority, but  both  concur  in  one  end  and  to  the  advancement  of 
one  interest.  If,  then,  any  collision  of  parental  authority  occur 
between  that  of  the  father  and  that  of  the  mother,  it  must  arise 
from  the  ignorance  or  the  selfishness  of  one  party,  and  not  from 
any  legitimate  contrariety  in  parental  authority  itself.  In  an  un- 
fortunate, and  from  some  source,  wi'ong  clashing  of  commands, 
there  must  of  course  be  some  ultimate  sovereignty ;  and  the 
reason  of  the  case,  the  law  of  the  land,  and  the  law  of  God,  put 
this  supremacy  of  family  sovereignty  in  the  hands  of  the  father. 
In  the  case  of  separate  commands,  the  children  and  servants  are 
bound  to  obey  both,  but  in  any  direct  contradiction  of  com- 
mands, that  of  the  man  is  paramount.  The  duties  of  each  are 
similar,  inasmuch  as  the  ends  of  each  are  the  same  and  the  au- 
thority concurrent.  The  difference  of  duties  is  found  only  in 
those  things  where  the  action  of  one  can  gain  the  common  end 
more  effectually  than  the  other.  The  marriage  union  supposes 
that  the  authority  will  always  be  one,  inasmuch  as  the  husband 
and  wife  in  marriage  become  one. 

It  is  in  this  view  that  the  wife  acts  through  the  husband,  in 
those  particulars  where  the  agency  of  only  one  can  be  permitted. 
In  personal  acts,  involving  personal  merit  and  demerit,  the  hus- 
band and  wife  are  wholly  separate,  both. in  the  law  of  the  land 
and  of  God.  One  is  not  held  responsible  for  the  other,  and,  of 
course,  one  does  not  act  in  the  other.  In  all  cases  where  one 
only  can  act,  the  liusband's  action  is  alone  known.  Thus,  in 
the  domestic  priesthood,  the  husband  and  wife  cannot  each 
offer  the  family  sacrifice,  but  the  wife  acts  in  the  public  homage 


258  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

rendered  by  the  husband.  There  axe  other  cases  in  which  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  wife,  as  separate  from  her  husband, 
may  make  her  conjunct,  or  her  separate  agency  proper  and  im- 
perative, according  to  circumstances.  In  the  transfer  of  prop- 
erty, which  may  involve  her  interests  distinct  from  his,  or  in  her 
religious  profession  and  communion,  her  separate  voluntary  act 
may  be  ethically  required. 

The  grand  principle  by  which  to  determine  all  such  cases  is 
that  of  the  unity  of  the  parties  in  marriage ;  where  one  only 
should  act  in  view  of  the  end  of  marriage,  the  wife  is  known  as 
acting  only  in  the  husband  ;  but  where  the  end  of  marriage  does 
not  demand  this  single  action,  the  interest  of  the  wife  distinct 
from  the  husband  tolerates  her  separate  action ;  and  where  the 
responsibilities  of  personaUty  remain  which  cannot  be  merged 
and  lost  in  any  union,  the  separate  action  of  both  is  ethically 
required.  In  this  sense,  even  the  union  of  marriage  may  lay 
personal  responsibilities  upon  the  husband  in  relation  to  the 
wife,  which  he  only  can  sustain,  and  in  this  point  of  view  he  has 
the  ethical  right  to  restrain  the  wife.  He  may  be  Hable  for  her 
debts,  or  for  her  injuries  to  others  in  slander  or  violence,  and 
should  have  a  constraining  authority ;  and  his  duties  as  head  of 
the  household,  including  both  wife  and  children,  must  be  modi- 
fied by  such  responsibiUties.  The  peace  of  the  family,  and  the 
political  and  rehgious  ends  of  family  government,  cannot  other- 
wise be  attained. 

We  have  thus  the  principle  of  concurrent  authority  in  the 
family  government,  except  in  some  extreme  cases ;  and  this  in 
connection  with  the  end  of  the  family  organization  will  deter- 
mine parental  duty. 

The  Duties  of  Parents  may  be  comprised  in  the  following 
particulars  : 

I.  Support  and  maintenance  of  the  children  during  their 
minority.  Infancy  is  helpless,  and  tlxrough  the  stages  of  child- 
hood, youth,  and  on  to  maturity,  there  is  dependence  upon 


DUTIES    OF    PARENTS.  259 

parental  support,  though  constantly  diminishing  in  degree  to  the 
period  for  manly  independence  to  begin.  Nature  more  spe- 
cially throws  the  infant  upon  the  mother,  and  thus  claims  from 
her  the  chief  support  and  care.  The  more  special  charge  of  the 
father  increases  with  the  growing  ripeness  to  maturity.  Tlie 
parents  are  in  this  way  both  called,  in  their  distinctive  times 
and  degrees,  to  minister  to  the  support  of  their  children. 

This  support  and  maintenance  is  demanded,  in  view  of  the 
end  of  the  family  state.  If  children  do  not  fmd  support  from 
others  they  must  die,  and  neither  the  ends  of  patriotism  nor 
religion  be  attained.  The  parents  are  the  natural  provides  for 
the  wants  of  their  children  ;  and  God's  design,  that  they  should 
do  this,  is  manifest  in  the  constitutional  impulses  of  parental 
feeling.  Those  to  whom  God  has  given  this  natural  affection, 
and  not  strangers,  should  provide  for  the  family  wants.  It  is 
only  in  the  death  or  disability  of  the  parents  that  the  support  of 
the  child  should  rest  on  the  care  of  others. 

The  quality  of  the  supplies,  and  the  amount  furnished,  should 
correspond  in  a  degree  with  the  parents'  rank  and  wealth.  It 
would  be  an  immorality  for  those  parents  who  are  poor  and  lowly 
to  attempt  furnishing  their  children  with  the  supplies  of  the  rich 
and  elevated  ;  and  it  would  be  an  equal  immorality  for  the  latter 
to  give  to  their  children  only  such  supplies  as  might  come  from 
the  former.  Equality  of  condition  can  nowhere  be  permanently 
maintained ;  if  all  were  alike  to-day,  they  would  again  become 
unlike  to-morrow;  and  the  support  demanded  by  morality 
must  have  regard  to  the  circumstances  of  the  parent. 

2.  Care  should  be  taken  to  secure  a  healthy  and  vigorous 
constitution.  Many  weakly  and  sickly  constitutions  are  heredi- 
tary, and  often  the  fault  of  one  or  both  of  the  parents,  as  the 
consequence  of  their  own  carelessness  or  vice.  The  direction, 
thus,  would  demand  of  all  persons  to  so  regard  their  own  health 
that  their  children  need  not  suffer  by  it.  But  the  direct  care  for 
healthy  physical  development  is  in  reference  to  the  children 


260  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY, 

when  born.  The  strongest  may  be  made  weak  by  a  careless, 
and  the  weakest  may  be  made  stronger  by  a  careful  parent. 
Much  of  human  imbecility,  pain,  and  premature  death,  is  the 
immediate  result  of  parental  ignorance,  negligence,  or  direct 
wickedness.  The  child  may  be  ruined  in  health  by  either  too 
much  hardship  or  too  much  indulgence,  and  the  parent  is 
bound  to  guard  against  all  extremes. 

It  becomes,  thus,  the  duty  of  all  parents  to  attend  to  the 
entire  habits  of  life  in  their  children.  Their  method  of  dress, 
food,  exercise,  sleep,  and  all  their  employments,  act  upon  the 
physical  constitution ;  and  if  this  be  neglected  in  their  indul- 
gence or  privation,  it  will  necessarily  suffer  thereby.  What- 
ever weakens  the  constitution  interferes  with  the  right  of  the 
state  ;  and  though  a  sick  man  may  be  as  pious  as  a  healthy  one, 
yet  he  has  not  the  occasion  for  doing  so  much  for  general  piety, 
and  therefore  the  parent  who  has  brought  sickness  and  feeble- 
ness upon  his  child,  through  his  fault,  has  also  interfered  with 
the  claims  of  God,  The  end  of  family  culture,  both  in  pohtics 
and  religion,  demands  the  securing  of  as  robust  and  vigorous  a 
constitution  as  may  be.  The  whole  parental  discipline  should 
be  modified  by  such  important  considerations. 

3.  Mental  adtivation.  The  mind  has  its  own  native  rudi- 
ments, and  such  only  can  be  made  to  develop  themselves  to 
their  maturity.  But  this  growth  to  maturity,  of  what  is  in  the 
mind,  depends  upon  favoring  ouhvard  conditions,  and  thus  upon 
the  culture  and  discipline  bestowed.  Little  can  be  done  for 
the  good  of  the  state,  or  the  honor  of  God,  by  the  ignorant  and 
weak-minded ;  and  the  whole  end  of  family  government  may 
easily  be  defeated  by  a  faulty  or  a  neglected  education. 

The  parents  are  at  first  directly  responsible  for  the  training 
of  the  opening  mental  faculties  of  their  children ;  and  then,  in 
more  advanced  stages,  they  are  responsible  for  the  instructors 
employed  and  the  advantages  given.  A  thorough  education  is 
not  only  a  fortune  to  the  child,  but  a  price  put  into  his  hand 
whereby  he  may  serve  both  his  country  and  his  God. 


DUTIES    OF    PARENTS.  26 1 

4.  Habits  of  industry  and  economy.  Every  child  should  be 
made  to  know  the  value  of  labor,  of  time,  and  of  money.  With- 
out this,  he  will  habituate  himself  to  squander  them  all,  for  no 
profit  to  himself,  his  country,  or  religion.  The  most  wealthy 
parent  sins  against  all  these  interests  in  allowing  his  child  to 
grow  up  in  habits  of  indolence,  dissipation,  and  prodigality.  It 
is  not  merely  the  danger  to  that  child's  own  want  and  poverty, 
from  idle  and  dissolute  habits,  but  the  very  end  for  which  God 
has  given  children  to  the  parents  is  thus  frustrated.  They  are 
useless  to  the  state  and  to  the  church,  and  neither  man  nor  God 
gets  any  good  of  them,  except  in  setting  them  as  a  warning  to 
others.  If  the  parents  through  fondness,  carelessness,  or  too 
busy  occupation  in  other  matters,  have  neglected  to  train  up 
their  children  in  habits  of  industry  and  sobriety,  they  are  guilty 
of  gross  parental  delinquency. 

5 .  Counsel  and  assistance  upon  their  independent  entrance  oti 
the  business  of  life.  There  must  be  a  period  for  minority  to 
cease,  and  independent  activity  and  business  to  begin.  As  this 
period  of  full  age  approaches,  parental  care  should  be  modified 
to  the  growing  experience  and  wisdom  of  the  child,  and  he  be 
taught  to  rely  more  upon  his  own  judgment,  and  avail  himself 
of  his  own  resources. 

But  at  this  period  of  adult  age,  and  entering  upon  the  respon- 
sibilities of  his  majority,  the  child  has  peculiar  claims  upon  the 
parent ;  and  whether  son  or  daughter,  the  most  prompt  and  ef- 
fective assistance  is  here  needed.  Parental  counsel  can  never 
come  under  more  affecting  and  encouraging  circumstances. 

Secular  influence  and  pecuniary  assistance  should  be  granted, 
especially  to  sons,  as  the  parent  can  afford,  and  the  condition 
of  the  child  needs.  It  is  a  violation  of  a  moral  claim,  if,  for  their 
own  selfishness  or  indulgence,  the  parents  withhold  assistance 
in  this  crisis  of  their  child's  history.  A  lavish  provision  and  ex- 
pensive outfit  is  not  demanded  in  any  case  of  such  beginning 
experience ;  and,  if  bestowed,  will  pretty  surely  do  more  hurt 


262  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

to  the  child  than  good ;  but  the  assistance  should  be  such  as 
will  encourage,  and  yet  prompt  to  greater  industry  and  frugality. 
The  boy  passes  into  the  man,  and  all  the  former  discipline  of 
the  parent,  to  prepare  him  for  his  place  in  society  and  his  wor- 
ship of  God,  is  now  to  come  forth  in  actual  engagedness.  As 
he  steps  over  the  domestic  threshhold,  to  go  out  among  strangers 
in  the  social  world,  he  never  more  needs  the  parental  blessing 
and  counsel ;  and  in  his  individual  destitution  of  all  accumulated 
capital,  he  can  be  never  more  in  want  of  judicious  help  from  the 
patrimonial  resources.  His  influence  for  the  state  and  for  God 
will  thus  be  best  subserved. 

6.  Over  the  whole  period  of  minority  there  should  be  direct 
training  for  the  state.  The  parental  duty  towards  the  state  is 
not  fulfilled  by  that  culture  and  discipline  which  enables  and 
induces  the  child  to  take  care  of  himself,  and  sends  him  out,  or 
sets  him  up  in  business,  on  his  own  account.  This  would  be 
acting  as  if  the  parent  had  no  higher  responsibility  than  the 
animal,  —  merely  to  propagate  his  kind,  and  rear  his  offspring  to 
do  the  same,  and  then  die.  Man  lives  for  ends  beyond  himself, 
and  thus  beyond  what  would  be  gained  in  rearing  up  another 
man  merely  that  he  should  take  care  of  himself.  Society  can- 
not exist,  and  grow  in  moral  and  intellectual  elevation,  and  thus 
the  race  make  progress  from  generation  to  generation,  without 
the  state  and  the  action  of  its  sovereign  authority.  And  such 
state  action  can  only  be  in  constraint,  except  as  the  citizens  are 
intelligent  and  virtuous.  No  man  helps  his  fellows  in  elevation 
and  refinement  above  his  own  standard ;  and  thus  no  man 
works,  in  his  place  in  the  state,  for  any  political  profit,  without 
having  already  become  himself  enlightened  and  righteous.  And 
to  train  to  this  capability  of  service,  for  public  freedom's  sake,  is 
one  great  part  of  the  end  for  which  the  family  organization  exists. 

Every  parent  is  bound,  thus,  to  keep  his  eye  upon  the  state, 
in  all  his  government,  and  directly  educate  for  its  wants.  This 
is  done  by  educating  the  child  for  his  own  highest  interests, 


DUTIES    OF    PARENTS.  263 

and  also,  so  far  as  his  regularitj^  industry,  and  frugality  go,  to 
help  the  social  world  about  him.  But  he  must  be  trained  to 
patriotism  other  and  higher  than  as  his  country  is  helped  col- 
laterally by  his  helping  himself.  His  country's  freedom  is  an 
end  of  life,  and  he  must  be  taught  to  make  sacrifices  for  it. 
Not  to  seek  first  his  own,  and  his  country  only  in  benefiting 
himself;  but  himself,  a  servant  to  his  country,  for  his  country's 
sake.  And  with  this  patriotic  spirit,  he  needs  to  have  been 
taught  how  he  may  advance  his  country  in  civilization  and  the 
public  freedom.  He  should  know  her  constitution  and  her 
laws ;  her  relation  to  other  nations,  and  her  past  history ;  and 
no  parent  has  done  his  duty  as  a  parent  to  his  child,  if  he  has 
not  cultivated  both  this  patriotic  spirit,  and  the  faculties  which 
are  to  carry  it  out  in  action  through  all  his  political  life.  The 
family  is  bound  to  be  directly  subservient  to  the  state. 

7.  There  must  also  be  direct  training  for  God  and  heaven. 
God  has  given  the  child  into  the  parents'  hand,  as  the  highest 
of  all  ends,  to  train  in  piety  for  his  sake.  The  end  of  the  family 
is  to  teach  the  child  reverence  for  God,  and  a  sense  of  depen- 
dence upon  him,  and  direct  prayer  to  him  and  worship  of  him. 
The  child  may  grow  up  irreverent  and  impious,  but  not  without 
the  neglect  and  fault  of  the  parent.  If  by  both  precept  and  ex- 
ample the  child  from  infancy  is  nurtured  in  true  piety,  the  effect 
will  be  seen  in  early  years,  and  even  to  old  age  he  will  not 
depart  from  the  way  he  should  go. 

This  is  due,  not  only  as  thereby  gaining  the  heavenly  reward 
to  the  child,  and  thus  the  prudential  consideration  of  parental 
care  for  the  child's  good  ;  but  true  piety  is  loyalty,  —  obedience 
of  God  from  love  to  God,  —  and  thus  such  training  is  due  in  the 
Divine  right ;  an  end  God  instituted  the  family  to  attain  ;  and 
therefore  of  every  family  where  it  is  neglected,  he  may  make 
the  righteous  charge  of  direct  robbery  of  his  own  right,  and  call 
to  account,  for  eternity,  every  parent  whose  child's  piety  has 
been  neglected.    The  family  is  God's  ordinance  for  piety's  sake. 


264  LEGALITY   AND   LOYALTY. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

DUTIES   OF   CHILDREN. 

The  duties  of  parents  will  determine  very  much  the  duties  of 
children,  inasmuch  as  they  are  mostly  reciprocal.  The  authority 
on  one  side  is  met  by  corresponding  obligation  on  the  other, 
and  for  the  same  end  that  the  parent  should  administer  the 
family  government,  should  the  child  also  be  completely  subject 
to  it.  The  duties  of  the  parent  terminate  in  the  state  and  the 
kingdom  of  God,  and  the  obligation  is  clear  and  full  upon  the 
family-head  to  train  the  children  for  meeting  the  claims  and 
responsibilities  of  both ;  and  in  the  same  way  the  obligation  is 
upon  the  children  to  conform  to  this  parental  culture  and  con- 
trol, and  thus  secure  that  the  end  in  view  shall,  in  their  case,  be 
consummated. 

A  few  instances  of  the  more  general  and  prominent  duties  of 
children  will  be  sufficient  to  be  here  noted,  and  all  others  will 
be  indicated  thereby  or  included  therein. 

I.  Prompt  subjectioji  to  parental  authority.  This  is  unquali- 
fied in  reference  to  all  commands  that  are  within  the  parental 
authority  legitimately.  The  parent  has  the  proper  place  of  sov- 
ereignty, and  thus  the  right  to  command ;  and  when  the  com- 
mandment is  within  the  proper  lines,  nothing  can  release  the 
child  from  the  obligation  of  subjection. 

In  the  early  years  of  childhood,  this  must  be  much  more  un- 
questioned, in  respect  to  the  rectitude  of  the  command,  than 
when  advancing  to  maturity.  The  child  is  not  competent,  ex- 
cept in  extreme  cases,  to  determine  the  consistency  of  the  par- 
ent's government ;  and  his  conscience  and  conduct  should, 
except  in  such  extreme  cases,  be  controlled  by  the  will  of  the 
parent.     When  approaching  nearer  maturity,  the  judgment  be- 


DUTIES    OF    CHILDREN.  265 

comes  more  clear  and  sound,  and  the  conscience  more  enlight- 
ened ;  and  there  may  not  unfrequently  come  up  cases  of 
casuistry,  in  reference  to  the  rectitude  of  a  parent's  command, 
and  thus  also  in  reference  to  the  morality  of  filial  obedience, 
which  may  occasion  much  doubt  and  perplexity. 

The  principle,  in  all  cases,  is  seen  in  the  end  of  parental  gov- 
ernment. What  goes  to  the  necessary  peace  of  the  family,  or  is 
accordant  with  the  rights  of  the  state,  and  the  claims  of  God, 
will  always  be  legitimately  binding.  But  should  the  parent's 
commands  invade  the  rights  of  the  family,  the  state,  or  God,  they 
are  a  nullity,  and  their  fulfilment  would  be  immoral.  No  child 
may  consciously  deal  a  blow  at  the  peace  of  the  family,  the  lib- 
erty of  the  state,  or  the  purity  of  religion,  because  a  parent 
assumes  to  command  him.  But  within  parental  jurisdiction, 
parental  authority  is  unqualified.  It  is  not  necessary  that  rea- 
sons for  the  command  be  at  all  given  ;  the  positive  authority,  in 
the  parent's  will,  is  sufficient  to  hold  the  conscience. 

The  external  obedience,  which  may  be  rendered  from  fear  of 
punishment,  may  keep  the  peace  of  the  family  from  all  disturb- 
ance ;  and  this  spirit  of  legality  will  also  stand  in  the  future  rela- 
tions of  civil  polity ;  but  this  cannot  meet  the  full  claim  to  the 
subjection  of  the  child  and  obedience  to  the  parent.  There  is 
another  and  a  higher  end  of  piety  to  be  attained,  and  this  de- 
mands a  heart  of  loyalty.  Filial  piety  is  obedience  to  the  father 
from  love,  and  religious  piety  is  obedience  to  God  from  love, 
and  the  child's  duty  is  not  done  in  any  mere  legality,  but  must 
come  upon  the  ground  of  complete  loyalty. 

2.  A  meek  and  docile  spirit.  The  whole  of  parental  duty  is 
not  in  exercising  positive  authority,  and  securing  action  by  com- 
mands ;  much  instruction  is  to  be  given,  and  a  very  varied  dis- 
cipline to  be  administered,  .which  is  not  merely  legal.  Law 
itself  is  a  teacher  as  well  as  a  commander.  The  end  of  patriot- 
ism and  of  piety  cannot  be  reached  without  much  teaching,  and 
a  varied,  long-continued  nurture. 


266  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

On  this  account,  the  duty  of  every  child  is  to  maintain  per- 
petually a  teachable  frame  of  mind.  There  must  be  the  readi- 
ness to  gain  knowledge,  to  know  duty,  and  also  to  conform  to 
the  truth  known  ;  a  mind  soft  and  yielding,  and  thus  freely  sus- 
ceptible to  the  plastic  hand  of  parental  discipline.  A  stubborn, 
froward,  unyielding  spirit  in  any  child,  aside  from  all  overt  ac- 
tion, is  a  gross  immorality.  The  family  peace  must  be  often 
disturbed,  the  end  of  the  state  cannot  be  subserved,  and  much 
less  the  end  of  piety,  by  any  hardness  of  heart  or  wilfulness  of 
disposition.  Under  the  Jewish  law,  the  punishment  of  a  fro- 
ward and  stubborn  son  was  terribly  severe.  Deut.  xxi.  i8  to  21. 
The  abhorrence  of  God  towards  such  impiety,  in  all  cases,  is 
not  probably  too  strongly  expressed  in  this  case. 

3.  Respect  and  reverence.  In  the  nature  of  the  case,  high 
regard  and  honor  are  due  to  those  from  whom,  under  God,  life 
has  been  given  and  sustained.  But  the  claim  is  not  merely  from 
nature.  The  life  is  given,  and  the  living  being  reared  in  the 
family,  that  as  a  man  he  may  be  matured  and  fitted  for  the  citi- 
zen and  the  Christian.  He  must  come  to  bow  reverently  be- 
fore the  sceptre  of  civil  sovereignty,  and  religiously  before  the 
throne  of  God.  He  is  under  the  culture  of  the  domestic  insti- 
tution, that  he  may  there  attain  this  higher  preparation. 

And  nothing  is  a  better  discipline  for  the  perpetual  respect 
of  the  majesty  of  law,  and  the  religious  homage  of  Jehovah,  than 
that  filial  reverence  and  honor  which  is  claimed  of  all  the  chil- 
dren in  the  family  toward  their  common  parent.  Even  should 
the  parent  be  an  unworthy  member  of  civil  society,  it  is  still  the 
duty  of  the  child  to  hold  the  parent  in  great  honor,  though 
obliged  to  grieve  for  the  degeneracy  of  the  man.  All  neglect, 
reproach,  or  contemptuous  speech  or  look,  directed  towards  a 
parent,  is  most  undutiful  and  immoral.  The  fruitful  source  of 
much  political  evil,  and  prevalent  irreligion,  is  in  an  irreverent 
family. 

4.  Kind  attention  in  sickness,  and  support  in  old  age.    Time 


DUTIES   OF    BROTHERS   AXD    SISTERS.  26/ 

brings  round  its  changes,  and  a  complete  revolution  is  made  in 
the  family  relations.  The  sources  of  support,  and  the  objects 
of  dependence,  have  reversed  their  standing  to  each  other  ;  the 
child  has  become  a  man,  and  the  man  has  gone  back  to  be  a 
child  a  second  time.  There  is  no  nurture  and  discipline  to 
bring  to  maturity  in  second  childhood,  but  a  patient  and  affec- 
tionate tending  of  the  decrepitude  which  has  passed  maturity, 
and  a  reverent  watching  of  the  dust  which  the  remnant  of  vital- 
ity yet  keeps  from  crumbling. 

With  this  change  of  condition,  the  duty  of  the  children  has 
changed.  They  are  now  to  manifest  the  filial  piety  they  have 
been  taught,  and  to  support  those  limbs  which  in  their  own 
weakness  had  supported  them.  The  duty  of  obedience  in 
youth  is  not  more  imperative  than  the  soothing  attention  and 
care  of  parents  in  their  declining  age.  No  man  can  be  either  a 
good  citizen,  or  a  good  Christian,  who  neglects  the  helplessness 
and  dependence  of  an  aged  parent.  Even  if  remembered 
neglect,  on  the  part  of  the  parent,  be  grievous,  still  the  debt  of 
hfe  and  ancestral  origin  remain,  and  the  child  is  vicious  not  to 
pay. 


CHAPTER  V. 
DUTIES  OF    BROTHERS  AND  SISTERS. 

The  difference  of  sex  will  in  some  degree  modify  the  duties 
of  the  children  towards  each  other ;  still  the  duties  of  brothers 
and  sisters  are  so  nearly  the  same,  that  they  may  be  embraced 
within  the  same  description,  occasionally  only  demanding  a  little 
peculiarity  of  application. 

The  parents  are  more  directly  responsible  to  the  state,  and  to 
God,  for  the  manner  of  their  action  upon  their  children,  and 
the  directness  with  wliich  they  apply  their  authority  to  the  secxir- 


268  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

ing  of  the  ends  of  civil  freedom  and  religion ;  but  the  same 
ends  are  yet  to  be  had  in  view  in  determining  the  duties  of  the 
children  of  the  same  family,  and  each  child  must  be  iield  re- 
sponsible directly  to  the  parents,  and  ultimately  to  the  state  and 
to  heaven,  for  the  manner  in  which  he  fulfils  these  fraternal 
obligations.  The  peace  and  freedom  of  the  family  will  be  more 
immediately  in  view,  to  the  children,  than  the  interests  of  the 
state  and  religion ;  yet  in  reality  all  will  be  found  not  only  to 
harmonize  together,  but  that  each  one  must  necessarily  imply 
the  others. 

1.  Muhial affection  and  kindtiess.  Neither  man  nor  woman 
can  become  good  citizens  of  the  state  without  having  cultivated 
an  amiable  temper,  and  an  affectionate  and  kind  disposition. 
And  unless  this  be  cherished  in  the  family  circle,  it  is  vain  to 
expect  it  first  to  spring  up  among  the  jarring  interests  and  selfish 
purposes  of  public  society.  And  although  the  temper  and  the 
example  of  the  parents  will  do  much  to  mould  and  form  the 
dispositions  of  the  children,  yet  must  very  much  also  depend 
upon  the  mutual  influence  which  they  exert  upon  each  other. 
Kindness  begets  kindness  in  return,  and  the  reciprocal  good 
feeling  and  kind  action,  between  .the  children  of  the  same  family, 
perpetuates  its  peace  and  happiness.  Every  hour's  indulgence 
of  a  spirit  of  jealousy  or  envy,  of  anger  or  hatred,  by  any 
member  of  the  circle  of  children,  brings  its  discomfort  to  the 
whole  family ;  disquieting  and  grieving  the  parents,  and  provok- 
ing to  retaliation  the  other  menbers. 

The  heart  of  each  is  thus  to  be  cultivated,  by  his  or  her  own 
care  and  self-discipline,  and  its  affections  cherished  directly  and 
constantly  towards  every  brother  and  sister.  A  disregard  of 
this  perpetual  obligation  is  a  great  immorality. 

2.  A  careful  7-egard  to  each  other's  feelings  and  reputation. 
The  union  of  the  marriage  bond  is  the  most  cordial,  constant, 
and  indissoluble  of  any  relation  in  life.  It  is  not  the  tie  of  blood, 
but  the  commingling  of  personalities  in  union,  from  which  all 


DUTIES    OF    BROTHERS    AND    SISTERS.  269 

the  relationships  of  consanguinity  originate.  The  famil}',  thus,  is 
made  a  unit;  and  as  the  husband  and  wife  have  become  "one 
flesh,"  so  are  their  children  participants  in  their  blood,  and 
identical  in  the  union.  Emphatically,  one  member  cannot 
suffer,  but  every  other  member  must  suffer  with  it.  The  dis- 
honor of  one  is  an  indignity  to  all,  and  a  pang  felt  in  one  bosom 
must  shoot  through  every  heart. 

No  wound  can  be  so  painful  here  as  one  inflicted  by  a 
brother's  or  a  sister's  misdeed.  An  intended  or  a  careless 
w-rong,  from  one  within  the  fraternal  circle,  is  far  more  intolera- 
ble than  the  injuries  or  the  insults  of  any  without  the  family. 
Moreover,  all  the  regard  to  the  feeling  of  others,  and  the  tender 
care  of  character  and  reputation,  which  is  to  mark  our  life  amid 
the  duties  of  citizenship,  and  in  the  family  of  God,  are  to  be  first 
cultivated  and  practised,  in  our  intercourse  with  our  brethren 
and  sisters,  at  the  common  home  of  us  and  them. 

3.  An  acknowledged  equality  in  domestic  privileges  and  p?-e- 
rogatives.  From  the  very  fact  of  greater  age  and  experience, 
an  elder  brother  or  sister  may  be  justified  in  counselling  and 
directing  the  younger,  and  naturally  such  will  exert  a  leading 
influence  upon  the  later-born  children.  But  no  disparity  of 
age  gives  any  family  superiority  or  domestic  prerogative ;  and 
there  should,  on  this  account,  be  no  assumption  of  authority  and 
participation  in  the  parental  control.  All  such  usurpation  will 
beget  the  evils  in  the  family  which  flow  from  unrighteous 
authority  every^vhere.  Resentment,  pertinacious  resistance,  and 
direct  contempt,  will  spring  up  in  the  oppressed ;  and  in- 
solence, cruelty,  and  violence,  will  manifest  themselves  on  the 
side  of  the  oppressor ;  and  in  such  a  family  there  will  never 
cease  to  be  disunion  and  dissension. 

This  is  ever  the  duty  of  the  elder  to  the  younger,  that  in  all 
their  counsel  and  direction  they  use  only  the  moral  influence  of 
their  position,  and  not  arrogate  to  themselves  any  of  the  prerog- 
atives of  the  parental  authority.    There  is  no  such  authority 


2/0  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

legitimately,    and   all   assumption  of   it   is   an   injury  and    an 
immorality. 

4.  All  cases  of  collision  should  be  referred  to  the  pa7-ental 
authority.  Every  community  must  have  its  supreme  sovereignty, 
or  the  members  are  left  in  anarchy.  This  must  be  placed  in 
some  one  known  and  acknowledged  point.  In  the  family,  unless 
very  special  reasons  have  come  in,  this  sovereign  umpire  in  all 
controversy  is  in  the  parent.  No  other  has  the  authority  to 
judge  and  decide  in  disputed  family  rights.  The  whole  training, 
for  a  future  law-abiding  spirit,  is  in  this  deference  to  parental 
decision  and  execution. 

In  all  collections  of  children,  offences  and  collisions  will  occur. 
This  will  not  unfrequently  be  in  the  children  of  the  same  family. 
Their  common  umpire  is  the  parent ;  and  all  disputed  matters, 
unadjusted  among  themselves,  must  come  up  confidingly  to  this 
tribunal,  and  the  decision  be  received  with  ready  acquiescence. 
Such  an  ultimate  tribunal  is  not  to  be  used  by  the  child  as  a 
matter  of  threatening,  to  deter  or  coerce  a  brother  or  sister  to 
his  or  her  wishes,  against  which  every  parent  should  scrupulously 
guard  each  child ;  but  the  resort  is  righteously  made  only  for 
instruction  and  decision,  and  to  the  child  this  is  final  when 
validly  given. 

5.  All  demoralizing  example  and  influence  must  be  sedulously 
excluded.  The  nearness  of  the  connection,  and  the  constancy 
of  the  intercourse  among  brothers  and  sisters,  give  necessarily 
great  consequence  to  all  moral  influences  exerted.  One  vicious 
member  of  a  family  very  soon  corrupts  others,  and  very  easily 
leads  astray,  especially  under  the  advantages  of  age  and  more 
experience.  All  the  ends  of  the  family  institution  may  be  de- 
feated and  lost  by  the  action  upon  others  of  one  immoral 
brother  or  sister. 

The  intercourse  in  the  fraternal  circle  should  thus  be  scrupu- 
lously virtuous  and  pure.  Especially  should  all  the  example  and 
influence  of  brothers  with  sisters  be  the  most  delicate,  refined, 


DUTIES    OF    BROTHERS    AND    SISTERS.  2;  I 

and  elevating.  A  poison  instilled  here  not  only  goes  through 
the  family,  but  out  into  society,  and  on  into  eternity.  The  con- 
versation and  reading,  the  amusements  and  diversions,  the  whole 
communion  within  the  domestic  circle,  should  be  as  pure  as  it 
is  intimate  and  influential. 

6.  Their  mutual  duties,  though  modified,  are  not  lost  by  their 
dispersio7i  frofii  home.  Successively  they  go  out  from  the  com- 
mon paternal  home  to  find  them  other  homes  and  originate 
other  families  in  their  own  chosen  connections.  Though  these 
new  homes  may  be  at  a  distance  from  the  old  family  dwelling, 
and  far  from  each  other,  they  are  still  bound  by  strong  ties,  and 
owe  to  each  other  many  duties.  The  remembrances  of  the  past 
go  with  them,  and  these  tender  reminiscences  still  link  them  in 
unity.  They  are  to  each  other  what  no  other  persons  on  earth 
can  become. 

There  is  thus  the  duty  in  each  to  cherish  such  remembrances, 
to  seek  all  favoring  opportunities  for  repeated  interviews,  to 
maintain  frequent  correspondence  by  letter,  and  to  cease  not 
the  habitual  remembrance  of  each  in  prayer.  They  have  gone, 
separate,  it  may  be,  in  society,  and  are  in  their  own  spheres 
fulfilling  to  the  state  the  duties  to  which,  in  the  family,  they  have 
been  trained ;  but  as  these  duties  were  not  the  only  end  of 
family  government,  so  their  performance  will  not  finish  all  their 
work.  They  will  come  together  again  before  God,  to  exhibit 
the  issues  of  that  parental  culture  which  cherished  their  piety 
and  prepared  them  for  heaven. 

Great  forbearance  and  self-control  is  demanded  in  all  distri- 
butions of  the  parental  inheritance.  Sad  occasions  here  occur 
for  lasting  heart-burning  and  perpetuated  alienation,  for  which 
no  amount  of  wealth  can  be  a  compensation.  A  family  that  has 
been  united  and  happy  around  the  family  hearth  may  thus  fall 
into  dissension  about  its  ashes  when  its  fires  have  gone  out.  All 
such  occasions  for  family  alienation,  given  by  any  of  the  children 
through  a  spirit  of  selfishness  or  jealousy,  is  not  only  sadly  dis- 
astrous to  all  future  fraternal  peace,  but  flagrantly  vicious. 


272  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

CHAPTER    VI. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  SERVANTS, 

It  is  often  essential  to  the  ends  of  the  family  institution  that 
there  be  other  inmates  than  the  parents  and  children.  In  vari- 
ous ways  services  must  be  performed  by  such  as  are  taken  into 
the  family  for  that  purpose.  These  persons  come  thus  to  sus- 
tain a  peculiar  relation  to  the  natural  members  of  the  family,  and 
their  duties  must  be  determined  from  the  rights  acquired  by  the 
head  of  the  household.  We  have,  thus,  belonging  to  the  sphere 
of  morality  under  family  government,  the  Duty  of  Servants  to  be 
determined. 

Servitude  may  be  either  vohcntary  or  imwluntary.  These 
distinctions  give  peculiarity  to  the  servile  relationship,  and  must 
necessarily  very  much  modify  the  ground  of  obligation  and  the 
nature  of  the  duties.  We  shall  thus  best  apprehend  the  truth  in 
relation  to  both  by  considering  each  sepai-ately. 

Section  I.  Voluntary  Servitude.  The  whole  service  in  this 
rests  wholly  upon  contract.  It  will  include  all  such  as  come 
within  the  family  by  personal  agreement,  or  by  indenture  of  the 
parent  or  guardian.  Hired  servants,  bound  servants,  indented 
apprentices,  etc.,  come  under  this  division  of  voluntary  servi- 
tude. The  principles  which  govern  are  the  same  as  in  all  ordi- 
nary contracts,  and  need  only  to  be  simply  stated  to  determine 
the  whole  matter  of  duty. 

I .  The  entire  ground  of  claim  is  in  the  contract.  Nothing 
may  be  assumed  which  is  not  there  specified,  or  fairly  implied 
in  all  the  circumstances.  Established  custom  may  regulate 
many  things  which  will  need  no  specification  in  the  Awitten  con- 
tract, but  this  must  be  on  the  ground  that  each  party  has  under- 
stood, and  tacitly  agreed  to,  all  these  matters  of  custom  and 
precedent.     The  whole  act  of  claim  and  obligation  was  in  the 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  2/3 

ratifying  of  the  agreement,  and  nothing  back  of  that  can  be  a 
source  of  right  or  duty. 

2.  Each  party  must  be  alike  free  in  making  the  contract. 
Whatever  circumstances  may  make  such  an  agreement  desirable, 
on  either  side,  the  party  must  be  the  one  to  decide  to  what  ex- 
tent it  is  desirable.  In  relation  to  the  matter  of  agreement,  they 
come  together  as  equals,  and  one  as  free  to  assent  or  dissent  as 
the  other.  Neither  can  be  bound  to  any  thing  to  which  the  free 
assent  has  not  been  given. 

3.  Neither  party  can  contract  in  violation  of  any  previous 
claims.  Whatever  obligations  either  may  have  been  under  to 
the  claims  of  others,  these  must  be  regarded  in  the  making  of 
the  contract.  If  any  such  higher  and  older  obligations  are  con- 
travened by  the  later  contract,  it  is  to  this  extent  null  and  void. 

4.  The  contract  equally  binds  both.  The  master  may  no 
more  violate  his  stipulations  than  the  servant. 

5.  No  one  has  the  right  to  contract  to  the  known  injury  of 
the  other.  Morality  demands  the  same  mutual  respect,  as  men, 
in  making  contracts  as  in  all  other  human  intercourse ;  and 
hence  each  is  bound  to  respect  the  rights  of  the  other.  All 
trick  and  deceit,  all  concealment  and  duplicity,  which  seek  to 
take  advantage  one  of  the  other,  are  vicious  and  immoral. 
Considering  the  wants  and  circumstances  of  both,  each  must 
stand  upon  the  ground  of  a  fair  and  honest  equivalent  in  the 
bargain  made. 

6.  A  wilful  breach  of  the  contract  on  one  side  releases  from 
obligation  on  the  other.  If  one  has  been  injured  by  the  viola- 
tion of  the  contract,  in  the  neglect  or  wrong-doing  of  the  other, 
he  has  not  only  a  claim  to  redress  by  way  of  damages,  but  he 
has  the  right  to  say  whether  the  contract  has  not  itself  thus 
become  worthless  to  him,  and  that  he  may  claim  a  full  release 
from  it.  He  may  take  his  option,  to  be  indemnified  in  damages, 
or  in  the  annulling  of  the  contract. 

7.  Neither  party  may  take  advantage  of  his  own  wrong- doing. 


274  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

A  violation  of  the  contract  in  any  way,  by  one,  leaves  it  solely 
at  the  option  of  the  other  how  to  get  his  redress.  The  wrong- 
doer cannot  plead  his  breach  of  tlie  contract  to  attain  any 
benefit  on  his  part. 

8.  Neither  party  can  bind  Jiis  children  beyond  their  minority. 
The  tie  of  consanguinity  may  lay  claims  upon  a  child  after  his 
parents'  decease,  and  thus  more  manifestly  after  the  child's 
majority  in  the  parents'  hfe-time.  It  may  be  incumbent  upon 
the  child  to  do  and  sacrifice  much  to  rescue  a  parent's  charac- 
ter and  memory  from  reproach ;  but  this  is  from  the  permanent 
ethical  claim  of  blood-descent.  The  child  would  degrade  him- 
self in  allowing  the  stain  to  rest  on  his  ancestor.  It  cannot 
originate  in  any  contract  the  parent  has  made.  The  child,  at  his 
majority,  must  have  all  the  independent  prerogatives  of  a  man 
that  the  father  has,  or  one  generation  enslaves  another.  When 
a  new  generation  comes  on,  it  must  stand  as  free  as  the  prede- 
cessor in  making  its  contracts ;  and  the  people  of  the  last 
cannot  be  bound  by  the  first,  to  be  made  either  masters  or 
servants.  A  man  may  legally  direct  his  property  so  as  to  bind 
his  heirs  after  his  decease,  but  his  children's  servitude,  or  mas- 
tership, must  be  of  their  own  free  controlling. 

The  above  may  be  applied  as  the  principles  which  are  to 
regulate  in  all  cases  of  voluntary  servitude,  and  which  will 
determine  all  specific  duties  and  claims.  The  rights  on  each 
side  will,  in  these,  be  duly  guarded,  and  the  ethical  claims  of 
each  enforced. 

Section  II.  Involuntary  Servitude.  This  is  where  the  per- 
son is  held  to  service  without  his  consent,  and  thus  no  contract 
is  made.  The  will  of  one  party  is  not  consulted,  but  he  is 
under  duress,  and  constrained  to  serve.  Several  such  cases 
may  be  named,  as  equitable  compulsory  servitude,  but  which  do 
not  strictly  come  under  the  authority  of  the  family.  The  state 
is  the  controlling  sovereign ;  and  if  the  service  be  rendered  in 
the  family,  it  is  wholly  under  the  direction  of  the  state  authority. 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  2/5 

1.  The  demerit  of  crime.  Compulsory  service  may  ethically 
be  demanded  of  the  criminal,  either  as  penalty  for  his  crime,  or 
as  contributing  to  his  support  while  he  is  undergoing  confine- 
ment as  a  penalty.  Principles  of  equity  and  humanity  are  to 
determine  the  amount  and  kind  of  labor,  and  whether  some 
portion  of  the  proceeds  should  not  go  to  the  comfort  of  his 
needy  family;  but  the  state  may  rightfully  enforce  labor  and 
sendee  from  the  criminal,  without  regarding  at  all  his  own 
consent. 

2.  The  claim  of  debt.  One  man  has  received  that  which 
belongs  to  another,  and  as  thus  indebted,  he  is  bound  to  render 
a  full  equivalent.  It  might  be  considered  in  the  light  of  a  brok- 
en contract,  for  when  the  debt  was  contracted  there  was,  ex- 
pressed or  implied,  the  promise  to  pay.  But  in  whatever  way 
bound,  the  creditor  has  now  a  righteous  claim,  and  it  may  be 
pressed  to  liquidation  without  regard  to  the  will  of  the  debtor. 
If  no  other  means  of  pay  exist,  his  personal  services  may  be 
exacted.  The  creditor  has  the  right,  under  the  authority  of 
civil  law,  to  coerce  payment  by  compulsory  labor. 

3.  The  exaction  of  paicper  hibor.  If  the  state  is  responsible 
for  the  support  of  its  poor  members,  it  has  also  the  right  of 
coercing  their  services  against  their  consent,  so  far  as  these  may 
be  made  to  minister  to  the  diminution  of  the  poor-rate.  The 
state  may  not  make  gain,  and  raise  a  revenue  from  their  com- 
pulsory labor,  nor  violate  any  claim  of  humanity ;  Ijut  the  state 
may  compel  the  idle  and  dissolute  to  labor  towards  tbsir  cvyd. 
support. 

4.  Captives  taken  in  war.  The  capturing  power  is  bound, 
on  all  principles  of  humanity  and  morality,  to  support  in  com- 
fort the  prisoners  it  has  taken  in  war,  who  shall  be  unable  to  pay 
for  their  own  support.  This,  as  in  the  case  of  pauper-labor 
above,  gives  the  right  to  coerce  servitude  to  the  extent  of  the 
prisoner's  support.  Morality  does  not  tolerate  war  and  captivity 
as  a  source  of  gain,  and  thus  a  right  of  possession  and  property 


2/6  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

in  the  prisoner ;  but  as  bound  to  maintain  while  a  prisoner,  so 
the  nation  may  exact  services  of  the  prisoner  to  that  end. 

In  all  the  above  cases,  the  state  may  sell  the  services  to  indi- 
viduals, and  may  thus  give  over  the  right  to  exact,  to  the  extent 
to  which  this  right  is  possessed  by  itself.  But  in  none  of  the 
above  cases  is  this  exacted  servitude  any  matter  of  family  author- 
ity. If  the  family  have  the  service,  it  must  be  bought  of  the 
state,  and  all  right  of  control  and  coercion  is  only  by  state 
transfer. 

Under  the  head  of  Family  Government,  aside  from  the  pa- 
rental authority  which  commands  and  controls  the  child,  and 
exacts  services  without  consent  for  the  great  ends  of  the  family 
institution,  there  is  but  one  case  of  involuntary  servitude  which 
can  be  contemplated,  viz. :  Domestic  Slavery.  This  has  many 
more  difficulties  attending  its  consideration  than  any  of  the 
above  cases.  The  conflicting  interests,  prejudices,  political 
party  arrangements,  and  general  public  excitement  in  reference 
to  its  evils,  and  the  different  methods  of  redress,  all  have  united 
to  complicate  and  embarrass  the  subject,  and  render  it  for  the 
present  almost  hopeless  of  any  determination  in  wliich  there 
shall  be  harmony  of  conviction  and  action.  And  yet  the  great 
principles  of  family  government,  and  the  ends  to  be  subserved 
by  it,  are  as  readily  applied  to  domestic  slavery  as  to  voluntary 
servitude  or  parental  authority  over  children.  So  far  as  slavery 
is  a  domestic  institution,  it  must  be  determined,  in  its  morality, 
by  the  ends  for  which  the  family  exists,  and  be  justified  or  con- 
demned accordingly. 

I.  The  nature  of  domestic  slavery.  This  is  quite  distinct 
from  all  voluntary  service,  inasmuch  as  that  is  founded  upon 
contract,  but  this  contemplates  service  without  consent,  —  labor 
from  compulsion.  A  definition,  which  will  embrace  all  modifi- 
cations of  domestic  slavery,  is  the  exacting  of  personal  services 
without  consent.  It  controls  without  contract.  It  directs  the 
action  of  the  servant  at  the  will  of  the  master,  and  treats  him 
as  incapacitated  from  forming  and  executing  his  own  choices. 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  2// 

2.  The  ground  on  which  domestic  slavery  becotnes  righteous. 
This  absolute  control  over  the  service  of  another  is  completely 
righteous,  as  a  domestic  arrangement,  when  it  is  kept  fully 
within  the  ends  for  which  the  family  has  been  instituted.  The 
family  is  the  nursery  for  man,  to  train  him  up  for  civil  freedom 
and  piety.  The  race  is  to  be  perpetuated  and  nurtured  from 
generation  to  generation  in  lawful  wedlock,,  and  not  through 
promiscuous  cohabitation,  because  thus  the  freedom  and  piety 
of  the  race  can  be  best  promoted.  It  is  this  fact  which  gives 
its  ethical  validity  to- parental  authority;  and  tlie  same  fact, 
actually  existing  in  any  case,  will  give  equal  validity  to  the 
authority  of  the  head  of  the  household  as  the  master  of  his 
slaves.  So  long  as  it  is  most  subservient  to  their  preparation 
for  the  rights  of  citizenship,  and  the  blessedness  of  heaven,  so 
long  it  will  be  their  duty  to  be  obedient  to  their  master  for 
righteousness'  sake.  There  is  here  one  ground  of  subjection 
to  family  authority,  to  the  child  and  to  the  slave,  and  while 
they  both  stand  on  that  ground,  the  master's  authority  over  his 
slave  is  as  righteous  as  his  authority  over  his  child. 

But  this  domestic  arrangement  of  master  and  slave  must 
stand  solely  on  this  ground,  of  subserviency  to  civil  freedom 
and  to  pious  worship,  or  it  becomes  an  immorality.  No  man 
has  the  right  to  lord  it  over  his  servant,  and  control  his  services 
at  his  own  pleasure,  without  regard  to  the  choice  of  the  servant, 
except  upon  precisely  the  same  principles  that  give  him  this 
authority  over  his  child.  The  child  is  born  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  such  authority,  and  thus  comes  naturally  under  the 
principle  ;  the  slave  may  or  may  not  be  so  born.  But  whether 
born  in  the  master's  house,  or  bought  with  his  money,  the  only 
end  that  can  ethically  justify  his  control  over  him  is,  that  he 
sustain  that  relation,  and  exert  that  authority,  solely  to  the  end 
of  his  preparation  for  state  citizenship  somewhere,  and  for 
heaven.  Not  at  all  the  consideration  of  the  master's  profit  or 
pleasure,  but  the  highest  public  freedom  and  piety,  can  alone 
make  domestic  slavery  stand  square  with  the  claims  of  morality. 


278  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

It  is  quite  important  here  to  see  how  the  whole  Jewish  code 
of  legislation,  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  followed  out  this  prin- 
ciple. It  never  omitted  the  end  of  civil  freedom,  where  that 
was  attainable ;  and  never,  on  any  occasion,  the  end  of  piety. 
It  justified  itself  perpetually  by  keeping  within  righteous  domes- 
tic principle,  and  seeking  the  end  for  which  the  family  itself 
was  instituted. 

//  recognized  no  right  to  slavery  among  the  heathen.  If  a 
slave  fled  from  a  Pagan  master,  and  would  dwell  in  the  Holy 
Land,  there  was  the  prohibition  to  deliver  up  the  fugitive. 
"  Thou  shalt  not  deliver  to  his  master  the  servant  who  hath  es- 
caped from  his  master  to  thee  :  He  shall  dwell  with  thee,  even 
among  you  in  that  place  which  he  shall  choose  in  one  of  thy 
gates  where  it  liketh  him  best :  thou  shalt  not  oppress  him." 

Deut.  xxiii.  15,  16. 

It  prohibited  all  Hebrew  slavery  except  by  contract.  A  He- 
brew servant  might  be  bought,  but  with  such  contract  only  to 
the  next  coming  year  of  release.  "  If  thou  shalt  buy  a  Hebrew 
servant,  six  years  he  shall  serve,  and  in  the  seventh  he  shall  go 
out  free  for  nothing."  Ex.  xxi.  2.  "  And  if  thy  brother,  a  Hebrew 
man  or  a  Hebrew  woman,  shall  be  sold  to  thee,  and  serve  thee 
six  years,  then  in  the  seventh  year  thou  shalt  let  him  go  free  from 
thee."  Deut.  xv.  12.  If  he  became  a  perpetual  servant,  it  was  at 
his  own  agreement.  "  And  if  thy  servant  shall  plainly  say,  I  love 
my  master,  my  wife,  and  my  children  ;  I  will  not  go  out  free  : 
Then  his  master  shall  bring  him  to  the  Judges ;  he  shall  also 
bring  him  to  the  door,  or  to  the  door-post :  and  his  master  shall 
bore  his  ear  through  with  an  awl ;  and  he  shall  serve  him  for- 
ever."     Ex.  xxi.  s,  6.      See,  also,  Deut.  xv.  16,  17. 

//  permitted  national  Gentile  slavery  as  a  commutation  for 
death.  The  Canaanites  were  doomed  to  death,  by  God,  for 
their  idolatry,  after  waiting  for  the  filling  up  of  their  iniquity  from 
the  days  of  Jacob.  "  But  in  the  fourth  generation  they  shall 
come  hither  d%dxxi,  for  the  iniquity  of  the  Amorites  is  not  yet  full.^^ 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  2/9 

Gen.  XV.  i6.  "  And  when  the  Lord  thy  God  shall  deliver  them 
before  thee,  thou  shalt  smite  them  and  utterly  destroy  them  : 
thou  shalt  make  no  covenant  with  them,  nor  show  mercy  to 
them."  Deut.  vii.  1, 2.  "  But  of  the  cities  of  these  people  which  the 
Lord  thy  God  doth  give  thee  for  an  inheritance,  thou  shalt  save 
alive  nothing  that  breatheth."  Deut.  xx.  i6  to  i8.  By  deceit  some 
of  them  made  a  covenant  under  which  they  were  spared,  but 
were  upon  detection  made  perpetual  national  bond-men.  "And 
Joshua  that  day  made  them  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of 
water  for  the  congregation,  and  for  the  altar  of  the  Lord,  even 
to  this  day,  in  the  place  which  he  should  choose."     Josh.  ix.  3  to  27. 

It  allowed  doniesiic  slavery  by  purchase  from  Gefitiles.  This 
was  the  only  source  of  family  slavery.  "  Both  thy  bond-men, 
and  thy  bond-maids,  which  thou  shalt  have,  shall  be  of  the 
heathen  that  are  around  you,  of  them  shall  ye  buy  bond-men 
and  bond-maids.  IMoreover,  of  the  children  of  the  strangers 
that  sojourn  among  you,  of  them  shall  ye  buy,  and  of  their 
families  that  are  with  you,  which  they  begat  in  your  land,  and 
they  shall  be  your  possession."  Lev.  xxv.  44  to  46.  Such  as  were 
already  in  heathen  bondage  they  might  l>iiy,  but  it  was  a  capital 
offence  to  kidnap.  "  And  he  that  stealeth  a  man,  and  selleth 
him,  or  if  he  shall  be  found  in  his  hand,  he  shall  surely  be  put 
to  death."  Ex.  xxi.  16.  This  transferred  from  Paganism  to  the 
privileges  of  a  true  religion. 

The  slave  was  allowed  full  religious  privilege.  Circumcision. 
"  He  that  is  born  in  thy  house,  and  he  that  is  bought  with  thy 
money,  must  needs  be  circumcised ;  and  my  covenant  shall  be 
in  your  flesh  for  an  everlasting  covenant."  Gen.  xvH.  12, 13.  The 
Sabbath.  "  But  the  seventh  day  is  the  Sabbath  of  the  Lord  thy 
God,  in  it  thou  shalt  not  do  any  work,  thou,  nor  thy  son,  nor 
thy  daughter,  fhy  man-servant,  nor  thy  maidservant,  nor  thy 
cattle,  nor  thy  stranger  that  is  within  thy  gates."  Ex.  xx.  10.  Tlae 
passover.  "  But  every  man's  servant  that  is  bought  for  money, 
when  thou  hast  circumcised  him,  then  shall  ho  eat  thereof." 


280  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

Ex.  xii.  44  to  49.  The  temple  service  and  sacred  feasts.  ''And 
thou  shalt  rejoice  before  the  Lord  thy  God,  thou,  and  thy  son 
and  thy  daughter,  and  thy  man-servant  and  thy  maid-servant, — 
in  the  place  which  the  Lord  thy  God  hath  chosen  to  put  his 
name  there."  Deut.  xvi.  n.  In  solemn  national  covenant.  "Ye 
stand  this  day  all  of  you  before  the  Lord  your  God,  —  your 
little  ones,  your  wives,  and  the  stranger  that  is  in  thy  camp, 
from  the  hewer  of  thy  wood  to  the  drawer  of  thy  water,  that 
thou  shouldst   enter  into  covenant  with  the   Lord  thy  God." 

Deut.  x.xix.  10,  12. 

If  he  was  uiaimed  by  violence  he  was  made  free.  "  And  if  a 
man  shall  smite  the  eye  of  his  servant,  or  the  eye  of  his  maid, 
that  it  shall  perish,  he  shall  let  him  go  free  for  his  eye's  sake. 
And  if  he  shall  smite  out  his  man-servant's  tooth,  or  his  maid- 
sei"vant's  tooth,  he  shall  let  him  go  free  for  his  tooth's  sake." 

Ex.  xxi.  26,  27. 

If  he  was  killed  outright  hy  his  master,  the  master  was  pun- 
ished. "  And  if  a  man  shall  smite  his  servant  or  his  maid  with 
a  rod,  and  he  shall  die  under  his  hand,  he  shall  surely  be 
punished."     Ex.  xxi.  20. 

The  fact  that  if  he  survived  the  injury  two  or  three  days,  the 
master  was  not  punished,  "  because  he  was  his  money,"  verse 
twenty-first,  —  is  the  least  easily  reconciled  with  the  general 
principle,  of  any  regulation  given.  The  fact  that  he  was  "  his 
money,"  might  indicate  that  it  was  not  to  be  inferred  that  there 
was  the  intent  to  kill ;  and  that  in  the  uncertainty  of  the  occa- 
sion of  the  death,  the  whole  matter  was  to  be  left  to  the 
judgment  of  God. 

It  may  not  be  certain,  though  it  is  probable,  that  the  slave 
had  the  same  privilege  of  becoming  a  proselyte  that  any  free 
Gentile  had  ;  and  thus  at  his  own  option,  as  a  convert,  he  would 
come  into  all  the  privileges  of  an  Hebrew  of  the  Hebrews,  and 
go  out  of  his  bondage  at  the  next  year  of  release.  It  is  prob- 
able, also,  that  the  Gentile  as  well  as  the  Jewish  slave  had  his 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  28 1 

liberty  at  the  jubilee.  "Ye  shall  hallow  the  fiftieth  year  and 
proclaim  liberty  throughout  all  the  land,  to  all  its  inhabitants." 
Lev.  XXV.  lo.  All  Jewish  slaves  were  free  every  seventh  year  by  the 
special  statutes  before  cited.  Ex.  xxi.  2;  Deot.  xv.  12.  This  really  leaves 
none  but  Gentile  slaves  to  have  the  special  benefit  of  the  fiftieth 
year  freedom,  for  the  Jewish  slaves  were  already  provided  for  in 
the  seventh  year  of  release,  and  the  Gentile  slaves  are  manifestly 
recognized  as  properly  citizens  and  inhabitants  in  the  above 
transactions  of  Deut.  xxix.  10,  12.  The  interpretation  of  Lev. 
XXV.  45,  46,  is  thus  to  be  a  permission  perpetually  to  make 
bond-men  of  Gentile  descendents  in  every  generation,  but  not 
that  any  one  Gentile  man  and  his  children  should  be  perpetual 
slaves.     Every  slave  was  made  free  at  the  year  of  jubilee. 

His  whole  training  in  a  Hebrew  family  would  be  thus  fitting 
him  for  the  rights  and  duties  of  a  citizen.  And  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, the  Jewish  law  kept  the  great  end  of  piety  as  fully 
in  view  to  the  master  for  his  slave,  as  to  the  father  for  his  son. 
Take  the  whole  condition  of  a  Pagan  bond-man,  and  view  him 
as  transferred  by  purchase  to  a  Hebrew  master,  and  how  great 
the  change  for  the  better,  both  politically  and  religiously  ! 

3.  The  ground  on  which  domestic  shivery  becomes  2/ftrighieous. 
The  only  end  for  which  the  master  may  hold  slaves,  morally, 
has  been  given  ;  but  it  may  often  occur  that  one  man  may  con- 
trol the  services  of  another,  in  fact,  for  c]uite  another  end.  The 
only  one  supposable  is  some  private  interest.  The  authority  is 
exerted  for  some  personal  gratification  not  for  public  freedom 
nor  piety.  On  such  ground  the  domestic  institution,  as  embrac- 
ing slavery,  is  immoral,  and  all  its  authority  an  unrighteous  usur- 
pation. The  particular  definition  of  slavery,  on  the  former 
ground,  would  be  —  exacting  service  without  consent,  bi/f  solely 
for  ike  end  of  highest  freedom  and  piety.  The  particular  defini- 
tion, on  the  latter  ground,  is  —  exacting  service  without  consent, 
for  the  master's  own  pleasjire.  The  immorality  of  this  form  of 
domestic  slavery  is  made  manifest  in  the  usurpation  and  tyranny 


282  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

of  the  authority.  Liberty  of  choice,  in  object  and  execution,  is 
every  man's  birthright ;  restrained  "only  by  that  which  is  due  to 
the  same  right  in  all.  There  is  admitted  no  partial  prerogatives  ; 
but  as  man,  every  one  is  alike  free  and  alike  restrained.  All 
men  may  do  what  they  please,  if  only  each  one  will  regard,  in  his 
pleasure,  this  same  right  in  all  others,  and  restrain  his  choices 
by  the  freedom  of  all.  But  the  principle  of  this  form  of  slavery 
makes  the  individual  pleasure  supreme.  One  man  gratifies  his 
own  choice,  and  discards  wholly  the  right  of  choice  in  another. 
It  annihilates  the  imperatives  of  morality  in  public  freedom  by 
its  own  selfishness. 

Still  further,  it  overrides  all  the  claims  of  piety.  Piety  can 
only  be  in  freely  worshipping  and  serving  God  according  to  the 
dictates  of  conscience.  It  is  complying  with  the  impulse  of 
man's  spiritual  being,  in  its  conscious  dependence,  to  go  out  in 
reverence  and  confidence  to  God,  according  to  the  honest  con- 
viction of  the  claims  that  God  makes.  The  end  of  all  family 
authority,  beyond  political  freedom,  is  the  cultivation  of  such 
piety.  But  this  form  of  slavery  discards  utterly  all  such  claims, 
moral  and  Divine,  and  puts  the  pleasure  of  the  master  above 
conscience  and  religion.  It  assumes  to  do  what  morality 
can  never  permit  may  be  done.  Responsibility  to  personal 
claims  of  conscience  is  inalienable.  Personality  may  not  re- 
nounce its  prerogative  and  become  a  thing.  The  slave  may 
not  consent  to  surrender  it ;  the  master  may  not  arrogate  to 
assume  it.  One  cannot  give  it,  the  other  can  not  take  it,  without 
guilt.  Neither  consent  nor  force  can  effect  such  a  transfer. 
Immutable  morality  still  holds  every  man  by  the  imperatives  of 
his  own  conscience  ;  and  yet  this  form  of  the  institution  as- 
sumes to  accomplish  all  this  ethical  impossibility  by  the  mere 
contradictory  pleasure  of  the  master.  No  possible  assumption 
of  authority  can  be  more  tyrannical  or  immoral. 

All  domestic  slavery  which  controls  the  slave  for  the  pleasure 
of  the  master  is  most  abhorrent  to  virtue. 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  283 

It  may  also  be  important  to  see  how  the  Christian  Scriptures 
view  this  form  of  domestic  slavery.  We  have  already  examined 
the  Jewish  law  of  the  Old  Testament,  and  found  its  provisions 
agreeing  substantially  with  the  true  ends  of  the  family  institu- 
tion, and  thus  resting  upon  a  moral  basis.  So  slavery  might  be, 
and  be  righteous.  But  the  Christian  Scriptures  manifestly  refer 
to  the  latter  form  of  slavery,  where  the  services  were  controlled 
at  the  will,  and  for  the  pleasure  of  the  master.  It  was  Grecian 
and  Roman  slavery  to  which  the  Apostles  allude,  in  the  several 
epistles  to  Christian  Churches,  which  we  shall  examine.  In 
what  light  is  this  form  of  slavery  regulated  in  the  Gospel? 

//  enjoins  emphatically  obedience  to  the  master.  "  Servants, 
be  obedient  to  them  that  are  your  masters  according  to  the 
flesh,  with  fear  and  trembling,  in  singleness  of  your  heart,  as  to 
Christ ;  Not  with  eye-service  as  men-pleasers ;  but  as  the 
servants  of  Christ,  doing  the  will  of  God  from  the  heart." 
Eph.  vi.  5to8.  And  to  the  same  purport  see  Col.  iii.  22  to  25. 
"  Let  as  many  servants  as  are  under  the  yoke  count  their  own 
masters  worthy  of  all  honor,  that  the  name  of  God  and  his 
doctrine  be  not  blasphemed."  i  Tim.  vi.  i.  "  Exhort  serx-ants  to 
be  obedient  to  their  own  masters,  and  to  please  them  well  in  all 
things ;  not  answering  again ;  Not  purloining,  but  showing  all 
good  fidelity,  that  they  may  adorn  the  doctrine  of  God  our 
Saviour  in  all  things."  Titus,  h.  9, 10.  "Servants,  be  subject  to 
your  masters  with  all  fear,  not  only  to  the  good  and  gentle,  but 
also  to  the  froward.  For  this  is  thank-worthy,  if  a  man  for 
conscience  towards  God  endure  grief,  suffering  wrongfully.  For 
what  glory  is  it,  if  when  yc  be  buffetted  for  your  faults,  ye  shall 
take  it  patiently?  but  if  when  ye  do  well,  and  suffer  for  it,  ye 
take  it  patiently,  this  is  acceptable  with  God.  For  even  here- 
unto were  ye  called  because  Christ  also  suffered  for  us,  leaving 
us  an  example  that  ye  should  follow  his  steps."  i  Pet.  ii.  18  to  20. 
This  obedience  was  by  no  means  required,  on  the  ground  that 
the  slavery  was  righteous,  and  the  master's  authority  morally 


284  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

valid.  It  would  be  more  prudent  for  the  slave  to  obey,  and 
tend  most  to  cultivate  his  piety.  He  was  required  to  be  obe- 
dient, "  not  only  to  the  good  and  gentle,  but  also  to  the  fro- 
ward"  ;  even  obedient  where  cruelty  and  wickedness  led  to  the 
"buffeting"  of  the  slave  for  "doing  well."  It  was  expedient 
to  obey ;  just  as  when  you  cannot  escape  from  a  tiger,  it  is 
expedient  not  to  provoke  him.  It  by  no  means  justifies  the 
usurped  authority.  It  was  better  for  the  slave  to  obey ;  and 
especially  it  would  serve  to  augment  piety,  and  recommend  the 
religion  of  Him,  who  in  his  humiliation  was  smitten  and  "  opened 
not  his  mouth." 

//  requires  7?iasters  to  reciprocate  the  same  spirit.  "  Do  the 
same  things  to  them,"  —  "forbear  threatening,"  —  "give  to  the 
slave  that  which  is  just  and  equal."  Eph.  vi.  9;  Cou  iv.  i.  The 
Christian  master  was  no  more  to  provoke  a  froward  slave,  than 
the  Christian  slave  was  to  disobey  a  froward  master ;  and  the 
wicked  authority  of  the  master  is  no  more  sustained  by  the 
injunction  in  one  case,  than  is  the  wicked  spirit  of  the  slave  by 
the  injunction  in  the  other. 

A  slave  ivas  to  take  his  freedom  if  he  could.  "  Art  thou 
called  being  a  servant  ?  care  not  for  it ;  but  if  thou  mayest  be 
made  free,  use  it  rather.  For  he  that  is  called  in  the  Lord, 
being  a  servant,  is  the  Lord's  freeman ;  likewise,  also,  he  that  is 
called,  being  free,  is  Christ's  servant.  Ye  are  bought  with  a 
price  ;  be  not  ye  the  servants  of  men.  Brethren,  let  every  man, 
wherein  he  is  called,  therein  abide  with  God."  i  Cor.  vii.  21  to  24. 
The  great  thing  was  his  Christian  redemption ;  he  need  not 
much  mind  his  bondage  to  his  master,  compared  with  the 
unspeakable  prerogative  in  that  he  was  now  "  the  Lord's  free- 
man." Still,  if  he  might  be  free,  that  was  desirable.  "  Use  it 
rather."  Fully  condemning  the  relation  as  unrighteous,  on  the 
part  of  the  assumed  authority  of  the  master.  Had  it  been  on 
the  ground  that  the  slave's  culture  in  social  and  political  duties 
was  best  subserved  by  remaining  in  such  a  domestic  arrange- 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  285 

ment,  and  that  his  piety  was  there  best  promoted, —  the  only 
ends  that  could  justify  the  relation,  —  we  should  certainly  have 
had  no  such  direction.  It  would  have  been  as  irrelevant  to  the 
slave  as  to  the  child.  Both  ought  to  stay  under  the  authority, 
till  the  end  of  the  cultivation  has  been  attained. 

When  we  add  to  all  this  the  most  affecting  direction  of  Paul 
to  Philemon,  in  sending  his  fugitive  slave  Onesimus  to  him, 
converted  and  pious,  and  expressly  saying  "  not  now  as  a  slave, 
but  above  a  slave,  a  brother  beloved  "  ;  and  also,  all  the  gener-al 
principles  of  the  Gospel  bearing  on  this  assumption  to  use  one 
man  for  another  man's  pleasure  ;  as  in  the  parable  of  the  good 
Samaritan ;  the  golden  rule  ;  the  command  to  self-denial  for 
other's  good,  etc. ;  we  cannot  fail  to  see  that  any  form  of 
domestic  slavery,  which  assumes  to  control  the  slave  for  the 
master's  pleasure,  is  as  truly  condemned  by  our  Saviour  as  it  is 
abhorrent  to  humanity. 

Slave  emancipation  had  been  effected  in  many  cases  by  civil 
authority,  and  in  different  states  of  the  American  Union,  but  in 
the  year  1863  slavery  was  virtually  abolished  in  the  United 
States  by  the  proclamation  of  President  Lincoln,  as  a  war- 
measure  in  suppressing  the  civil  conflict  then  raging ;  and  the 
growing  spirit  of  benevolence,  freedom,  and  humanity  had  been 
since  steadily  at  work  for  expelling  slavery  from  all  lands.  It 
does  yet,  however,  widely  prevail  in  the  world,  and  the  cause  of 
morality  demands  still  the  clear  expression  of  its  claims,  and 
especially  the  distinctions  between  justifiable  and  forbidden  forms 
of  domestic  servitude,  that  the  right  and  wrong  of  household 
slavery  may  be  everywhere  fully  apprehended. 

It  will  not  be  difficult  in  any  community,  where  the  institution 
of  domestic  slavery  is  established,  to  determine  on  which  basis 
it  rests,  and  is  supported  and  defended.  The  laws  which  define 
and  regulate  it,  the  customs  and  habits  engendered  by  it,  the 
practises  constantly  prevailing  under  it,  will  make  patent  the  life 
and  spirit  of  the  system ;  and  accordingly  as  it  keeps  within  and 


286  LEGALITY    AND    LOYALTY. 

subserves,  or  overrides  and  discards,  the  great  end  of  the  family, 
will  it  be  approved  or  condemned  by  the  stern  rule  of  immutable 
morality. 

Some  individual  cases  of  men  there  may  be,  who  fully  conform 
to  the  claims  of  morality  and  Christianity  in  the  spirit  and  prin- 
ciple of  their  domestic  arrangement,  both  as  to  children,  volun- 
tary servants,  and  slaves,  while  the  public  institution  of  slavery, 
as  it  is  known  in  the  law,  sustained  in  the  state,  and  practised 
by  the  mass  of  families  in  the  community,  is  utterly  vicious  and 
immoral.  The  institution,  as  having  its  basis  and  support  in 
state  authority,  and  controlled  by  laws  which  coerce  the  slave 
to  the  master's  pleasure,  without  coercing  the  master  to  the 
legitimate  ends  of  family  government,  may  be  wholly  immoral, 
and  also  wholly  unchristian ;  and  every  family,  which  includes 
slaves  on  such  a  principle,  will  also  be  vicious ;  and  yet,  in  such 
a  community,  and  under  such  a  jurisdiction,  it  is  possible  that 
families  may  be,  where  the  involuntary  servitude  of  their  mem- 
bers is  wholly  righteous  and  justified  both  by  pure  morality 
and  revealed  Christianity.  The  head  of  the  family  may  have 
no  other  end  than  the  elevation  of  the  servant,  and  his  prepara- 
tion for  heaven ;  and  the  servant  may,  as  a  fact,  be  in  the  best 
condition  to  improve  his  humanity  and  his  piety  of  any  to  which 
the  master  can  introduce  him ;  and  where  these  things  are  so, 
the  relation  of  master  and  servant  is  as  legitimate  by  morality 
and  Christianity,  as  is  the  relation  of  parent  and  child. 

The  law  of  the  land  may  give  to  the  master  prerogatives  and 
authority  over  his  servant,  which  he  would  by  no  means  use ; 
and  it  may  fasten  obligations  and  responsibilities  upon  him,  in 
reference  to  his  servant,  which  he  can  never  justify  as  ethically 
binding ;  and  even  hold  the  slave  to  alternatives,  in  the  death 
or  misfortunes  of  the  master,  which  both  the  master  and  the 
servant  disapprove  and  regret,  but  which  neither  have  any 
power  to  change ;  yet  if  both  master  and  servant  are  controlling 
their  own  conduct  by  the  ends  of  all  family  government,  they 


DUTIES    OF    SERVANTS.  28/ 

may  both  be  very  much  pitied,  under  these  imposed  state 
liabilities,  but  they  can  neither  be  morally  nor  scripturally  con- 
demned. With  the  parties,  it  is  a  righteous  family  arrangement, 
and  a  virtuous  connection  of  master  and  servant,  though  the 
political  aspect  is  that  of  unrighteous  slavery. 

A  short  summary  of  duties,  in  reference  to  all  that  may  have 
any  connection  with  a  system  of  slavery  as  here  presented,  may 
be  thus  given  : 

I.    In  reference  to  the  master. 

1.  The  master  is  bound  to  relinquish,  at  once,  all  claim  to 
control  his  servant  merely  for  the  ends  of  his  own  interest  or 
pleasure,  and  immediately  to  renounce  any  assumed  right  to 
interfere  with  the  dictates  of  conscience. 

2.  He  is  bound  to  give  to  the  slave  the  same  freedom  that  he 
himself  possesses,  so  soon  as  the  ends  for  which  slavery  may 
righteously  exist  in  the  domestic  institution  have  been  attained. 
These  ends  consist  in  the  training  of  the  slave  for  the  duties  of 
the  citizen  and  the  Christian. 

3.  Where  these  ends  are  not  yet  attained,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  master  to  hasten  t'hem  as  directly  and  as  diligently  as 
possible. 

4.  Until  such  attainment  is  secured,  the  master  is  bound,  to 
a  proper  degree,  by  the  duties  of  household  baptism,  religious 
nurture,  and  mental  instruction,  as  really  towards  his  slave  as 
towards  his  child. 

5.  Where  the  man  faithfully  fulfils  such  duties,  the  law  of  the 
land  may  unrighteously  coerce  to  the  relationship  of  master  and 
slave,  but  it  is  the  master's  misfortune  and  not  his  sin. 

II.    In  reference  to  the  slave. 

1.  The  slave  must  obey  his  master,  for  the  sake  of  expe- 
diency and  prudence,  where  the  commands  do  not  clash  with 
the  convictions  of  conscience. 

2.  The  slave  must  suffer  his  injuries  meekly  and  patiently, 
though  not  bound  to  admit  them  to  be  righteous. 


288  LEGALITY  AND  LOYALTY. 

3.  He  should  keep  the  freedom  of  his  conscience,  and  reso- 
lutely refuse  to  violate  its  dictates  even  unto  death. 

4.  He  should  seek  and  take  his  freedom  by  all  means  not 
denied  by  prudence  and  conscience. 

5.  If  running  away  is  prospective  of  less  evil  than  staying  in 
slavery,  it  is  right  to  run.  The  laws  which  masters  may  make, 
to  restrain  from  flight,  have  no  other  moral  force  upon  the  slave 
than  that  of  prudential  consideration. 

in.    In  reference  to  other  persons. 

1.  All  are  bound  to  compassionate,  benevolently  to  regard, 
and  to  pray  for  both  the  master  and  the  slave. 

2.  Every  man  in  the  community  is  bound  to  exert  his  in- 
fluence, in  a  wise  and  prompt  manner,  and  as  occasion  may 
offer,  both  by  speech  and  act,  through  the  press  and  legislation, 
to  abohsh  the  unrighteous  system  of  slavery  as  soon  as  possible. 

3.  As  opportunity  occurs,  all  ought  to  enlighten,  persuade, 
and  reprove  the  unrighteous  slaveholder,  but  with  neither  raihng 
nor  denunciation. 

4.  All  should  help  the  slave  to  regain  his  freedom  in  all  ways 
not  criminal.  The  law  of  the  land  may  bind  the  citizen  where 
it  could  not  righteously  restrain  the  slave.  The  one  is  legiti- 
mately under  authority,  the  other  is  not. 

5 .  All  should  insist  upon  the  right  of  free  discussion,  and  the 
application  of  general  principles  to  practice,  in  the  matter  of 
slavery  as  on  every  other  topic.  A  man  becomes  a  traitor  to  the 
rights  of  humanity  when  he  renounces  his  claims  to  free  inquiry 
and  discussion. 


Philosophy. 


Empirical  Psychology ;  or,  The  Human  Mind  as 

Given  171  Coiiscioiis}tess.  By  Laurens  P.  HiCKOK,  D.D.,  LL.D. 
Revised  with  the  cooperation  of  Julius  H.  Seelye,  D.D.,  LL.D., 
President  of  Amherst  College.  i2mo.  300  pages.  Mailing  Price, 
$1.25  ;   Introduction,  3i-i2;  Allowance,  40  cts. 

Hickok's  "  Science  of  the  Mind,"  which  has  been  in  the  hands 
of  teachers  and  students  for  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century,  has 
been  here  wholly  revised,  and  almost  wholly  re-written,  makinj^  it 
not  only  a  new  text-book  but  a  new  contribution  to  the  important 
science  of  which  it  treats.  The  precision  of  statement  and  thorough- 
ness of  treatment  which  so  remarkably  characterized  the  original 
work,  and  made  it  so  highly  prized  by  so  many  teachers,  are  no  less 
conspicuous  in  the  present  work ;  but  a  dilTerent  method  in  the  gen- 
eral discussion  has  been  adopted,  though  the  end  originally  sought 
is  the  same. 

The  publishers  believe  that  the  book  will  be  found  to  be  remark- 
ably comprehensive,  and  at  the  same  time  compact  and  clear.  It 
gives  a  complete  outline  of  the  Science,  concisely  presented,  and  in 
precise  and  plain  terms. 


John  Bascom,  Pres.  of  Univ.  of 
Wisconsin,  Madison  :  It  is  an  excellent 
book.  It  has  done  much  good  service, 
and,  as  revised  by  President  Seelye,  is 
prepared  to  do  much  more.  (/vi5.3,'82.) 

I.  W.  Andrews,  Pres.  Marietta 
Coll.,  Ohio :  I  am  glad  to  see  that  this 
work  holds  its  place  among  our  text- 
books on  that  most  important  subject. 
Dr.  Hickok  I  regard  as  one  of  the  ablest 
of  our  philosophical  writers,  and  few 
teachers  have  had  so  large  and  success- 
ful an  experience  as  President  Seelye. 
This  new  edition,  carefully  revised  by 
these  two  gentlemen,  may  be  confi- 
dently recommended  as    presenting  a 


delineation  of  the   mental  faculties  so 
clear  and  accurate  that  the  careful  stu- 
dent will   hardly  fail  to   recognize    its 
truth  in  his  own  experience. 
{April  6,  1882.) 

M.  Valentine,  Pres.  and  Prof,  of 
Intellectual  and  A/oral  Science,  Pennsyl- 
vania Coll.,  Gcttysbur^^ :  I  take  pleasure 
in  saying  that  the  new  edition  impresses 
me  very  favorably.  This  work  of  Dr. 
Hickok  is  unquestionably  one  of  high 
ability  and  much  merit,  and,  by  its  close 
analysis  and  compact,  orderly  classifical 
of  the  mind's  powers,  admirably  suited 
for  use  as  a  text-book.  Its  value  is  in- 
creased in  this  edition.     (y<J«.  28,  '82.) 


242 


PHILOSOrHY. 


Hichok's  Moral  Science. 

By  Laurens  P.  Hickok,  D.D.,  LL.D.  Revised  with  the  cooperation 
of  Julius  H.  Seelye,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  President  of  Amherst  College. 
i2mo.  Cloth.  288  pages.  Mailing  price,  ^1.25;  Introduction,  ^1.12; 
Allowance,  40  cents. 

This  work  is  an  entire  and  careful  revision  of  Hickok's  original 
text-book  of  Moral  Science.  The  remarkable  excellences  of  that 
book,  unsurpassed  as  it  is  in  systematic  rigor  and  scientific  precision, 
are  carefully  retained  in  the  present  edition.  Many  parts  of  the 
book  have,  however,  been  rewritten  entirely,  modifying  the  original 
statements  where  this  was  necessary  for  clearness,  and  adding  new 
discussions  where  this  was  required  for  fulness.  To  the  many 
teachers  who  have  used  the  original  text-book  with  such  signal 
profit,  the  publishers  confidently  commend  this  new  and  revised  edi- 
tion ;  and  with  equal  confidence  they  offer  it  to  others  who  would 
like  a  manual  in  which  the  principles  of  morality  are  expounded  in 
a  manner  as  truly  simple  as  it  is  thoroughly  scientific. 


A.  P.  Peabody,  Prof,  of  Christian 
Morals,  Harvard  Coll. :  Permit  me  to 
express  my  very  high  appreciation  of 
the  value  of  the  work.  I  read  it  when 
it  first  appeared  with  the  greatest  in- 
terest and  satisfaction,  and  in  its  pres- 
ent form  it  possesses  whatever  added 
claims  the  most  skilful  and  careful 
editorship  can  give.  Had  it  appeared 
a  month  earlier,  should  more  probably 
than  not  have  adopted  it. 

G.  P.  Fisher,  Pro/,  of  Church  His- 
tory, Yale  Coll.  :  I  have  long  wanted  to 
see  just  such  a  book, —  one  in  which 
practical  ethics  should  be  clearly  and 
systematically  and  philosophically  pre- 
sented. I  am  very  much  pleased  with 
the  chapters  relating  to  duties,  and  not 
less  so  with  the  more  theoretical  por- 
tion of  the  work.  The  style  is  so  per- 
spicuous, and  at  the  same  time  so 
concise,  that  the  work  is  eminently 
adapted  to  serve  as  a  text-book  in  col- 
leges and  higher  schools.  In  matter 
and  manner  it  is  a  capital  book,  and  I 
wish  it  God  speed. 


C.  B.  Hulbert,  Pres.  Middlebury 
Coll.,  Vt.,  and  Prof,  of  Moral  Science  : 
In  its  present  form  it  is  the  best  of 
recently  issued  text-books  on  Moral 
Science. 

A.  A.  E.  Taylor,  Pres.  of  Univ. 
of  Wooster,  Ohio,  and  Prof,  of  Biblical 
Instruction  :  It  is  a  capital  text-book 
for  the  class-room,  fully  abreast  of  the 
ethical  controversies  of  the  day. 

I.  W.  Andrews,  Pres.  Marietta 
Coll.,  O.,  and  Prof,  of  Intellectual  Phi- 
losophy :  It  is  sound,  strong,  and  clear. 
I  doubt  whether  any  work  on  Moral 
Science  surpasses  this  in  the  depth  and 
permanence  of  the  impression  made 
upon  the  student.  It  requires  study, 
of  course,  but  it  will  repay  the  student, 
whether  teacher  or  pupil.  The  part 
on  duties  to  the  State  is  admirable  for 
its  fulness  and  precision. 

Wm.  P.  Swahlen,  Pres.  McKen- 
dree  Coll..  Lfbaiion,  III. :  I  am  more 
and  more  pleased  with  it. 


PHILOSOPHY. 


243 


The  N.  E.  Journal  of  Educa- 
tion: Taken  altogether,  it  is  an  ad- 
mirable text-book,  and  we  can  cor- 
dially recommend  it  for  use  wherever 
pupils  are  old  enough  to  consider  mor- 
ality in  a  scientific  way,  or  to  discuss 


intelligently  the  fundamental  principles 
of  civil  government.  No  subjects  are 
more  vitally  necessary  in  public  educa- 
tion, and  this  volume  presents  them 
in  a  clear,  compact,  and  forcible  man- 
ner. 


Rational  Psychology;  or,  The  Subjectiue    Idea 

and  Objective  Law  of  all  Intelligence.    By  Laurens  P.  HiCKOK,  D.D., 
LL.D.    543  pages.    8vo.    Mailing  Price,  $1.95.    Introduction,  $1.80. 

Creator  and  Creation ;  or,  The  Knowledge  in  the 

Reason  of  Cod  and  His  Work.     By  Laurens  P.  Hickok,  D.D.,  LL.D. 
360  pages.     8vo.     Mailing  Price,  $1.75.     Introduction,  ^1.60. 

The  Logic  of  Reason,  Universal  and  Eternal. 

By  Laurens  P.  Hickok,  D.D.,  LL.D.     192  pages.     8vo.     Mailing 
Price,  $1.60.     Introduction,  ^1.44. 

Humanity  Immortal ;  or,  Man  Tried,  Fallen,  and 

Redeevied.     By  Laurens  P.  HiCKOK,  D.D.,  LL.D.     362  pages.     Svo. 
Mailing  Price,  $1.75.     Introduction,  $1.60. 

These  books  discuss  the  most  difficult  and  important  problems 
of  human  thought.  Though  each  is  complete  in  itself,  they  pursue 
the  following  order :  — 

The  Empirical  Psychology  gives  the  basis  of  all  physical  and 
logical  science. 

The  Rational  Psychology  connects  all  science  with  philosophy. 

The  Creator  and  Creation  gives  the  philosophy  of  all  mechan- 
ical and  vital  forces. 

The  Moral  .Science  is  already  in  the  field  of  philosophy,  and 
gives  the  basis  of /Esthetics,  Politics,  Ethics,  and  Theology. 

The  Logic  of  Reason  frees  empiricism  from  all  scepticism  in 
the  attainment  of  a  Being  absolutely  Universal  and  Eternal. 

The  Hu.MANTTV  Immortal  gives  the  Divine  history  of  human 
experience  from  its  origination  to  its  consummation. 


244  PHILOSOPHY. 


Lotze's  Philosophical  Outlines. 

Dictated  Portions  of  the  Latest  Lectures  (at  Gottingen  and  Berlin)  of 
Hermann  Lotze.  Translated  and  edited  by  George  T.  Ladd,  Pro- 
fessor of  Philosophy  in  Yale  College.  121T10.  Cloth.  About  180  pages 
in  each  volume.     Mailing  price  per  vol.,  $1.00;    Introd.  price,  80  cents. 

The  German  from  which  the  translations  are  made  consists  of  the 
dictated  portions  of  his  latest  lectures  (at  Gottingen,  and  for  a  few 
months  at  Berlin)  as  formulated  by  Lotze  himself,  recorded  in  the 
notes  of  his  hearers,  and  subjected  to  the  most  competent  and  thor- 
ough revision  of  Professor  Rehnisch  of  Gottingen.  The  "  Outlines  " 
give,  therefore,  a  mature  and  trustworthy  statement,  in  language 
selected  by  this  teacher  of  philosophy  himself,  of  what  may  be  con- 
sidered as  his  final  opinions  upon  a  wide  range  of  subjects.  They 
have  met  with  no  little  favor  in  Germany. 

There  is  scarcely  any  other  recent  writer  on  philosophical  sub- 
jects whose  thoughts  are  so  stimulating  for  their  breadth,  penetra- 
tion, and  candor ;  or  with  whom  an  acquaintance  is  so  desirable  for 
purposes  of  general  culture  through  the  philosophic  way  of  consid- 
ering life,  with  its  interests  in  not  merely  pure  thought,  but  also  in 
morals,  religion,  and  art. 

It  is  also  hoped  that  the  use  of  these  translations  will  further  the 
work  of  teaching  philosophy.  Such  condensed,  orderly,  and  mature 
statements  of  conclusions  on  a  wide  range  of  philosophical  questions 
will  be  found  exceedingly  valuable  for  both  teacher  and  pupil.  They 
furnish  a  scheme  for  all  the  instruction  which  the  teacher  is  able  to 
give  in  presenting  and  answering  these  questions.  When  skilfully 
used,  they  may  be  made  to  introduce  the  pupil  to  the  widest  fields 
of  philosophy  under  the  guidance  of  a  great  master,  and  in  an  inter- 
esting way.  They  present  the  applications  of  Metaphysic  to  art, 
religion,  nature,  and  human  conduct ;  — and  they  thus  open  regions 
of  reflection  into  which  the  instruction  of  our  colleges  and  universi- 
ties scarcely  takes  their  students  at  all,  —  regions,  however,  which  are 
precisely  the  ones  where  such  students  both  desire  and  need  to  go. 

These  translations  have  been  undertaken  with  the  kind  permission 
of  the  German  publisher,  Herr  S.  Hirzel,  of  Leipsic. 


Outlines  of  Metaphysic. 

The  Outlines  of  Metaphysic  contains  the  scientific  treatment  of 


PHILOSOPHY.  245 


those  assumptions  which  enter  into  all  our  cognition  of  Reality.  It 
consists  of  three  parts,  —  Ontology,  Cosmology,  Phenomenology. 
The  first  part  contains  chapters  on  the  Conception  of  Being,  the 
Content  of  the  Existent,  Reality,  Change,  and  Causation  ;  the  second 
treats  of  Space,  Time,  Motion,  Matter,  and  the  Coherency  of  Natural 
Events  ;  the  third,  of  the  Subjectivity  and  Objectivity  of  Cognition. 
The  Metaphysic  of  Lotze  gives  the  key  to  his  entire  philosophical 
system.  It  should  therefore  be  studied  at  the  very  entrance  upon 
examination  of  that  system. 

Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

In  the  Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  Lotze  seeks  "  to 
ascertain  how  much  of  the  Content  of  Religion  may  be  discovered, 
proved,  or  at  least  confirmed,  agreeably  to  reason."  In  successive 
chapters  he  discusses  the  Proof  for  the  Existence  of  God,  the  Attri- 
butes and  Personality  of  the  Absolute,  the  Conceptions  of  the  Crea- 
tion, the  Preservation,  and  the  Government,  of  the  World,  and  of 
the  World-time.  The  book  closes  with  brief  discussions  of  Religion 
and  Morality,  and  Dogmas  and  Confessions. 

Outlines  of  Practical  Philosophy. 

This  one  of  the  "Outlines"  contains  a  discussion  of  Ethical 
Principles,  Moral  Ideals,  and  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  and  then  an 
application  of  the  theory  to  the  Individual,  to  Marriage,  to  Society, 
and  to  the  State.  Many  interesting  remarks  on  Divorce,  Socialism, 
Representative  Government,  etc.,  abound  throughout  the  volume. 
Its  style  is  more  popular  than  that  of  the  other  works  of  Lotze,  and 
it  will  doubtless  be  widely  read. 

Outlines  of  Psychology. 

The  Outlines  of  Psychology  treats  of  Simple  Sensations,  the 
Course  of  Representative  Ideas,  of  Attention  and  Inference,  of 
Intuitions  of  Objects  as  in  Space,  of  the  Apprehension  of  the  Exter- 
nal World  by  the  Senses,  of  Errors  of  the  Senses,  of  Feelings,  and  of 
Bodily  Motions.  Its  second  part  is  "  theoretical,"  and  discusses  the 
nature,  position,  and  changeable  states  of  the  Soul,  its  relations  to 
time,  and  the  reciprocal  action  of  Soul  and  Body.  It  closes  with  a 
chapter  on  the  "  Kingdom  of  Souls."  Lotze  is  peculiarly  rich  and 
suggestive  in  the  discussion  of  Psychology. 


246 


PHILOSOPHY. 


Ouilines  of  /Esiheiics. 

The  Outlines  of  ^Esthetics  treats  of  the  theory  of  the  Beautiful 
and  of  Phantasy,  and  of  the  Realization  and  different  Species  of  the 
Beautiful.  Then  follow  brief  chapters  on  Music,  Architecture, 
Plastic  Art,  Painting,  and  Poetry.  An  appendix  to  this  volume 
contains  a  brief  biography  of  Lotze.  This  volume  will  be  of  the 
same  size  as  those  issued  already.  [Ready  in  1886. 

Outlines  of  Logic. 

The  Outlines  of  Logic  discusses  both  pure  and  applied  Logic. 
Under  the  first  head  come  the  formation  of  Concepts,  the  theory  of 
Judgment,  a  system  of  the  forms  of  Judgment,  the  doctrine  of  argu- 
ment or  the  drawing  of  conclusions,  the  figures  of  Aristotle,  etc. 
The  applied  Logic  presents  the  application  of  the  forms  of  Concep- 
tion, the  adducing  of  Proof,  and  the  Process  of  Thought  in  Dis- 
covery. The  Logic  is  followed  by  a  brief  treatise  on  the  Encyclo- 
paedia of  Philosophy,  in  which  are  set  forth  the  definition  and 
method  of  Theoretical  Philosophy,  of  Practical  Philosophy,  and  of 
the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  This  volume  will  be  about  one-fifth 
larger  than  the  others,  and  will  make  an  admirable  brief  text-book 

[Ready  in  1886. 

very  much  for  the  use  of  my  pupils, 
who  do  not  read  German,  a  good  trans- 
lation of  Lotze's  "  Dictate  "  ever  since 
they  began  to  appear.  The  present 
translation  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired, 
except  the  completion  of  the  series. 

D.  S.  Gregory,  Pres.  Lake  Forest 
{III.)  Univ.  :  Lotze's  Outlines  of  Psy- 
chology will  give  the  young  men  a 
comprehensive  grasp  of  all  the  capital 
questions  at  the  basis  of  the  current  psy- 
chological discussions,  and  help  them 
to  estimate  for  themselves  the  real  sci- 
entific standing  of  the  prevalent  sensa- 
tional psychology.  The  work  of  the 
translator  is  admirably  done,  in  conse- 
quence of  his  being  able  to  enter  into 
the  thought  of  the  author. 

W.  D.Wilson,  Cornell  Univ.,  N.  Y.: 
I  have  for  a  long  time  regarded  Lotze 


in  Logic. 

W.  T.  Harris,  Concord,  Mass. :  The 
project  of  Prof.  Ladd  strikes  me  as  by 
all  means  a  practical  one.  I  think  this 
likely  to  be  the  most  successful  venture 
in  philosophical  publication  that  I  have 
heard  of  lately. 

John  Bascom,  Pres.  of  Univ.  of 
Wis. :  The  publication  of  this  book, 
and  of  the  promised  series,  is  very 
desirable. 

"Wm.  F.  Warren,  Pres.  Boston 
University,  in  the  "  Western  Christian 
Advocate  ":  Prof.  Ladd  is  rendering  the 
English-reading  public  a  great  service 
by  bringing  out  in  neat  and  correct 
form  translations  of  the  dictated  por- 
tions of  the  late  Professor  Hermann 
Lotze's  lectures. 

Noah  K.  Davis,  Prof,  of  Moral 
Phil.,  Univ.  of  Vir.  :   I   have  desired 


PHILOSOPHY. 


247 


as  the  soundest,  as  well  as  the  pro- 
foundest,  of  all  the  German  metaphy- 
sicians. 

H.  N.  Gardner,  Prof,  of  Philosophy, 
Smith  College  :  I  have  decided  to  use 
the  Philosophy  of  Religion  next  term 
in  the  College. 

John  Watson,  Pro/.  Philosophy. 
Univ.  of  Kingston,  Can.  :  I  think  that 
judiciously  used,  it  would  form  a  very 
good  transition  from  the  study  of  Kant 
to  the  study  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  and 
Hegel,  especially  the  last. 

The  Critic,  A^ew  York:  The  in- 
fluence of  Lotze  would  be  most  salu- 
tary in  this  country  at  the  present  time, 
and  many  would  find  in  him  the  phil- 
osophic guide  they  need.  His  recon- 
ciliation between  science  and  phil- 
osophy, or  between  materialism  and 
idealism,  is  of  great  importance.  To 
many  it  will  commend  itself  as  the  only 
way  out  of  the  philosophic  confusion  of 
the  present  time.  The  student  will  find 
much  crowded  into  a  few  pages,  but 
Lotze  has  the  merit  of  clearness. 

New  Englander  :  The  translation 
of  the  volume  before  us  is  marked  by 
that  carefulness,  accuracy,  and  thor- 
oughness that  characterize  all  of  Prof. 
Ladd's  work.  The  task  he  has  accom- 
plished was  by  no  means  a. slight  one, 
as  those  familiar  with  the  German  of 
Lotze  will  recognize ;  and  if  the  Eng- 
lish reader  still  finds  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  a  clear  apprehension  of  the 
teaching  of  Lotze,  we  must  remind  him 
that  these  difficulties  cannot  be  re- 
moved by  a  translation,  however  excel- 
lent it  may  be. 

Literary  World,  Boston :  Pro- 
fessor Ladd  has  done  a  great  service 
to  all  those  persons  who  are  interested 
in  the  vital  questions  of  the  present  day, 
but  who  are  not  sufficiently  familiar  with 


German  to  make  it  easy  to  read,  in  the 
original  tongue,  one  of  the  freshest  and 
most  profound  of  modern  thinkers. 
We  have  not  found  ourselves  able  to 
agree  with  Lotze  in  all  his  doctrines ; 
but  have  so  greatly  admired  both  the 
candor  and  the  acute  jjrofundity  of  his 
thought,  that  we  disagree  with  him 
modestly,  with  the  concession  that  he 
is  possibly  right  when  we  think  him 
wrong.  In  the  great  main  trend  of  his 
thought  we  hold  him  to  be  certainly 
right. 

Mind,  London,  Eng. :  Xo  words  are 
needed  to  commend  such  an  enter- 
prise, now  that  Lotze's  importance  as  a 
thinker  is  so  well  understood.  The 
translation  is  careful  and  painstaking. 

Unitarian  Review,  Boston :  We 
have  already  called  attention  to  the 
admirable  service  Prof.  Ladd  is  ren- 
dering students  of  philosophy  by  editing 
these  dictated  portions  of  the  lectures 
of  Hermann  Lotze.  This  volume  of 
Outlines  is  of  great  interest  and  sug- 
gestiveness.  It  is  clear  in  vision  and 
strong. 

Congvegationalist, Boston, Mass.: 
While  we  have  not  accepted  the  au- 
thor's reasoning  as  a  whole,  we  have 
found  it  remarkably  suggestive  and 
stimulating. 

University,  Chicago :  It  is  this 
union  in  Lotze  of  scientific  spirit,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  of  deep  regard  for 
the  fundamental  interests  of  man,  on 
the  other,  that  makes  Lotze  so  signifi- 
cant a  figure  in  philosophy  at  present, 
and  the  study  of  him  so  hopeful  a 
sign. 

We  know  of  no  book  of  150  pages 
that  contains  more  condensed  food  for 
thought,  or  more  pregnant  statement  of 
informing  truth  on  the  higher  themes 
of  man's  life  than  these  Outlines  of  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion. 


History. 


Outlines  of  Mecliceuaf  and  Modern  History. 

By  P.  V.  N.  Myers,  A.M.,  President  of  Belmont  Coll.,  O.;  Author  of 
"Outlines  of  Ancient  History,"  and  "Remains  of  Lost  Empires." 
l2mo.  Half  Morocco,  xii  +  740  pages.  With  colored  maps,  repro- 
duced, by  permission,  from  Freeman's  Historical  Atlas.  Mailing  price, 
$1.65;   for  Introduction,  $1.50. 

This  work  aims  to  blend  in  a  single  narrative  accounts  of  the 
social,  political,  literary,  intellectual,  and  religious  develop- 
ments of  the  peoples  of  mediaeval  and  modern  times,  —  to 

give  in  simple  outline  the  story  of  civilization  since  the  meeting,  in 
the  5th  century  of  our  era,  of  Latin  and  Teuton  upon  the  soil  of  the 
Roman  Empire  in  the  West.  The  author's  conception  of  History, 
based  on  the  definitions  of  Ueberweg,  that  it  is  the  unfolding  of  the 
essence  of  spirit,  affords  the  key-note  to  the  work.  Its  aim  ia  to 
deal  with  the  essential  elements,  not  the  accidental  features,  of  the 
life  of  the  race. 

This  guiding  idea  has  determined  the  character  of  the  analysis  of 
the  subject-matter.  The  principles  of  grouping  are  the  Jaws  of  his- 
toric development.  The  divisions  and  subdivisions  of  the  subject 
being  thus  philosophical  and  natural,  with  cause  and  effect  as  the 
associating  principle,  the  whole  has  unity  and  cohesion,  and  readily 
impressing  itself  upon  the  memory  of  the  reader,  forms  a  permanent 
outline  for  his  guidance  in  all  further  historical  work.  ,, 

The  analysis  completed,  the  author''s  aim  has  been  the  expansion 
of  this  into  a  clear,  continuous,  and  attractive  narrative,  —  into  a 
story  that  should  at  every  point  hold  the  attention  and  throughout 
sustain  the  interest  of  the  reader,  without  sacrifice  of  the  condensed 
and  suggestive  style  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  student  and  the 
teacher. 


W.  F.  Allen,  Professor  of  History, 
University  of  Wisconsin  :  Mr.  Myers" 
book  seems  to  me  to  be  a  work  of  high 


excellence,  and  to  give  a  remarkably 
clear  and  vivid  picture  of  mediaeval 
history. 


HISTORY. 


237 


Geo.  W.  Knight,  Prof,  cf  History 
and  English  Literature,  Ohio  State 
Univ.,  Columbus.  The  author  seems 
to  have  gotten  hold  of  the  active  prin- 
ciple, the  leading  motives  and  tend- 
encies of  each  age;  to  have  taken  a 
comprehensive  view  of  the  development 
of  man's  ideas,  of  nations,  and  of  gov- 
ernments. Then  he  has  grouped  the 
various  events  in  such  a  way  as  will 
bring  clearly  to  \'iew  these  different 
phases  of  the  world-development  with- 
out ignoring  what  may  be  called  the 
collateral  events. 

E.  R.  Ruggles,  Prof.  Mod.  Lang., 
Chandler  Scientific  Deft.,  Dartmouth 
Coll. :  The  work  impresses  me  very 
favorably,  and  I  think  we  shall  introduce 
it.     (^Af'arch  8,  1886.) 

Arthur  Latham  Perry,  Prof,  of 
Hist,  and  Political  Economy,  Williams 


\  Coll. :  I  find  proofs  of  unusual  dili- 
gence and  studious  investigation,  and  a 
happy  skill  in  narration.    (^Ped.  27,  '86.) 

Alexander  Johnston,  Prof  of 
Jurisprudence,  and  Political  Economy, 
Princeton  College :  I  can  only  say,  for 
the  period  covered  by  the  specimen 
pages  received,  that  I  like  the  spirit  of 
the  author  and  his  success  in  putting 
it  into  shape,  and  shall  be  very  well 
satisfied  to  make  the  work  the  starting 
point  of  my  son's  reading  on  this  sub- 
ject, when  he  arrives  at  that  stage  of 
development.     (Sept.  29,  1885.) 

A.  Rittenhonse,  Prof,  of  History, 
Dickinson  Coll.,  Pa.:  I  am  much  pleased 
with  the  work.  If  present  plans  are  car- 
ried  out  with  reference  to  the  history 
course,  it  will  be  introduced  next  fall 
term.  This  is  my  best  endorsement. 
{March  3,  1886.) 


The  Reader's  Guide  to  English  History. 

A  classified  list  of  works  in  English  History,  including  poems,  dramas, 
and  works  of  hction,  arranged  by  periods,  for  convenience  of  reference. 
With  a  Supplement,  extending  the  plan  over  other  departments  of 
history,  —  ancient,  modern,  European,  and  American.  By  William 
FR.A.NCIS  Allen,  A.M.,  Professor  in  the  University  of  Wisconsin.  Long 
8vo.  Paper.  50  pages.  Mailing  price,  30  cts. ;  Introduction,  25  cts. 
The  Supplement  can  be  had  separately;    Mailing  price,  10  cts. 

The  arrangement  is  that  of  four  parallel  columns  upon  two  oppo- 
site pages :  the  first  column  containing  the  English  sovereigns,  in 
the  several  houses,  in  the  form  of  genealogical  tables;  the  second, 
good  historical  reading,  whether  histories,  biographies,  or  essays; 
the  third,  novels,  poems,  and  dramas  illustrating  that  period  of  Eng- 
lish history,  —  also,  so  far  as  possible,  arranged  chronologically  ;  the 
fourth,  the  same  class  of  works,  illustrating  contemporary  history. 


F.  A.  March,  Prof,  of  the  Eng- 
lish Language  and  Comp.  Philology, 
Lafayette  Coll. :  It  is  a  good  idea,  and 
will  be  a  useful  book.  We  are  all 
novel-readers. 


H.  B.  Adams, 


History,  Johns  Hopkins  Univ. :  I  know 
something  of  Professor  Allen's  histori- 
cal scholarship,  and  it  is  sufficient  praise 
of  this  little  l)ook  for  handy  reference 
to  say  that  it  sustains  the  author's  repu- 
tation for  accuracy,  sound  judgment, 
Associate  Prof.  <y  and  nice  discrimination.    (/Vov.  6, '82.) 


238 


HISrOKY. 


The  Leading  Facts  of  .English  History. 

By   D.    H.    MoNTGOMiiRY.      121110.      Cloth,     xxxiv+254  pages,  with 
a  colored  map.     Mailing  price,  ;^l.lO;    for  Introduction,  ^i. 00. 

This  work  aims  to  present  very  briefly,  yet  clearly  and  accurately, 
the  broad  vital  facts  of  English  History  in  their  connection  with 
the  great  laws  of  national  growth. 

It  opens  with  an  account  of  prehistoric  Britain,  and  of  the  Roman 
attempt  to  force  the  framework  of  a  high  civilization  on  an  unwilling 
people.  The  work  then  proceeds  through  the  English  and  Norman 
invasions  with  their  results,  the  struggle  between  the  barons  and 
the  crown,  the  rise  of  Parliament,  the  gradual  destruction  of  feudal- 
ism, and  the  final  establishment,  through  revolution,  of  the  right  of 
the  people  to  self-government.  Free  use  is  made  of  the  researches 
of  specialists,  of  ancient  records,  and  of  archaeological  collections, 
while  the  color,  life,  and  movement  essential  to  the  best  history  have 
been  studiously  preserved. 

The  full  Tables  of  chronology,  statistics,  and  authorities  will  be 
found,  it  is  believed,  of  special  value. 


p.  V.  N.  Myers,  President  Belmont 
College,  O. :  The  author  knows  how  to 
seize  upon  the  sahcnt  points  of  his  sub- 
ject and  how  to  throw  the  best  hght 
upon  tlie  features  he  selects  to  exhibit. 
The  work  is  concise,  clear,  and  accu- 
rate. It  forms  an  admirable  framework 
about  which  to  construct  the  complete 
edifice  of  English  history.  (/v3.2o,i886.) 

"W.  P.  Atkinson,  Prof.  Eng.  and 
Hist.,  Mass.  Inst.  Tech.,  Boston  :  I  have 
read  it  with  much  pleasure.  It  is  that 
uncommon  kind  of  book,  a  readalale 
short  sketch.  It  is  fresh  and  vigorous, 
and  the  references  seem  to  me  very 
well  selected.  I  cordially  recommend 
it  to  all  students  and  teachers  of  Eng- 
hsh  history.      (Jan.  3,  1886.) 

Herbert  Tuttle,  Associate  Prof. 
Hist,  and  Theory  of  Politics,  and  of 
International  Law,  Cornell  University, 
Ithaca,  N.  Y. ;  It  is   an   excellent   little 


volume.  The  "  leading  facts  "  are  ju- 
diciously cliosen,  and  related  in  a  viva- 
cious and  entertaining  manner.  The 
tabular  material  is  very  convenient  for 
reference.     {Feb.  2,  1886.) 

Geo.  W.  Knight,  Prof  of  Hist, 
and  Eng.  Lit.,  Ohio  State  University, 
Columbus :  I  have  examined  it  with 
considerable  care,  and  find  much  in  it 
that  pleases  me.  The  conception  is 
good,  and  the  execution  generally  so. 
It  seems  freer  from  actual  errors  of 
statement  than  most  books  of  the  text- 
book order.     (Feb.  20,  1886.) 

Alfred  S.  Roe,  Prin.  High  School, 
Worcester,  Mass. :  I  have  looked  it 
through  with  some  care,  and  think  it  a 
very  valuable  handbook.  I  shall  cer- 
tainly recommend  my  pupils  to  supply 
themselves  with  it  as  an  invaluable 
accessory  to  their  historical  data. 
(Feb.  ao,  1886.) 


STATE  NORMAL  SQIOUL, 


STATE  NORMAL  SCHOOL, 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 
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